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ABSTRACT
BUDGETING AND PUBLIC SECTOR EFFICIENCY IN TANZANIA.
The Government has been directing its efforts towards eradicating 
poverty, illiteracy and diseases through its policy of "Socialism and 
Self-Reliance" which placed greater emphasis on local initiative 
to steer its development. Its modest achievement in the social sectors 
notwithstanding, the pace of development in the economic sectors has 
not matched the expectation. Some intractable economic problems 
experienced since late 1970s have even pushed the Government into 
seeking for more foreign aid. Some stabilization measures initiated 
since the 1970s have had little success too.
A priori, it was thought that the lack of in-depth studies on the 
key sectors contributed to the failures, and hence the need for 
thorough studies to establish their operational level of efficiency.
The choice of the public sector for the study was underlined by 
its leading role in directing development activities. The study 
intends to establish the efficiency with which its operational and 
developmental resources are mobilized and allocated. The study has 
focussed mainly on the process of forecasting Government revenues 
and expenditures. However, to support the latter analysis, an 
investigation of the factors which, a priori, were considered to 
influence the behaviour of revenues and expenditures was undertaken. 
While factors such as paucity of tax handles, and foreign aid and 
population growth appeared to influence the pattern of revenues and 
expenditure respectively, however, the investigation of the 
forecasting process did not indicate any use of the latter factors, 
nor did it point to any evidence of systematic or scientific methods
being used.
Various recommendations were suggested, including, inter alia, 
the use of easily identifiable factors to generate projections, the 
use of realization functions to adjust initial projections, better 
coordination of foreign aid, and greater emphasis on manpower training 
etc. Hopefully, if implemented, they will help to enhance the 
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PART 1.
This part comprises of chapters 1 to 3 which are intended to introduce 
and highlight the problem of public budget determination in Tanzania. 
Specifically, chapter 1 introduces the topic and underscores the 
reasons for chosing this particular study. Moreover, the methods of 
carrying out the study and the source of data are highlighted.
Chapter 2 examines the available literature on both developing and 
developed countries about the determination of public budgets, and as 
it relates to Tanzania. It also reviews contemporary economic 
thinking about the role and problems of fiscal policy. As for chapter 
3, the state of the Tanzanian economy is brought to the readers* 
perspective. The salient features of the economy are discussed in 
detail.
1C H A P T E R  1 
INTRODUCTION
I. AIM OF STUDY
The purpose of this study is to investigate the process of 
forecasting public expenditure and revenues in Tanzania. The 
variables which are used in predicting expenditure and revenues are 
identified and then investigated for their use. The process of 
identifying such predictor variables involves using some scientific 
methods (mainly regression analysis), and through imterviews with 
budget officers in various ministries and regions in Tanzania. The 
underlying assumption in carrying out this investigation is that the 
divergence between past forecasts and actual expenditure has arisen 
out of a failure to specify correctly the predictor variables. Correct 
specification of the predictor variables would therefore reduce the 
forecast discrepancies. Reliable budget forecasts are considered to be 
essential if the fiscal policy measures taken are to be of value in as 
far as the management of the economy is concerned.
The desire to carry out this investigation was motivated by a 
couple of factors. Foremost, the area of public finance in Tanzania 
has remained under- researched, and therefore the need for a detailed 
study is underlined mainly by the monumental role that is assumed by 
the public sector in steering the economy towards development. The 
current downward trend in economic performance certainly calls for a 
more in-depth investigation of the activities of the key sectors ^
\
2involved. Various policy measures adopted by the government have not 
achieved the desired economic growth and stability. The failure of 
such policies tended to suggest, on a priori grounds, that a lack of 
adequate analysis of the instrumental factors involved rendered most 
of the policy measures adopted ineffective. Therefore, identifying 
underlying weaknesses in the key sectors, and in particular the public 
sector, could enable the decision makers to undertake more concrete 
policy decisions.
As shall be discussed further in Chapter 2 under literature 
review, the literature lacunae that exists on public sector budgetary 
systems in developing countries is significant, and certainly a source 
of concern. The paucity of literature about Tanzania’s public sector, 
from either journals or books, precludes any informed decision making. 
There is hardly any scholarly study work on the sector. To account 
for this shortage, one is inclined to suspect that the absence of ^ 
literature is, on a priori grounds, due to the underdeveloped nature 
of the country, which manifest itself in situations like 
underdeveloped educational and research institutions which would have 
done such studies. Ultimately, a policy maker is confined to 
government publications and reports for an understanding of the 
budgetary system. However, this deficiency in literature is not 
confined to Tanzania alone. The problem looms large in the developing 
countries (LDCs). One may find a few publications on budgetary 
systems, confined mainly to a few articles in economic or public 
policy journals, which, however, have a tendency to study the problem 
from a large sample of countries with enormous differences in their 
economic development and ideological orientation. Such sample-based
3studies tend to give some general impressions, and it is quite 
possible to have conclusions on sample studies contradicting 
conclusions on individual country study. One major weakness in 
Tanzania and other LDCs, which constrains the development of 
literature, is of course the scantness of data. A priori, data-base 
development, especially that of long term series has lagged behind in 
most LDCs. Even where time series data are available, their 
reliability comes to question because of sheer inadequacy in the data 
collecting systems. The latter notwithstanding, some attempt has to 
be made to initiate studies based on the data available, which I 
suppose, will have an impact of encouraging the development of a 
better data management system.
While the need to study the public sector to bridge the 
literature gap that exists, as a long-run objective, remains 
paramount, in the short term, the economic turmoil that the country 
has been going through in the last decade or so, makes it even more 
imperative for micro-efficiency studies to be undertaken. This is in 
order to have a clear perception of the nature of the interactive 
forces which contribute to the pattern or behaviour that is generally 
discerned for the sectors in particular, and for the total economy at 
large. The underlying argument in this study is that it is only 
through an achievement of micro-efficiency that an overall macro­
efficiency can be achieved. In other words, the policy instruments 
set to improve the performance of the economy as a whole can be 
effective when each sector operates and allocates resources 
efficiently within itself, which in turn would have the impact of 
making intersectorial resource allocation and use be equally
4efficient. The latter said, the situation is not as simple of course 
as might be portrayed by the statement. This is so because, in the 
face of the entrenched structural economic imbalances, and the lack of 
a strong planning institution, the achievement of an optimal 
intersectoral resource allocation remains far fetched. Nevertheless, 
the economic crises cannot be left to worsen further without an 
attempt to redress the situation.
The macro-economic imbalances which have beset the economy, and 
for which various policy instruments adopted could not provide a 
solution, have manifested themselves in various ways, namely: a
deepening balance of payments crisis; a growing public sector deficit; 
a rapidly rising inflation rate, and a heavy slump in production at 
both sectoral and overall level etc. Moreover, those recessional 
problems have posed a serious threat to the country’s preferred 
economic stance of self-reliance, consequently forcing the country to 
continue seeking more developmental and operational economic aid from 
outside world. But this unceasing quest for more aid, with no bright 
prospects for the economy in the near future, remained of great 
concern to the government, but also to the foreign aid donors, notably 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The desire for 
much stringent policy measures and reforms became inevitable, with the 
aid donors insisting on seeing a package of structural adjustment 
measures. As one would expect, given the urgency of the external 
funds, a structural adjustment programme was hastily prepared in 1982 
without carrying out thorough studies on the major sectors of the 
economy.1 Given the past record of failures of policy measures 
adopted, the necessity for thorough sectorial studies was underlined.
Hence the picking up of the public sector for such study.
The public sector in Tanzania has been at the centre of economic 
activities, largely from 1967 when the country adopted a policy of 
socialism and self-reliance. This sector has therefore been used to 
implement virtually all the important macro-economic and social plans. 
Consequently, this has led to a sharp rise of the share of the public 
sector in GDP in post independence period.
The influence of public sector on resource use, in its own 
domain, and in the private sector, is undoubtedly complex and 
pervasive. Within itself, given that the government does face a 
budget constraint, increased resource allocation (or service output) 
in one sector of the government activity implies an eventual relative 
decline (or absolute decline in case of revenue stagnation or fall) of 
the other sectors. Beyond its own domain, the public sector 
influences the private sector by, first, diverting private income 
(through taxes) to public use, and secondly, through factor (labour) 
and product purchases.2 The situation for a LDC is even more 
complicated, especially where the public sector has been granted 
monopoly over economic activities. This is so because when the public 
sector is short of revenues, it often falls on unplanned deficit 
financing and secondly, resources invested by it inefficiently, 
especially those borrowed from outside, will have to be repaid 
eventually by resources produced in the private sector (ie from their 
exports), at the expense of imports required for further production 
and capacity creation. Therefore, the fact that when government 
expands its services there are output losses in the other sectors 
caused by either underfunding or/and deprivation of resources due to a
6de-emphasis of such sectors in the expansion programme, underlines the 
importance of this public sector to the rest of the economy. In lieu 
of the latter, a study priority ought to be placed on it.
II. METHODS OF APPROACH - HYPOTHESIS SETTING
The main analysis will be carried out at two levels. The first 
level discussion will focus on the investigation of those factors 
which influence both government expenditure and revenue in a 
developing country scenario. The second level of discussion will 
focus on the investigation of the practice of budgeting; which 
includes, an exploration of factors utilized to project the budget; 
the weaknesses of the forecasting system; and a recommendation of 
policy measures and reforms which ought to be initiated to retrieve 
the worsening budgetary situation.
The theories or hypotheses postulated so far to cover LDC 
scenario in the discipline of expenditure and taxation are generally 
limited. Nevertheless, those few hypotheses which have so far been 
proposed by other authors for LDCs, will be taken into consideration 
in the study. Moreover, alternative hypothetical propositions which 
may be more relevant in the Tanzanian circumstances will be suggested. 
The testing of the hypothesis will be done with empirical data on 
Tanzania. The objective is, of course, to be able to identify the 
factors which appear to influence the behaviour or pattern of public 
expenditures and revenues in Tanzania. Thus, a number of key 
questions will be addressed to in the study. These include, inter 
alia,
1. How does economic development affect both expenditures and
7revenues?
2. How do expenditure and internal tax revenues respond to
external assistance?
3. How unstable have the expenditures and the revenue been?
4. How does expenditure respond to the levels of revenues?
5. How correct have the predictor variables used in
forecasting of expenditure and revenues been etc?
The analytical techniques that will be used will be both 
descriptive and quantitative. The chosen method being contingent on 
the availability of data and other crucial informaton. In the case of 
quantitative analysis, resort is mainly to partial regression (and 
multiple regression) analysis using ordinary least square method, 
applied mainly to trend data. The functional forms that the 
formulations will take will be both linear and logarithmic form.
The data that are used in this study consists of government 
expenditures and revenues, and other supporting economic and social 
measurement data. The data were assembled from both primary and 
secondary sources. For primary data, the researcher employed both 
interviews (using a guiding open-end questionnaire) and self­
administered questionnaire, depending of course on the type of 
information that was to be gathered (see Appendix 14). A number of 
agencies were covered in the latter exercise. These included some 
government ministries and a few regional finance centres. As for 
secondary sources of data, the researcher collected the data from all 
possible sources such as libraries, research centres, etc.
8III. DATA LIMITS
The data that are used in the study relates to Tanzania 
mainland, ie they do not include Zanzibar Island which, in practice, 
operates a separate financial system.
Secondly, the reference to public sector in the text is used in 
connection with activities performed by the central and local 
government. These activities are of two types. The first category 
relates to the functions which are financed, executed and accounted 
for by the government itself or any of its independent agencies. The 
latter would involve provision of both ’pure public goods’ (ie. law 
and order, defense etc.) and ’mixed goods’ (ie. education, health 
services etc.).3 The second category of activities is that 
involving directly productive investments, financed mainly by 
government, but their management resting with independent 
corporations. In this latter case, the financial operations are 
separated completely from the budgetary system of the government, 
except where the government has to inject additional capital either 
inform of expansion capital or rescue (subsidy) capital. Therefore, 
in this study, the budgetary matters are confined mainly to the 
government budget, and the public corporations will be included in as 
far there is a flow of resources from the government sector to them. 
The separate budgets of such corporations do not become a part of the 
public budgetary system that is to be investigated. A more detailed 
outline of the nature of public sector in Tanzania is given in 
Appendix 3 below.
The data that was assembled covered the period 1953/54 to 
1983/84. The fiscal year 1953/54 was used as the cut-off bottom-end
9period because the time series data that is available in libraries and 
other record centres begin during this year. On the top end 1983/84 
has been used because that is when the latest actual data for a number 
of measures could be obtained. Although such a long time was 
considered for data assembly, however, all the analyses do not confine 
themselves to that period. In many analytical cases the author has 
tended to confine himself to data relating to the post 1968/69 period 
and ending in 1982/83 period. Nevertheless, where advantage in 
conclusions could be derived from a long-time data analysis, the 
author has not hesitated to exploit such advantage.
When dealing with a developing country, the problems of data 
inconsistence, imcompleteness and sometimes non-availability are 
inescapable. This is for two main reasons: This is so because the
problem of data is a reflection of the weaknesses in the data 
collection systems in the country: but it is also a reflection of the
"pressure” that the country finds itself under as a result of trying 
to respond to calls to supply information to external agencies which 
have a particular interest in the country. The latter point applies 
mainly to the disaggregated data, in which case one can encounter a 
case of a certain category of information being maintained in the 
records for as long as the relationship with the external agency 
lasted. To overcome this data discrepancy, some tireless effort was 
made to put together the loose information to an extent that a 
meaningful analysis could be done, while ensuring that the data did 
not lose its originality. In other occasions it was impossible to 
adjust the information available, and for that matter, certain 
analyses considered to be desirable had to be be skipped, but without
10
causing a serious gap in the study.
IV. OUTLINE OF STUDY
The outline of the study discussion is divided into four parts. 
Part I introduces the problem that will be studied, as well as 
highlighting on the salient features of the economy. The discussion on 
the state of the economy is covered in chapter three. The inclusion of 
the latter materials, as detailed as it has been presented, was 
considered essential in view of the fact that there is not much 
literature available about Tanzania in public literature sources. It 
is hoped that the readers of this study will have a greater 
appreciation of the problem being studied after they have gone through 
the material. In Part II the discussion moves to the core part of the 
study. The various hypotheses explaining the behaviour of expenditures 
and revenues are discussed and empirically tested. Thus, Chapter 4 
presents a critical review of the hypotheses, while Chapters 5 and 6 
present the empirical results for expenditure and revenues 
respectively.
In Part III the discussion concentrates on exploring the extent 
to which the various variables discussed in Part II have been used in 
the forecasting process. The discussion does not confine itself to the 
practical forecasting situation alone. A theoretical overview of the 
forecasting environment is presented as well. The latter is presented 
in Chapter 7. while the empirical investigation is done in the next 
five chapters. So, Chapters 8 and 9 present investigation results of 
tax revenue and external assistance forecasting respectively. Chapter 
10 and 11 present investigation results of recurrent and development
11
expenditure forecasting respectively. Chapter 12 presents the 
investigation results of fiscal deficit forecasting.
Finally, Part IV presents two critical Chapters. Chapter 13 
examines the problem of recurrent costs in Tanzania, while Chapter 14 
presents concluding remarks of the whole study.
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NOTES:
1. Events subsequent to the cut_off' time for the study (1983) have 
been highlighted in Appendix 2
2. Musgrave, R.A. and Musgrave, P.B. (1980). Public Finance in Theory 
and Practice. 3rd. ed. p.21 New York, McGraw Hill Book Company.
3. The dicussion on what constitutes ’pure public goods’ and ’mixed 




PROBLEM DEFINITION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter attempts to expose the nature of the problem that 
will be dealt with in this study. The focus is of course the public 
sector as defined in chapter 1 above.
The chapter presents highlights of the budget situation. 
Specifically, the size of the public sector, in terms of both revenues 
and expenditures, is examined. The merits and demerits of the 
observable size are also examined briefly. Moreoever, the state of 
affairs over the forecasting aspect of the budget is previewed 
briefly. The highlights on the latter touch on the direction of the 
past forecasts in relation to the outturn, and the nature of problems 
one has to face during forecasting in a LDC environment.
Furthermore, the problems of government budgets are examined in 
an international context so as to demonstrate that the study on 
Tanzania's public sector is part of a global effort to find a solution 
to the persistent problems of fiscal policy in many developing and 
developed nations. The outcome of this study is therefore expected to 
contribute to the current economic thoughts about fiscal policy 
issues.
This chapter presents also a brief literature review on 
Tanzania’s budgetary system. The problem of literature is also 
discussed in relation to other developing and developed countries.
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The setting of the chapter is as follows. Section II presents a 
review of the main trends of the public sector, while section III 
presents a review of an international p e r s p e c t i v e  Gf fiscal policy 
problems. Section IV looks at the problem of literature in Tanzania 
in relation to other countries. Finally, section V presents a summary 
of the chapter.
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IV THE PUBLIC SECTOR: MAIN TRENDS,
(A) EXPENDITURE LEVELS
There has been much concern over the rate at which the size of
/
the public sector (see Appendix 3 for a detailed definition) has been 
growing. Most of the concern by the government being on recurrent 
expenditure Referring to Table 2:1 below, between 1969 and 1983 the 
share of total government expenditure in GDP almost doubled. It rose 
from 22.9% in 1968/69 to 43.5% in 1982/83.
Table 2 {“^ .EXPENDITURE LEVELS IN RELATION TO GDP, AND TO 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE: 1968/69 to 1982/83
PERIOD TE/* RE/b DE/C RE/^ DE/*
GDP GDP GDP TE TE
% % % % %
1968/69 22.9 16.5 6.4 72.0 28.0
1969/70 28.9 20.5 8.4 70.7 29.3
1970/71 30.7 19.9 10.8 64.7 35.3
1971/72 30.1 20.1 10.0 66.8 33.2
1972/73 31.4 22.0 9.4 70.0 30.
1973/74 38.9 24.8 14.1 73.6 36.4
1974/75 44.2 28.3 15.9 64.0 36.
1975/76 35.1 21.9 13.2 62.3 37.7
1976/77 45.2 26.8 18.4 59.2 40.8
1977/78 37.4 23.4 14. 62.6 37.4
1978/79 42.2 26.8 15.4 63.6 36.4
1979/80 42.1 27.0 15.1 64.0 36.
1080/81 39.2 26.7 12.5 68.1 31.9
i
1981/82 41.7 31.0 10.7 74.2 25.8
1982/83 43.5________33.4 10.14 76.2_________23.3_______
Source; Computed from data appearing in Appendix 1
a - Total Expenditure to GDP ratio expressed in percentage
b - Recurrent Expenditure to GDP ratio expressed as a percentage
c - Development expenditure to GDP ratio expressed as a percentage
d - Recurrent Expenditure to Total Expenditure ratio in percentage
e - Development Expenditure to Total Expenditure Ratio in percentage.
On the other hand, the recurrent expenditure share on GDP rose from 
16.5% to 33.4% in the same period. Development expenditure did not
16
have that steady growth although there was a general upward trend.
Much of the growth in the development expenditure took place between 
1968/69 and 1979/80, after which there was a sharp fall. Its ratio 
jumped from 6.4% (1968/69) to 15.1% in 1979/80 and then fell to 10.1% 
in 1982/83.
Looking at the recurrent and development expenditure as a 
proportion of the total expenditure, we observe that the recurrent 
expenditure share remained within a range of 59% and 76%, while the 
rest went to development expenditure.
The expansion that took place in total expenditure during the 
1969-83 period was tremendous and it demanded more resource than the 
economy could provide. The government has been expressing its 
dissatisfaction of such a rapid expansion. In monetary terms, the 
expenditure appeared to have been growing at a faster rate than that 
of inflation. During the 1970-80 period inflation rate was about
11.9%2 while public expenditure growth was about 19.1%3 in nominal 
terms. The high growth in expenditure prevailed in spite of the 
expenditure compression policy pursued by the government during the 
same period. The government even adopted a system of setting ceilings 
and imposing cash limits for each spending agency so as to ensure that 
the levels of spending remained within the plan. The performance of 
the expenditure budget is discussed in detail in Chapters 10 and 11 
below. However, the high levels of expenditure tend to suggest that 
the country is facing consequential expenditure problems which were 
never encountered by the developed industrialized countries. A casual 
look at the latter*s capital spending levels vis-a-vis that of 
Tanzania points to a big contrast. In UK, the share of public capital
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expenditure in nominal GDP was between 3.6% and 6.4% during the 
1955-76 period. 4 pn the case of OECD countries, the public capital 
expenditure to GDP ratio for 1975 period, ranged between 2.2% and 
6.2%, 5 while that of Tanzania was 18.4% as appears on table 2:1 
above. The latter clearly suggests that Tanzania has been developing 
a capacity disproportionate to the expansion of the productive sectors 
of the economy. And as was pointed above; about two thirds of the 
development expenditure is financed from external sources. It can be 
hypothesized in this case that due to lack of prop)er planning in the 
country, and the absence of any serious studies as argued already 
above, such deficiencies obscured the grasping of the implied 
operation and maintenance burden associated with the excessive 
development spending. Moreover, since the governments’ social policy 
is to provide social services such as education, health, clean water 
etc., without user charges,6 the implication is that the 
consequential costs arising from any new investment in these sectors 
would have to be borne directly by government.
(b) Revenue Levels
This section examines the level of revenues over the period 
1968/69 - 82/83. The revenues are considered under three categories, 
namely tax revenues, local borrowings, and external borrowings. The 
tax revenues app>ear to have grown substantially over the 1969-83 
period. Its ratio (to GDP) rose from 17% to 25%, with certain years 
(especially mid-1970s) seeing a ratio as high as 35%.
In the case of local borrowing, there has been a substantial 
growth too. Its ratio (to GDP) grew from 4.1% in 1968/69 to 12.3% in
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1982/83, although in between especially mid 1970s, the ratio was as 
low as 2.4%, a time when the tax revenue ratio reached the highest 
peak.
Looking at foreign borrowings, there was a tremendous growth as 
well. The period 1968/69 - 76/77 was one of a rapid growth with a 
change of more than 350%. During the 1969-77 period the ratio rose 
from 1.7% to 8.0%. Between 1977/78 and 1982/83 the ratio fluctuated 
but with a downward trend, thus ending at 4.6% level. The ratios 
referred to above appear in Table 2:4 below. It is worth noting that 
the total of all categories of revenues equals to the total 
expenditure appearing on Table 2:3 above.
Overall, the trend of tax revenue does not appear to be in 
consonance with government spending needs as presented in Table 2:3 
above. In the more recent years, ie. beginning with 1978/79, the ratio 
of tax revenues has been lower than that of recurrent expenditure.
The implications of this gap are serious because government's adopted 
policy instrument of mobilizing local savings for investments is 
defeated. Besides, this gap must have pushed the government into 
greater deficit financing, a move that would definitely defeat the 
credit policy adopted for economic stabilization. Thus, given the 
tax revenue-expenditure gap, one cannot fail to see why local 
borrowing rose so sharply. This situation raises a number of 
questions. On the part of tax revenues one would certainly like to 
know whether the problem of inadequacy arose from a lack of buoyancy 
in the tax system (see chapter 6 p. 164 for a further discussion) or a 
lack of tax handles or possibly some laxity on the p>art of 
administration. The study will address itself to some of these isues.
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Table 2:2 REVENUE LEVELS IN RELATION TO GDP
Period Tax Rev Local Borrowing: Foreign Borrowing:
_____________ GDP_______ GDP__________ GDP
% % %
1968/69 17.16 4.1 1.7
1969/70 20.7 6.6 1.6
1970/71 18.4 7.6 3.3
1971/72 21.8 4.0 4.4
1972/73 22.9 3.4 5.1
1973/74 26.2 6.8 5.9
1974/75 28.5 8.3 7.4
1975/76 23.0 6.1 6.1
1976/77 34.9 2.4 8.0
1977/78 25.6 6.2 5.8
1978/79 22.0 12.3 7.9
1979/80 22.7 12.7 6.8
1980/81 23.4 10.9 4.9
1981/82 23.5 13.8 4.5
1982/83 25.1 13.9 4.6
Source: Computed from Data Appearing in Appendix 1
On the part of external revenues, the decline that was observed 
in the more recent past tend to suggest that there were problems with 
raising the external resources. Recalling what we said above 
regarding stabilization policies in the 1970s and early 1980s, one of 
the policy instruments adopted by government was one of increasing 
productive capacity financed from foreign borrowing. Therefore, the
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fall in the flow of external revenues is one isue that deserves an in 
depth study.
(C) Budget forecasts compared with the outturn
The importance of budget forecasts cannot be overemphasized. 
Projected budgets stand for plan of action. The message is clear from 
Caiden et.al. They pointed out that "when governments decide how much 
they will spend on various activities during the year, they have 
evolved a plan of action." 7 Behind plans are targets or specific 
goals that have to be accomplished. For the public sector, the goals 
are multivarious. They range from those aiming at allocation and 
distribution of resources in the state, to those intended to regulate 
and stabilize the economy. An accomplishment of such objectives would 
therefore require that a prudent estimation of both expenditures and 
revenues should be undertaken. Moreover, the resources put at the 
disposal of the government carry a big cost to the nation, especially 
those from external sources, a situation that underlines the 
significance of proper planning for their use. A realization of the 
targeted budget can therefore be construed as a realization of the 
plans, other things remaining the same.
The revelation made in section II above about the government's 
failure to enforce the policy measures it adopted over tax revenues 
and expenditure are a clear indication of the system's failure to 
produce reliable forecasts. The government failed to control the 
growth of expenditure and deficit financing; but also the tax 
increases were not sufficient to cover the upsurging expenditure in
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the ’70s and early 1980s.8 As a result, the government has often 
been pushed into preparing supplementary estimates to cover the 
shortfalls in the initial predictions. (Green 1983: p.365). The 
details for tax revenue and expenditure forecasts are covered in 
chapters 8 to 11 below; however, it is in order to mention at this 
juncture that there have been wide variations between the forecasts 
and the outturn for both revenues and expenditure. The most common 
situation being underprediction of both tax revenues and expenditure. 
The latter phenomenon, especially on the part of tax revenues, raises 
some doubts as to whether the actors in the budgetmaking were really 
committed to the policy measures which were adopted by government.
The underprediction suggests that the objective of raising as much tax 
revenue as was possible was undermined right from the budget inception 
stage. The second doubt raised is whether the actors in the budget- 
making had a control on the budget determinant factors, ie. those 
variables from which either revenues or expenditure are predicted.
The search for answers on these questions is, of course, the purpose 
of the study. Lest we raise too much optimism about what the study 
expects to uncover, the findings of Caiden and Wildavsky about other 
LDCs could be a valuable guide. To repeat what has been cited above 
already, they pointed out that "it may take two years or more before 
they (budgeters) know how much their goverment has spent. For them, 
not prediction but "retrodiction" is the problem’.9 They continue,
"to hedge against uncertainty the officials responsible for the budget 
under estimate and overestimate the revenue and expenditure 
respectively. By so doing, the officials hope for a balanced or 
surplus budget.10 The latter should not, however, be construed to
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imply that forecasting errors are a feature of the LDCs alone. They 
are also a common feature in the industrially developed countries. A 
good example of this is Britain.11
As regards the prediction of external loans and grants, the 
budgetars appeared to have been rather over ambitious. Some scholars 
who have looked at the problems of aid in Tanzania have observed that 
the government has been rather over optimistic in its expectations.
As Mushi commented, "the forecasts of foreign aid.... appears to be 
based on the residual needed to meet hopes for expenditure levels, and 
this residual may be double the historical trend for aid flows.12 
The problem of unpredictability is a serious one for the economy 
because a large proportion of the development expenditure (about 
2/3rds - Green 1983: p.355) is expected to be financed from such aid. 
However, the government has always been aware of the uncertainty that 
looms over external resource flow. In fact the policy of self-reliance 
enshrined in the Arusha Declaration (1967) pronouncements, was partly 
a reflection of failure to secure external resources at the 
anticipated level. In the first five-year plan, 1964/69, 78% of the 
development expenditure funds was expected to come from foreign 
sources, but only 35% was forthcoming.13 In recent years, although 
external funding still remains the main source of funding, however, 
the realizations have remained far short of expectations.14 But why 
such a big discrepancy? Resnick provides another guiding clue as he 
points out that "although they (government) took formal steps in the 
second five year plan to make the capital budget primarily locally 
financed, foreign-funded projects continued to be regarded by 
ministries as ’free’ in the sense that they were seen as activities
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that could be started without giving up projects wholly financed out 
of local funds."15 The latter certainly continues to underscore the 
weaknesses which have beset the budgetary system in Tanzania. The 
study will certainly focus on these weaknesses.
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III AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF FISCAL POLICY PROBLEMS.
The study on the Tanzanian fiscal system should not be viewed as 
an isolated case. It should be seen as being part of an international 
effort to seek a solution for the escalating problems of fiscal 
policy.
The role played by fiscal policy in controlling the economy has 
lead, to a surge in economic thinking about what ought to be the 
optimal level of government expenditure and taxation. Fiscal policies 
are seen to have profound effects on incomes, consumption, saving and 
investment.16 However, the trends in government budgets of both 
developed and developing countries point to persistence of the growth 
in expenditures, increasing deficits, and difficulties in raising 
resources. These problems have given rise to serious questions on the 
direction of fiscal policy and on the institutional adequacy of the 
budget machinery for controlling expenditure.17 The growth in 
expenditure is seen to have led to an increase in taxation which in 
turn had disincentive effects throughout the economy by holding back 
the growth of output. Moreover, higher indirect taxes contributed to 
increases in retail price indeces. As pointed out by Premchand,
"higher taxation encouraged the adoption of evasive strategies to 
minimize taxes by a host of activities that lacked any redeeming 
social value.”18
As for expenditures, the conversion of social assistance 
payments from discretional to entitlement programmes not only had 
contributed to the problems of budgretary control, but had tended to 
have adverse effects on incentives to production. Another effect of
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these transfer payments is seen to include the undermining of the 
process of restoring incentives through the tax cuts. Consequently, 
with the increase in inflation and the competitive prospects of 
domestic industries became dim, governments resorted to the provision 
of subsidies for private enterprises which culminated in increased 
inflation without economic growth.19
As for fiscal deficits, the resort to borrowing from the banks 
and from the public is seen to have had some adverse effects on the 
economy as well. The use of low prices bonds to borrow from the public 
pushed up interest rates which in turn had the effect of discouraging 
the issue of private bonds, private investment, and private spending, 
all of which are interest elastic. The excessive use of fiscal deficit 
thus contributed to a financial "crowding out" of the private 
sector.2 0
The above problems which are attributed to fiscal policies have 
given rise to economic thoughts which attempt to provide a solution on 
how governments could mobilize and allocate resources witout 
endangering economic growth and stability, and also provide new 
directions to fiscal policy. Although economists accept the growth of 
expenditures, there is no firm agreement on whether there has been 
inadequate use of the resources acquired from the private sector, and 
whether such acquisition had become more destabilizing by fueling 
inflation by higher taxes and interests.21 The economic theories 
which have emerged could be put into two categories. The first 
category is that of the "supply side of economics" while the second 
one is related to the approaches of pragmatic policy makers.2 2 In 
brief, the supply-side economic theories are divided again into two
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categories. The first category emphasizes the role of the private 
sector in the provision of goods and services hitherto priovided by 
the government. As pointed out by Premchand, the economists in this 
category advocate that ’’provision of education, health, and community 
services, or of assistance to the unemployed or backward, are better 
undertaken through the private sectorl."2 3 The second category of 
supply-side economics emphasizes the reduction of constraints caused 
by high levels of taxation and regulation. It is argued that reduction 
of tax would stimulate output etc.
This thesis is in the tradition of pragmatic school of thought 
which emphasizes the efficient performance of the fiscal functions. 
They recognize that public expenditures rise because of political 
pressures and the absence of market desciplines and competition. As 
pointed out by Prenchand [ibid. p.32], "this approach seeks to foster 
a link between services and p a y m e n t s , on the other hand, and a better 
use of the fiscal instruments, on the other."
The controversy that exists over what share of welfare services 
should be catered through government institutions and at what level of 
efficiency underlines the need to carry out some country studies so 
as to understand the nature of fiscal problems. The study on 
Tanzania’s fiscal policy problems therefore joins the international 
effort to understand the nature of the fiscal problems.
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IV. STUDIES UNDERTAKEN IN RESPECT OF TANZANIAN PUBLIC SECTOR.
(a) The Lack of Literature
The public sector in Tanzania has received the least attention 
as far as analytical publication is concerned. Inquiries made with 
persons who had been advisors to the government confirmed that there 
was no publication examining the problems of budgeting in 
Tanzania.24 The lack of literature about Tanzania’s budgetary system 
is a reflection of a general problem in Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs). Several authors have expressed their concern about this 
situation. For example, Caiden and Wildavsky have noted that the 
analyses of budgeting in LDCs have been very few, and the reasons for 
this lacunae is the scantiness of materials.25 Hinchliffe and Allan 
provide a further clue to the literature deficiency by pointing out 
that "relative to its size and importance in most economies, analysis 
of the allocation of public expenditure is one of the most neglected 
areas in development economics." They continue, "while planning has 
been regarded by economists as an innovatory high prestige operation 
worth of their skills, budgeting has been seen as a mundane low 
prestige activity undertaken by accountants.2 6 The latter point is 
further reinforced by Mendoza.27 And even where there are some 
references to budgeting in the general African literature, Leonard 
et.al point out that "they rarely get beyond generalities.”28
Although in the post-independence period, Tanzania’s government 
spending expanded considerably, from 16.2% in 1961 to over 40% in 
1980s (expenditure as a ratio of GDP),29 however, interest in 
studying the problems of the sector in respect of budgeting lagged 
behind. One could even suspect that the fact that government spending
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had not been in serious problems prior to 1970, in terms of lack of 
financial resources either from tax revenue or borrowings, obscured 
the need for thorough studies. But even with the emergence of the 
1970s and 1980s crises, it has still taken long before there were any 
rigorous studies. It appears as though this delay in initiating some 
studies is caused by the problem of manpower (skilled personnel in 
economics, finance, accounting etc.) shortage. The latter problem (ie 
of shortages in skills) was acknowledged by the World Bank as being a 
critical obstacle to growth In LDCs.30 But also as noted by Green, 
in 1961 the ratio of local high level person manpower was about 10% 
(Expatriates 90%) and by 1981 the ratio had risen to 80% (Expatriates 
20%).31 In spite of the increase in local manpower supply, however, 
the shortage continues to prevail due to the expansion in both 
productive and service sectors that the economy has been going through 
over the past years.
(b) Current efforts to study budgetary problems in LDCs and the 
Developed Industrial Countries.
The overwhelming economic crises which have engulfed LDCs in 
recent times have aroused the interest of several international 
scholars and institutions such as the World Bank and IMF to start 
looking at budgetary problems in such countries.3 2 There are other 
grounds for this interest, though. Besides an interest to assist the 
LDCs overcome the economic ills, on the other hand, the interests of 
the international money and capital markets are now at stake in most 
of the LDCs. The staggering external debts of the developing countries 
pose a very serious problem. Most of the LDCs can not service or
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repay such debts in spite of efforts to reschedule them taken by the 
financiers. Hopes for overcoming the debt crisis are seen to rest 
with a better management of the LDC economies. For many LDCs, the 
past decade was of declining economic performance. As the World Bank 
pointed out, GDP pier capita declined in many countries from 1973- 
1980.33 Besides, external dependence increased for most LDCs, as it 
now applied to basic economic operations, on top of development 
capital. These worsening economic conditions therefore drew the 
attention of institutions such as World Bank, IMF, OECD etc. which now 
started to pay some serious attention to the problems of the affected 
countries. Most of these institutions, especially IMF and the World 
Bank, have been sending experts to LDCs to establish facts and 
prepare reports. Moreover, they have established departments in their 
organizations whose work is to research on LDCs. Publications such as 
the ’IMF Staff Papers’ and the ’World Development Report’ by the World 
Bank have become an important source of literature material for the 
LDCs. Apart from the latter institutions, a number of individual 
scholars have also started looking at the problem of budgeting in 
LDCs. Some of the scholars who have researched extensively and 
published about budgeting problems of poor countries include Caiden 
and Wildavsky.34 Their research findings pointed out some terrible 
problems. In most LDCs, the authors remark,’the budgeters... do not 
know where they stand with respect to the basic features of national 
financial life,.... it may take two years or more before they know 
(within a reasonable margin of error) how much their government has 
spent.."3 5 Other problems related to manipulation of budget data 
were unveiled by Nicole Ball. She studied the problem of measuring
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Third World security expenditure. Her findings showed that 
significant amounts of security expenditure may not enter the budgets 
or the national accounts of many developing countries. Ball pointed 
out that the most common mechanisms used by governments to obscure 
their security related outlays included double bookkeeping, use of 
extra-budgetary accounts, use of highly aggregated budget categories, 
and government manipulation of foreign exchange.3 6
Other authors have started looking at the problem of recurrent 
costs in LDCs too. The recurrent costs problem has emerged as another 
big problem for many LDCs which are unable to put to use most of the 
installed capacity for lack of operating capital. Some of the 
scholars who have contributed to the research on recurrent costs 
problem include, inter alia, Gray and Martens,37 Jennings,38 and 
Heller39 etc. All the authors concede that the problem exists in 
LDCs and that their causes lie in developmental policies pursued by 
both LDCs and their aid partners. The authors consider the effect of 
the problem to be devastating in the economies concerned.
While there has been a paucity of literature about budgeting 
problems in developing countries, the developed countries have for 
decades experienced an abundance of budgeting literature. As will be 
discussed in chapter 4 below, attempts to study systematically the 
growth of public expenditure in the developed countries have led to 
the emergence of various hypotheses. The trend for this development in 
hypotheses which explain the behaviour of public expenditure was set 
by Adolph Wagner who started writing as early as 1880s.40 Other 
contributers to the development of theories of expenditure growth 
included economists such as Alan T. Peacock and Jack Wiseman in the
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early 1960s.41 However, as the problems of budgeting in the LDCs and 
IDCs alike continue to grow, new economic thinking has emerged which 
concentrate on public sector efficiency. Examples of such theories 
were mentioned in section III above, which included the supply-side 
economic theory. All these efforts to study the problems of fiscal 
policy in the IDC contribute further to the abundance in literature on 
public budgets. The developing countries will have to continue using 
the accumulated knowledge of the IDC while they try to develop 
hypotheses relevant to their own environment.
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V SUMMARY
An attempt was made to outline the problem that needs to be 
studied. Trends in expenditure revealed an increasing size of the 
public sector, while the revenue side revealed that dependency on 
borrowings from both local and foreign sources has been growing. 
Moreover, it was pointed out that the excessive growth in budget 
deficits could be a reflection of the problems the government has been 
encopuntering in preparing the forecasts.
Before embarking on any major study, it is necessary that one 
should know what research work has been done on the problem in the 
past. It was pointed out above that there was little evidence of any 
analytical literature about the problem. It was further argued that 
the vacuum that exists in Tanzania is a common problem in the LDCs as 
found out by various scholars who have attempted to study the problem 
in various other countries. This situation therefore underlines the 
need to have some study done to at least expose the dynamics and the 
mechanics of the budgetary system in Tanzania. The desire for the 
study was motivated further by the fact that the public sector share 
in GDP has been on the rise, inspite of the adversities that the 
economy has been going through. The message is therefore clear: that 
is, the budgetary system should be studied carefully so that it can be 
known in no uncertain terms what basic control measures need to be 
instituted for proper functioning of the sector, which should 
eventually ensure an efficient allocation of the government resources 
and at the same time restrain the pace of growth of the public 
sector.
To achieve the study objective, two major issues will be dealt 
with in the study. The first issue to be tackled is that of 
identifying the factors which have been influencing the behaviour of 
both government expenditures and revenues in Tanzania. The 
identification process will certainly lean on the hypotheses (or 
theories) posited on the determinants of public expenditure and 
revenue behaviour. The second issue to be dealt with is that of 
detecting the extent to which the factors identified in the latter 
analysis have been used in the real situation. In other words, an 
attempt is made to link the practical side of budgeting in Tanzania 
with the hypothetical conclusions made. Eventually, the study should 
be able to point out the major weaknesses which ought to be rectified 
and secondly, point out the factors which ought to be emphasized in 
the budget making process, especially for forecasting purposes. The 
study will also examine other sideline issues such as the salient 
features of the economy and the recurrent cost problem in Tanzania. 
These have been considered separately to either enhance our 
appreciation of the environment under which the budgetary system 
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C H A P T E R  3 
SOME SALIENT FEATURES OF THE TANZANIAN ECONOMY
I. INTRODUCTICW
The chapter focusses on some important economic aspects of 
Tanzania. It concentrates on trends of economic activities over the 
most recent years.
The topic will be discussed under a number of subtopics.
Section II looks at population, labour force and employment trends, 
while Section III looks at economic performance at an overall and 
sectoral levels. Section IV examines trends in balance of payments, 
while Section V examines trends in foreign debt. Section VI examines 
trends in gross capital formation. Finally there will be a summary 
that will provide a link with the other subsequent chapters.
II. POPULATION, LABOUR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT
Population: The latest census of 1978 revealed that the
country’s population was 17.5 millions. Projections made on the basis 
of past growth rates suggest a population of about 19 million in mid 
1981.1 As Table 3.1 shows, population growth has increased in each 
decade and almost tripled since World War II. According to the World 
Bank, the 3.4% growth rate of the 1970s is expected to increase 
slightly in the 1980s, These rates are much higher than those of the 
group of low-income economies as a whole which stand at 1.9 and 1.7
per cent for the periods 1970-81 and 1980-2000 respectively.2
TADLE 3:1: POPULATION fflaOWTH RATES, 1948-1981
(,OOQ and Percentages)











Source: ILO, JASPA, ’Tanzania: Basic Needs in Danger; Addis Ababa,
United Printers, p. 63 Table 6.1
The growth rates indicated above are higher than the GNP growth 
rate for the period 1960-80 which was 1.9 per cent. (World Bank,
1983: p 148). However, the GDP growth rates for the periods 1360-70 
and 1970-81 were 6.0 and 5.1 per cent respectively [World Bank: 1983,
p. 150]. The implications of the variation between population and 
production rates are obvious.
Though national output (GDP) grew faster than population, 
however, the nationally retained output (GNP) could not cater fully 
for the faster growing population.
Labour Force: According to the 1978 Census figures the labour force
is estimated to be 7.5 million. The latter was considered to be 
either working or searching for work.3 The urban population (about
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2.3 million) had a labour force of 1 million (43%).4
The labour force is basically agricultural. As can be seen 
from Table 3.2 below, wage labour is a very small proportion.
TADLE 3:2: ESTIMATED LAIXXJR FORCE COMPOSITION
1980 (’OOOs and Percentage)
WAGE NON WAGE TOTAL
AGRICULTURE 152 (1.9%) 6719 (83.3%) 6871 (85.3%)
NON AGRICULTURE 404 (5.0) 795 (9.8) 1199 (14.8)
TOTAL 556 (6.9) 7514 (93.1) 8070 (100.)
Source: 1L0 op cit. p. 66 Table 6.1
This has far reaching implications for the public budget, especially 
revenue mobilization and the provision of basic needs such as 
education, health, clean water, better housing etc.
A sectorial analysis of the waged labour force indicates that 
the agriculture and public services absorb more than 50% (Table 3.3) 
Overall, between 1974 and 1980 wage employment increased by 2.3% per 
annum. 5 In the early 1980s employment continued to grow (see table 
3.3) in spite of the economy being in severe recession.6 While the 
share of some sectors eg. agriculture dwindled, others, notably public 
services and industries gained employment considerably. Though 
industries were operating at very low capacity, the rise in employment 
arose from, first, the retention of the already employed, and
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secondly, employment in new investmentst,7 The rise in employment 
in public services could be a source of great pressure for government 
spending, perhaps at the expense of other essential services.
Unemployment: According to ILO (op cit. p 68) clear estimates
of unemployment in Tanzania do not exist. Studies on unemployment 
covering 1965-71 indicated unemployment for uneducated at 5.2%, 
primary school leavers around 7%, and post primary school leavers at 
3.2%.8 Some social factors help to explain this low unemployment 
rates. Heads of families take any job so as to support their large 
families. Consequently, their unemployment could be 3 to 4%, while 
that for dependants (mainly children and women) is 15 to 20%.9 
Moreover, as Myden has pointed out, an unemployed worker still has the 
option to return to the land.10
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TABLE 3:3: WAGE EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR FDR THE PERIOD 1978-1982
(*000 and Percentages)
PERIOD
SECTOR 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982*
000 % 000 f 000 f 000 7 . 000 *
AGRICULTURE 141.6 27.7 128.0 21.5 131.0 21.8 129.6 20.3 1=37.1 20.3
MINING 5.6 1.1 5.9 1.0 5.9 1.0 7.0 1.1 7.4 1.1
i-iANUFACTURING 80.3 15.7 107.1 18.0 105.8 17.5 114.2 17.9 120.9 17.9
PUBLIC
UTILITIES l6.il 3.2 19.8 3.3 19.4 3.2 21.1 3.3 22.3 3.3
CONSTRUCTION 46.1 9.0 50.6 8.5 48.2 8.1 49.8 7.8 52.3 7.8
TRADE 40.4 7.9 40.0 6.7 38.1 6.3 37.7 5.9 39.8 5.9
TRANSPORT 55.7 10.9 55.5 9.3 58.3 9.7 59.4 9.3 62.8 5.3
FINANCE 9.7 1.9 12.3 2.1 14 2.3 15.3 2.4 16.2 2.4
PUBLIC SERVICE 115.6 22.6 177.7 29.8 182 30.2 204.2 32 216.1 32.0




Change 1756 1% 6% 6%
^  Estimates
SOURCES: 1. ILO op. cit. p. 66 Table 6..?
2. United Republic of Tanzania (1982). Economic





The general economic performance during the 1964-82 period was 
marked by a definite periodicity. In real terms GDP grew by 5% per 
annum between 1964 and 1969. Between 1969 and 1974 the growth rate 
was lower at 5%. During 1974-78 it rose to 6%.11 and fell to a 
level of about 3%. between 1978 and 1979. But the ensuing period - 
1980-82 was a one of crises,12 with negative growth. In 1982 the 
decline was at the rate of -3.2%.
Table 3:4. Trends in Gross Domestic Product (GDP).














* At 1966 Prices.
Source: United Republic of Tanzania. (Various Years)* The Economic
Survey. Dar es Salaam: Government Printers.
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The fluctuations in the economy are presented in Table 3:4 above. 
Figure 3:1 shows it is possible to identify the periods when there was 
either accelerating or decelerating growth rates: The 1972-74 (slow 
growth); 1974-77 (rapid growth); 1977-80 (modest growth); and 1980-82 
(sharp decline).










* -  In  1966 P rices
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Tanzania's pattern of performance perceived reflected the 
general trend of developing countries, although Tanzania appeared to 
have been doing better than the others before 1980. According to the 
World Bank, the developing countries have been experiencing a 
continuous decline in the growth rate since the 1960s and the African 
low-income countries fared even worse,13 as can be discerned from 
Table 3.5.
TABLE 3.5: GROWTH OF GDP IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
BETWEEN 1960-1982 [AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE GR0WTII1
1960-73 1973-79 1980 1981 1982*
All Developing 
Countries 6.0 5.1 3.0 2.0 1 .9
Low income- 
countries 4.5 5.1 6.1 3.7 3.7
African developing, 
countries 3.5 1.5 1.2 0.1 0.8
Tanzania 6.0 4.9 3.5 -1.7 -3.2
* Estimated
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1983
The factors contributing to Tanzania's performance have varied, 
and the government has had mixed success in dealing with some of its 
crises which have surfaced so often, although the underlying problems
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remain. The country's economic instability can be linked primarily to 
its poor performance in the external sector, which in turn is affected 
perversely by agriculture’s poor performance, the dominant sector in 
the economy, accounting for slightly less than 40% of GDP (see Table 
3:6 below), and contributing to most of the exports.14 In real 
terms agricultural production grew at about 3.6% per annum between 
I960 and 1978 and then at around 1.5%.15 The terms of trade for 
agricultural exports deteriorated quite severely in 1961-71, 1973-75, 
and 1977-81.16 The average annual growth rate of the terms of 
trade for Tanzania between 1970-82 was -1.3%.17 This coupled by 
declining export volume exposed the country to a number of balance of 
payments crises. Since 1967 the country has been experiencing a 
deficit in the trade account. Exports fell from over 100% of imports 
in 1966 to under 45% in 1982 (see Table 3.14 ). The country managed 
to avert some of the balance of payments crises by securing external 
resources, and cutting down on imports which could not be supported by 
external assistance, without really solving the problem of falling 
export revenues. The stalled negotiations with IMF beginning with 
1979 cut off most foreign assistance and this precipitated the 
recession which began in 1980.
Besides the country’s inability to generate external resources 
to finance operational inputs and investment capital, there have been 
a set of shocks which exacerbated the instability. The first shock 
was the increase in crude oil prices of 1973 and 1979. Between 1973 
and 1979 the share of imported fuels in total imports rose 8% to 
15.7%,16 rising further to 21% in 1980.19 The fuel’s share in 
export earnings rose from 5% in 1971 to 55% in 1981/82.20
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Meanwhile, the volume of fuel imported in 1981/82 was more-or-less the 
same as that of 1973, a situation which is very detrimental to the 
expanding economy.
The second shock that affected the economic performance 
perversely was the Uganda war of 1978.21 The costs of the war stood 
at around US $700 million22 and resources had unavoidably to be 
diverted from essential operational needs.
Thirdly, the break-up of the East African community in 1977 
imposed significant economic burdens, particularly the cost of 
building up transport and communication services previously 
administered on a regional basis, and which were located either in 
Kenya or Uganda. The Uganda war and the closure of border with Kenya 
tended to exacerbate the severity of national adjustments 
required.2 3
Finally, the impact of poor weather on agricultural production 
in the 1970s the country suffered from two drought: in 1973-74 and in 
1979-82.24 Some studies have attempted to dismiss the idea that 
droughts had a significant impact on production. They even attempted 
to shown that rainfall in 1974 was well within normally adequate 
amounts.25 Such judgements sound quite unrealistic. The unstable 
nature of rainfall in Tanzania was documented well by a World Bank 
Report on Tanzania in 1961.26 Due to the size of the country, the 
weather is never uniform. Some few areas get stable and regular 
rainfall (eg. the highlands Kilimanjaro, Songea, Morogoro etc.) in 
the majority of the country with marginal rainfall the weather was so 
devastating. Many rural areas had to be supported by imported food 
stuff.
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I have examined the actual performance of the economy without 
reference to its relation to planned performance, for obvious reasons. 
The state of planning in Tanzania has been well documented by Stein 
who concluded that the '’primary thrust of annual planning is budgeting 
domestic and foreign development funds into particular projects". He 
pointed out that, although some unreliable projections were made for 
some sectors, there were no projections for aggregate GDP. This 
deficiency is attributed to shortage of manpower in the Dev Plan, and 
also a lack of reliable statistical base from which to generate the 
plans. Even the published actual national statistics are considered 
by Stein to be highly questionable.27 The lack of projections of 
GDP has serious consequences upon the planning and control of both 
government expenditures and revenues. The implication is that both 
revenues and expenditures are projected with little bearing to the 
general economic trend. And in view of these doubts about the 
reliability of the data: using the latter as a base for projecting 
expenditures and revenues is bound to produce very unreliable 
estimates.
The precise procedures and bases used for the projection of 
revenues and expenditures are a subject of discussion in Chapters 8 to
11. Meanwhile, I shall examine the important productive sectors and 
their contribution to performance of the economy.
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i. The Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Sector
This sector’s performance over the past twelve years has been 
less than satisfactory. Since 1972, the ratio of the sector’s real 
output to GDP has been declining from 40.1% to 33.4% in 1982 (see 
Table 3.6 and Figure 3.2 below).
TABLE 3:6: AGRICULTURE AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY OUTPUT
PERIOD OUTPUT OUTPUT PERIOD OUTPUT OUTPUT
(Shs to GDP (Tshs to GDP
mill* % mill* %
1972 3425 40.1 1978 4326 39.4
1973 3458 39.3 1979 4357 38.7
1974 3315 36.7 1980 4560 38.4
1975 3596 37.7 1981 4184 35.4
1976 3772 37.0 1982 3819 33.4
1977 4104 37.3
* On 1966 prices
Source: Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs Report, 1982
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FIGURE 3:2. AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PERFORMANCE 




1969 1975 1980 1983 YEARS
A number of factors account for the decline in agricultural 
output which can be categorized into three groups: those related to 
government policies ranging from pricing to transformational policies. 
The second category is that of general backwardness in Tanzanian 
agriculture, lastly, adverse weather and other minor factors affecting 
production.
While bearing in mind the limitations imposed by the declining 
terms of trade for our primary commodity exports, the national policy
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for setting producer prices has had its toll too. Producers accepted 
the prices because they had to sell their produce through the state 
owned marketing companies such as the crop authorities (ie. for 
coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco and cashew nuts etc) and National Milling 
Corporation (ie for grains). The food crisis of 1974-75 after the 
severe drought of 1973-74, pushed the government into adopting 
agricultural policies which emphasized food-crop production, and 
consequently increased producer prices of food and subsistence crops 
relative to export crops.28 On the other hand, the export crops 
continued to suffer from both fluctuating (and stagnating) prices in 
the international markets, and the policy to maintain an over valued 
foreign exchange rate. As can be seen from Table 3.7, although the 
prices of all agricultural crops declined between 1969/70 and 1981/82 
in real terms, the export crops bore more of the fall.
TABLE 3:7: EVOLUTION OF PRODUCER PRICES 1969/70
(100)-1981/82. 
1969/70 1975/76 1978/79 1981/82
FOOD CROPS
MAIZE 100 142 107 97
PADDY 100 96 81 87
WHEAT 100 87 77 75
SORGHAM 100 124 117 75
EXPORT CROPS
COTTON 100 91 77 76
CASHEWNUTS 100 55 63 71
TOBACCO 100 68 51 55
TEA 100 65 77 50
PYKETIIRUM 100 70 79 83
NB Nominal prices are deflated by the National Consumer Price 
Index which appears in Appendix 1.
Source: Adapted from Table 3.4: ILO (1982) op cit, p. 21
To sum up, the effect of the price changes was to increase the 
production of marketed subsistence crops very considerably; to reduce 
the production of food crops to some extent and the output of export 
crops by over one third.29
Secondly, the government’s policy of Ujamaa villages initiated
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in 1972 for rural areas had a negative impact on production. The 
villagization programme had emphasised communal production. The 
operation turned out to be costly in terms of time, misallocations 
etc., but most of all the peasants were more interested in private 
household plots rather than communal farms. 3 0 The idea of which 
never caught on. (Green, 1983 op cit. p. 355). But production had 
suffered already.
Another factor that has been a real obstacle to increased 
production is the backwardness of agricultural techniques still in use 
in Tanzania. Though the villagization programme was intended to clamp 
down on this serious condition, to a large extent, the problems remain 
unsolved. A study carried out in 1978 showed that 85 per cent of the 
acreage was cultivated by hoe, 10 per cent by animal drawn ploughs and 
5 per cent by tractors.31 Presently the per centage of hoe use 
could even be higher due to problems of maintaining and replacing the 
tractors and ploughs. The outocme of this agricultural backwardness 
is low productivity which culminates in decline in both food and 
export crops production. Any government policy which tends to 
emphasize more on one category of crops will inevitably lead to a 
death of the other mainly because the ’hoe* technology can not handle 
both within the limited period of growing season.
There are other factors as well which have combined with those 
mentioned above to reduce agricultural production. Production has 
suffered severely from successive years of serious drought32 (see 
p.48). The country had to spend a lot of its foreign exchange 
reserves to cover the food supply shortage that arose. Table 3.8 
indicates the magnitude of imported food grains in those years. The
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fall in production is also observable from Figure 3.2 where the 
troughs of 1974-76 and 1980-82 are quite distinctive.
TABLE 3:8: IMPORT OF FOOD GRAINS BY TANZANIA 1972-81
(’OOOs tons) AND AS A RATIO OF TOTAL IMPORTS
PERIOD 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
As % of
imports 12.9 10.4 21.4 19.5 10.9 11.1 7.4 4.8 13.2 9.0
TONS: 142 11 385 521 168 120 90 65 310 400
Source: Havnevik, K.J. et. al. op. cit. p. 60 Table 4
Wangwe, S.M. op cit. p 487 Table 5, Annual Economic Survey 
(Various Years).
Another factor which has been mentioned by Kleemeier is that of 
government’s neglect of research and extension.33 The literature 
relates to periods prior to 1970. However, a more recent assessment 
of research and extension in agriculture points to serious weaknesses 
in especially the structure of agricultural extension services thus 
reducing its effectiveness. Three problems were identified by ILO.
The first is that the extension workers operate under too many 
institutions, a system that appeared to have resulted in rather poor 
communeiation. Secondly, is the lack of focus in terms of well-
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defined objectives and programmes and clear job description for its 
field worker. Finally, is the acute shortage of inputs which has 
blanketted the effectiveness of extension services [ILO (1982) op cit. 
p. 195], So, in spite of the increased effort to develop more staff 
for the agricultural sector (ILO op cit. p. 197 in 1979 about 5,350 
professional and technical staff were in the agricultural sector] 
their impact has been less effective.
Finally, a point that is often overlooked when considering the 
problem of agricultural production is that of nationalization of the 
large private farms. These nationalized farms have been suffering 
from the problems of organisation and management.3 4
In short, the general downward trend in this sector is not only 
a cause for alarm to the other sectors, but to itself as well. The 
shortall that is experienced in export earnings causes a ’vicious 
circle’ manifesting in short supply of farm inputs, machinery, 
equipment, transport etc,
iii. Industrial Sector Performance
This sector’s performance has not been satisfactory over the 
last few years. The sector suffered from the oil crisis and the 
drought of 1973/74 and 1979/80 which precipitated a balance of 
pjayments crisis causing a diversion of foreign exchange to meet the 
higher fuel costs and imperts of food. The sector had done very well 
between 1961 and 1972 when its share in GDP had more than doubled from 
3.5% (1961) to 10%.35 After 1972 there was a deceleration from an 
annual growth rate of 8.4% in 1972 to 0.3% in 1975. The improvement 
in the balance of payments in 1976 and 1977 due to the coffee boom and
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better management of foreign exchange followed by a liberalization of 
imports on the persuasion of IMF and World Bank36 led to an 
improvement in the sector’s performance. Annual growth jumped to 6.4 
per cent in 1976 and 5.8 per cent in 1977. With the fading away of 
the coffee boom in 1978 coupled with the liberalization which had by 
now depleted the reserves, the balance of payments crisis set in again 
making it impossible for the sector to acquire all its input- 
requirements. As a result deceleration in annual growth became more 
pronounced. The balance of payments crisis became even more serious 
due to the Uganda War, the 1979 second oil price shock, and the 
1979/82 drought causing massive imports of food supply. By 1979 the 
growth rate had fallen to -2.1 per cent and by 1982 it had declerated 
to -25.4 per cent.37 The data for the period 1962 and 1972-82 is 
presented in Table 3.9 and Figure 3.3 below for further clarification.
The deceleration in the annual growth also meant a fall in the 
sector’s share in GDP, from 10% in 1972 to 5% in 1982. For a modern 
society to have so little contribution from the industrial sector 
underlines the structural economic imbalances inherent in the system. 
In terms of the problem of government budgeting, especially revenue 
mobilization, such an insignificant contribution implies that there 
are problems in identifying tax handles which could contribute a 














TABLE 3:9: TRENDS IN INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OLTTPUT
1962 and 1972-82 (at 1966 prices)
OUTPUT ANNUAL SHARE OF OUTPUT
(Tshs mill) CHANGE (%)_____ IN GDP (%)
313 +10.8 3.7
850 + 8.4 10.7
888 + 4.5 10.1
900 + 1.4 10.0
903 + 0.3 9.5
961 + 6.4 9.5
1017 + 5.8 9.4
1051 + 3.3 9.2




(1) Annual Economic Surveys
(2) Wangwe, S.M. op cit. page 484 Table 1
FIGURE 3.3: TRENDS IN INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OUTPUT





The sector's contribution towards exports has remained around 10 
per cent of total exports. Between 1964 and 1975 the ratio fluctuated 
between 8 and 12% with an average of about 9.5%. By 1980 its share in 
total exports was just about 8%. The exported products comprised, 
mainly of processed agricultural raw materials.3 8 What then are the 
basic weaknesses which are in fact making the sector play a diminished 
role in the Tanzanian economy? The industrialization policies both 
inherited from the colonial government and adopted in post­
independence period focussed on industries which semi-processed 
agricultural products and which were of an import substitution nature. 
The latter were totally dependent on imported capital goods, 
intermediate goods and raw materials.39 However, it was a 
satisfying for the country to encourage such industries because its 
limited resources, especially skilled local manpower could not 
initiate local-resource based industries. Moreover, before 1975 a 
time when the government started looking at its industrial policies 
anew, the country had been able to finance most of its foreign input 
requirements with little difficulty. Viability of industries was 
decided on two criteria: they should creat employment, and the
country should make a foreign exchange saving by local processing. 
After the shocks of 1973/74 in the form of the oil price hikes and 
food supply crisis the government started rethinking its industrial 
policy. In 1975 the government laid down a long-term industrial 
policy in a document called "Basic Industry Strategy: 1975-1995." The 
objective was to set up industries which would use more of locally 
available raw materials for the production of consumer, intermediate 
and capital goods primarily for the home market.40 The policy has
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never really been put into practice. Reports by the World Bank and 
ILO prepared in 1977 indicated that the industrial policy of the 
country was divorced from the long-term policy already articulated and 
adopted. The choice of projects and techniques of production had 
little relationship to any formal development plan or to the 
proclaimed goals of industrial development.41 And yet, investment 
between 1975 and 1980 was 297.3 percent higher than that made over the 
same p>eriod of five years between 1969 and 1974. Table 3:10 gives 
more information. Though the new industrial investments covered 
products not produced locally before,42 they however added to the 
already existing imbalance in resource allocation by joining the older 
ones in requesting for imports of raw materials and intermediate 
goods. For those industries which were covered by Wangwe’s study, in 
12 out of 16 industries, actual output in 1980 was below capacity 
output in 1976 indicating that whatever capacity was installed in the 
1976-80 period did not benefit society.43 By 1982 capacity 
utilization was 25-30 percent compared to 65-70 percent in 1977.44 
The contradictions which surface between policy, capjacity installation 
and capacity utilization px)int to serious inadequacies at macro level 
planning. The Ministries of Planning and Economic Affairs,
Industries, and Finance which coordinate macro-level investments 
appear to be quite weak at that job.
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TABLE 3:10 INVESTMENT IN MANUFACTURING 1969-1980.
Year Investment in Share of Investment
Industry (Tsh in in Industries in













Source: Wangwe, S.M. op. cit. p. 486 Table 3
*1966 prices
The same weaknesses are exhibited by micro-level investment planners. 
Their feasibility studies must be highly inadequate otherwise the 
problems which have incapacitated other industries or investments 
would have been noted.45 Besides problems of foreign exchange, 
other companies have been closing down because of problems of water 
and electric power supply, such as Mwanza Textile Industry and
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Kilimanjaro Textiles.46 There is no doubt, therefore, that the 
industrial sector has been weakened by poor management, inexperience 
in industrialization and inadequacy in research to support 
implementation of policies.
(iii) The Mining Sector
The mining sector’s performance has been detereorating 
considerably, thus making its contribution to GDP almost nil. The 
sector is considered to be important to the economy because of its 
potential to earn foreign exchange. In the past ten years, the 
sector’s contribution declined from 1.4 percent in 1972 to 0.6 
percent in 1982. Table 3:11 below gives the trend picture.
The sector’s poor performance has resulted from a number of 
weakening factors. First there are problems related to the balance of 
payments crisis. In most of the old mines maintenance of the old 
machines and their replacement have not been done efficiently because 
of lack of foreign inputs. Secondly, after the government 
nationalized the existing mines such as the Diamond mines, it found 
itself in a position whereby it could not open new mines because of 
lack of skilled and experienced mining technicians, engineers and 
managers.47 And because of its nationalization policy, potential 
external investors were certainly scared off. Raising financial 
resources from outside was also a problem. This situation led to a 
decline of the sector.
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TABLE 3:11 TREND IN MINING SECTOR OUTPUT 1972-1982
YEAR OUTPUT ANNUAL SHARE OF OUTPUT
(Tsh. mill.)* Change(%) in GDP (%)
1972 119 1.4
1973 91 -23.5 1.0
1974 88 - 3.3 1.0
1975 73 -17.0 0.8
1976 95 +30.0 0.9
1977 104 + 9.5 0.9
1978 70 -32.7 0.6
1979 81 + 15.7 0.7
1980 69 -14.8 0.5
1981 74 + 7.2 0.6
1982 72 - 2.7 0.6
* In 1966 prices
SOURCE: Annual Economic Survey.
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(iv) Other Sectors
Performance in these other sectors which are heavily biased 
towards services has been mixed. Some, such as water and electric 
supply, transport and communication, etc have had an encouraging 
performance in the past ten years. Others such as construction, 
commerce and tourism, and financial institutions have suffered a 
decline, especially in the most recent five years. These sectors 
suffered also from the imbalances of the external account, the 
industry and the agricultural sector. However, there are some 
specific weaknesses in each sector which made their contribution to 
the country’s economic prosperity remain just marginal.
Transport sector: The problems which face this sector are a
combination of technical, managerial, operational, financial and so 
forth. Poor management in the operation of institutions like Dar es 
Salaam Port and Air Tanzania Corporation (ATC) made the country lose a 
lot of foreign exchange. The export-import trade for Tanzania was 
affected adversely because of port mismanagement. ATC was near 
collapse due to mismanagement in leasing the planes, making 
maintenance, and control of traffic. Also there was poor allocation 
of vehicles to the nation which never took into consideration their 
economic and efficient use. For example, the public sector got many 
vehicles which were not put to optimal use. The latter sector got 
buses which were used to ferry workers to working places and residence 
but not put to use after that service while the public in general was 
getting insufficient transport from the public transport corporations 
and the private transport operators. Other problems of lack of
reliable statistics for administrative and planning purpose added to 
the deficiencies of the sector.48
I do not have to list the problems of the other sector because 
they repeat those mentioned above. There are some serious structural 
problems in the economy which have created a number of macro- 
imbalances which make it impossible for any particular sector of the 
eoconomy to operate efficiently.49 One has a vicious circle of 
problems which keep on shifting from one sector to another and 
occasionally bringing one sector or another to a halt. Table 3:12 
gives Trend figures for these other sectors.
TABLE 3:12: TRENDS IN OUTPUT OF VARIOUS SECTORS* 1972-1982
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 I98C 1981 •82
PUBLIC UTILITY
w
1.2 1.3 1.A 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.C
CONSTRUCTION A.7 A.7 A.6 A.1 3.5 3.2 3.2 3.5 4.5 A.3 A.2
TRANSPORT 10.2 10.3 10.6 10.2 10.1 ;10.6 10.8 10.5 10.7 11 .1 11.9
COMMERCE/TOURISM 11. 6 11 .8 11 .8 11 .2 10 .7 10.7 10 .1 9.9 9.7 9.5 8.6
FIN. INSTITUTIONS 10.6 10.2 10.3 9.8 9.3 9.0 9.A 9.A 9.2 9 8 10.5
* As a ratio of GDP - using 1966 prices 
Sources: Annual Economic Survey 1982
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IV FOREIGN TRADE
Tanzania is basically an exporter of primary products of 
agricultural and mineral type. The main crops exported from Tanzania 
include coffee, tea, tobacco, cotton, sisal, cashew nuts and 
pyre thrum. Minerals include diamonds, gold, tin concentrates and 
salt. Few manufactured products are also exported. It was mentioned 
above that most of the manufactured exports are semi-processed 
agricultural products, which account for about 8% to 10% of total 
exports.
On the other hand, Tanzania's imports comprise mainly of 
petroleum products, machinery, transport equipment and intermediate 
inputs. The latter items claim more than 66% of the imports. The 
rest 34% goes to food and other consumer goods imports. Table 3.13 
indicates the structure of imports under the major categories, for 
1972-80..











Source: Wangwe S M op cit p 487 table 5
PETROLEUM MACIP- TRANSPORT INTERMEDIATE OTHER
AND PETROL 15ERr EQUIPMENT INPUTS CONSUMER
PRODUCTS GOODS
10.4 20.2 10.8 25.1 16.6
12.0 19.0 12.2 32.3 14.0
11.9 14.8 9.5 26.8 15.5
11.9 19.8 11.0 22.5 15.4
18.6 22.4 10.6 23.5 14.0
13.8 25.7 11.4 22.4 15.7
11.9 29.4 14.5 22.8 13.9
11.3 31.0 16.9 21.8 14.2
21.1 23.4 11.5 16.3 14.3
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Overall, Tanzania has been performing poorly in the foreign trade 
sector. And because the resources flowing from this sector are vital 
for good performance of the other sectors, the imbalances experienced 
in this sector have also spread to other sectors.
The export ratio, both in terms of GDP and imports, has been
getting worse in the past 10 years. As can be seen from Table 3:14,
the exports share in GDP shrank from 23% (in 1972) to about 8% in 
1982, while imports maintained their share in GDP at a level higher 
than 20% during that period. Worse was the ratio of exports to
imports which shrank from 80% (in 1972) to 42% in 1982. The gap
between exports and imports has been increasing as is shown further by 
the balance of payments deficits appearing in Table 3:15. Yet, a 
number of sectors are operating far below their capacity because their 
foreign supplies demands can not be met out of the current level of 
imports.














1964 1613.9 28.9 1255.5 22.4 128.6
1969 1751 23.5 1710 22.9 102.4
1972 2312 22.8 2877.8 28.4 80.3
1973 2581 22.3 3478.9 30.1 74.2
1974 2860.8 20.4 5377.0 38.4 53.2
1975 2764 16.3 5710 33.6 48.4
1976 4108 23.3 5350 30.4 76.8
1977 4464 18.8 6161 25.9 72.4
1978 3671 11.9 8798 28.5 41.7
1979 3980.5 11.6 8986 26.3 44.3
1980 4187 11.0 10003 26.3 41.9
1981 4372.8 10.5 9120 21.9 47.9
1982 3484.4 7.8 8392.1 19.0 41.5
Source: IMF (1983)
Annual Economic Survey 1982
Bank of Tanzania: Economic Bulletin
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* Tsh. in Millions.
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, (Various Years). The 
Economic Survey, Dar es Salaam: Government Printers. Also 
Bano, S. (1984). Tanzania’s Balance of Payments. In 
Msambichaka, L.A. and Chandrasekhar, S. eds, p.139 Readings 
in Economic Policy of Tanzania. University of Dar es Salaam.
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This poor performance could be explained by a number of factors, 
some of which are endogeneous to the economy, while others are 
external. First, exports have been declining. The indices appearing 
below help to demonstrate the drop experienced for reasons already 
discussed under Agricultural sector performance.
TABLE 3:16: INDICES OF EXPORT VOLUME.
PERIOD 1966 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
All cropsS 134 137 101 108 117 93 90 94 87
Coffee 100 106 80 93 83 94
Cotton 100 149 106 100 105 124
Sisal 100 91 72 80 81 55
s - 1976/78 is the base period 
# - 1975 is the base period
Source: Havnevik K. J. et. al. op. cit. p. 65 table 8.
Also IMF International Financial Statistics.
Secondly, the country’s policy over its exports was not dynamic 
enough. Much reliance was placed on agricultural products (but 
without due support to the sector) without looking into the 
possibility of having the industrial sector take over a significant 
share. The management of industrial and commercial enterprises were 
biased to serving the internal market, and paid little consideration 
to the external market. Thirdly, terms of trade in the international
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markets have contributed to the balance of payments crisis.
Prices for most commodities fluctuated considerably. As pointed 
above, Tanzania’s average annual growth rate of terms of trade during 
the 1970-82 period was - 1.3%. Table 3:17 gives a wider picture of 
terms of trade for various categories of products.
TABLE 3:17: TREND OF TRADE PRICES IN CURRENT DOLLARS 1965-1982 
(Average Annual Percentage Change)
1965-73 1973-80 1981 1982
Non-fuel Primary 
Products 7.0 6.6 -7.0 -12.0
Fuels 7.5 32.8 12.5 -3.8
Manuf actures 5.1 11.0 -4.8 -2.1
Source: World Bank. (1983) World Development Report 1983.
Lastly, the structure of imports presented above (Table 3:13) 
point to some irregularities in external resources allocation which 
has exacerbated the crisis. While the most serious bottleneck in the 
industries is the lack of intermediate inputs, the data on Table 3:13 
show that the capital goods group has continued to receive a greater 
share of the imports, thus increasing capacity underutilization. The 
inadequacies of annual planning have already been pointed out Since 
the exports are just about half of the imports (Table 3:14), the 
excess imports must have been financed through loans and grants. This 
bias towards capital goods reflects the Donor-aid giving conditions
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which hitherto emphasized new projects rather than on-going programmes 
(World Bank, 1984, op cit pp 46-47). Therefore, the demand for more 
imports was being created without taking into account the export 
limitations of the country.
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V FOREIGN DEBT
Tanzania has been drawing quite a considerable amount of 
external funding for its development. Most of the funds have been 
harnessed under the umbrella of the government, implying that all the 
debt is public or public guaranteed. The volume of debt outstanding 
is as appears in Table 3:18 below, column 1. When the debt is compared 
to GNP, we observe that there was a significant growth between 1970 
and 1976, ie. a rise from a ratio of 21.6% to 32.8% respectively, but 
declined thereafter to a level of 25.3% in 1981. In 1982 it rose 
again to 34.5%. However, when the debt is compared to exports in 
column 3, we get quite scaring results. The ratio rose from about 80% 
in 1970 to 314% in 1982. The latter implies that the country has been 
increasing its borrowing without really increasing its ability to pay 
through increased exports. From column 5 of Table 3:18 the debt 
service ratio (to exports) is seen. Before 1980 the ratio remained 
reasonably low (average of 6.1%), but afterwards the ratio can be seen 
rising rather sharply, reaching 21.7% in 1982. This phenomenon is not 
surprising because, first the export sector has not been performing 
well as was seen above (pp 67), and secondly, the debt service has 
been growing mainly because most of the loans which were taken in the 
early seventies had an average grace period of about 7.5 to 9.4 
years.5 0
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Table 3:18 FOREIGN DEBT OUTSTANDING & DEBT SERVICE
Col I Col 2 Col 3 Col 4 Col 5
TOTAL DEBT/GNP DEBT/EXPORTS DEBT SERVICE$ DS/
DEBT# (DS) EXPOI
(Mill.of US$) (%tage) (%tage) (Mill.of US$)
1970 248.5 21.6 79.9 15.7 5.0
1971 307.8 24.9 90.5 16.8 4.9
1972 368.9 23.7 89.6 47.7 11.6
1973 463.7 28.3 106.4 31.9 7.3
1074 621.5 27.8 127.2 23.4 4.8
1975 797.6 34.8 165.4 26.4 5.5
1976 907.5 32.8 143.4 27.7 4.4
1977 1100.2 31.3 167.2 36.1 5.5
1978 1141.7 26.2 182.1 38.2 6.1
1979 1203. 27.0 ' 173.2 39.1 5.6
1980 1360.3 27.6 189.2 51.5 7.2
1981 1476.1 25.3 204.1 107.1 14.8
1982 1631.6 34.5 313.8 112.6 21.7
# Total Debt stands for Total Debt disbursed and outstanding 
$ Debt service stands for principal and interest payable on 
outstanding debt.
Source: World Bank (1982/83) World Debt.
International Monetary Fund IFS 1982
United Republic of Tanzania (Various Years). The Economic 
Survey. Dar es Salaam: Government Printers.
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The loans taken by Tanzania were mainly from official 
sources51 with only a small proportion in hard loans 52 which 
were used mainly to finance the direct productive investments such as 
industries, hotels, hydro-electric power stations and plantation 
acquisitions etc. The yearly average interest rate for the priod 1972 
to 1981 ranged between 2.2% and 4.7%. And as can be seen from Chart 
3;1 a large proportion of the loans had interest rates between 0 and 
3%. The grant element in these loans is quite high, the yearly 
averages ranging between 37.8% and 67.2% during the 1972-81 period.
The maturity years have been quite high with yearly averages ranging 
between 24.6 and 39.5 years.53
Various methods of transferring the foreign resources to 
Tanzania have been used. As can be seen from Table 3:19, albeit for a 
few years when data was available, most of the funds were channelled 
through the project programme, followed by the general imports support 
programme.
TABLE 3:19. COMPOSITION OF AID TO TANZANIA (in %)
AID TYPE 1979 1980
Grants (%) Loans Grants (%) Loans
Project Aid 59 76 60 48
General Imports 21 18 21 30
Food Aid 5 6 6 6
Technical Assistance 15 - 13 -
Commercial Credits — — 16
Source: Adapted from Mushi & Kyeshus op.cit. table 3 p. 22 
Note: Programme aid may have been included in general imports.
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Finally, a few comments about the implication of the foreign 
debts to the government budget: overall the government has been 
prudent enough to avoid hard loans which could drain massive resources 
from the country. Nevertheless, the current trend of the outstanding 
loans and the due debt service vis-a-vis the exports trend does not 
present any feeling of relief. The small interest that has to be paid 
will certainly demand a large share of the foreign resources earned by 
the country by exports. And in view of the fact that the non-interest 
budget has to use external resources as well, the implications are 
obvious.
VI. Gross Capital Formation (GCF)
The gross capital formation (GCF) fell to 3.7% in 1970-81 period 
from 9.8% in the previous decade.54
When GCF is examined in relation to GDP, the percentage of GCF 
to GDP increased substantially between 1960 and 1981. In 1960 it was 
14 percent while in 1980 it had grown to 22%. When the latter is 
compared to the average for the low-income economies, Tanzania appears 
to be performing below average. The 1960 and 1980 group averages were 
19% and 24% respectively. 55
Looking at the more recent ten years, the ratio of GCF and GDP 
has remained between 22% and 27% as appears on Table 3:20.
Table 3:20 TRENDS IN CAPITAL FORMATION BETWEEN 1978 & 1979 (in %)
Col.I Col.II Col.Ill Col.IV
Monetary Govern't Pa'stal Private
Year GCF to to to Monetary
GDP GDP GDP to
GDP
1972 22 4.9 13.0 • 4.7
1973 21.9 4.5 11.4 4.JB
1974 23.2 5.5 9.2 5..3
1975 21.8 5.4 7.5 6.3
1976 25.2 6.1 6.5 11.0
1977 22.2 5.3 4.8 10.2
1978 22.0 5.0 4.5 9.8
1979 23.3 6.5 3.8 11.0
1980 20.9 6.7 4.1 8.6
1981 22.3 6.4 4.0 10.3
1982 20.0 5.5 4.1 9.1
GCF - gross Capital Formation ; Govern't - Gove:
Pa' s'tal = Parastatal; mon = monetary.
Col V Col. VI Col VII Col. VIII
Private Govern't Pa's'tal Private
Non-Mon to to Monetary
to Total Total to
GDP Mon,GCF Mon,GCF Total
_____________________________________Mon,GCF
2.3 22.2 59.0 21.2
2.2 20.6 52.0 22.2
2.0 23.6 39.7 22.6
1.8 24.8 34.5 28.9
1.9 24.4 25.9 43.5
1.6 24.0 21.5 46.0
1.4 24.1 21.2 46.5
1.4 27.9 16.1 47.3
1.4 32.2 19.4 41.1
1.5 28.8 18.1 46.4
1.7 27.3 20.4 45.3
Source: Annual Economic Survey - Various years.
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There is no distinguishable pattern observable. The GCF has been 
decomposed into sectorial contributions, and the data appear on Table 
3.20 as well. The sectors considered are the government, the 
parastatal organizations, and the private monetary sector. These 
sectors’ share of GCF is considered just as a ratio of GDP. The 
government’s share remained fairly stable, remaining within a range of 
4.5% and 6.7%. The parastatal’s share to GDP (Col.Ill) clearly points 
to a declining trend, beginning with a share of 13% in 1972 and 
finishing with 4.1% in 1982. This trend demonstrates the effort taken 
by government in the early 1970s to set up industries and all other 
forms of institutions which were considered essential for the 
development of the country. On the other hand, the private monetary 
sector (Column IV) managed to double its share from 4.7% in 1972 to 
about 10% in 1982. The latter situation implies that the public 
sector and the private sector have been contributing almost equally to 
the capital formation in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This is also 
the impression one gets when each sector’s share of the total GCF is 
considered, as appears in Column VI to VIII. Initially the public 
sector was contributing about 80% but towards the end of our study 
period (1982) its share had declined to just about 50%. The rest went 
to the private sector.
However, the pattern of capital formation that has been 
discussed above has some serious effects on the economy as a whole.
The general pattern has been seen to be one of government sector 
maintaining its share, the parastatal sector losing its share, while 
the private sector has gained considerably . Since the government’s 
socialist policy requires that major investments be undertaken by the
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parastatal sector, the loss in share of this sector implies that vital 
investments in the country are not being undertaken. The increase in 
dominance of the private sector implies a greater proliferation of 
petty (possibly family owned) businesses in the country which would 
not be within the national economic plans. Thus, the idea of a 
centrally planned economy is undermined. Besides, these petty 
businesses are a problem to government in as far as fiscal plans are 
concerned. Due to the fact that the small businesses don’t prepare 
reliable accounts; such situation will certainly make difficult the 
task of estimating revenues. On the other hand, the government’s 
ability to maintain its share during the period means that a sizeable 
amount of resources were committed to non-direct productive 
activities, which, on apriori ground, could be said to continue 
demanding more resources for their operation and maintenance. This is 
a clear indication of potential problems in the budget because the 
productive sectors do not appear to be supported enough so as to be 
able to provide resources to the consequential government needs.
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VII SUMMARY
The chapter has highlighted the salient features of the economy. 
In spite of a number of crises, related mainly to balance-of-payments 
problems, severe drought and a war, the economy had managed to 
maintain a reasonable amount of growth until 1980, when it started to 
experience a real decline. An account of sectoral performance was 
made, so as to show the extent to which the macro-trend is influenced 
by each one of them. The agricultural sector was seen to have been 
experiencing poor performance, the cause of which.was partly poor 
policy measures taken by the government, especially on producer prices 
and reorganisation of the rural communities, but also the impact of 
frequent droughts and shortages of essential inputs. On the part of 
industrial sector, performance was also poor, and the main 
contributing factors were seen to be poor industrialization policy 
which emphasized import substitution as opposed to export-orientation, 
and secondly, lack of imported inputs which crippled the industries. 
The mining sector’s performance was the worst of all. The causes for 
the decline being lack of skills and technology, especially after the 
nationalizations. Thus, as Weaver et al (op.cit.p339) point out, much 
of the increase in GDP came from expansion of services, particularly 
of public administration. The rate of domestic saving and investment 
was high, but the resulting output was disappointing.
The implications of this dismal performance by the key sectors 
on the government budget could be quite grave. The fall in 
agriculture implies a fall in exports, which in turn affects imports. 
Thus the tax handles for export duties and import duties are eroded. 
And of course the instability experienced by the sector implies a hard
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task for the revenue forecaster. On the part of industrial sector the 
decline has also far reaching complications on the revenue 
mobilization. The tax bases associated with such industries are 
depleted so long as the establishments do not break even. The latter 
makes the task of forecasting revenues very difficult. On the part of 
the mining sector, its disappearance also affects the budget, 
particularly in view of the fact that it could have been one of the 
easiest sector to tax.
Finally, Tanzania’s debt situation was reviewed. Both debt and 
debt service were perceived to be growing at an alarming rate in 
relation to exports. Although the government had refrained from 
securing high interest bearing loans, which could tie up a significant 
portion of the budget, nevertheless, the fact that whatever little has 
to be paid to foreign creditors must be in hard currency earned 
through exports, the crippling impact that such debts have on the 
government budget is just the same. The budget will be disrupted for 
lack of foreign exchange to support import-oriented expenditures.
The points highlighted in this chapter cast a rather gloomy 
picture over the task of determining the budget. The problem is 
further enhanced by the lack of plans or projections prepared for the 
whole economy or for the sectors. This deficiency could impose a 
severe limitation on the forecasting of revenues and expenditures, and 
hence their control. The latter will be the subject of discussion in 
the chapters to follow.
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In this part the analysis proceeds to, first, explore hypotheses 
which have been postulated about the behaviour of expenditure and 
revenues, and secondly, examine these hypotheses empirically using 
Tanzanian data. Those hypotheses considered to be relevant to the 
Tanzanian environment are stressed, and the variables which appear to 
be influential in explaining the pattern of expenditures and revenues 
are the ones explored further in part 3. Thus, in chapter 4 the 
hypotheses are discussed in detail. In chapter 5 an analysis of the 




POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AND REVENUES: A REVIEW 
OF VARIOUS HYPOTHESES.
I. INTRODUCTION:
The focus of this chapter is to explore the hypotheses so far 
postulated to explain the behaviour of government expenditure and 
revenues, with an intention of identifying those ones which are 
appropriate for use in the Tanzanian case. Moreover, we shall move 
beyond those factors which have been examined for their influence on 
public expenditure and revenues in the past, by identifying other 
factors (hitherto not considered seriously) which have some influence 
as well. The underlying reason for carrying out this search is to 
identify those variables which could be used to forecast accurately 
both expenditure and revenues so as to improve budget control. In so 
doing, we are in fact trying to respond to some of the questions or 
issues raised in Chapter 1 p.6 above.
The more familiar expenditure hypotheses will be discussed in 
section II in general terms without relating them to the type of 
economies they would apply. The association of the hypotheses with 
any particular system of economy is done in subsequent sections. For 
the purpose of this discussion, the world economies are categorized 
into two groups, namely, the Industrially Developed Economies (IDC) 
and the Least Developed Economies (LDC).
In section III the hypotheses which explain the behaviour of 
revenues in LDC are examined. Some special consideration is given to 
the * degree of openness* hypothesis which has received some emphasis
89
from various authoritative sources and which purports to provide a 
significant explanation of the behaviour of revenues in LDCs.
In section IV an attempt is made to identify those hypotheses 
which would be more relevant to the Tanzanian type of economy. In 
section V we further explore the possibility of explaining expenditure 
growth in Tanzania through a historical-political stage framework. In 
this case we are trying to pay special attention to the unique events 
which took place during the colonial times and in post colonial era.
Finally there will be a summary of the chapter. The hypothesis 
to be considered in this chapter cannot be claimed to be very 
complete. Though much work has been done in respect of IDCs, a lot 
remains to be done for LDCs. This deficiency is not without a cause. 
By and large, the study of public expenditure has suffered some 
neglect. Reddy has pointed out that, in the past, economists or 
specialists in the field of public finance were confined to the 
analysis of effects of budget policies and the development of 
normative theories aiming at explaining how the revenue and 
expenditure policies are in fact determined, rather than studying the 
behaviour of public expenditure growth. The current efforts to 
undertake such studies are seen to have emanated from the realization 
of how important the public sector is now, and its strong influence in 
the economy, and therefore the need to incorporate some explanation of 
the behaviour of public expenditure in the general explanation of the 
process of economic growth.1
Moreoever, while the IDCs can continue to study the behaviour of 
government expenditure and revenue using the data they have, in the 
case of LDCs, to carry out such studies poses a lot of problems due to
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non-availability of data and sometimes incompleteness.
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II A REVIEW OF HYPOTHESES EXPLAINING GROWTH OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
A number of explanatory hypotheses on the growth of public 
expenditures have received great attention in post World War II period 
in the IDC, due to the expansion of the public sector. 2 The 
hypotheses can be categorized into three groups. There are those 
which look at the development of public expenditure from an economic 
point of view, that is, they use economic factors to explain such 
development. Secondly there are those which take into consideration 
conditioning factors such as changes in technology and demography to 
explain the behaviour of government expenditure. Finally there are 
those which use political, social and cultural factors to explain the 
changes. While we attempt to study the hypotheses under such distinct 
groupings, it should be borne in mind that there are no clear cut 
lines between these categories of factors. It also means that testing 
such hypotheses which have been formulated within such groupings could 
be difficult due to problems of separation of the impact of each 
factor. This message is clear from Musgrave (1969) when he points out 
that "if the expenditure share change for any one country is 
considered over, say, the last hundred years, this change may be 
related to economic development as measured by rising per capita 
income. But using per capita income was not the only influence on 
budget policy. The other factors, including conditioning and social 
forces, enter as well, and their influence cannot be separated neatly 
from that of the economic factors."3
The first predictive hypothesis on the development of public 
expenditure which takes into consideration economic factors was
postulated by A. Wagner. His theory came to be called ’ Wagner * s
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Law* 4 and he expounded the law of ’’expanding scale of state 
activities".5 According to Musgrave, the proposition of expanding 
scale should be interpreted as postulating a rising share of the 
public sector in the economy, rather than an absolute increase in the 
size of the budget which can hardly fail to result as the economy 
expands.® In other words - to borrow the words of Gould, the law 
states that "as countries progress and grow more prosperous the demand 
for publicly provided services such as defence, physical 
infrastructure, communication and education will increase with the 
result that the state will take up an increasing share of total 
activity. ’’7
Another hypothesis which is related to economic factors is one 
that takes into consideration the differential productivity increases 
in the public and private sectors. The argument in this case is that, 
due to the nature of functions or activities conducted by the public 
sector which are more labour intensive, there is less chance for 
productivity increase in the public sector than the private. In view 
of the latter, the costs of the services provided by the public sector 
will tend to rise relative to those provided by the private sector. 
This implies that the public expenditure share would continue to rise 
even if the volume of services remained constant.®
A third hypothesis in the same category of economic factors is 
one that considers the effect of Keynesian-type economic policies in 
the post World War II period. The central issue here is that the 
anti-recession Keynesian policy has been interpreted as requiring 
fiscal manipulation, especially changes in public expenditure. And 
since it is easier to increase public expenditure than decrease it,
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the result will be an upward drift of public expenditure over time.9
Now let us review those hypotheses which attempt to explain 
changes in public sector in the light of conditioning factors. 
According to Musgrave, these conditioning factors are of two types, 
namely demographic and technological changes. The demographic change 
factor is further subdivided into population rise and population 
structure change. How do they affect the development of public 
expenditures? In case of population rise it has been stipulated by 
Musgrave that there will be an absolute expansion of basic public 
services and an increased level of expenditure thereon. Most of the 
goods and services in question are mostly available to subgroups, or 
represent mixed goods and services the cost of which is not 
independent of the number of consumers served. He however qualifies 
the latter by saying that "though there is a strong presumption that 
the absolute level of public expenditure rises with population, 
effects on the public expenditure share are less obvious. Much will 
depend on the location patterns of the growing population, the 
presence of economies or diseconomies, and so forth."10 Secondly, 
population structure change in the sense of age composition changes, 
call for varying allocations to particular public services. The more 
school-age children there are, the more school expenditure is 
required. On the other hand, a higher ratio of aged calls for a 
larger share of assistance. Musgrave also cautions on the above by 
pointing out that "economies of scale is again a factor in determining 
the effects of such changes or expenditure shares, and may operate as 
either a strengthening or a dampening factor."11
On the side of technological changes, it has been postulated
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that changes in the technology lead to availability of new products 
which in turn lead to changes in the mix of desired goods* Musgrave 
gives several examples. Foremost, the invention and rise of the 
automobile which has led to heavy spending on high wages; secondly, 
the development of space technology which has stimulated further 
reseach spending in this area; and thirdly, changing military 
technology which has led to countries changing their military 
equipment which engenders more spending.12 The technological 
changes taking place are seen to have set in a new wave among spenders 
to keep abreast with the new developments. Inevitably the 
governments have to support new research programmes in its 
institutions which experiment on new technology. Consequently, its 
willingness to adopt new technology in its departments entails greater 
spending. It can therefore be argued that the conditioning factors 
mentioned above could be used to explain the development of public 
spending.
The third category of hypotheses are those which explain the 
behaviour of government expenditure by considering social, cultural 
and political forces. The latter factors are non-economic in nature 
and cannot be readily incorporated into the economic model although 
they have an important bearing on the expenditure ratio.
It has been postulated that the changes in cultural values and 
social philosophy affect the extent to which institutional adjustments 
are desired, and may bear also on the degree to which demand is 
directed at public goods. In studying the US and European public 
sectors, Musgrave (op.cit. p.86) observed that the growing sense of 
social responsibility for the welfare of individuals in the present
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century greatly increased the demand for transfer programmes. 
Moreoever, the acceptance by the state of a large role reduced 
political resistance to the allocation of resources for the provision 
of public goods.
As far as political forces are concerned they are seen to 
influence the rate of growth of public expenditure in a number of 
ways. First, changes in political structures in the sense of 
transition from authoritarian to representative governments and their 
democratization through the broadening of suffrage had an impact on 
the demand for social goods. The demand for more equitable 
distribution of the national wealth by such representative governments 
led to expansion of public services which could be seen to be much 
less difficult a redistributional measure than if tax-transfer 
programmes were used.13 Secondly, there is the argument that he 
ideological stance of governments would influence the rate of growth 
of public sector, in the sense that governments tending towards the 
right on a left-right spectrum would favour greater emphasis on 
individualism and therefore a smaller degree of state intervention and 
public expenditure, while those tending towards the left would favour 
more redistribution and equality and therefore greater state 
intervention and public expenditure.14 Besides this point of 
government inclination, there is the view that political practices in 
democratic societies, in order to be elected or re-elected, tend to 
make high promises in their manifestoes so as to gain more votes over 
the others. This process has been referred to as one of vote 
maximization.15 Eventually the government is forced to extend 
further the public goods which in turn increase the expenditure ratio.
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Other hypotheses have emerged also which link growth in public 
expenditures with behaviour of the bureaucrats who work on the budget, 
and the methods used in deciding on the budget. The forerunner of 
such hypothesis is Aaron Wildavsky. The latter has argued that the 
public employees (bureaucrats) are interested in increasing their 
power, prestige and promotion prospects.16 As hypothesized further 
by Breton (op.cit. pp. 162-3), the bureaucrats seek to maximize the 
relative size of their bureaux. The size of the bureau being defined 
by the number of individuals in the bureau, or when defined in terms 
of money expenditure, then one looks at the budget of the bureau 
relative to the government's total budget. Implied by such a 
hypothesis is that, through the miximization of their share in total 
budget, the bureaucrats are able to achieve the highest possible 
income and prestige, subject of course to the constraints that they 
have to overcome.17 The implications of the bureaucrats seeking to 
satisfy their own preferences by influencing the general level of 
expenditure as pointed out by Breton (op.cit p. 163) are several;
(i) the bureaucrats will emphasize the benefit and under-estimate 
costs in cost-benefit studies.
(ii) they will favour a rate of discount in estimating the present 
value of benefits and costs which will make projects look more 
profitable than they really are.
(iii) they will support the introduction of complicated and elaborate 
machinery to deal with the problem of rising prices and money incomes 
and other issues.
(iv) they will systematically redefine the objectives and the purpose 
of a programme to ensure that it remains up-to-date
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(v) finally, they will favour the introduction of new legislation to 
correct the ill effects of some older policy, instead of recommending 
the abolition of the old policy. The latter implies therefore, that 
the public expenditure will assume an upward trend in relation to the 
pressure or influence exerted by the bureaucrats.
Other scholars of public finance have come out with an 
hypothesis that considers the impact of wars and other social 
disturbances (upheavals), such as economic depressions, floods, 
droughts and so forth, on the behaviour of public expenditures. It is 
argued that such events have a profound effect on the timing of 
expenditure growth causing sharp temporary departures from underlying 
trends, and in addition they may have a lasting effect on the trend 
line itself. Those who contributed towards this hypothesis include 
Peacock and Wiseman, in early 1960s. The central argument in the 
hypothesis is that such social upheaval lead to a reduction in 
taxpayers* resistance to higher levels of taxation (with a shift of 
the threshold of resistance to a higher level). Civilian public 
expenditure fill the gap after the upheaval. The government is thus 
able to finance a higher level of public expenditure from the higher 
taxation receipts. And because of a * ratchet effect*, neither public 
expenditure nor taxation will fall back to the pre-crisis level 
afterwards. The public expenditure share is thus permanently raised 
or enlarged and a displacement of private spending has taken 
place.18
Finally, some scholars of development finance have developed an 
hypothesis that explains the behaviour of public expenditure in LDCs
using the revenue factor. The central issue in their argument is that
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the problem of revenue mobilization, from local and external sources, 
poses a serious restraint on the development of public expenditure. 
Lotz19 has argued that revenues should be treated as a demand 
determinant when it forms a constraint on spending. This is because 
in the LDCs the public expenditure tends to be limited to the 
financing that is available. The revenues are perceived as being 
quite inflexible in response to the upward changes in public 
expenditure. This inflexibility is not limited to the tax system 
alone. In the case of revenues from local borrowing, Lotz pointed to 
a number of factors which make such revenue quite inflexible. First 
is the low degree of monetization in LDCs coupled by reduced scope for 
credit expansion. Secondly, is the non-existence of a significant 
non-bank market for government bonds. In many cases, such markets are 
limited to social security institutions.20 As regards external 
revenues (ie loans and grants), Lotz considers it to be a constraint 
because of the limited access that the LDCs have to the open money and 
capital markets due to their uncreditworthiness. Even bilateral and 
multilateral aid is seen by Lotz not to be flowing to the LDCs to 
match the level of demand of such countries.21 The latter point of 
revenue insufficiency does not however exist in the IDCs due to the 
fact that the tax system is quite flexible, with the effect that the 
revenues respond to the preferred levels of public expenditure. For 
that matter, the revenues become less important in explaining the 
behaviour of expenditure.22 So, in the LDCs the sequence of 
decisions tends to run from taxation to expenditures. The causes of 
the inflexibility of the tax system in LDCs will be examined further 
in the next section.
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III DETERMINANTS OF REVENUE SHARE IN LDC-VARIOUS HYPOTHESES
Various scholars of development finance (Lotz, 1970) Chelliah 
et.al. 1974 etc.) have attempted to study the factors which influence 
the behaviour of the share of revenue (in GDP) in the LDCs. Due to 
problems of underdevelopment, most of the studies came out with only 
one major hypothesis which adequately provided an explanation for the 
pattern of revenues in such LDCs. This hypothesis has ben referred to 
as the ’degree of openness* hypothesis. Another factor which is 
usually used to explain the behaviour of revenues, especially in the 
IDCs, is the *Per Capita Income* factor. This is however considered 
to be less appropriate to LDCs for reasons to be outlined below. 
Another factor that will be examined is that of foreign receipts, in 
terms of its contribution towards the increasing of domestic revenue 
mobilization effort. But first we shall examine why the Per Capita 
Income* factor is inappropriate to LDCs.
(a) Per Capita Income Factor
A number of economic, social and political constraints tend to 
reduce the flexibility of the tax system in the LDCs to respond to 
economic development. Musgrave has pointed out some of the straining 
economic conditions which tend to limit to the development of the tax 
structure in LDCs with the effect of keeping low tax revenue.23 
These constraints are however related to the imbalanced structural 
economic situation of the LDCs. The limitations are:
(i) the dominance in the economy by smal 1-holder agriculture which 
precludes the use of income tax. Thus presumptive methods of 
assessment are resorted to.
(ii) The dominance of small-scale manufacturing establishments in LDC
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limit the amount that can be collected as excise duties. Keeping a 
track of movement of goods is difficult. Therefore it is only the few 
large enterprises that pay their proper tax.
(iii) the dominance of small-retail businesses which are sole 
proprietorships and which do not keep accounting records makes it 
difficult to operate a retail-sales taxation.
(iv) The tax administrators in LDCs are seldom able to administer an 
effective income tax system that captures taxes from all income 
sources of an individual. Incomes from non-official channels, in 
particular that from self-employment, does not necessarily give the 
government more revenues.
(v) The lack of adequate accounting practices and delays in 
preparing accounts in larger businesses compel the tax administrators 
to use presumptive methods of assessment.
(vi) The inadequacy of skilled tax manpower precludes the development 
of complex tax system such as an interlocking one which links an 
individual’s income to expenditure and networth.
(vii) Finally, the tax authorities and courts in LDCs are seen to be 
too lax on tax-evaders. The fact that tax evaders are allowed to get 
away with their offences continue to encourage more under-reporting, 
consequently making the government lose more revenues. Some studies 
by Hinrichs on LDCs which tried to determine whether there was any 
strong association between government revenue share (Revenue/GNP) and 
’per capita income’ found out that there was no significant 
correlation between the two.24 Therefore, in view of Musgrave*s 
points above, there is no solid ground for the use of economic 
development (as indexed by per capita income) to explain the pattern
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of revenues. The drawing of this conclusion has the implication that, 
for budget control purposes, especially through the forecasting 
process, the GNP measurement cannot be used effectively to achieve 
that objective.
(b) The "Degree of Openness” Hypothesis
The * degree of openness* hypothesis attempts to explain the 
pattern of revenue share through the foreign-trade sector of the LDCs. 
A number of authors have shown that *openness* is a more appropriate 
determinant of government revenue share in LDCs, than say, per capita 
income. Hinrichs who used the imports/GNP ratio as an index of 
* openness* found out that such index explained well the variations in 
government revenue shares for the LDCs with per capita income lower 
than US $750, than did the per capita income index.25 Hinrichs* 
results have been corroborated by the findings of other authors like 
Lotz and Mors.2 6 The latter expanded more on Hinrichs * work by 
formulating the foreign trade variables differently. They 
incorporated exports in the analysis by taking first the ’exports/GNP* 
ratio and secondly the ’(exports + imports)/GNP* ratio. The two 
variables gave better results than that of Hinrichs* import/GNP ratio, 
with the export/GNP ratio giving the superior results.
Why is this foreign trade sector such an important determinant 
of government revenue shares in LDCs? Hinrichs has argued that the 
chief source of tax revenue in more than two thirds of the LDCs is 
based on the foreign trade sector. Such taxes vary from import duties, 
taxes on exports, taxes on exporting companies and so forth.27 
Since revenue collections depend on the availability of tax handles, 
the foreign trade sector is considered to provide them easily.
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Musgrave supports the latter idea also, but adds that easy 
identification of the goods to be taxed contributes to easiness to 
tax, and the political will to tax imports of luxury or semiluxury 
nature, all underline the influence of the foreign trade sector on 
revenue share.2 8
The second reason for the importance of *openness* is that the 
foreign -trade sector size has spillover effects on the ability to 
collect taxes elsewhere in the economy. Hinrichs has argued that the 
greater is the size of the foreign trade section, quite probably, the 
greater is the degree of monetization of the economy; the predominance 
of cash crops rather than subsistence agriculture; the size of 
business units; the extent of urbanization, and industrialization.29 
The latter points to the fact that as this sector penetrates the 
economy, it stimulates more economic development and eventually 
transforms it into an exchange (monetary) economy that can be taxed 
easily.
Though most of the authors who have studied the behaviour of 
taxation development in LDCs have emphasized a lot on this hypothesis 
of ’openness*, there are, however, a number of criticisms which could 
weaken it in the light of present day economic problems in the LDCs. 
Foremost, the results which have been reported above relate to data 
pertaining to years when most of the countries were still colonies or 
years of immediate post independence period. Hinrich’s data pertain 
to the year 1958,30 while Lotz et al. data pertain to 1967-68.31 
The economic data of these periods reflected strongly some of the 
colonial policies which encouraged the colonies to specialize more on 
commodities for export. Hinrichs (p.555) has underscored the latter
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point by pointing out how colonial history has often been reflected in 
the size of foreign-trade sector of LDCs. Other studies of later 
periods such as that by Chelliah et.al.32 covering 1969/71 period 
show that the share of taxes in international trade has fallen and was 
just about one-third of total taxes (in percent of GDP), while in 1958 
according to Hinrichs * study it was more than 50 percent. Such a 
change could be an indication of either fluctuations taking place in 
this sector or a reorientation of the economies of LDCs from one of 
dependence on export of primary products to one that is more internal- 
oriented in terms of orienting production towards internal market. On 
the other hand it could also be the outcome of an induced development 
in other sectors which enabled them to pay more taxes than was the 
case in Hinrichs * period. It will therefore be more interesting to 
study the explanatory power of the foreign-trade sector in Tanzania 
for the more recent years when a lot of economic transformation has 
taken place.
(c) FOREIGN RECEIPTS FACTOR
In explaining the behaviour of revenues, the role played by 
foreign loans and grants has not received adequate attention as yet.
A few studies have been done, but the results still remain 
questionable. Thus it is still debatable whether foreign loans and 
grants substitute or supplement a developing country*s effort to raise 
development finance. Various empirical studies in this issue (as 
summarized by Mikesell et.al) never came out with clear cut results. 
Some of the results supported the hypothesis of substitution implying 
that the governments have reduced their efforts to save domestically, 
while others supported the hypothesis of supplementation which implied
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that foreign receipts contributed to increased effort to save more 
domestically.3 3 One shortcoming with the latter studies is that 
they do not point out explicitly whether the savings referred to are 
those out of tax effort or improvement in the functioning of domestic 
financial institutions. It is only in the case of World Bank that it 
is explicitly indicated that foreign capital has been used to 
substitute domestic savings (in the 1970s and early 1980s), 
particularly those from the local financial markets.34 However, the 
latter observation would apply more to those creditworthy LDCs which 
could borrow from the open foreign markets, such as Brazil, Mexico, 
Egypt etc. The case for the very poor nations would be less obvious, 
and I suppose they would have to make all efforts to raise public 
savings through taxation. In fact more recent studies which have 
allowed for non-project aid in the analysis found a positive 
relationship between aid and the savings ratio. Moreover, it is 
further pointed out that there is little evidence to support the view 
that aid reduces tax efforts in recipient countries, or aid is 
systematically substituted for public savings. (Cassen et.al. 1986. 
p.25.) Thus, for Tanzania it is worthwhile considering this factor.
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IV WHICH HYPOTHESES ARE RELEVANT TO TANZANIA-TYPE OF ECONOMY.
The hypotheses which were discussed in section II in respect of 
expenditure pattern, except for the revenue constraints hypotheses, 
were generated out of an empirical investigation of public sector 
performance of IDCs. These economies have certain characteristics 
which somehow legitimize the empirical tests carried out to confirm 
most of the hypotheses. These characteristics are not often mentioned 
in the literature of public finance, but are taken for granted that 
they prevail. What are they? To mention only a few, first, the IDC 
attained a high stage of development more than a century ago. Such 
economies have been self-sustaining, with the necessary backward and 
forward linkages which ensure structural economic balance. Local 
ownership of the major economic sectors further ensures that decisions 
made are consistent with national needs. The structural economic 
balance that such IDCs maintain allows the allocation of resources 
between private and public sector to be done in an efficient pattern. 
Secondly, the IDCs have the whole economy monetized, which allows for 
more accurate acocunting and recording of economic activities. For 
that matter the GNP measure gives a fair view of the state of the 
economy. Thirdly, for decades, the IDC have developed realiable data 
management systems, all serving the analytical needs of the nation. 
Fourthly, the IDCs have developed creditable democratic institutions 
like parliaments etc., which cater for national interests and 
influences the pattern of resource use for the benefit of all sectors. 
Under such conditions then, the hypotheses generate based on IDCs have 
a solid base supporting them.
When one tries to relate such hypothese to the Tanzanian-type of
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economy, which is typical of the least developed economies, some 
doubts emerge immediately. For one thing, most of the conditions set 
above applying to the IDC do not prevail. The economy is not 
structually balanced, but depends considerably on the outside world 
for its survival. This dependence takes the form of reliance on 
imports for feeding nearly every sector - economic or social, 
supported mainly by external grants and loans, due to insufficiency in 
own export generated funds. The backward and forward linkages which 
are an important facet for self-sufficiency are lacking. Most of the 
sectors, especially the agricultural and the manufacturing do not 
cater for the needs of each other within. The link that exists is 
external through the export-import mechanism. Besides, for many 
years, beginning with the colonial period and including the post 
independence period preceding the Arusha Declaration, the economic 
activities were not really geared towards the interests of the nation. 
The foreign capital that operated in the country was interested in 
earning good profits which were syphoned off to the countries where 
the investors were based. The outcome of this process was an improper 
allocation of resources in the economy which culminated in a complete 
under development of other sectors. Moreoever, the economy has 
remained under a dualism of a monetary (modem) and a subsistence 
sector. A large subsistence sector, coupled by poor accounting and 
information systems limit the amount of data available for analytical 
use.
As regards the existence of democratic institutions, the country 
has suffered a lot also. Throughout the colonial period, democratic 
institutions were non-existent. The legislative council which
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operated in the country had its members appointed by the colonial 
power, actually with little representation of the indigenous 
population. After independence, the Parliament was made more 
democratic by having its members elected from the whole population, 
but its effectiveness in the early years remained doubtful, 
particularly on grounds of lack of experience at national level on 
those elected, and also on grounds of the enormous political, economic 
and social problems they had to deal with. Other underdeveloped 
characteristics have been discussed above in Section III. Thus, this 
is the kind of background from which the hypotheses have to be 
appraised for application to Tanzania.
Some of the hypotheses, especialy the Wagner*s law, have been 
tested for LDCs. The results were quite conflicting. Various authors 
in early and mid-nineteen sixties carried out some studies which tried 
to establish that a relationship exists between p>er capita incomes and 
the size and pattern of government expenditure in LDCs.35 Their 
studies were based on two presumptions: first, that the purely 
economic and institutional factors represented by a certain * stage of 
development* have a strong enough effect on government spending to 
impart a pattern distinguishable from the influence of political, 
historical and fortutious factors. Secondly, that the "stage of 
development" is properly represented by a simple index such as per 
capita GNP converted to a common basis at official rates of exchange. 
In general, changes in per capita income were found to explain a 
relatively small part of the changes in items of government 
expenditure. Given the large number of non-significant correlations, 
Lall could not see the meaningfulness of the exercise as a whole, and
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even the validity of the results of other similar attempts. He 
pointed out that "per capita income did seem to influence government 
expenditure on some items, but on larger categories it seemed not to 
exercise any influence at all." The reasons for the failure of the 
Wagner's Law to apply to the LDCs* economies are quite clear*. Lall 
has pointed out two main weaknesses pertaining to the LDCs. First, 
the per capita GNP figures are notoriously unreliable for the poorer 
countries. They are not satisfactory indicators of the level of 
development of a country, particularly of the sophistication and 
complexity of its institutions. For this reason, par capita GNP may 
be the wrong thing to relate expenditure to.. Secondly, Lall points 
out the possibility of existence of other influential factors which 
overlay the effects of per capita income on the pattern of government 
expenditures. Lall suggested that other indices of development, if 
any can be found, be used as explanatory variables, or else 
explanatory variables not directly connected to the level of 
development such as imports/GNP or dummy variables for certain non­
economic factors be used either with per capita income or 
independently of it.3 6
Other authors have observed the same results as Lall in as far 
as far as Wagner's Law applies to LDCs. Musgrave observed that 
neither cross section nor the time series data seem to support 
Wagner's Law p>er se in the context of poor countries.37 Likewise, 
Thom observed that social forces which are closely related to the 
process of development are a major determinant of the observed 
tendency of public expenditures to rise faster
than GDP. Also a large portion of the services of government are
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socially determined and are influenced by the changing social 
framework of the society. Social change is both a condition for, and a 
goal of, economic development. Thom's hypothesis put more emphasis 
on the social and political forces rather than on economic 
factors.38
In view of the above observations, it becomes clear that 
Tanzanian-type of economy cannot benefit from Wagner's Law hypothesis 
to explain the pattern of public expenditure, due to the fact that per 
capita income does not represent satisfactorily the stage of economic 
development. However, accepting that 'per capita income' factor is 
less relevance to LDCs does not imply that it will not be considered 
in the analysis. In fact we have more recent data ie that covering 
the 1970s and early 1980s, which was not available when most of the 
empirical studies referred to above were undertaken. Thus, it might 
be interesting to see whether the new economic, social and political 
circumstances in Tanzania will produce different significant results 
from those of the early studies.
How about the other hypotheses related to conditioning, social, 
cultural and political factors? Are they applicable to Tanzanian type 
economy? Some of the literature referred to above has already 
indicated the need to incorporate such factors in explaining the 
behaviour of public expenditure. Lotz has underlined the necessity to 
look at such factors. He has pointed out that government spending 
patterns appear to be associated not only with the level of p>er capita 
income, but with other economic and social factors. He observed also 
that "there is empirical evidence that with intensive economic 
development, democratic institutions will be strengthened and the
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government’s policy will tend to be influenced by the voters whose 
first concern may well be with social expenditure.” He also observed 
that "the countries with an intensive economic development (ie one 
which penetrates the whole economy with an increase in per capita 
income, monetization, urbanization and literacy), expenditures for 
social welfare seem to be particularly important."39
Up to this point there is no doubt about the relevance of the 
latter hypotheses to Tanzania. However, given its historical- 
political background, comprising of pure colonialism, trusteeship 
colonialism and then sovereignty, it appeals to look at the evolution 
and pattern of public expenditure through those stages. Each stage 
of political power had different policies towards economic development 
and public expenditure. This will be discussed in section V below.
The other hypothesis discussed above and which appear to be more 
important in the LDCs* situation, and which is gaining ground is that 
which concentrates on the supply of revenue in relation to the 
behaviour of government expenditure. The importance of the revenue 
constraint in LDCs has been underlined by Lotz, who also criticized 
the other earlier studies for not considering this factor.40 For 
that matter, the revenue constraint factor need to be emphasized in 
the study of public expenditure.
As regards revenue behaviour, we have already underlined above 
the importance of the ’degree of openness’ hypothesis. This hypothesis 
will be tested using Tanzanian data. Another hypothesis that will be 
considered is the one that takes the foreign aid as a determinant 
factor of revenue pattern. The justification for the inclusion of the 
latter factor has already been discussed above. On the other hand,
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the ’per capita income’ factor will not be ignored completely. For 
reasons already mentioned above (p. 110 ), some empirical tests will be 
conducted based on it to detect for any influence on the revenue 
pattern.
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IV A Stage-Theory of Public Expenditure in Tanzania*
The literature that has been referred to above has analyzed 
public expenditure covering the periods between 1950s and 1960. Early 
work by Kuznets covered the period 1950 to 1959, Lotz's work covered 
the period 1962-1966.41 Hinrichs covered the period 1952-1960,42 
and so forth. Most of the authors assembled the data that was 
available and analysed them as they would have done for the IDCs. And 
not surprisingly, the results of their work did not confirm some of 
the hypotheses they were testing. Moreover, some blame has been 
focussed on non-availability of data in LDCs, and where it exists, it 
is considered to be highly unreliable. Nobody would dispute the 
latter, but still, one wonders why such studies did not incorporate 
earlier years, say from when the nation states were formed in Africa 
or Latin America, etc., under the British or Germans etc. Secondly, 
LDCs are considered in the analyses as if they carried similar 
sovereign status before they were independent. If I may take the 
example of African states, these nations started getting their 
independence in late 1950s. As colonized nations, the political 
status they assumed varied from one nation to another, and this had 
great developmental implications. Consider for example the status of 
Tanzania which was a Trusteeship in the hands of the British 
government, and that of Kenya or Nigeria which were full colonies of 
Britain. Without doubt, the latter received a greater share of 
resources towards their development compared to the former. The 
policies implemented in Tanzania never considered development as their 
priority. Further discussion on the latter point will come later.
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This sharp contrast between one country and another under the same 
colonial power was also to be found between countries under different 
colonial powers. For example, the French policy and its colonies 
brought the latter even closer to its home administration in the sense 
of making them constituent regions with even some representation in 
the French parliament. Such policies must have had some significant 
impact on the development of the colonies. So, in view of the above 
realities I consider an analysis that just groups these colonies 
together under the umbrella of developing countries, as if they had an 
equal chance towards development, to be incomplete and unjustified.
If one has to study the pattern of public expenditure in 
Tanzania, such study should consider the whole period that Tanzania 
has been operating as a state, beginning with 1880s when the German 
rule began. In the course of the colonial era, Tanzania had to change 
from German rule to British rule in 1919. When the changes in 
colonial power took place, some changes in policies occurred too, 
although from the indigenous population’s point of view, such changes 
never made much difference in terms of improving their welfare. The 
main sphere of controversy was the economic one, in particular the 
agricultural sector. Both German and British Administration found it 
impracticable to turn the indigenous population into a mere settler 
and plantation farm labour. Similarly, the British administration in 
the 1930s found it difficult to enforce its Credit to Natives 
(Restrictions) Ordinance of 1931 which restricted the African 
population from engaging in commercial activities. The emergence of 
cooperatives by Africans was a source of conflict with the 
administration till the 1950s.4 3 And because the administration did
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not put emphasis on the social sector, eg education, health, better 
housing etc. at independence the country still remains one of the most 
underdeveloped nations. The economy still remained a weak settler cum 
peasant entity.
Given such changes in power and policies, my proposition is that 
any analysis of the public expenditure done should take into 
consideration the various stages of political administration that the 
country went through. This is to go further than just to accept that 
political factors influence the pattern of public spending. On 
apriori grounds it could be stated that the different regimes that 
governed Tanzania generated policies which uniquely determined the 
level of govenment expenditure without regard to social demands and 
the level of economic development. It is therefore proposed that the 
colonial and post colonial period should be divided into stages which 
reflect the political-economic environment prevailing during the 
period. Six stages have been proposed so far. They include:
(a) Stage of retarded economic development: 1890-1914 (German Rule).
(b) Second Stage of retarded economic development 1919-1937 (British 
Rule)
(c) Stage of moderate economic development: 1945-1960 (British Rule)
(d) Second stage of moderate economic development 1961-67 (Sovereign 
status)
(e) Third stage of moderate economic development 1967-72 (Sovereign 
status)
(f) Stage of progressive economic development 1973-84 (Sovereign 
status)
The salient features of these stages in relation to their
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The chapter has made a review of various hypotheses postulated 
so far to explain the behaviour of government expenditure and 
revenues. Most of these hypotheses were seen to have been formulated 
to explain mainly the government sector situation in the 
Industrialized countries. Moreover, the hypotheses were seen to have 
been formulated on the basis of economic, conditioning, social and 
political factors. Those examined in respect of expenditure pattern 
included: the Wagner’s law which emphasizes the role of economic 
development on public expenditure; the ’displacement effect* 
hypotheses which considers the role of shock-full events such as wars, 
floods, earthquakes etc, on expenditure trend; the revenue constraint 
on expenditure trend, etc. On the part of revenues pattern, factors 
such as ’per capita income’ and the ’degree of openness* were 
examined.
In addition to the above hypotheses, it was further suggested 
that two additional hypotheses should receive some attention. These 
were identified as the ’foreign-receipts’ hypotheses, and the stage of 
economic/political development’ hypothesis. The ’foreign receipts’ 
factor is taken for its impact (mainly supplemental) on local revenue 
mobilization effort. On the other hand, "the stage of 
economic/political development" hypothesis attempts to incorporate 
into the analysis the unique past (especially the colonial era) that 
Tanzania experienced. The latter hypothesis is an attempt to abstract 
from the tendency assumed by most of the scholars cited of looking at 
government sector performance in LDCs in the same way as they would do 
for the Industrial economies. Although it might be difficult to
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quantify the variables in this hypothesis, nevertheless, as 
qualitative factors, they give a more realistic impression of the 
phenomenon.
The hypotheses which could be applied to the Tanzanian situation 
were discussed also. These included the revenue constraint, the 
conditioning factors (change in technology and demography), the social 
and political factors, the *degree of openness*, the * foreign 
receipts* factor etc. Their relevance was determined on the basis of 
evidence provided by other studies in development finance. Most of 
the studies had, however, a reservation on the use of *per capita 
income* as a determinant factor for both expenditures and revenues due 
to its unrealiability. This could be a source of problems for 
budgetary control because, if the GNP figures used in computing the 
*per capita income* cannot be relied upon, then even the composite GNP 
figures are not reliable for the pupose of analyzing the composite 
revenue and expenditure items. The latter notwithstanding, I have 
indicated that the GNP factor will be considered in the analysis on 
grounds of the additional recent long-term data available which was 
not considered in the previous studies.
Needless to mention, the main objective in examining some of 
these hypotheses is of course to detect those explanatory variables 
which are critical in determining the level of both expenditures and 
revenues, which in turn can be used to prepare policy measures 
intended to increase budgetary control. The latter implies that the 
strong factors can be used in the process of projecting more accurate 
expenditure or revenue figures in the future. For example, in the 
case of foreign receipts, there are grounds to suspect that the past
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reliance on it to finance government expenditure might have been the 
cause of the present recurrent costs problems, which cannot be met 
internally, and yet not much of the foreign financing is available for 
that pupose. But even without considering the long term effects of 
it, in the shorter run too much dependence on foreign funds could lead 
to a disruption of expenditure if there is a cut or interruption by 
the donors. Therefore, a thorough understanding of the influence on 
expenditure and revenue of each of the factors discussed is essential 
for exercising financial planning and control as part of budget 
management.
In the next couple of chapters, the factors discussed in this 
chapter will be tested using Tanzania data so as to establish the 
variables that are most influential in determining (and hence for 
controlling) both expenditures and revenues. Such variables would 
then form the basis for further discussion in the chapters (part 3) 
which deal with forecasting.
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As Coulson points out, peasant production in crops like coffee 
and cotton was booming. But the settlers who were growing coffee 
in the same regions as the peasants (mainly in Arusha and 
Kilimanjaro areas) fought hard to prevent the peasants from 
growing such crop. The colonial administration had to bow to the 
demands of the settlers by discouraging further expansion on the 
part of the peasants. But the latter measure had little 
restrictive effect. However, a greater conflict was to emerge in 
the sphere of marketing of the peasants agricultural produce. 
During the German era, it was only the European trading companies 
and Asian merchants who were allowed to engage in import and 
export trade, and local trade. The British administration 
continued to encourage this policy by actively discouraging 
Africans from any sort of commercial operations, mainly through 
the Credit Native (Restrictions) Ordinance of 1931. To 
circumvent these restrictions, the peasant growers decided to set 
up the cooperatives (mainly in Kilimanjaro and Bukoba) which
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would buy and sell their produce. The struggle between the 
colonial administration and the peasant-owned cooperatives 
continued into the 1950s, when at last the former gave up.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPENDITURE TRENDS - AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
I INTRODUCTION
The chapter will focus on testing some of the hypotheses 
discussed in chapter 4 in the context of Tanzania. Various hypotheses 
were cited and discussed in the aforementioned chapter, which attempts 
to explain the growth of public expenditure in both developing and 
developed states. Some attempts were made to single out the 
hypotheses which appeared to be more relevant to the Tanzania-type of 
economy. The relevancy distinctions had been made based on research 
work results of various scholars. Moreover, the chapter highlighted 
some salient social, political and economic factors (p.108) which 
distinguished a developing country from a developed country with 
respect to the hypotheses ’ application. Therefore, the major part of 
this chapter will concentrate on testing those hypotheses which have 
some bearing on the Tanzanian socio-economic and political 
environment.
Three main hypotheses will be tested. The first hypothesis 
relates to Wagner’s law. The second hypotheses relates to revenue 
constraint in relation to behaviour of public expenditure. The third 
hypothesis relates to the "stage of development".
In the case of the Wagner’s Law hypothesis, we state that the 
government expenditure has been growing both absolutely and relative 
to total economic performance. This hypothesis is being tested here 
further although its applicability to a country like Tanzania has been
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ruled out by a number of early studies. The main reason for picking 
it up once again is that the early studies had analysed data of upto 
early 1960s. Since we have data of up to early 1980s, it is pertinent 
that the hypothesis should be tested for the observation of any 
relationship between the two factors. The second hypothesis of 
revenue constraint on public expenditure is constructed in a way that 
allows for the examination of how revenue mobilization in Tanzania has 
been influencing the pattern of public expenditure. Conceptually, the 
tests will attempt to determine the extent to which efforts to 
mobilize revenue influence expenditure patterns. The third hypothesis 
on "stage of development” attempts to relate the Tanzanian pattern of 
public expenditure to its historical politico-economic background.
The hypothetical construct states that the pattern of public 
expenditure in Tanzania was influenced by the political events taking 
place during the country’s nationhood. There are difficulties of 
course of testing this hypothesis using statistical data. It is 
intended that the "stage of development" factor should be used in a 
qualitative sense mainly, although some dummy variable will be used to 
cover such influences in a general model that combines all the factors 
which will be discussed.
The discussion to follow will assume the following pattern. In 
section II below the total expenditure will be examined for its trend 
pattern, while in section III a cross section analysis of total public 
expenditure will be considered, taking into account the influence of 
economic development. In section IV the disaggregated expenditure 
will be examined for its trend pattern, while in section V the 
influence of economic development on the decomposed expenditure will
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be tested. In section VI the influence of revenues on total 
expenditure will be tested, while in section VII the hypothesis of 
* stage of development* will be examined. In section VIII we will 
examine an additional factor of "concessional foreign receipts (AID)," 
and also try to combine all the other factors discussed above to see 
how they influence expenditure. Finally there will be a summary.
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II AGGREGATE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE - TIME SERIES ANALYSIS
The growth of public expenditure in Tanzania was examined 
briefly under the problem definition chapter 2. The salient 
observations noted there will be stressed once more, but covering 
expenditure trend from 1953/54 up to 1983/84. During this period of 
31 years, total expenditure has seen a tremendous increase. In 
1953/54 the expenditure share in GDP was just about 14.4 per cent. By 
1959/60, a period when the country was getting its independence, the 
expenditure share was still low at 15.7 per cent. Between 1960/61 and 
1969/70 there was a modest increase with expenditure share remaining 
between 15 per cent and 22 per cent of GDP. After 1970 there was an 
outburst of expenditure growth. Within a decade and a half, the 
expenditure share had risen from 26.3 to 43.7 per cent. Figure 5:1 
below clearly shows the high growth pattern assumed by the absolute 
public expenditure. (Figure 5:1) An observation of the relative 
expenditure figures (to GDP) also plotted on graph (Figure 5:2) 
portrays the same image of slow growth initially followed by 
accelerated growth in recent years. The various peaks and troughs 
observable in the latter will be discussed further below.
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FIGURE 5:1. TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE TREND. 












In order to test for the secular increase in government expenditure, 
a linear and non-linear (single logarithm) regression on time were 
estimated. The expenditure figures were taken as a proportion of GDP, 
for the period 1953/54 to 1983/84. The results of the estimates are 
as presented in equations 1 and 2 below.
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(E/Y) = 0.10084 + 0.0065(T) R2 = 0.89596 (1)
(9.0) (15.9)
Log(E/Y) = -2.00424 + 0.037265(T) R2 = 0.943 (2)
(-64.3) (21.9)
Durbin-Watson (DW): 1.22
(E/Y) is the percentage share of government expenditure in GDP, (T) is 
the Time series and the figures in parentheses are t-ratios)
For both equations the coefficient of correlation (R2 ) is 
quite high implying that the equations are a good fit. The 
significant t-values in both cases also confirm that the regression 
coeficients are significant at the 5% level of significance. However, 
the non-linear function gives much more superior results compared to 
the function, given the different levels of R2 . Therefore, on the 
basis of the logarithmic function, it could be concluded that the 
expenditure has had a secular increase given the positive regression 
coefficient. On the other hand, the residuals of equation (2) are 
significant in view of the DW statistic (at the 5% level of 
significance), which points to an existence of a positive 
autocorrelation of the first order. Although additional factors will 
be considered below, it will suffice at this point to examine the 
sharp turning points (i.e. the peaks and troughs) of Figure 5:2 to 
determine their causes. Generally, the turning points appeared when 
changes in absolute GDP and public expenditure occured in the opposite 
direction. As can be seen from Table 5:1 below, the peaks occur ed 
when the GDP grew at a lesser rate than that of expenditure, while the 
troughs occured when it grew at a higher rate than that of
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expenditure. In the more recent years, beginning 1964/65, it is 
possible to identify the shocks which caused either the sharp rise or 
fall. These are indicated on the remarks column of Table 5:1.
TABLE 5:1: EXPLANATIONS FOR TURNING POINTS IN EXPENDITURE RATIO.
YEAR |NATURE CHANGE CHANGE
WITH OF IN IN
TURNING TURNING ABSOLUTE ABSOLUTE REMARK (SHOCKING EVENTS)
POINT P0INT$ GEP EXPENDITURE
1955/56 PEAK 3.9% 13.1% n
No major event or policy1959/60 TROUGH 4.5 1.9 I
1962/63 TROUGH 8.6 "*7 •1 J change can be identified
1964/65 PEAK 1.4 16.8 ^ rst five year development
1970/71
plan launched
PEAK 7.7 16.8 Nationalisation and effect ' 
of massive investment 
programme after launching
1971/72 TROUGH ; 14.5 5.8
second five year develonment Plan^
Foreign exchange crisis^
1974/75 PEAK 21.3 38.3 Villagization Programme
implemented and Drought 
expenditure-^
1977/78 TROUGH 30.0 11.9 Good crop year with coffee boom**
1978/79 PEAK 10.7 46.7 Uganda War and extra East
1980/81 TROUGH 9.7 3.3
African Community expenses^ 
IMF pressure to cut spending^
1983/84 PEAK 10.0 17.7
and severe drought effect on GDP 
Foreign exchange crisis 
affecting production in every 
sector.
As noticeable from Figure 5:2 above
- the change is the difference between outturn in the turning point 
period and the prior year
SOURCE. The figures for GDP and the Total Expenditure are as 
appears in Appendix 1
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III AGGREGATE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE - TIME SERIES ANALYSIS
This section endeavours to determine the influence of per capita 
GDP on the expenditure growth pattern in Tanzania. For the purpose of 
this analysis the per capita GDP is defined els the GDP (in current 
price) per person. The period covered is 1953/54-1982/83.
To carry out the test, the share of total expenditure in GDP was 
regressed on per capita GDP using ordinary least squares. The 
equation obtained with the various test statistics was as follows:
(E/Y) = 0.14708 + 0.0001141(P) R2 = 0.829 (3)
(12.83) (11.89)
(E/Y is the share of Total Expenditure in GDP, P is the per capita 
income, while the figures in parenthesis are the t-ratios).
At the 5% level of signficance, the significant values of t- 
statistics indicate that the regression coefficients are significant. 
Also, the R2 is high enough implying that the fit is good. The 
latter clearly shows that there is a close association between 
expenditure levels and economic development. A casual look at the 
regression coefficient might tempt someone to think that its value (ie 
0.0001141) is too small, which in fact is not the case. We need to 
remember in this instance that per capita income is expressed in 
absolute terms (ie in a few thousand shillings) while the ’E/Y’ is 
expressed as a ratio with values between O and 1.
The strong positive influence that the per capita income has on
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expenditure trend can not be brushed aside as some of the critics of 
Wagner’s Law in respect of LDCs have tended to suggest. The fact that 
a bigger portion of the economy continues to be drawn into the 
monetary sector (consequently improving the GDP measure) underlines 
the necessity to use the hypothesis in explaining expenditure 
behaviour.
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IV DISAGGREGATED GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE - TIME SERIES ANALYSIS
Hie categories of expenditure for which trend analysis was done, 
with their results, include those appearing under equations 4 to 10 
below* The data covered is that for the period 1953/54-1982/83
As far as equations (4), (6), (7), (9) and (10) are concerned,
2
the correlation coefficents (R ) are high indicating that the fit is 
good. In the case of equations (5) and (8), the R2 are rather low, 
implying that the fit is not good. As far as the t-statistics are 
concerned they are all significant, thus confirming that the 
regression coefficients are significant at the 5% level of 
significance.
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The t-statistics are given in parenthesis 
T- stands for Time Series
TYPE OF EXPENDITURE
Recurrent expenditure 
Economic Serv. Exp. 



































The fact that the regression coefficients on the time factor are all 
positive indicate that the various expenditure components have had a 
secular growth, corresponding of course to the growth pattern assumed 
by the total expenditure. Moreover, it is worth noting that the 
correlation coefficients (R2 ) for social services ((6)) and 
education expenditure ((7)) (i.e 0.8725 and 0.845 respectively) are 
quite high compared to the rest, which suggests that the government 
has been putting more emphasis in this area compared to the other 
sectors.
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V DISAGGREGATED GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE - TIME ANALYSIS
The disaggregated government expenditure items were also 
regressed on per capita GDP using ordinary least squares. The items
f
with their regression results are listed below. The data covered is 
that for 1953/54-1982/83.
The regression results on the expenditure components indicate 
the following. Equations (11), (13), (14) and (17) have a high value 
of correlation coefficient implying that the fit is good. Equations 
(12), (15) and (16) have R2 values below 0.50 indicating that the 
estimations are not very good fits. Hence, only in the case of good 
fit do we continue with the other interpretations.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Significant coihrelations between fvno
percentages of GOp and per capita ineomp ,f°vernmen  ^expenditure as 
parentheses.  P Plt* lnCOme (P) statistics are given in
TYPE OF EXPENDITURE REGRESSION EQUATION CORRELATION EQUATION
COEFFICIENT(R2) ^
Recurrent expenditure .112933+0.0000735P .825
(15.01) (11.69) * 11
Economic Sev. Exp. 0.02354+0.00000655P 282
(10.15) (3.38) ’ 12
Social Serv. Exp. 0.02813+.000020SP 693














The t-statistics in equations (11), (13), (14), and (17) indicate 
that the coefficients on per capita income are significant. For 
equation (17) the constant is not significant at the 5 percent level 
of significance. The above results bring us to a point where we 
cannot draw a strong general conclusion that the various expenditure 
items* growth patterns are influenced by economic development as 
measured by per capita income. Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that some items* growth patterns are influenced by per capita income. 
Some of these observations might tie in with the earlier observations 
made by Lall (1969: pp 416-17) 7 whereby he observed that 
correlations coefficients of the regressions he carried out were 
rather poor to the effect that changes in per capita income explained 
a relatively small part of the changes in items of government 
expenditure.
VI THE REVENUE CONSTRAINT HYPOTHESIS
In chapter 4 (p.98) the case for revenues being a big constraint 
on expenditure pattern was put forward. The government expenditure is 
seen to be restrained by the government's ability to raise revenue.
In Tanzania, revenue mobilization has always been on the difficult 
side. The existence of a big subsistence sector restricts the 
buoyancy of the tax system in that direct taxation is limited, and 
also that the administration of an indirect taxation system is costly 
and very uncertain. Much of the latter is discussed in Chapters 6 and 
8 below which deal with revenue behaviour and forecasting. For the 
purpose of testing the revenue constraint hypothesis, we need to have 
an index that will measure the effort extended by government in 
mobilizing revenues. The index that will be used in this analysis 
is the actual tax ratio (ie tax revenues to GDP). Other indices which 
have been used to measure a country's effort to mobililize revenues 
include tax capacity and tax effort indices. These indices have been 
used in cross sectional data analysis as for example in the case of 
Lotz et. al.8 and several IMF studies.9 Such indices are not 
relevant to time series data.
When the actual tax ratio is regressed against expenditure, the 
results are as shown in equation (18) below.
E/Y = -0.08345 + 1.8089(Ty) R2 = 0.80 (18)
(-2.59) (10.8)
(where E/Y is the expenditure ratio, Ty is the actual tax ratio, while 
the figures in parenthesis are the t-ratios).
The results of equation (18) appear to be significant in view of
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the high R2 value and the t-values. It can therefore be concluded 
that the revenue constraint is an influential factor in explaining the 
trend of public expenditure.
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VII THE "STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT’1 HYPOTHESIS
It was mentioned in the last chapter 4 (p1l4) that the 
expenditure pattern would be studied in the light of "stage of 
development" and it was also suggested that the whole period of 
nationhood would be considered. For reasons beyond control it has not 
been possible to collect complete data on government expenditure for 
the period preceding 1953/54. The data that could be reliably used 
for the purpose of this study was that of 1953 and after. Therefore, 
for the period before 1953/54 only the major policy highlights will be 
mentioned without statistical proof. Moreover, in a combined model of 
expenditure determinants discussed in section VIII below, * the stage 
of development* factor will be represented by a * dummy variable*. The 
setting of the variable is outlined at the end of the section. But 
first a discussion of the various stages.
(a) First Stage Of Retarded Economic Development 1890-1914
(German Rule)
During this stage the Germans spent much of the time on 
consolidation of power over the local chiefdoms. A few settler sisal 
plantations were set-up, while some peasants were encouraged to grow 
cotton. Two lines of railway were built to serve the plantations, 
namely the Central Line (1905) and the Northern Line (1912). The 
Central administration was kept at a minimum with administrative 
powers delegated to chiefs, while the provision of health and 
Education services was left to missionary establishments. Hence, it 
could be argued, the government spending remained quite insignificant.
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(b) Second Stage Of Retarded Economic Development 1916 - 1937
(British Rule)
Tanzania was ceded to Britain by League of Nations after the 1st 
World War. During the period, the taken-over economic, administrative 
and social structures were not changed significantly. A mixed economy 
(plantations and peasant production) was retained. The missionaries 
continued to provide social services, while the chiefs continued to 
administer their enclaves.10 In the area of transportation it is 
only a small extension that was made to the Germans’ installations, ie 
a Tabora-Mwanza rail extension in 1928.11 Therefore, with the 
latter set up, it can be argued that the government was not bound to 
incur high expenditure on government services.
(c) Stage Of Moderate Economic Development: 1945-1960
This period starts with the ending of the 2nd World War, after a 
short break of events in the country due to the war. In this new era 
the colonial government (ie Britain) put more emphasis on economic 
development by encouraging more of peasant, settler and commercial 
company agricultural undertakings.12 Likewise, the government 
undertook to provide better transport network, especially to areas 
which were active in agriculture. Hence, railway extensions such as 
those from Kaliuwa to Mpanda, Msagali to Hongoro, and Mtwara to 
Nachingwea.13 Though the government attempted to improve the 
quality of roads, by 1960 the road-network was still poor.14 
Moreover, government involvement in the country was limited by a 
number of factors. First was lack of skilled manpower, and secondly 
was lack of financial resources.15 The latter factors had the
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effect of pushing the government into adopting very conservative 
approach towards budgeting.16 Needless to mention, the government 
had no means of borrowing from the banks due to the finacial system in 
operation, whereby the authority lay with the East African currency 
Board in Nairobi (see Coulson 1982: p 274). Inspite of the adverse 
conditions mentioned above, the total expenditure appeared to have 
grown significantly, as can be seen from Table 5.2 below, although 
only little appeared to have been spent in the key infrustructural 
sectors (ie roads, water supply, agriculture etc).
1V5
TABLE 5:2. TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE STATISTICS
i' MILLIONS SKILLINGS






1948 136. 6.0 2.01949 174. 8.0 4.01950 232. 28.0 4.01951 292. 30.0 4.01952 366. 44.0 6.01953 360. 42.0 6.01954
} 38.1955 396. }l2.0
1956 452. j 38. 116.0
1957 462. } 36. ll8
1958 482. J 36. J18
1959 494. J 36. }22.
1960 502.
The ^ implies that the figures are for a fiscal year ending 
in June, while in the rest the figures are for the calendar year
SOURCE: Cyril Ehrlich - Tables 1 and 2. From Journal of Modern
African Studies, vol. 2 1964 pp. 265-77. Some Aspects of 
Economic Policy in Tanganyika 1945-60.
In the period 1953/54 to 1954/60 (period when GDP figures were . 
available) the public expenditure as a share of GDP ranged from 14.4% 
to 16.5%. The latter was quite minimal compared to what was taking 
place in Britain itself and other western nations. Table 5.3 below 
gives some clear impression of the point raised. Even a country like
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Kenya which held the colonial status of a full colony, had a higher 
share of public spending compared to Tanzania, although still low 
compared to what was being spent by the western countries.
TABLE 5:3. VARIOUS COUNTRIES* TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
AS A SHAKE OF GNP (in %tage).
PERIOD 1948 1950 1955 1957 1958 1962 1963
COUNTRY
USA 23 28.5 33.2
UK. 39 36.6 38
GERMANY 40.8 44.1
KENYA 16.0 20.8 19.8 18.9
SOURCE: Musgrave, R. (1969). Fiscal Systems. Chapter 4 Table 4-1 
(Data for USA, UK. & Germany). Yale University Press. 
Chadwyck Healey Ltd. Cambridge. The source for the 
Kenyan data (Original source being the Kenyan 
Statistical Abstract (Various Years)).
(d) 2nd Stage Of Moderate Economic Development, 1961-67
This was the beginning of a new era of independence. The 
political environment changed slightly but without much change in the 
economic sphere. The necessary grounds for a major change was being 
prepared, especially with the comissioning of World Bank, Arthur D 
Little Consultants and the Raisman Commission (all in 1961) to 
undertake some studies in various aspects of the economy. The reports
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were followed by the First Five-Year Plan launched in 1964/65.
Moreover, a law to protect foreign investments was enacted.17 But 
the tide was not in favour of Tanzania. Diplomatic problems with 
Britain and West Germany over Rhodesia and East Germany respectively 
led to a blockade of foreign funds which had been expected to be the 
main source of funds for the development programmes. (Coulson 1982 p 
142). The modest growth in spending during this period can be 
discerned from Figure 5.1 above.
(e) 3rd Stage Of Modest Economic Development 1967-72
This period is entered with a feeling of failure, but with 
greater political determination. The economic path to be pursued is 
defined within the policy of "socialism and self-reliance" as 
enshrined in the 1967 Arusha Declaration.18 Consequently, some 
nationalizations of foreign owned companies is carried out.19 
Moreover, the government started to approached non-tradi tional aid 
donors such as China, Netherlands, Scandinavian countries and the 
Eastern Block. China responded well by supporting the Tanzania-Zambia 
railway in 1968. Heavy spending by government through bank borrowing 
also started to take roots. From Figure 5:1, the rising level of 
expenditure is quite noticeable.
(f) Stage Of Progressive Economic Development 1973-84
The gloomy political climate with the western countries had been 
cleared. The period saw the launching of rural development programmes 
needing significant financing. Many western countries and the World 
Bank enter the scene to support the country in the poverty eradication
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programmes, especially those in the area of health, education, water 
supply, and energy supply20 etc. The rising demand for expenditure 
forced the government to borrow more from the banks. However, the 
period 1974/75 and 1975/76 saw some direct initiative on the part of 
government to reduce spending, particularly by reducing its employees 
(see Green (1984) op cit. p 293). From Figure 5.1 the sharp rise in 
expenditure is discenible, except for 1974-1976 period when there was 
a retrenchment of public spending.
In short, it is being argued on a priori grounds that some 
deliberate political-economic policies at various stages of the 
nationhood had a direct bearing on the public expenditure. To 
incorporate this factor of * stage of development* in the quantitative 
analysis, a * dummy* variable with *0* values for those periods with 
little push for expenditure will be assigned, while *1* will be taken 
for those periods with great push for expenditure, and *-1* will be 
assigned to those periods when political events had a negative impact 
on expenditure. Further specifics of the value assignment will be 
indicated in section VIII below.
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VIII A COMBINED MODEL FOR ALL THE FACTORS INFLUENCING GOVERNMENT
EXPENDITURE PATTERN
Having seen in the preceding sections the explanatory power of 
the various factors discussed over public expenditure, in this section 
we attempt to bring such factors together and see how they influence 
expenditure in general. In addition to the factors discussed above, 
ie Per Capita Income, actual tax ratio and the ’stage of development’, 
it is intended to introduce some extra factors in this multiple 
regression analysis. The first factor is that of demography, which 
should be taken to be a proxy for the automatic pressure exerted on 
government for high spending due to population growth. Although in 
this analysis the index that will be used is the annual total 
population figure, it would be interesting to find out the influence 
that changes in the structure of the population have on the 
pattern of public expenditure. Therefore, the latter remains as a 
potential area of further research. The second factor that will be 
considered in this analysis is that of concessional foreign receipts 
(aid). It is being hypothesized that the aid flows have had some 
positive influence on the expenditure pattern. Population and the aid 
factor appeared to have a strong correlation with total expenditure,
as shown in equations (19) and (20) below.
E/Y = -0.1032 + 0.0263(Po) R 2 = 0.93 (19)
(-5.53) (19.7)
E/Y = 0.1374 + 3.7838(Fy) R2 = 0.58 (20)
(6.39) (6.31)
(Where E/Y is the ratio of expenditure to GDP, Po is the
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population while Fy is the ratio of Aid to GDP)
The multiple regression results for the factors considered 
appear below as equation (21).
E/Y= 0.07773+0.8831(Fr)+0.4523(Ty)+0.0155(Po)+0.96E-05(P)+0.0033(D) 
(-1.69) (2.13) (2.07) (2.37) (0.38) (0.36)
R2 = 0.953 (21)
(E/y is the total expenditure ratio, Fr is the Aid ratio; Ty is the 
actual revenue ratio, Po is the population; P is the income per 
capita; while in D is the duimny variable representing the ’stage of 
development.’ The figures parentheses are the t-ratios.
From equation (21), the income per capita variable appears to be 
very insignificant both from the very insignificant value of the 
coefficient and from the t-ratio point of view. And when this factor 
is eliminated from the analysis, the results still remain at the same 
level of significance.22 Another factor which turns out to be 
insignificant is the ’dummy variable’. this implies that the 
assumption of certain economic political events having influenced 
expenditure trend is discontinued. Therefore, the strong factors in 
the analysis are the aid, actual revenue, and population. These 
results imply that, in forecasting expenditures, these variables have 
to be accorded due emphasis, otherwise, a failure to consider them 
could only add to the crisis experienced in expenditure control. The
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forecasting aspects will be discussed in later chapters.
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IX SUMMARY
The Chapter has tested empirically a number of factors. The 
analysis began with the examination of expenditure trends with the 
results revealing some secular growth for both total expenditure and 
the major subcategories of expenditure. Moreover, a number of 
instantaneous shocks were identified for those years when there was a 
sharp turn of expenditure trend. The shocks included political 
antagonisms, severe drought, foreign exchange crisis and wars etc.
The second level of analysis concentrated on testing the 
important factors hypothesized to be influencing the behaviour of 
expenditure. The per capita income factor was seen to be a strong 
influence on total expenditure and some of the categories of 
expenditure. For other expenditures, especially economic services 
expenditure (see equation (12)), per capita income did not appear to 
be influential. The other factor of *revenue constraint* which was 
represented by the actual tax ratio index, appeared to be a strong 
influence on expenditure as well. Other factors which could be tested 
statistically as well were those of demography and Aid. Their results 
revealed that the expenditure pattern has been responding to their 
influence too. The factor of ’stage of development* which was used to 
represent the political and social factors, could not be assigned some 
precise proxy values which could be reflected in the analysis 
justifiably. Neither did the dummy variable assigned to such factor 
emerge with significant results in the analysis. Nevertheless, on a 
priori grounds it could be argued that the determinant contribution of 
such factors upon the expenditures had been subsumed by the other 
factors. As argued correctly by Musgrave, it is not easy to separate
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neatly the influence of these political and social factors from that 
of economic factors.2 3
Finally, when the influential factors were combined in a single 
model, the results indicated that aid, actual revenue and population 
had a strong influence on expenditure trend. The per capita income 
variable emerged as a weak determinant factor, an outcome which infact 
supports the findings of the other studies which have never found per 
capita income to be a strong factor in the LDCs situation. The 
importance of these results is that, if the influential factors can be 
specified (ie forecasted) accurately, then it is quite possible to 
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C H A P T E R  6 
REVENUE TREND - AN 134PIKICAL INVESTIGATION 
I INTRODUCTION
In reviewing theories on public expenditure and revenue 
behaviour in Chapter 4, an attempt was made to identify those factors 
which influenced expenditure determination in less developed economies 
(LDCs). Among the factors examined was tax revenues. It was 
emphasized that tax revenues were a great constraint on expenditure 
determination. In carrying out the empirical tests in Chapter 5, the 
revenue aspect was included in the expenditure determination model by 
the proxy of actual tax ratio. The tax index used appeared to be 
influential in explaining the behaviour of expenditure (Chapter 5 
p.147 )•
This Chapter intends to explore further the determination of 
the revenue share in Tanzania. Those hypotheses which have been used 
or constructed to cover LDCs will be considered, and they include the 
following: The first one states that the tax capacity in Tanzania is 
positively related to the level of economic development. The second 
hypothesis states that the foreign trade sector of the LDCs serves is 
a significant factor in determining the tax capacity of a country.
The latter hypothesis is oftenly referred to as the ’degree of 
openness’ hypothesis. The former hypothesis is being reconsidered in 
spite of some objections by some eminent theorists such as Hinrich’s 
etc. who have argued that per capita income does not represent
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correctly the level of economic development in LDCs.1
Another two hypotheses that will be covered also associate the 
revenue share with the composition of the GDP with emphasis laid on 
the mining and agricultural sectors, and the foreign loans and grants 
taken by the country.
The sections to follow will be in the following order: Section
II will carry out a test for secular increase or decline in the 
revenue share. This section will also examine the level of revenue 
share instability and explore the causes for it. Section III will 
consider the hypotheses mentioned above on an aggregate level.
Section IV and V will consider foreign loans and grants from a trend 
point of view, and also a consideration of factors thought to be 
influencing it. Section VI and VII examines disaggregated current 
revenues on both trend and cross section basis. The factors which are 
thought to be influencing revenue share will be tested for the tax 
components as well. Finally, there will be a summary.
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II • CURRENT REVENUES - TIME SERIES ANALYSIS
The current revenues share of GDP has been fluctuating although 
the general trend overtime has been an upward one. A graphic 
presentation below (Figure 6:1) clearly shows that revenue growth 
relative to GDP has not been very stable over the 1953/54 - 1983/84 
period.
FIGURE 6:1 






A non-linear regression analysis of the revenue share on time 
for the period 1953/54 to 1983/84 shows that there has been secular 
growth. The values for R2 and t-statistics are high enough, thus
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pointing to the strength of the fit and the significance of the 
coefficients. The equation appears below. The t-ratios are in 
parentheses.
Log(TA) = -2.09597 + 0.02415(T) R2 = 0.81 (1)
(-59.8) (11.2)
DUEBIN-WATSON (DW):0.68 
(T/Y stands for Taxes ratio to GDP, while T stands for the time).
Worth noting from Figure 6:1 above is the fact that between 
1953/54 and 1962/63, the share of tax revenue in GDP was declining.
The ratio fell from 15.6 per cent in 1953/54 to 12.8 per cent in 
1962/63. Beginning with 1963/64 the ratio started rising gradually 
from 18.0 per cent to 25.8 per cent in 1976/77. There was a drop in 
1977/78 of about 6 per cent from that of prior year. In 1978/79 the 
share rose again reaching a peak of 29.9 per cent in 1983/84. Also 
noticeable from Figure 6:1 are a few sharp turning points which may be 
related to some events taking place. A scientific testing of the 
residuals (ie. using DW test) indicates that there is a positive 
autocorrelation of the first order, the other factors affecting the 
revenue share will be discussed in the next sections. However, some of 
the turning points will be examined further at this point. In Table 
6:1 below the nature of turning points and the levels of changes in 
taxes and GDP for the years involved are indicated. In most of the 
cases, the peaks occurred when the tax revenue change was greater than 
that of GDP, while the trough occured when the reverse of the latter 
occurred. Some of the explanations given are speculative, ie. without 
concrete support, while others are factual.
t
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TABLE 6:1. EXPLANATIONS FOR TURNING POINTS IN REVENUE 





YEARLY- YEARLY POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS OF TURNING 
TAX GDP j POINTS 
} REV CHANGE*
* CHANGE/
1964/65 PEAK 14-* 4 % 1.4# Drive to raise local funds to launch 
the 1st Five-Year Plan
1965/66 TROUGH 6.9 14.9 Could reflect the outcome of the 
diplomatic crisis which cut off 
external funding and hence reduction 
of local tax effort related to 
shelving of projects.
1968/69 PEAK 8.7 3.9 Reflects increased local tax effort 
to meet nationalization needs, as 
part of fSelf Reliance* Policy.
1970/71 TROUGH 5.5 7.7 Reflects icrpact of deep balance of 
payments crisis following Nationali­
sations (Rutayasire (1984) op cit.
P 12)
1974/75 PEAK 32.4 21.3 Reflects impact of the Introduction 
of Income Tax Act in 1973/74 which 
established fairly progressive tax 
rates.
1975/76 TROUGH -1.9 3.5 Reflects impact of severe drought 
which affected production (Rutayasire 
(1984) op cit. p l£).
1976/77 PEAK 56.8 35.3 Reflects results of coffee and tea 
boom (Arkadi# (1983) op cit. p 129) 
and external Trade Liberalisation 
(Payer (1983) op cit. p 798)
1978/79 TROUGH -4.0 10.7 Reflects impact of .severe balance of 
payments crisis (Arkadie (1983) op cit. 
P 129)
1983/84 PEAK 13.3 10.0 Reflects impact of Private Trade 
liberalisation especially on 
importation using private sources of 
funding.
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$ - As noticeable from figure 6:1 above
# - The change is the difference between outturn in the turning 
point period and the prior year.
SOURCE: The figures for GDPand the tax revenues are as appears 
in Appendix 1.
The fluctuations observed on the plot line (figure 6:1) were 
subjected to further analysis. The purpose of such analysis is to 
determine the degree to which the annual revenue flows are unstable. 
The technique used in measuring the instability analyses the 
variations of the yearly revenue figures from the trend line. Thus the 
index of instability is derived using the normalized coefficient of 
variation obtained from a linear regression of the absolute 
revenue on time over the period 1953/54-1983/84. The
formular used is: 100 X Standard Error of Estimate
Sample Mean
The Standard Error of Estimate was obtained from this equation:
R = 2680.13 + 381. 05 (T) R2 = 0.72 
(-3.3) (8.6) SEE 2192.06
(R = total Revenue; T = Trend, and the figures in parentheses 
are the t-ratios. Sample mean = 3406.7 
The level of revenue instability in Tanzania stood at 64.3%. 2 In 
order to know whether the index is either too low or too high, it was 
compared with other instability indices developed by Lim. However, 
the comparison has to be interpreted with caution due the fact that 
the periods involved are not the same. My index is based on the period 
1953/54 to 1983/84 while that of Lim is based on the 1965 to 1973 
period. Therefore, Lim's indices should only serve as rough
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indicators. Lim’s median instability index for 45 LDCs was 64%. 3 
But when the Tanzania's index is compared to the average index of 
other 21 African countries, which stood at 54%, the former certainly 
appear to be on the high side.4
What factors could explain this variability or instability in 
revenues? Several factors have been used to explain this phenomenon, 
and they appear to be related to the common characteristics of the 
LDCs. Such characteristics include the following: First, in terms of
value added (GDP), the economies are dominated by the agricultural 
sector, a sector where natural factors such as weather, pests, 
diseases etc cause great instability in production.5 The second 
argument is that most of the LDCs depend heavily on the agricultural 
sector for public revenue. Since a major source of revenues is import 
and export duties, a slight change in the quanta and prices of exports 
- which also affect foreign exchange earnings for imports, will 
immediately affect the amount of export and import duties. Hence a 
change on the supply (production) side and/or on the demand 
(consumption) side for the agricultural products affects revenues 
considerably.6 The latter implies that, in the LDCs direct taxes 
play a relatively less important role. Thirdly, it is argued, the 
existence or non-existence of spending pressure can affect revenue 
stability. Besides spending pressure arising from general price level 
changes, there could be pressure from, inter alia, the growth of 
population and the emergence of strong local opinions and world 
opinion etc. Since the government has to incur the expenditure 
arising from such pressures, it is obliged at the same time to raise 
the revenues so as to satisfy the pressure groups.7
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How do the mentioned factors affect the instability of revenues 
in Tanzania. As regards the point of agricultural sector’s dominance 
in the economy, this has already been pointed out in Chapter 3 page 
^9 above. Most of the country’s exports are to a large extent of 
agricultural nature. How then has the latter been affecting revenues? 
In the 1950’s and the 1960’s the government received more than a 
quarter of its tax revenues from export and import duties (see Table 
6:1b below). In the 1970s and early 1980’s that share declined 
considerably. Any changes which took place in the exports also 
affected the quantum of imports. An examination of the instability 
indices of agricultural output (Monetary sector), exports (excluding 
services) and imports (excluding services), which were computed using 
the same formular as on p. 157 above, pointed to rather low indices 





On the basis of the above indices, there is not much evidence 
of the instability in total revenue to having been caused wholly by 
instability in agricultural output, or exports, or imports. The 
results are reasonable of course in view of the fact that about four 
fifths of the revenues are not derived from the foreign trade sector.
The second other major factor contributing to the instability 
of revenue share in Tanzania is the tax structure itself. Looking at 
the tax components as presented on Table 6: (la) and (lb) below we
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observe that the share of indirect taxes in the total recurrent 
revenue has always been higher than that of direct taxes. Before 
discussing further the latter point, it is worthy noting that even on 
the indirect taxes, Tanzania has not been earning much revenues from 
the foreign trade sector as was argued in Chapter 4 (p.101) above. 
Quite noticeable in this respect is the export duties which have 
remained almost insignificant in all periods (except in mid and late 
1970s). Most of the exports are agricultural based as pointed out in 
chapter 3, the bulk of them being produced by peasant farmers. The 
issue of low producer prices and incentives to the farmers has 
dominated decisions concerning the setting of export taxes. The 
Government has been trying to keep taxes low on agricultural exports 
so as to keep producer prices high enough. On the part of mineral 
exports, the share is obviously low given the low level of output as 
was indicated on chapter 3 p. 62 above. Hence only a small amount of 
export taxes can be recovered from mineral exports. The latter point 
will be examined further in Section III below where some analysis has 
been done.
TABLE 6:l(a)
TAX COMPONENTS AS A SHARE OF TOTAL RECURRENT REVENUE (%)
PERIOD 1953/54 *59/60 *64/65 *69/70 *74/75 *79/80 *83/84
DIRECT TAXES 30.8 23.4 15.1 22.8 25.3 31.0 25.6
INDIR. TAXES 34.4 42.4 39.3 53.6 56.8 56.3 62.1
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TABLE 6:l(b)
TAX COMPONENTS AS A SHARE OF TOTAL RECURRENT REVENUE (%).
1953/54 *59//60 *64/65 *69/70 *74/75 *79/80 *82/83
l.EX. DUTIES 1 1 3 3 6 6 0.09
2. IMP.DUTIES 16.0 31.0 24.0 22.3 13.2 10.5 5.3
TOTAL (1+2)# 17.6 31.6 27.0 25.4 18.2 16.4 5.6
3.SALES TAX 5.7 10.9 8.9 24.4 35.7 38.1 41.0
4.V. L.TAXES 1.4 2.0 2.1 2.6 0.4 0.4 0.6
TOTAL (3+4)# 10.6 14.8 12.8 28.3 38.1 37.4 46.2
5.I.& P.TAX. 23.5 22.5 15.0 22.8 25.3 31.0 23.7
Note: # The totals do not add up exactly to the sub-components
because of either some omissions of other minor taxes, or even some 
errors in the data.
Key for abbreviations used:_______
Indr. Taxes - Indirect Taxes.
Ex. Duties - Export Duties.
Imp. Duties - Import Duties.
Sales Tax - Consumption and Excise Duties.
V.L. Taxes - Vehicle Licences and Taxes.
Source: Computed from Revenue data appearing in Appendix 1
Coming back to the point of low direct taxes, it has been 
argued that, in order for the tax share to grow at the same rate or
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even at a higher rate than that of national income, the tax system as 
a whole must be income elastic in character. The taxes involved 
should have a built-in flexibility to increase as income increases.
The built-in tendency to rise should be supplemental to whatever 
discretional measures which might be taken by tax authorities to 
bolster revenue inflows. Norman Gemmell has been able to show in the 
case of a country like the U.K. which relies heavily on progressive 
income tax and value added tax that there is a built-in tendency for 
the shares of income tax and VAT in total revenue to rise and fall 
respectively as income rises. The effective average rate of income 
tax rises independently of changes induced by inflation, under 
indexing or other discretionary actions by the tax authority, while 
the effective average rate of VAT falls slightly as incomes rise in 
the absence of changes in the rate structure.8 As far as Tanzania 
is concerned, in the 1950s and 1960s, for direct taxes, the country 
relied upon taxes such as poll tax and hut tax.9 A more 
progressive income tax system was introduced in 1973 under the Income 
Tax Act of 1973. Moreover, as appearing on Table 6:1(b) above, the 
share of non-income taxes have continued to dominate. A further 
examination of the tax-income buoyancy coefficients for the various 
major groups of taxes pointed to the results appearing below.
The taxes which have an elasticity co-efficient greater than 
unity certainly point to progressivity of the tax. However, when we 
compare the elasticity coefficient of income tax with that of sales 
tax, we note that the former has been less progressive. But more to 
it is that most of the sales taxes depend on discretional action 
(either changes in tax rates or bases etc.) for increased taxes. And
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in view of the fact that sales taxes are now the main revenue sources, 
and given that they do not bear a built-in flexibility to change with 
changes in national income, any instability experienced in this source 
will therefore be felt in the total tax revenue.
CATEGORY OF TAX BUOYANCY COEFFICIENT
Total Tax Revenue 1.225
Foreign Trade Taxes 0.840
Local Transaction Taxes 1.749
Consumption and Excise Duties 1.901
Income and Personal Taxes 1.2762
Source: Adapted from equations appearing in Appendix 6 Table 6A-1
Having looked at the trend and the unstable nature of the tax 
share, I now turn to the next sections which examines the factors 
which appear to explain or influence the behaviour of the total 
revenue ratio and the tax components ratios.
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III CURRENT REVENUE: TIME SERIES ANALYSIS
In this section the hypotheses (discussed in Chapter 4 above) 
which considered the per capita income, * degree of openness1, the 
composition of GDP and the foreign loans/grants will be tested. The 
per capita income factor which represents the stage of economic 
development was considered inappropriate measure for development in 
LDCs (see Chapter 4 p. 108 ) although observation made on empirical 
tests were of mixed results. In some cases this factor appeared to be 
important in explaining changes in revenue share while in some 
countries * cases, it appeared to be less influential.10 Inspite of 
the latter objection to use income per capita for LDC revenue 
analysis, I, however, consider it important that it should be taken 
into account in the analysis, for a couple of reasons. First, my 
analysis will cover an additional 15 years relating to 1970s and 1980s 
which were not covered in the analyses cited above. Secondly, as the 
economy continues to be monetized further, the problems of compiling 
GDP figures continue to ease. Current efforts to raise the ratio of 
manufacturing output (see Chapter 3 p. 57 ) through industrialization, 
and also efforts to change rural life through the Integrated Rural 
Development Programmes should imply a greater monetization of the 
economy. Moreover, the government’s integration into the UNO, IMF, 
World Bank etc. Systems of data reporting should also imply to some 
extent an improvement in the data management systems. Nevertheless, 
the results obtained from the use of per capita income in the analysis 
of revenues have to be interpreted with caution.
On the other hand, the ’degree of openness’ hypothesis has 
received much attention from those who have done some studies in this
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area such as Musgrave (1969 p 72) and Hinrichs (1965 p. 549) etc. 
Though there is no dispute among scholars over what * degree of 
openness* covers, however, some scholars differ on the selection of 
proxy that represents the foreign trade sector.11 The variables 
which have been used as representing the * degree of openness* or 
foreign trade sector include: the imports ratio to GDP, the export
ratio to GNP, the sum of exports and imports ratio to GNP; the trade 
balance (exports minus imports) ratio to GNP, etc. Since the purpose 
of this study is to identify those factors which influence tax ratio 
in Tanzania, all of the variables will be included in the cross- 
section analysis to test for their effect on the pattern of revenue 
share.
The other variables which will be tested for their influence on 
revenue shares are those of the composition of GDP. In particular the 
share of Mining and Agriculture will be considered. The two variables 
have been included in various studies undertaken under the umbrella of 
IMF staff papers. For most of the LDCs, excluding petroleum exporting 
countries, the latter sectors are most important in as far as tangible 
goods production is concerned. Manufacturing sector still remains 
insignificant with less than 10 per cent share (Chapter 3 p 57 ). 
Secondly, the output of these two sectors accounts for almost 100 per 
cent of the foreign (export) trade sector. Implicitly, the two 
sectors provide the cushion for the taxable bases in the LDCs. 
Undoubtedly, the level of production in the two sectors have a direct 
impact on the level of exports and imports as well as the level of 
demand for consumable goods, which in turn affect revenue flow. Since 
the LDCs do not tax directly the incomes of small farmers and miners,
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the tax advantage of the two sectors are expected to be in the form of 
foreign-trade sector duties and consumption taxes.
Finally, the other factor to be tested in this analysis is that 
of external concessional receipts (Aid)12 The latter view is still 
controversial because there are other schools of thought which argue 
that receipts of foreign aid lead to taxes being lower than they 
otherwise would be.13 Nevertheless, in view of current efforts by 
institutions such as World Bank to have more aid mobilized for the 
LDCs, the latter underscores the importance of aid in increasing the 
recipients9 dewiestic saving efforts.14 Moreover, if we may assume 
that aid (especially that in form of projects) exerts some form of 
pressure on the government to increase its efforts in mobilizing more 
local resources to cover the counterpart project costs, then there is 
some practical support to consider Aid as a potential factor 
influencing revenue shares.
The regression analysis was made for the period 1953/54- 
1983/84, taking into account the variables discussed above. The 
recurrent revenue ratio was regressed on the various variables in 
various combinations as listed in Table (6):2 below. For the Aid 
factor, further regressions were made to cover the period 1966/67- 
1983/84.
17Q
TABLE (6):2: REGRESSION RESULTS ON REVENUE SHARK 
(PERIOD COVERED: 1953/54-1983/84)
REGRESSION EQUATION R2 Bl- .
T/Y = 0.1407 + O.48E 04 (P) 
(17.47) (7.18J .64 (1)
T/Y = 0.1729 + 0.384E 04 (P)-0.0981 Xy 
(3.8) (2.5) (-.73)
.647 (2)
T/Y = .1086 + 0.49E 04 (P) + 0.0098 (My) 
(3.6) (7.297 (1.117)
.655 (3)
T/Y = 0.1768 + 0.03745 (My) 
(3.7) (0.21)
0.0015 (4)
T/Y = 0.147 + 0.36E-04 (P) -0.624E 02 (My) 
(2.5) (1.966) (1-0.032)
-0.16 ( ^ ) 0.66 (5)
(-0.774)
T/Y = -0.0091 + 0.713E 04 (P) + 0.2372 (— ) 
(-0.15) (6.56) (2.56) y
0.71 (6)
T/Y = 0.18711 —  3.506 (Ny) + 0.1278 (Ay) 
(8.25) (-8.02) (2.79)
.6969 (7)
T/Y = 0.0772 + 0.403E 04 (P) + 0.1861 ( ± ^  )-0.1938(Fy)71 
(2.9) (4.8) (2.5) y (-.55)
(8)
T/Y = 0.0387+0.56E 04(P)+0.151(Ym)-0.09154 (FY) 
(.737) (5.59) (1.924) (-0.26)
.686 (9)
T/Y = .229+0.324E 04 (P)-0.1337(^ 3lX ') +0.0894 (FY) 
(3.1) (3.1) (-0.8) (0.21)
.481 (10*)
T/Y = 0.466-0.403E 06(P) 0.399 (Ym) +0.184 (Fy) 
(2.28) (-0.15) (-1.46) (0.442)
.46 (11*)
T/Y = 0.1765 + 0.193E 04(P)-2.334(Ny)+0.6997(Ay) 
(7.57) (1.49) (2.6) (1.18)
.720 (12)
T/Y = 0.091+0.1768E 04(P) -1.709 Ny+0.0977 Ay 
(1.54) (1.399) (-1.78) (1.61)
+ 0.144 (Ym-X*)
(1.537) y .74 (13)
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TABLE (6): 2 (Continued)
T/Y = 0.1117+0.268E.04 (P)-1.982 (Ny) + 0.0673l(Ay)




T/Y = 0.078 + 0.4HE_04(P)-1.644 (Ny)+0.048(Ay)+1395^y^
(0.98) (1.94) (1.59) (0.79) (1.29)
T/Y =0.18313+0.541E 04(P) - 0.094(Ay)
(7.3) (8.4) (-1.94)
Symbols used
T/Y = ratio of Revenue to GDP 
P = Per capita income 
Xy^ = ratio of export goods to GDP 
My = ratio of import goods to GDP
(x~-5)= patio of foreign trade balance to GDP
y
(£±H) = ratio of total foreign trade to GDP
y
Ny = ratio of mining sector output to GDP
Ay = ratio of Agricultural sector output to GDP.
(XSlX  ^_ pg^o of non-export monetary GDP to GDP
y
Fy = ratio of AID to GDP
Ym = ratio of monetary GDP to GDP
* = the equations are based on 1966-84. data
(The Figures in Parentheses are*T-ratios)
The results of the per capita income [P] variable regression 
were quite significant as presented on equation (1) above. The R2
with the value 0.64 indicates that the regression is reliable. The t- 
value also shows that the coefficients are significant at the 95 per 





case might look small, but that is not the case. This is due to the 
fact that the per capita income is stated in absolute terms while the 
revenue ratio is stated in percentage. In view of the above 
reasonably significant results, we can draw the conclusion that, in 
part, the revenue share responds to the influence of the economic 
development.
The results of the ’degree of openness’ hypothesis where 
regressions were made on exports, imports, total foreign trade, 
foreign trade surplus etc. were quite unsatisfactory. Equation (2) 
above which has the export goods as a variable clearly shows that the 
coefficient is insignificant when judged from the low level of t- 
value, and moreover, the coefficient has a negative sign, which 
actually negates our hypothesis that the exports have a positive 
contribution to the taxable capacity.
Using the imports as our variable and having multiple 
regression done with per capita income as the other explanatory 
variable, the results as presented on equation (3) above are a bit 
encouraging although the low value of t-ratio indicates that at the 5 
per cent of significant the import coefficient is insignificant. 
However, when the import variable is regressed alone as presented on 
equation (4) above, the very low values of t-ratio = (0.21) and R2 = 
(0.0015) clearly shows that there is hardly any relationship between 
the revenue share and import ratio. The results are not surprising 
though because, as shown on Table 6:1(b) above, the taxes arising from 
the foreign trade sector have been declining substantially relative to 
the other sources.
The foreign trade surplus variable (X-M) as presented on
\;
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equation (5) above, also appears to be unimportant as a determinant on 
the revenue share. The t-ratio for this variable indicates that the 
coefficient is insignificant. Though the coefficient bears a negative 
sign, the final impact is expected to be positive because since 
1969/70 the trade balance has been in the deficit, and in more recent 
years the deficit has been almost 100 per cent of the export value. 
Prior to 1969/70 the account was almost balancing. The trade 
balances for a few selected years which appear below in Table 6:3 
might help to exemplify the point.
TABLE 6:3 FOREIGN TRADE BALANCE FOR SRTJarrgn YFAFS 
(in millions shs)
YEAR 1953/54- 57/58 61/62 65/66 68/69 69/70 73/74 78/79 81/82 83/84
BALANCE +40 +182 -12 +110 +25 -407 -2170 -4629 -6111 -7183
+ = positive trade balance 
- = negative (deficit) trade balance
Source: Computed from total exports (goods and services) and total
imports (goods and services) as supplied by United Republic 
of Tanzania (various years) Economic Survey, Dar es Salaam.
The results of the *total trade variable (X+M)/Y) in equation 
(6) above appear to be significant. The critical value of t-ratio 
shows that the coefficient is significant. The coefficient on the per 
capita income (P) is also significant. The constant is rendered 
insignificant due to the low level of t-ratio. In view of the high
value of R2 =0.708, the regression is also considered to be 
signi ficant.
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The rather poor explanatory power of 'degree of openness* 
variable as represented by the various proxies, can be explained by 
the changing in role of the various foreign trade taxes in relation to 
the total revenue over the period in consideration. As presented in 
Table 6:1(b) above, the local transaction taxes and income taxes have 
assumed a greater proportion, especially in more recent years, thus 
overshadowing the important role played by the foreign-trade taxes in 
the 1950s and 1960s.
The results for the shares of mining and agriculture as 
specified in equation (7) appear to be quite interesting. These 
results were expected because of the relative roles played by the 
mineral and agricultural sectors. In Chapter 3 (p. 1*9 a^d p.62 ) the 
diminishing contribution by the mineral sector and the dominance of 
agricultural sector were pointed out. Although agriculture may not be 
taxed directly, ie. through producer taxes, or land taxes etc. 
however, for agriculture-based LDC like Tanzania, it is this sector 
that provides the income which eventually is taxed in form of import 
duties, sales taxes, excise duties etc. Therefore, the agricultural 
sector is taxed indirectly through expenditure taxes.
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The next results to be considered are those related to the Aid 
influence on revenue share as specified in equation (8) and (11) 
above. The equations appear to be good fits as reflected by the 
significant values of R2 . However, for the Aid variable (Fy), the 
ratios are very insignificant, thus making the coefficients appear 
insignificant. More interesting on the latter variable is the change 
in the arithmetic sign of the coefficients on the basis of length of 
study period taken. For equations (8) and (9) which covered the 
period 1953/54 - 1983/84, the coefficients were negative which implied 
that the Aid had the negative effect of having taxes lowered. But 
equations (10) and (11) which were based on the period 1966-84, gave 
positive coefficients on Aid which implied that the latter had the 
effect of increasing tax effort. In view of the fact that the level 
of aid to Tanzania increased considerably after mid 1960s (discussed 
further in Section V below), the results of equations (10) and (11) 
are important in that they confirm the positive role played by aid 
towards local resource mobilization.
Besides the results already discussed for equation (1) to (11), 
some additional simulation analysis was done that involved combining 
the various factors. These are reflected in equations (12) to (16) 
above. The equation that would present the best option is (16) due to 
its high values of t-ratios and R2. The Ay coefficient now assumes 
a negative sign, but this could be expected because since it is taken 
as a proxy for income per head (Prest op cit. page 20), it therefore 
appears as a repetition of the other variable (P) ie per capita 
income.
When the Tanzanian data was applied to the IMF accepted equation
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(18) below,14 the results were as shown in equation (18(a) below.
T/Y= 11.47 + 0.001(Yp_Xp) + 0t44 Ny + 0#05 xy R2= 0#376 (18)
(7.84) (0.38) (5.45) (1.17)
T/Y= 0.1773 + 0.3565E-04(yp-Xp)-1.18(Ny)+ 0.076(Xy) R2=0.704 (18a) 
(4.29) (2.31) (2.64) (0.4945)
(Yp-Xp is per capita non export GNP, Xy is the export ratio 
excluding mineral exports, Ny is the share of mining in GDP, T/Y is 
the share (in percentage) of taxes in national income).
The correlation coefficient (ie R2 = 0.704) for equation (18a) 
is quite high which confirms the fitness of the equation, but the t- 
ratio for the non-mineral exports is rather low, thus rendering the 
regression coefficient insignificant. Another major difference is the 
sign on the Ny (mineral) variable which is negative in equation (18a). 
The reasons for the latter occurancy are certainly the same as those 
given for the outcome in equation (7) above. In spite of the fact 
that the mineral sector is not a major contributor to the economy, 
however, equation (18) could still be used to assess the tax capacity 
of Tanzania.
IV FOREIGN LOANS/GRANTS - TIME SERIES ANALYSIS
The foreign aid ratio to GDP pattern over the period 1953/54- 
1983/84 has been one of great fluctuations. When we apply regression 
analysis to the trend, we observe the following: The foreign receipts
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(Aid) have been growing over the period as revealed by equation (19) 
below, where the regression coefficient is positive.
F/Y = 0.0071 + 0.14889 E-02 (T) R* = 0.516 (19)
(1.44) (5.56)
(Fy is the foreign aid ratio, T is the trend and the figures in 
parenthesis are the t-ratios. At 5 per cent level of significance, 
the t-ratio for the trend is critical, signifying the reliability of 
the coefficient. The constant appears to be insignificant in view of 
the low value of t-ratio).
The foreign aid ratio has been plotted on graph and it appears below 
as Figure 6:3 (next page).
An inspection of the above plot reveals a number of peaks and 
troughts which can be associated with a number of local and 
international political occurances. The 1957 peak was the climax of 
the effort which the colonial government was making to mobilize 
resources for the development of infrastructure.15 The 1958-60 fall 
is the period of independence arrangements which certainly saw the 
weakening of effort on the colonial government to continue investing 
more on infrastructure in the country. The 1964-70 decline stands for 
the period when the country was involved in a diplomatic row with the 
traditional source of aid, especially Britain, USA and West Germany. 
The causes of hostilities were the unilateral declaration of 
independence by Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and the establishment of 
diplomatic ties with the German Democratic Republic.16 The sharp
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rise after 1970 and ending in 1978 signified the change in direction 
of aid seeking, which saw the alignment with new sources of aid such 
as Scandanvian countries, the Netherlands, China, Canada, Japan and 
the World Bank.17 Finally, the drop from 1979 reflects on the 
period of protracted negotiations with IMF which have kept aloof some 
of the main donors who have been looking forward for an agreement.18







Besides these political factors which somehow influenced the 
direction of foreign aid share, what other factors made a similar 
influence? We provide an answer in the next Section.
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V. FOREIGN LOANS/GRANTS - TIME SERIES ANALYSIS
A meaningful factor that the foreign aid factor could be 
associated with is the share of exports in GDP. The support for the 
export share has been its association with the country’s 
creditworthiness or ability to meet its foreign obligations. In 
recent years, particularly in the late 1970s and early 1980s, LDCs 
have fallen into serious debt problems, especially in fulfilling their 
debt related commitments, apparently due to their inability to export 
enough. Tanzania itself has been facing this problem. This has led 
to difficulties in meeting its maturing debt obligations,19 and in 
turn she has failed to improve on her aid inflow, as can be seen from 
the upper part of figure 6:2 above where the share of aid has been 
falling. Therefore, the export factor which is considered to have a 
great bearing on debt procurement and servicing, is regressed upon the 
aid factor to see if there is any association. The regression is done 
in both linear and non-linear (double logarithmic) function. In the 
case of linear function, an additional ’dummy* explanatory variable 
was included. The dummy variable is set in line with the political 
factors which were highlighted above in Section IV. The setting of 
the dummy variable is as follows: where political factors involved
had a negative influence on aid inflow, a value of -1 has been 
allocated. Where the political factors were of positive nature, then 
a +1 has been used. 0 (zero) has been used where political factors 
did not appear to have played a distinct role. Thus -1 has been used 
for the periods 1958-60, 1965-71 and 1980-84; while +1 has been used 
for 1972-1979.
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The results for the regressions appear below.
FR = 0.075445 + 0.1740816(X) + 0.01092(D) R2 = 0.60 (20)
(8.6) (-5.05) (4.22) df = 28
logFR = log5.26866 - 1.08791og X R2 = .24 (21)
(-9.96) (-3.04)
(F/R stands for foreign aid share. X is the export share and D is the 
dummy variable with *0’ value for the year 1954-57 and 1961-64 while 
'+1' value is for the years 1972-79 and *-1* value for 1958-60, 1965- 
1971 and 1980-84, all as explained in the text above).
Equation (20) which appears to be more reliable due to its high 
value of R2 (=.60) has critical values of t=statistics as well 
which implies that the coefficients are signficant at the 5 per cent 
level of significance. Interesting though is the inverse relationship 
between the foreign aid factor and the export ratio. The 
interpretation of the inverse relationship could be that the foreign 
aid are secured when performance in exports is rather low. This 
implies that when export performance is good, there is less begging 
for aid to support imports. The latter argument could hold for 
Tanzania where most of the aid is secured to support the government 
development budget, which is actually obtained through bilateral and 
multilateral arrangements rather than from the open private money and 
capital markets. This also implies that in times of high exports, the 
economy must have performed well too, given that exports are mainly 
agricultural in nature. Since agricultural output dominates in the
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national output, this has the effect of having the government earn 
more revenues which could be used to finance the development budget, 
supported also with enough foreign exchange. We have already seen 
above that the revenue ratio is influenced significantly by the 
agricultural share. Moreover, realising the problem of budgeting in 
LDCs, and if on a priori grounds, we may accept the view, that foreign 
aid budget in LDCs is a financing requirement residue of the total 
budget rather than an autonomous properly planned budget, then the 
export-aid relationship observed above could be expected. Thus the 
aid would be supplementing the export earnings.
Looking at the dummy variable used, the results have confirmed 
the important role played by the political events mentioned earlier in 
determining the pattern of foreign aid.
As regards the results of the logarithmic fit, equation (21) 
above, the ciritical values of t-ratios clearly show that the 
coefficients are significant, in spite of the equation being less 
reliable due to the low value of R 2 ( = .24). The 1.1 coefficient on 
log X which is greater than unity implies that foreign aid is modestly 
elastic to exports.
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VI. DISAGGREGATED CURRENT REVENUE - TIME SERIES ANALYSIS
The recurrent revenues which have been decomposed into the 
various components, namely indirect taxes, direct taxes, foreign 
transaction taxes, local transaction taxes and income taxes, will be 
tested for their secular growth or decline. Our hypothetical setting 
is that the various tax components have had an upward trend overtime.
The various ratios were regressed on time using a linear fit. 
The results appear below on Table 6:4
- i8 * t
TABLE 6:4. REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS
(PERIOD COVERED IS 1953/54-1982/83) 




0.02548 + 0.00128 (T) 
(7.9) (7.3)
0.2353 - 0.00668 (T) 
(I5.i) (0.78)














0.319 - 0.00607 (T) 
(16.25) (-5-7)
-0.0105 + 0.00396 (T) 
(-1.75) (12.17)
0.03197 + 0.014 (T) 
(1.56) (12.6)
0.02429 + 0.001322 (T) 
(7.68) (7.71)
0.2282 + 0.00953 (T)
(14.2) (1.08)
Key to symbols used 
TD - Direct, taxes
Tid - Indirect taxes
TF - Foreign Transaction Taxes
TL - Local Transaction Taxes
Ti - Income Taxes
























The direct taxes shares are represented by equations (22) and
(23). In the case of equation (22), we observe that the direct taxes 
to GDP ratio has been growing over the period. The t-ratios and the 
correlation coefficient are critical and significant respectively.
For equation (23), the direct taxes to total taxes ratio does not 
appear to have changed significantly with time. The R2 (=0.02) and 
the t-ratios for time factor are both insignificant thus limiting the 
reliability of the results. The latter results confirm observations 
made on Table 6:1(a) above where the direct taxes were seen to have 
been erratic with little sign of growth.
In the case of the indirect taxes shares presented in equations
(24) and (25) below, in both respects, the ratios have been growing 
over time. The t-ratios and the R 2 are high enough thus indicating 
that the fit and the coefficients are significant. This upward trend 
was also observed in Table 6:1(a) for indirect taxes.
In the case of the foreign trade taxes* shares presented in 
equations (26) and (27) below, the results are not significant for 
equation (26) ie. where the taxes are considered as a ratio of GDP.
The low value of R2 which is 0.07 clearly shows that the fit is 
very poor. Moreover, the t-ratio for the time coefficient is not 
critical. The latter implies that there was no secular growth during 
the period. However the results of equation (27) show that there was 
a secular decline as indicated by the negative coefficient. The 
latter certainly corroborate the observations made on Table 6:1(b) 
above where the foreign transactions taxes (as a total) was seen to 
be falling, especially from mid-1960s although the export duties (with 
an almost insignificant share) had shown some growth up to late 1970s.
186
The import duties comprised most of the foreign trade taxes and their 
declining trend from mid-1960s is the one mirrored by the total 
foreign trade taxes. The decline in the foreign trade taxes can be 
explained mainly by the fall in exports (see Chapter 3 p. 67 ). The 
exports as a ratio of GDP fell from a level of 28.9% in 1964 to 7.8% 
in 1982. This has consequently implied a strangulation of imports 
financed by export earnings. The considerable rise in imports (in
absolute terms) as seen above (Chapter 3 p. 67 ) can be accounted for
by the increase in foreign aid, the imports of which are of capital
nature (between 1972 and 1980 more than 50% of the imports were of
machinery, transport equipment and intermediate inputs nature. See 
chapter 3 p. 66 ) and are not taxed in any case. However, since 1978 
the imports as a ratio of GDP have been declining, a phenomenon which 
tends to undermine further the relative contribution of the tax base 
to the revenues. Secondly, with the increase in industrialisation, 
especially the import substitution type, there has been some reduction 
of certain types of exports and imports. The raw inputs into the new 
industries such as coffee, cotton and sisal etc. reduce what could 
have been exported easily. Equally, the output of the new industries 
cater for the heme market for the consumable goods, which has meant 
cutting down on imports of similar goods. In view of the disappearing 
exports and the reduction in taxable imports, it is not supprising to 
find that the share of foreign trade taxes in total taxes declines 
with time as total tax revenues increase. The above trend of events 
certainly give way to other local transactions-based taxes as will be 
seen below.
In the case of local transactions taxes, [equations (28) and
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(29)], we observe that there has been a growth with time. On both 
equations the fit is quite superior, and the t-ratios are quite 
critical. Since this type of taxes comprises mainly of local 
consumption taxes such as sales tax, excise duties, licences, etc. 
the results tie-up with the argument advanced in respect of the 
declining foreign transactions taxes. It is interesting to note that 
the sales taxes started rising when the import duties, for example, 
started to decline, as can be seen from Table 6:1(b).
Finally, in the case of the income taxes (equations (30) and (31) 
above), i t is only in the case of the income taxes ratio to GDP (eq.
(30) where we find the results are to be reliable. The equation has a 
high value of R2 which is 0.67, and the t-ratio are critical thus 
confirming the significance of the coefficients. This also means that 
there has been a secular growth of the ratio with time. For the 
income tax share in total revenue, the value fo R2 is very low at
0.03 thus limiting the reliability of the results. Moreover, the t- 
ratio for the trend is insignificant thus indicating that the 
coefficient is not significant. So, the share of income taxes in 
total taxes has not been growing. From Table 6:1(b) above the income 
taxes ratios were seen to have been quite static. This result could 
well be in line with what theoretically could be expected on Tanzania. 
As pointed out by Musgrave, income taxation can be important, only 
when economic organization has been developed with production and 
sales establishments becoming larger and more permanent, private firms 
operating more efficiently, accounting practices improved thus making 
it possible to tax business income effectively etc. Similarly rural 
subsistence sector with concentration of employment in large
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establishments is important for effective operation of income tax 
20system. In Tanzania, just about 10 per cent is the industrial 
contribution to GDP. There still exists a relatively large rural 
(subsistence) sector. With these draw-backs, we cannot expect to find 
an elaborate income tax system that would contribute an increasing 
share in total revenues.
The results observed in this section will be corroborated further 
by the test-work to be done in the next section where the various tax 
ratios are tested for their influence by other factors.
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VII DISAGGREGATED CURRENT REVENUE - TIME SERIES ANALYSIS
In this section the tax components as outlined in Section VI 
above will be examined further. The hypotheses to be tested are those 
relating tax structure to economic development. For the purpose of 
stating the hypotheses, the tax components are divided into the 
indirect and direct taxes. The other subdivisions tested above, namely 
foreign transactions taxes, local transactions taxes and income taxes 
are expected to fall in one of the latter categories.
The first hypothesis to be tested states that the ratio of 
* indirect * to total taxes is related conversely to per capita income. 
The construction of the hypothesis in this way is in line with the 
position taken by Richard A. Musgrave. His supportive argument for 
such construction is that in low income economies the economic 
structure is not suited to the imposition of direct taxes. But 
indirect taxes can be imposed more readily. 21 Although Musgrave*s 
empirical work was based on cross section data of various developing 
economies, however, the same hypothesis can be applied to Tanzania.
The underlying assumption in the hypothesis is that high ratio of 
indirect taxes would be associated with low per capita incomes.
The second hypothesis to be tested states that the ratio of 
'direct* to total taxes is related positively to per capita income.
The assumption in this case is that higher economic development makes 
it possible for direct taxes such as income taxes to play a more 
significant role than the indirect taxes.
The regression results for both linear and logarithmic fit appear 
in Table 6:5 below. The indirect taxes results are represented by
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equations (32), (33), (34) and (35) below. Equations (32) and (35) 
relating to indirect taxes and local transactions taxes* do not 
confirm the hypothesis. The inverse relationship anticipated between 
the tax shares and per capita income is not there. However, equation 
(33) which relates 'foreign transactions taxes share to per capita 
income confirms the hypothesis. Similar results are observed when a 
logarithmic fit is used as appears in equation (34) below, although 
the fit is a bit inferior to that of equation (33). The results of 
equations (32) and (35) might just point to the low level of economic 
development in Tanzania which implies that the indirect taxes still 
play a very significant role.
When indirect taxes are taken as a ratio of GDP (see equations 
(36), (37) and (38)), the results of equation (36) and (38) indicate 
that such taxes have been growing with per capita income. In the 
case of equation (37), the foreign transactions taxes appear to be 
related inversely to the per capita income.
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TABLE 6:5. REGRESSION RESULTS ON TAX STRUCTURE.
(PERIOD COVERED IS 1953/54-1983-84)
EQUATIONS H2 Eq. No.
Tid/T = 0.4049 + 0.941E 04 (P) 
(20.8) (5.78)
.53 (32)
TF/T = .3053 - .871E 04 (P) 
(25.2) (-8.S1)
.72 (33)
LogTF/T = Log1.7*0 -0.506LogP .61 (3*0
(3.5) (-6.77)
TL/T = 0.0971 + 0.1694E -04 (P) 
(5.25) (10.95)
.81 (35)
Tid/Y = 0.C5404 + 429 E-04 
(9.8) (9.3)
.75 (36)
TF/Y = 0.04.73 - 0.871E 04 (P) 
(17.5) (-3.84?)
.34 (37)
T I A  = 0.00746 + 0.48E -04 (P) 
(1.519) (11.71)
.83 (38)
TD/T = 0.22804 + 0.2028E 04 (P) 
(19.37) (2.06) “
.13 (39)
Ti/T = 0.2232 + 0.227E 04 (P) 
(18.2) (2.2)
.145 (40)
TD/Y = 0.03105 + .161E 04 (P) 
(13.23) (8.22)
.70 (a)
Ti/Y = 0.0302 + 0.1654 E 04 
(12.7) (8.34) _
.71 (42)
Tid/Y = 0.0478 + 0.7646 (T/Y) 
(-4.53) (13V9)
.87 (43)
LogTid/Y = LogO.17^5 * 1.52fiLogTA .84 (44)
(.83) (12.5)
Tid/T = 0.5469 - 0.1014 (Ay) 0.01 (45)
(6.3) (-0.62)
Tid = indirect taxes; TF = foreign transaction taxes; TL local 
transaction taxes; TD = direct taxes; Ti = income taxes; Y = GDP;T= TOT. 
taxes; P = per capita income; Ay = Agricultural sector output ratio.
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It might be appropriate at this point to note that the outcome of 
equation (33) below ties up with results reported earlier on the 
secular decline of the foreign transactions taxes [equation 27] above. 
When the results on indirect taxes are compared with those of 
Musgrave, we note quite a few significant contrasts. His results 
showed that the Tid/T ratio was related negatively to per capita 
income. This is certainly different from the finds in equation (32) 
below where the regression coefficient is positive. Another important 
difference in finds is on the relationships between Tid/T and 
Agriculture share in GDP, as represented by equation (45) above. In 
spite of the equation being insignificant, however, the negative 
regression coefficient is in the opposite of the findings by 
Musgrave.22 This can possibly be explained by the rapid rise in the 
share of indirect taxes in total taxes in Tanzania as was indicated in 
Table 6:1(a) above.
Turning to the results of direct taxes as represented by
equations (39) and (40) above, the results are not significant for any
meaningful conclusion to be drawn because of low values of the R2 
which are below 0.15. The coefficients carry the right sign 
(positive) though, which would imply a positive influence. The latter 
results tie-in with the results obtained earlier when testing for 
secular growth [equations (23) and (31)].
When the direct taxes are taken as a ratio of GDP, as represented
in equations (41) and (42) above, the results confirm that the tax
shares are positively related to per capita income. The function 
appears to be a good fit in view of the high values of R2 and the t- 
ratios which are also critical.
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Some additional regressions were done to relate the indirect 
taxes to the ratio of total taxes to GDP, and the agricultural share 
in GDP. The results appear under equations (43), (44) and (45) above. 
The results of equations (43) and (44) indicate that there is a 
positive relationship between indirect taxes and the total taxes share 
in GDP. This relationship was expected because indirect taxes still 
contribute a significant share to the total taxes.23 The 
relationship is a positive one. Equation (45) which takes agriculture 
share factor appears to be insignificant due to the insignificant 
value of R2 which is 0.01. This lack of association is a clear 
indication of the rapid upward change that the indirect taxes have 
been experiencing relative to the dismal change in growth observed in 
the share of agriculture in GDP (see Chapter 3 p.49 )•
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V I I I .  SUM M ARY
The Chapter has attempted to analyse the determinants of tax 
levels and foreign receipts using the hypotheses which apply to LDCs. 
Significant results which either confirm or refute some of the 
hypotheses were achieved. Generally, both total tax revenues and 
foreign receipts were seen to be experiencing some secular growth. At 
the disaggregated tax levels, with an exception of foreign trade taxes 
(ie exports and import duties) all the component taxes experienced 
some growth during the 1954-84 period. With the exception of the 
foreign trade taxes, the growth in the other categories of revenues 
were reinforced further by the buoyancy coefficients which were 
greater than unity. However, the total tax revenues were found to be 
quite unstable. The instability index stood at 64.3% which seemed 
high. Such instability reflects the kind of problems that the 
government may experience in preparing the budget forecasts.
As regards the determinant factors of the tax levels, the results 
of linear regression functions indicated that per capita income, the 
share of mining output in GDP, the share of agricultural output in 
GDP, and the foreign trade sector (exports plus imports) had some 
significant influence on the former. Moreover, as far as the foreign 
receipts were concerned, two factors appeared to have had some 
significant influence. These were the export share in GDP and the 
distinct political events which occurred during the period.
Secondly, as far as the composite taxes are concerned, the per 
capita income appeared to have a positive influence on them, except in 
the case of the foreign trade related taxes. An interesting case in
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this group was the indirect taxes which produced different results 
from those of other studies, such as Musgrave's. While the latter’s 
findings pointed to a negative relationship between the indirect tax 
ratio and the per capital income, this study's findings showed a 
positive relationship as represented by equation (32) above. 
Furthermore, in the case of the agricultural share of GDP being used 
in place of per capita income, the results of this study were 
insignificant (ie there was no relationship with the indirect taxes 
ratio) as shown in equation (45) above, while those for Musgrave were 
significant.24
The analyses which have been carried out in this chapter were 
intended to identify those factors which can be used as predictor 
variables. As such, the influence of the agricultural variable 
underlines the need to consider it seriously in the process of 
forecasting revenues. The low instability of agricultural output 
relative to total revenue confirms its role in the determination of 
the budget forecasts. The other factor which should be considered 
seriously for forecasting is imports. From table 6:1 (b) above, the 
share of import duties used to be quite high prior to 1970s, but 
subsequent to this period there has been a substantial decline. 
Nevertheless, the share is still high in comparison to the other 
sources. Besides, the imports appear to be quite stable relative to 
total revenue stability as was shown on p. 158 above.
As for exports, the strong relationship that was observed in 
relation to the aid variable emphasize the fact that aid procurement 
is linked to the country's capability to generate export income, which 
in turn is used to pay back the loans. These findings suggest that the
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export factor could be used in predicting the likely amount of aid 
Which could be forthcoming.
Finally, in stressing the differences in the results between this 
study and other studies, we should also emphasise the fact that most
of the other studies were of a cross sectional nature, which took into
account only a few years* average figures for the countries included
in the sample. In this study some 31 years have been covered, which I
presume, reflect a lot of changes in-between. This is why the results
differ quite significantly from other findings.
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Tid/T = 0.3875 + 0.6709 As/GNP R* = 0.35. 
(7.039) (3.994)
(Tid = indirect tax revenue, As = values added by Agriculture).
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PART 3.
This part examines empirically the forecasting of expenditures 
and revenues in Tanzania. Past forecasts are analysed by comparing 
them with outturns. The main objective for carrying out such analyses 
is to determine the accuracy with which the forecasting has been 
done. The causes of any major discrepancies are then explained. 
Besides, the variables which are used to determine the forecasts are 
analysed in detail. The results of the analyses of the forecast 
errors and the predictor variables are then used to make some 
recommendations on how to improve the forecasting process.
In particular, chapter 7 presents a general discussion on the 
prerequisites of accurate forecasting. Chapter 8 presents an analysis 
of tax revenue forecasting. In chapter 9 foreign loans and grants are 
analysed. In chapters 10 and 11 recurrent and development 
expenditures are analysed respectively. Chapter 12 presents an 
analysis of the overall budget deficit.
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C H A P T E R  7 
BUDGET FORECASTING - AN OVERVIEW
i. pmaopucTioN
The importance of revenue and expenditure estimation in any 
economy, but more so for the Less Developed Countries (LDC’s), can not 
be overemphasized. A combination of scarce resources and lack of 
economic certainty have a perverse impact on the budget. Expenditure 
programmes cannot be accomplished as preferred due to paucity of 
resources available. Moreover, political and bureaucratic disruptions 
in many LDCs have contributed to further adversity in resource 
mobilization for the budget programmes. In view of these latter 
limitations, a careful forecasting of potential revenue is necessary. 
Equally important is the function of allocating the scarce resources 
which are mobilized to the various spending programmes. Quite often, 
a failure to establish realistic estimates has led to what Wildavsky 
has termed * repetitive budgeting *. This is a budgeting phenomenon 
which is characterized by a resubmission of budget estimates several 
times during the annual budget cycle. To quote Wildavsky*s words "the 
budget is not made once and for all when estimates are submitted and 
approved, rather, as the process of budgeting is repeated, it is made 
and remade over the course of the year ... Instead of supplemental 
appropriations being relatively infrequent, the entire budget is 
treated as if each item were a supplement".1 Revenue instability in 
LDCs is quite significant and such instability is transmitted to the 
expenditure programme.2
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The dependence of LDCs on indirect taxes such as export and import 
duties, sales taxes etc. which depend on very unstable tax bases due 
to economic fluctuations in the sectors of exports, imports, local 
industrial capacity utilization etc. are bound to create some severe 
problems on the budget. Yet, the demand for more spending arising 
from population growth pressure and international pressure on 
government to satisfy basic needs, and also the need to maintain 
installed capacity and finance external debts, all exacerbate further 
the budget problem. A solution to such problems can partly be 
realized through prudence in projecting revenues and expenditure.
This chapter is intended to highlight the important aspects of 
the forecasting function in relation to the budget. It is a digest of 
issues which need to be borne in mind in considering forecasts. 
Discussion in the various sections will be as follows: Section II
prensents a theoretical framework of forecasting, Section III examines 
some issues related to forecasting technology. Section IV presents 
highlights on budgetary systems, Section V presents an overview of 
forecasting environment in a general context and in relation to 
Tanzania. Finally, Section VT presents a summary and highlights of 
the analytical work to be undertaken in the next four chapters.
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II.THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF FORECASTING
This Section provides a conceptual overview of forecasting, with 
emphasis on forecasting methods and the choice of technique or 
methodology with reference to Tanzania's situation. Hyde et al. have 
pointed out that forecasting methodologies can be separated into two 
distinct groupings: Qualitative Methods and Quantitative Methods.
Qualitative Methods rely on managerial judgement where data are 
usually not readily available or applicable to the forecasting 
situation. Quantitative Methods generally require inputs in order to 
generate forecasts. In less complex methods, historical data is 
needed through which patterns are identified to predict future 
values. In more complex methods, both historical and future values of 
the exogenous variables are needed over the forecasting horizon. 3 
However, the two methods are not mutually exclusive and in some cases 
they are combined for the purpose of making the forecast.4
In choosing the forecasting method, there are a number of issues 
to be considered. Foremost is the purpose for which the forecast is 
to be used which will determine the level of accuracy required. 
Accuracy is essential in forecasting. As Klein puts it: "Accuracy of
the forecast is the 'bottom line* for the professional forecaster, 
much as profit is the 'bottom line' for the chief executive of an 
enterprise".5
The implications of the forecasts to the economic and social 
systems have to be clear in the mind of the forecaster in order to 
choose the right technique. Secondly, the dynamics and components of 
the system for which the forecasts will be made. The interacting 
variables and components of the forecasted environment have to be
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identified. It is from such variables that a model of causal 
relationships can be designed to form the basis of the forecasting 
situation. A third relates to the importance that has to be attached 
to the past in estimating the future. If quantitative methods have to 
be used, then the historical data required have to be known. It is 
from such past data that future values will be extrapolated.
Sometimes past data might have no bearing on future values due to a 
change in circumstances in which case resort to qualitative methods 
has to be made. Alternatively, present or recent policy changes may 
require a significant qualitative input to augment the quantitative 
methods chosen. For example, a recent change in tax policy may not be 
apparent in historical data. The latter might necessitate an 
adjustment on the historical data before the data base can be 
manipulated and then extrapolated. 6
Besides the issues listed above, the basic characteristics of each 
forecasting technique should be considered before selecting an 
effective forecasting methodology. Hyde et. al. have pointed out six 
such characteristics, namely: time horizon, pattern of data, type of
model, cost, accuracy and ease of application.
"Time horizon" refers to the period that is being forecasted. One 
has to be clear as to whether the forecast is for one year ahead or 
(is more a multi-period one). Knowing the time horizon helps to 
choose a forecasting method that can give the best results.
Similarly, one has to have a clear picture of the 'data pattern* 
before choosing the method. A chosen method which works on historical 
data should be able to predict the turning points in the data pattern, 
particularly when the data pattern is rather erratic.
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When a methodology has been chosen, it is important to decide on 
the type of model to use and the underlying assumptions. The model 
may be a series in which time is viewed as the important element to 
determine changes in the pattern, or it may be statistical in nature 
such as regression or correlation analysis or even econometric models. 
What then should we look for in a model? Wheelwright et. al. has 
summarized in pointing out that "the importance of the model is not so 
much that the decision maker must understand the mathematics of each 
one, but rather that the assumptions underlying each of them are 
different, and the capabilities of different models in different 
decision making situations do vary”.7
The cost implications of any technique chosen has to be known as 
well. The cost factor can be broken down into three main components. 
There are development costs, storage costs and actual operation costs. 
And there is also the opportunity costs for other techniques that 
might have been applied.8 Related to cost is the accuracy factor. 
Accuracy depends on the complexity or strength of technique chosen.
The more complex a technique, the more accurate it is likely to be 
which also imply higher costs. A decision has to be made between high 
costs for good forecasts and low costs for bad forecasts which could 
kill the best of plans. A rough sketch of the various techniques 
plotted on a cost-accuracy plane appears below on Figure 7:1
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Source: Adapted from Hyde et. al. op cit p 270
Finally there is the factor of ease of application. This factor 
demands that the users of forecasting methods should use those methods 
which they understand. In other words, decision makers should 
endeavour to understand the methodology or the forecasts before they 
can have the confidence in their ability to apply the forecasts in a 
particular situation. Hyde et. al. considers the latter to be an 
important consideration especially in determining revenue estimates,
208
because the decision makers are generally one step away from the 
forecasting machinery. As he points out, "as increasingly scientific 
and more complex methodologies are employed in determining revenue 
estimates, the ability of government decision makers to understand the 
derivation of those estimates decreases, and therefore confidence in 
those estimates may diminish even though accuracy increases".9
Most of the quantitative methods which can be used appear on 
Figure 7:1. They can be grouped under two broad catergories. They 
include trend extrapolative models and causal models. The trend 
extrapolative models involve extension or extrapolation of the 
existing time trend, and they consider the past observations of a 
specific system, the budget environment, and then project into the 
forecast horizon what the continuation of the trend will bring. They 
do not however, take into account factors other than time. The 
system, or generating process is assumed to be constant.10
On the other hand, the causal methods consist of regression 
analysis and econometric simulation models. The latter assume a cause 
and effect relationship betwen the inputs of the system and the output 
generated. Stated differently, a set of independent variables are 
related to the dependent variable, and changes from year to year in 
the independent variable should accurately determine the change in the 
dependent variable. In contrast to the extrapolative methods, here 
the generating system is analysed and assumed relationships are 
determined.11
Nevertheless, having these quantitative models is not a full 
guarantee against forecasting errors. A number of factors could 
contribute to errors. As pointed out Mosley, such errors could be
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caused by the following events:
(i) Changes in data about the past after the forecast is made.
(ii) Incorrect forecast or assumptions for exogenous variables.
(iii)Errors in the specification of the model.
(iv) Errors of judgement in imposing coefficients in defiance of 
the evidence of the statistical relationship between past 
data. 12
As far as qualitative methods are concerned, a number of methods 
have been suggested. They are mainly intuitive or judgemental 
approaches. To mention a few, one could have: "visionary forecasting" 
which involves a purely subjective estimate (or a guess) done by one 
individual; secondly, there is "panel consensus forecasting" which 
involves a group of people familiar with the situation who sit 
together and out of their discussion produce a forecast; and thirdly 
there is "Delphi forecasting method" whereby a panel of experts make 
independent judgements on a common question. Independence in the 
decision process eliminates group influence. As the experts* opinions 
are evaluated, forecasts are generated.
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III FORECASTING TECHNOLOGY (RESOURCES)
Knowing what techniques could be used and having them put into use 
is quite a separate issue. Resources to put into action the 
forecasting have to be available. Thus, whether qualitative or 
quantitative methods are involved, the availability of * human* and
’machinery* technology is absolutely essential. The more complex is
■;
the method of forecasting, the higher the level of technology one 
would require to carry out the task.
The ’human’ technology can be viewed as the technical experts - 
whether an individual or a group, who could be entrusted with the task 
of doing the forecasting. Considering the various forecasting issues 
discussed above, one will find himself dealing with a multitude of 
social, political and economic factors. This implies that only people 
who are well versed in such environment can handle the situation. 
Secondly, the analytical work and judgemental insights involved in 
forecasting requires high levels of skills or expertise. Thirdly, the 
fact that the analytical methods mentioned above would require many 
valuable man hours has the implication that a reliable human resource 
base has to be established. Ideally, what should this technical task 
force comprise of? Though the emphasis would be on forecasting 
specialists, however, the policy interests of all the pressure groups, 
especially the party, the politicians and the bureaucrats have to be 
taken care of. To accomplish this, the task force has to comprise of 
knowledgeable personalities from all walks of life. These experts 
would be positioned in every department where forecasting is done.
The second type of technology needed is machinery, especially 
computers. Analyses which require the use of causal methods such as
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multiple regression analysis, and econometric models, cannot be done 
accurately, on time and at minimal costs by manual methods. High 
speed electronic data processing equipment for storage of data, for 
quick retrieval and for prompt analysis is essential. Therefore, 
remarkable achievements in revenue and expenditure forecasting can be 
attained with improved technology in processing equipment.
The developed nations have no problems in both the human resource 
and high technology. In LDCs, improvement in forecasting is bound to 
remain low due to lack of both technical experts and hard currency to 
acquire high technology. In later chapters, it will be demonstrated 




It is worthwhile though at this juncture to mention some of the 
broad methods (traditional and reformed) which have been used to 
predict expenditure in certain countries. These are Traditional 
Budgeting (TB); Zero Base Budgeting (ZBB) and Planning Programming 
Budgeting Systems (PPBS).
With TB, the basic characteristics are that the expenditure items 
are classified on line-item basis (such as personnel or maintenance). 
The time horizon is normally one year and is on cash basis. The 
projections are done on an incremental basis, whereby only increases 
or decreases to the existing base (the prior year expenditure) are 
considered.13 The latter is a simplified version of trend 
extrapolation, which considers only the one past year historical data. 
If TB is assessed for its accuracy using Figure 7:1 above, its 
simplicity would imply low accuracy and low costs. The implied
dangers of using TB is well put forward by Wildavsky. He pointed out
that ’’Comparing this year with last year may not mean much if the past 
was a mistake and the future is likely to be a bigger one. Quick 
calculations may be worse than none if it is grossly in error”. 14
A variant of the TB is what Wildavsky has termed "repetitive
budgeting" (KB). The latter differs from TB in two main respects. 
First it covers shorter periods than a year, and secondly, the 
underlying economic conditions reflect volatility and a high degree of 
resource limitation (poverty) which create uncertainty. Poor 
countries could be culprits of such a type of budgeting. Under RB, 
adaptiveness is maximized but predictability is minimized.15
In response to weaknesses in TB especially, alternative reformed
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approaches were initiated which would accommodate comprehensive 
calculations in the budget projections. These were the ZBB and PPBS. 
ZBB*s approach to budget ting is one of re-examining the base of 
existing programmes activities and exploring the effects of reducing 
or reallocating the current levels of resources rather than taking for 
granted the base of existing programmes.16 At the core of ZBB is 
policy analysis. Resources are allocated according to the government 
policies. The four stages which are followed in ZBB appear in Chart 
7:1.
CHART 7:1: ZERO BASE BUDGETING
Re-examine Examine Set Priorities Re-allocate
l^existing 2-^programme 3 among existing 4— ^resources from 





Source: Wholey, J.S. (1978) Zero Base Budgeting and Programme
Evaluation, (p. 4) Lexington, D.C. Heath and Company.
If an effective ZBB is implemented, one could expect the following 
benefits to accrue.17
(i) the budget process would be focussed on a comprehensive 
analysis of objectives and needs.
(ii) it would combine planning and budgeting into a single 
process.
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(iii) it would cause bureaucracy to evaluate in detail the 
cost-effectiveness of their operations and
(iv) it would expand bureaucracy participation in planning 
and budgeting at all government levels.
The above brief outline of ZBB, leaves us in no doubt that the 
approach is not a simple one. A full implementation would certainly 
require high costs in terms of resources and time. Wildavsky provides 
us with a clue about ZBB’s ease of application. He pointed out that 
"ZBB provides a-historical information system. The past as reflected 
in the budgeting base is explicitly rejected. Everything at every 
period is subject to searching scrutiny. As a result, calculations 
become unmanageable".18
On the other hand, PPB can be seen as an extension of ZBB. FPB 
compares alternative expenditure packages to decide which best 
contributes to larger programme objectives.19 The PPB system 
which had its origin in U.S.A., involves three levels of management. 
First is the *policy management* responsible for; identification of 
needs, analysis of options, selection of programmes, and allocation of 
resources; second, the Resource management * responsible for 
establishment of basic support systems viz., improvements in basic 
budget structures, financial management practices; third, 'programme 
management' responsible for implementation of policies and related 
operations, namely accounting, reporting, and evaluation.20 Ideally, 
PPB has three major ingredients, namely: (i) structural aspects, 
dealing with the classification of government transactions, (ii)
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analytical aspects, dealing with the application of quantitative 
criteria for the determination of appropriate programmes, and (iii) 
information aspects, dealing with the development of supporting 
systems that help policy formulation and appraisal.21 Programmes are 
evaluated and those which are found to produce superior results are 
chosen. The rationale for PPB lies in its connectedness in that like 
programmes are grouped together. As Wildavsky puts it, "programme 
structures are meant to replace the confused concatenations of line- 
items with clear differentiated, non-overlapping boundaries: only one
set of programmes to a structure. This means that a change in one 
element or structure must result in change reverberating throughout 
every element in the system". 2 2
The PPB, like the ZBB, involves comprehensive calculations which 
stress effectiveness. Goals have to be identified and cost-benefit 
analysis applied to assess alternatives. This comprehensiveness takes 
time and this is not an asset in responding to fast-moving events.2 3 
As pointed out further by Premchand (1983: pp.328-331), specification 
of goals and objectives is a difficult task. Similarly, assigning 
monetary value to benefits and costs of some activities which do not 
have market prices is a difficult task. Therefore, the application of 
cost-benefit analysis becomes a problem. The use of this budgetary 
system has been limited, even in U.S.A. where it was initiated.24
The LDCs are bound to be in a more disadvantaged position in the 
implementation of PPB is concerned due to shortages in essential 
resources such as skilled accounting, finance and planning manpower, 
and of course, the general economic instability which makes forward 
budgeting unworkable.
216
TOE FORECASTING ENVIRONMENT: A GENERAL PERSPECTIVE AND A
REVIEW ON TANZANIA
The environment under which forecasting is done influences the 
outcome of the predictions. Two environmental factors will be 
considered. These are time allocated for budget preparation; levels 
of participation by bureaucrats and politicians; manpower supply; and 
political environment.
The "time allowed factor" in forecasting determines the level of 
accuracy of the forecasts. Those who work on the forecasts should be 
allocated enough time to handle the task. The concept of * enough 
time* has to be considered in relation to the satisfaction of the 
other determinant conditions such as availability of predictor data, 
price stability etc. The accuracy with which the predictor variables 
can be determined will influence decisions regarding the length of 
time allowed for preparing the forecasts. Different countries have 
different time allocations for preparing the forecasts. Some 
countries allocate a full year or more. The latter practice is common 
in the developed countries.2 5 For some LDCs, the time allocated is 
much shorter, apparently because of the prevalent economic 
instability. Fluctuations in LDC’s production, prices of local and 
exported products, etc may invalidate forecasts prepared too early in 
advance. The existence of repetitive budgeting in LDCs is a clear 
indication of forecasting problems they face. In spite of the 
uncertainties already noted in respect of LDC’s, some countries 
unwisely emulate the developed countries’ budget timing, i.e. by 
allocating between twelve and eighteen months.2 6 But the reality of 
their economic problems take them back to repetitive budgeting. In
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Tanzania, the time allocated is about four months. The budget 
preparation is initiated by the Treasury after a review of prior 
year’s budget performance and also after a review of current period’s 
performance up to the middle of the year. Since the fiscal year runs 
from July to June, it means that the mid-year review takes place in 
December or January when at least two quarterly reports on revenue and 
expenditure have been submitt ted. After the review, the Treasury 
prepares its preliminary forecasts based on both the review results 
and other Dev Plan data. The preliminary forecasts are submitted to 
the Economic Committee of the Cabinet (ECC) for consideration and 
approval, after which they are communicated to Accounting Officers in 
other Ministries, Regions and Independent Departments as ceilings to 
guide them in preparing their estimates.2 7 The communication is 
done through Treasury Circular No. 1 which establishes instructions 
for the preparation and submission of budget estimates, and is 
released between February and March. This implies that the forecasts 
have to be done within three and four months so as to be tabled in 
Parliament for debate and approval in mid-June. A summary of key days 
in the budget cycle appears in Table 7:1.
TABLE 7:1
Summary of key dates in the budget cycle
(FOR TANZANIA)
Date Institution Activity
August November 1 Technical Institutions
2 Central Ministries
1 Review of previous financial year's activities to assess budget implementation
2 Preparation of the annual performance review
3 Formulation of preliminary guidelines and distribution of same to technical institutions
4 First quarter reports — preparation and review
December - January 1 Technical Institutions
2 Central Ministries
3 ECC
1. Mid-Year Reports — preparation and review
2 Finalization of guidelines and submission to ECC for approval
3 Distribution of final guidelines to technical institutions 
4. Preparation of budget estimates
February Aprii 1 Technical Institutions
2 National Consultative Economic and Planning Council
3 Central Ministries
1. Submission of estimates proposals from technical institutions to central ministries
2. Scrutiny of estimates proposals by central ministries
3 Discussion of budget estimates
4 Consolidation of overall budget estimates
5 Devplan Submits Devejopment Expenditure Estimates to National Consultative and 
Economic Planning Council for review and recommendation
May 1 ECC
2 Finance and Economic Committee of Parliament 
3. Technical Institutions.
1. Presentation of Budget proposals to ECC for review and approval
2. Printing of budget documents
3. Presentation of budget proposals to the Finance and Economic Committee of Parliament 
for Scrutiny. Examination and approval
June July ! National Assembly
2 Technical Institutions
3 Central Ministries 
-1 Parliament
I. Budget Speech
2 Public debate on budget Estimates proposals
3 Authorization of the budget
Source: Adapted fro* Ministry of Finance (1984) A Manual of the Budget Process in Tanzania, p 86
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A question that one would like to pose is: does this short time 
provide sufficient opportunity to those involved in the budget 
preparation to generate reliable forecasts? One fact that ought to be 
grasped about the LDCs is that the forecasts prepared can be more 
realistic when the forecasting is done a short while from the 
implementation period because by then the predictor variables used in 
generating the forecasts would be approaching their true values. A 
longer period of time would just render the estimate worthless, thus 
returning to repetitive budgeting. However, allowing adequate time is 
of course not a sufficient condition for full success. Forecasts are 
often hampered by two other factors which I will call ’levels of 
participation’ and ’manpower supply*.
The administrative and political participants in the budget 
preparation have an impact on the outcome. Equally, the level of 
skills and expertise of those participating affects the forecasts. It 
is possible that the greater the number of participating levels, the 
greater is the danger that each level might pay less attention to the 
task. This could happen where the total time available for generating 
the forecasts is rather short so that the participants have to rush 
over the task. There is also the possiblility that participants would 
go with the feeling that they are not accountable for the outcome 
because responsibility is not fixed on any particular participant.
The existence of multi-participant levels is an asset when the 
participants are conscious of the importance of the forecasts.
For Tanzania, the budget estimates pass through a number of 
administrative and political levels before they are implemented. The 
current expenditure forecasts start with the Budget Division of the
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Treasury preparing the preliminary expenditure forecasts which are 
passed to ECC for scrutiny and approval. The approved preliminary 
forecasts are passed to the Accounting Officers - normally ministerial 
Principal Secretaries (PS) and the Regional Development Directors 
(RDD). The Accounting Officers then use their machinery to prepare 
the estimates. On completion, the PS forward their forecasts to the 
Treasury for review, while the RDDs pass their forecasts to the Prime 
Minister’s Office (PMO) for review. The reviewed forecasts, after 
adjustments, are forwarded to the ECC for scrutiny and approval. In 
case there are adjustments to be made, this is done by the Accounting 
Officers responsible in consultation with the Treasury. The 
participation by the ECC is quite important because this is the last 
level of administrative participation. From the ECC level the 
forecasts are forwarded to the Finance and Economic Committee (FEC) of 
the Parliament for consideration. The approved estimates by FEC are 
passed to the next level of participants, that is the Parliament. In 
practice then, the current expenditure estimates pass through five 
levels as shown in chart 7:2 below.
221




> Forward Movement of Estimates for Scrutiny and Approval
 > Backward Movement of Estimates for Adjustments
■ x-> Guidelines Flow
In the case of development expenditure, the preparation 
participation starts with the Programming, Budgeting and Control 
division of DevPlan preparing budget guidelines which get approval 
from the ECC. The approved preliminary estimates are then sent to the 
Accounting Officers (RDD/PS). The forecasts pepared by the PS are 
reviewed by DevPlan while those prepared by RDD are reviewed by PMO. 
Normally the Dev Plan Officers attend the PMO review. From the 
FMO/DevPlan level the forecasts are sent to the ECC for scrutiny and 
approval. From the ECC they go to the FEC for further consideration 
before they Eire forwarded to the Parliament for debate and 
appropriation. In short, the levels participating are as shown in 
Chart 7:3.
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CHART 7:3 PARTICIPANTS IN DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE FORECASTING
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For revenue forecasts, the Treasury in collaboration with DevPlan 
initiate them. The Treasury makes its preliminary projections which 
are sent to the ECC for approval, after which they are sent to 
collecting agencies as guidelines. The agencies are mainly Treasury 
departments. In the case of domestic revenues, the agencies involved 
are: the Commission of Income Tax, the Commission for Customs and
Sales Tax; the Principal Secretaries (PS); the Regional Development 
Directors (RDD); and heads of independent departments. For external 
revenue, the Director for External Finance is responsible for 
preparing forecasts of loans and grants expected during the year, 
which are reviewed further by the Revenue Division of the Treasury 
before they are sent to the ECC for scrutiny and approval. From ECC 
they go to the FEC for further consideration, and there after to the 
Parliament for approval.
Each participating level in the forecasts has to ensure that all 
considerations whether economic, social or political have been taken 
into account. Thus, the awareness of the participants in the broad
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national objectives, the political aspirations, social norms and 
beliefs etc., is essential for the success of the forecasting task.
The 'skilled manpower* factor is also important in influencing 
the forecasts. In LDCs skilled manpower shortages in the disciplines 
of accounting, finance, economics etc., are common phenomena. The 
gravity of the shortage is well summarized by the World Bank: MIn
most developing countries, overstaffing at lower grades co-exist with 
severe shortages of senior professional and technical people - a 
shortage that can often be made good only by employing expatriates. 
This imbalance of skills is particularly severe in African countries: 
at independence, more than three quarters of the jobs for University 
graduates were held by expatriates. Since then, the ratio has been 
reduced steadily". The report continues: "While the skill shortages 
are hard to quantify, the World Bank finds that two thirds of its 
borrowing countries face serious difficulties in filling certain 
posts in the public sector, particularly for engineers, managers, 
accountants, and doctors ... These difficulties are compounded by a 
tendency for the more experienced staff to quit the public service in 
search of better jobs in the domestic private sector and abroad where 
they will be paid more"28
As forecasting entails evaluation and analysis of determinant 
factors, and making projections, shortages of skilled manpower could 
lead to guesswork. Tanzania like other LDCs, began its political 
independence with a very tiny fraction of its population educated even 
up to pre-university level. After Independence, it also took some 
time before it worked out a conscious manpower development programme. 
The latter was launched in 1964.2 9 The manpower shortages in
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Tanzania are further pointed out by Due, he wrote in 1962: "From the
standpoint of manpower personnel, some of the countries, particularly 
in East Africa, would have been better off to postpone independence 
for five to ten years while much larger numbers of Africans were being 
trained for responsible positions". 30 Even though some training 
has been done and continues to be done, it takes a long time before 
those training can acquire good experience. As will be revealed in 
subsequent chapters, internal shortages of accountants, planners,
engineers etc., have affected the function of the public budget quite 
adversely.
Finally, there is the political environment factor in the 
forecasting process. The forecasts have to be done with a bearing in 
mind of policies and aspirations of the political party in power. In
a multiparty system, party politics and general polices are of
oppositional nature. Revenue and expenditure forecasts generated 
under the auspices of the ruling party policies will definitely 
receive some challenge from the opposition. The essence of opposition 
is vote maximization. As pointed out by Brown et al: "The vote 
maximizing politician will attempt to introduce those tax and 
expenditure programmes that satisfy the median vote".31 
The administrative participants have to be aware of the political 
motivations of the rival parties. In a single-party parliamentary 
system, sustained opposition on revenue and expenditure policies is 
less likely to emerge from within. This is so because, first, there 
is no vote maximization which in turn leads to complacency and 
secondly, especially for the LDCs, there is a lack of technical 
knowledge on the part of the politicians to assess fully the impact of
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tax and expenditure programmes presented to them. Such systems tend 
to build up a lot of confidence in the administrators who prepare the 
forecasts. In this case the administrators have to ensure that 
* public interests* are well covered in the forecasts prepared. In 
Tanzania, when ECC has approved the forecasts, there is little 
opposition expected from the political levels, namely the EEC and the 
Parliament itself. In short, it has to be realized that the forecasts 
have to be made within the political environment that prevails, over 
and above the other factors discussed earlier.
After examining some of the theoretical issues relating to 
forecasting techniques and the environmental conditions under which 
the forecasts are made, we can now turn to Tanzania and have a review 
of forecasting methods which have been recommended by Treasury. The 
basis for discussion is a budgeting manual published by Treasury. 32 
To forecast revenues, the manual recommends a tax-by-tax analysis.
For income tax revenues, there are two main sources namely, the 
P.A.Y.E. and profits. In the case of P.A.Y.E., tax revenue expected 
is supposed to be estimated from the total national wage bill.
However, the manual does not state the technique to be used in making 
such estimates. In the case of profit taxes revenue, the basis is 
expected to be the total profits of parastatals and companies. Again, 
there is no mention of a method that will be used. 3 3 The second 
category of tax is custom duties. The outlined basis for estimating 
the revenue is the anticipated export earnings and likely quantum of 
imports as forecasted by the Bank of Tanzania. Once again, there is 
no mention of method to be used to generate the forecasts. The latter 
applies also to sales tax revenues which are to be estimated on the
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basis of type and quantum of goods likely to be locally produced and 
imported having regard to their rates.3 4 In the case of 
miscellaneous tax revenues from training levy, stamp duty, business 
licences, entertainment tax, etc., the manual is quite explicit for it 
points out that the basis of estimation is the annual trend for the 
past year.
In the case of non-tax revenues, namely parastatal dividends and 
other miscellaneous revenues such as user-charges for government plant 
and equipment, surplus transfers from paras tatals, repayments on 
investments etc. the manual is not very clear on the methods to use.
It is only in the case of the miscellaneous revenues that it is 
mentioned that the projection should be done on a * straight line 
basis* which presumably means linear extrapolation.35
As for expenditure forecasts, the manual places more emphasis on 
recurrent expenditure. The latter falls into two main categories, 
namely: * personal emoluments*, and * other charges*. For * personal 
emoluments*, the Accounting Officers are required to have manpower 
establishment (in case of changes from previous standing) approved by 
the Ministry of Labour and Manpower Development. Then costing is to 
be done using appropriate salary rates and any other statutory rates. 
As for *other charges*, especially for items other than those whose 
commitment is known such as interest on loans, statutory compensations 
etc., the methods proscribed for estimating such items are not 
comprehensive at all. For example, on the maintenance expenses for 
existing assets such as roads, plants, vehicles etc. the instruction 
by the manual is: "Budgeting for maintenance needs to be done
carefully so that they can last long enough to justify initial
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spending on them". It continues, "estimates for hospital, school and 
defence forces supplies are based on number of people in each 
institution,previous tender prices and the price changes.36
What could be said about the way the guidelines have been set is 
that much discretion is left to the "technical experts". Moreover, if 
the forecasters are to use the various factors listed under, for 
example, the revenue sources, it implies that the forecasters are 
expected to use some of the causal methods. Whether this is the 
practice or not, the true situation will become clear after the 
empirical investigation in chapters 8 to 11. However, one has to be 
cautious in comparing the manual guidelines with practice, mainly 
because the manual appears to have been prepared to assist in 
rectifying some weaknesses often noticed in the budgetary system, a 
fact that is actually acknowledged in the foreword of the manual.
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SUM M ARY
The Chapter has presented an overview of the fundamental issues 
involved in budget forecasting, together with a survey of the 
forecasting framework in Tanzania*
A number of critical constraints which determine whether 
forecasting will be a success or not were considered. These included:
(i) the provision of adequate time for carrying
out the forecasting.
(ii) the provision of optimal levels of
participation for both bureaucrats and 
politicians, which would instil a sense of 
responsiblity and accountability.
(iii) the provision of adequate manpower skills to
carry out the forecasting task, and 
(iv) the provision of stable party-political
environment which minimizes conflicts in 
acceptance of proposed budget forecasts.
Moreover, the Chapter examined the issue of forecasting methods 
and the choice of techniques. The methods that can be used in 
forecasting were put in two categories: (i) intuitive or judgemental, 
and (ii) quantitative. The latter was seen to involve comprehensive 
calculations such as trend analysis, regression analysis, econometrics 
etc., The choice of a particular methodology was seen to hinge upon a 
number of factors: (i) Time horizon of the forecasts, which addresses
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itself to the question of: what is the length of future period that
is covered by the forecast? (ii) Data availability and its pattern.
A model that is chosen should be able to handle the data available, 
while being able to pick up any erratic movements which might be
observed, (iii) Accuracy. The level of accuracy required in the
forecasts has to be known and this will influence decision on what
technique should be used, (iv) Cost. A forecaster has to take
cognizance of the fact that there are costs associated with 
forecasting. A method chosen has to be within the financing reach of 
the forecasting agency, (v) Ease of application. The method that is 
chosen should be one that is understood and can be used by those 
involved, of course having regard to other factors mentioned above.
The other major issue emphasised in this Chapter is that of 
developing a forecasting system which entails the provision of 
necessary technology, identified mainly as being of human and 
mechanical nature. The purpose of emphasizing this system is to 
underscore the need for the LDC to elevate forecasting to a point 
where it is considered to be crucial in the process of preparing the 
budget. Forecasting experts equipped with necessary machines are 
absolutely necessary.
While most emphasis was laid on conceptual issues, some attention 
was also drawn to the forecasting procedures in Tanzania. The 
objective in this case was to see how comprehensive were the 
established procedures for budget forecasting. It became apparent 
that the manual had not specified explicitly the methods to be used, 
although it had identified some of the factors.
In short, the chapter has shed some light on what to look for
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when analysing budget forecasting in Tanzania. This chapter therefore 
provides a background to the empirical analysis that will be of the 
next four chapters (8-11). The investigation will include the 
following. First, the expenditure and revenue forecasts will be 
analysed in relation to the outturns. The purpose of carrying out this 
particular analysis is to establish the magnitude of variations 
between the forecasts and the outturns. Secondly, the practical 
methods involved in generating the forecasts are investigated, a task 
that involves analysing the predictor variables used in the 
forecasting process. Thirdly, an evaluation of the variations, in 
terms of their possible causes, is made. Finally, some policy 
recommendations are made which are based on the findings of the 
investigation.
The methods of analysing the forecasts and the outturns are drawn 
from Mosley’s work (see note 12). In particular the approach of using 
realization functions to establish the extent of under- and over­
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C H A P T E R  8 
CURRENT REVENUE FORECASTING - EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
I. IhnTODUCTION
The Chapter attempts to provide an empirical analysis of tax 
revenue forecasting in Tanzania. In general, the analysis has its 
focus on the hypothetical framework of an inefficient budgetary system 
being a contributing factor to the present economic crisis. More 
specifically, the analysis is done with a bearing in mind of the 
hypothesis that improper specification of tax revenue forecasting 
variables have contributed to uncontrollability in revenue outturns.
In carrying out the analysis, some emphasis will be put on the 
comparison of the estimated and actual tax revenues. This involves 
determining prediction errors, that is the over-and-under predictions, 
and the association between the estimates and the outturn through 
regression analysis. Both aggregate and disaggregated revenue sources 
will be dealt with. Also, some evaluation of predictory factors will 
be done for each category of tax revenue in relation to the results 
achieved in forecasting. Moreover, the volatility of each tax source 
will be considered for the purpose of determining the tax types which 
appear to be more controllable; that is, those which are predicted 
more accurately, with the implication that while the more predictable 
sources continue to receive greater attention, on the other hand, the 
less predictable sources should also continue to receive some 
attention for the purpose of making some improvement. This involves 
comparing the average absolute errors taken as a percentage of the
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estimates. At the same time the instability of the forecasting 
variables will be analysed so as to be able to determine whether they 
can be relied upon or not. The measure that will be used in the 
latter case is the normalized co-efficient of variation.
The data that are used are for the period 1967/68 to 1982/83. 
Needless to say, the data used in this analysis are not perfectly 
correct. The figures presented in different sources for some periods 
do differ, although not by a very big margin. So, the figures which 
have been taken should be considered as a best approximation of the 
real or actual data.
All regressions which will be done in the analysis are ordinary 
least square regressions. Moreover, the co-efficients are tested for 
their significance using t-values based on a 5 per cent level of 
signif icance.
In looking at the above analytical issues, the following order of 
discussion and analysis will be followed. Section II deals with the 
analysis of revenue forecasts in relation to outturns, while Section 
III presents an appraisal of the factors which are used in revenue 
forecasting. Section IV presents an analysis of the variations 
between the forecasts and the outturns. Section V explores the other 
possibilities available for raising more revenue. Finally, the 
Section IV presents a summary of the Chapter.
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II. REVENUE FORECASTS IN RELATION TO OUTTURNS
(a) Regression of actual total recurrent revenues in relation to 
forecasted revenues
An analysis of the actual revenues in relation to the forecasted 
revenue led to the following observations, which are based on Table 
8:1 below.
The results in Table 8:1 indicate that during the 16 years under 
consideration, there was under prediction of revenues in 11 periods 
and overprediction in three periods while in two periods the forecasts 
tied in with the outturn. This tendency to underestimate revenues is 
seen to be common in developing countries by Wildavsky et. al. Two 
main reasons have been given for such occurence. These are: the 
uncertainty that confront poor countries, which inevitably bias the 
estimation of revenues on the low side so as to ensure that the 
government will not run short of cash, and secondly, is the desire to 
increase the likelihood of a surplus. The latter implies that 
underprediction is deliberate.1 In some of the years, the 
underpredictions were quite significant. Although there is no 
standard set for determining whether an overprediction or 
underprediction is beyond limit or not, however, there are cases which 
appear to be above some tolerable level. If we consider cases which 
exceed 10%, we find that there were three periods of excessive 
underprediction, noticeably 1973/74 (10%), 1976/77 (15.7%) and 1982/83 
(28.8%).
TABLE 8:1
FORECAST ERRORS IN TOTAL RECURRENT REVENUES
? A i l G D  67/8 '68/9 S9/7U 70/1. 71/2 72/3 73/1 74/5 75/6 76/7 77/8' 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
♦ERRORS 
!  8.3 -7.0 5.8 1.8 1.9 0 10.1 -7.1 2.2 15.7 6.0 -2.6 1.5 0 3.7 28.8
* The error is the ratio of difference between actual revenues and forecasted revenues 
to estimated revenues.
Source: The figures have been computed from actual and estimated revenue data
appearing in Appendix 1.
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When the errors in Table 8:1 above are examined for trend pattern 
using regression analysis, there is no strong pattern observable. 
According to equation 1(a) below, the low values of the t-statistics 
clearly show that the coefficients are insignificant, and also 
according to the correlation coefficient (R2) = 0.104, the fit is a 
very weak one.
(E stands for errors, while T stands for time (trend). The figures in 
parentheses are t-ratios).
For the periods which indicated perfect forecast - with zero 
error, the 1972/73 should be treated with suspicion because it appears 
that those who compiled the data at the Treasury took the estimates to 
be actuals. The latter observation can easily be arrived at by 
looking at the tax revenue components* figures where the forecasts 
and outturns are the same in nearly all cases. The disaggregated tax 
revenues appear in the next subsection below.
Looking at the forecasts and outturns in a more scientific way, 
whereby the outturns have been regressed on the forecasts, the 
following observations based on equation (1) below are made.
E = 9.023 + 0.594 (T) 1(a)
(-0.84) (1.27) R 2 = 0.104
AR = 60.2 + 1.072(ER) ( 1 )
(0.15) (15.37) R 2 = 0.94 df = 14
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(AR stands for actual recurrent revenues, ER is the estimated 
recurrent revenues, and the figures in parenthesis are t-values).
The t-value for estimated revenues9 co-efficient is high enough 
to confirm that the coefficient is significant. The constant is 
insignificant due to the insignificant value of t-statistic. The high 
value of R2 = 0.94 indicates that the association between the 
estimates and the actual revenues is very strong. Although the 
constant is not significant, however, this is the level of actual 
revenues expected even if the predictory variable is zero. On the 
other hand, the coefficient figure on the estimate revenues which is 
higher than unity clearly confirm the observation made above of a 
tendency to underpredict. This implies that the predictory variable 
has to be rolled over more than once to arrive at the actual figure.
A graphic presentation (Figure 8:1(a)) of the actual revenues and 
estimated revenues gives a vivid picture of the underestimation that 
has been going on. A comparison of the perfect line which reflect a 
perfect forecasting situation, with the trend line representing 
equation (1) above, clearly shows that there has been underprediction. 
Moreover, the divergence of the trend line from the perfect forecast 
line, particularly on the upper part, clearly shows how forecasting is 
getting out of control. A desirable condition would be one where the 
two lines coincided or converged together. The causes for the 
variations will be discussed after an examination of the forecasts of 
the individual tax components.
2*f0
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(b).Revenue forecasts in relation to outturn of the
disaggregated tax revenues.
{i) The Import Duties
An analysis of actual import duties in relation to its forecasts 
clearly indicates that there was overpredictions in most of the 
periods. The errors of prediction appear in Table 8.2 below.
From the latter table, in twelve periods out of the 16 years 
under consideration, there was overprediction, while in three periods 
- 1973/74, 1977/78 and 1982/83 there was underprediction. In 1972/73 
there was a tie-up, but this situation has been highlighted in (a) 
above. The magnitude of the over-and-under prediction was also high. 
All the underpredictions were above 10%. In the case of 
overpredictions, the range was between -1.7% and -440%. The wide
TABLE 8:2
FORECAST ERRORS IN IMPORT DUTIES
PERIOD 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
+ERRORS
% -4.0 -7.4 -1.7 -8.7 -3.4 0 46.7 -18.5 14.3 -44.0 47.4-5.8 -29.5 -2.8 -33.8 13.1
* The ’error1 is the ratio of difference between Actual and forecasted import duties 
to forecasted import duties.
Source: Computed from actual and estimated data on import duties appearing in
Appendix 1
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variations apparently point to the difficulties involved in 
forecasting this type of tax, which will be discussed in Section III 
below. Equation 2 gives us a better picture of the relationship 
between the actual and estimated import duties.
Al = 175.32 + 0.6214 (El) (2)
(1.98) (4.47) R2 = 0.59 df. 14
(Al stands for actual Import Duties, while El represents Forecasted 
Import Duties. The figuress in parenthesis are t-values).
On the basis of the significant t-values, the constant and the 
coefficient are significant. The coefficient of correlation (R2) = 
0.59 clearly shows that changes in estimated import duties account for 
just about 59% of changes in actual import duties. Moreover, the low 
value of the coefficient on El (=0.6214), also point to the 
imperfection that exists in forecasting this particular type of 
revenue. Since we expect a coefficient that is about unity, one can 
only conclude that the estimation process in this case is more 
intuitive (guesswork) than it is a systematic one.
A further examination of the import duties from a graphical 
presentation, figure 8:1(b) below shows that there is no clear pattern 
between the actual and forecasted inport duties. The plotted points 
for the sixteen years are scattered all over. The situation appears 
to have grown worse after 1974, a point when the errors started to 
grow increasingly big.
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Since we had more underpredictions in the case of total revenue 
above, the high level of overpredictions in this source of revenues 
must have been offset by another source which had an inverse pattern 
of predictions.
(ii) The Export Duties
The forecasting of export duties has been afflicted with problems 
as well. In the course of the sixteen years, under-and-over
predictions have both been quite common. The prediction errors appear
below in Table 8:3
TABLE 8:3
FORECAST ERRORS IN EXPORT DUTIES






1—1 « -19.1-26.2 0 92.9 10.9 1.0 249.6 2.8 -1.0 13.4 -46.3 68.3 2 6 . 0
# Error is the ratio of difference between actual and forecasts of 
export duties to forecasts of export duties.
Source: Computed from actual and estimated data on Export Duties appearing 
in Appendix 1.
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A feature that is rather interesting in this case of export 
duties is the pattern of errors. In the early years, 1967/68 to
1971/72, there were only overpredictions. After this period, a mixed
situation appears, although underpredictions are more dominant. 
Secondly, the range of errors is quite wide. They range from -68.1% 
to 249%. There are only a few cases of absolute errors of under 10%.
The above results were confirmed further by the regression 
results represented by equation 3 below.
AE = 25.9 + 1.033 (EE) (3)
(.411) (4.06) R2 = 0.54 df. 14
(AE stands for actual export duties, while EE is the estimated export
duties. The figures in parenthesis are t-values).
The constant is insignificant due to the low value of t- 
statistic, while the coefficient on EE is significant. Overall, the 
equation accounts for only 54% of the changes in the actual export 
duties, which implies that the predictions have been far from perfect. 
Moreover, the high coefficient value of 1.033 would imply that there 
has been under prediction generally, which is not the case. From 
Table 8:3 above, underprediction was noted in only six periods while 
overprediction was noted in nine periods. The coefficient must have 
been influenced unduely by the few excessively large underpredictions, 
notably those for 1973/74 and 1976/77 with 92.9% and 249.6% 
respectively. The general results of biased underprediction are also 
evident from Figure 8:1c below. The regression line lies to the left 
of the perfect line which implies that there were more
2*+6
underpredictions than overpredictions. However, more of the plotted 
points appear to be lying to the right of the perfect forecast line 
implying overpredictions.
In short, the prediction of export duties does not appear to be 
under control. The wide variations noticed above have certainly 
contributed to the variations observed in total recurrent revenues.
FIGURE 8:1(c). EXPORT DUTIES: FORECAST & OUTTURN
Actual
Revenues Realization Line
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(iii) Consumption and Excise Duties (Sales Tax)
In this source of revenue, the predictions situation has not been 
very erratic, although variations of both over-and-under prediction 
are observable. The tendency is to overpredict. In nine periods 
there were overpredictions, while underpredictions were observed in 
only six periods. As can be seen from Table 8:4 below, the errors are 
of moderate size. They range between -15.9% and 11.6%. The latter 
results are confirmed further by the results of the regression 
analysis done. See equation 4 below.
AC = 37.48 + 0.9377 (EC) (4)
(0.44) (30.39) R2 = .985 df+14
(AC is Actual Sales Tax, EC is the forecasted Sales Tax, while figures 
in parenthesis are t-values.
On the basis of t-values, the constant is insignificant, but the 
co-efficient on the forecasts is significant. The high value of R2 
= 0.985 clearly shows that the relationship between the estimates and 
the actual data is near perfect. Moreover, the co-efficient (0.9377) 
which is a bit less than unity, confirms the tilt towards 
overprediction. The latter is also revealed by Figure 8:1(c) below, 
where the regression line lies to the right of the perfect forecasts 
line. Whether the satisfactory forecasting situation observed here is 
an outcome of a good forecasting system or is just coincidental will 
be known when the remaining sections are discussed.
T A B L E  8 : 4
F O R E C A S T  ER R O R S IN  SALES TAY
PERIOD 57/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80; 80/1 81/2 nl)
♦ERRORS
%
+0.0 -8.9 -3.3 3.6 -8.9 13.4 11.6 -15.9 2.5 -11.' 2.5 -1.9 -8.7 -9.3 -12.0 6.2
# Errors in the ratio of difference between actual and estimated sales 
tax to estimated sales tax.
Source: Computed from actual and estimated data on consumption and
excise duties appearing in Appendix 1.
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However, since this source of revenue has been contributing a 
significant share to the total recurrent revenues in recent years,2 
its forecasting performance has also helped to keep the variations in 
the total revenue low.
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(iv)The Income and Personal Taxes
This is the second major source of revenues, besides consumption 
and excise duties3, The predictions in this category of tax have been 
quite uncontrollable. As shown in Table 8:5 below, the errors are 
quite large and are mainly of underprediction nature.
T A B L E  8 : 5
F O R E C A S T  ER R O R S IN  IN C O M E  A N D  P E R S O N A L  T A X E S
PERIOD 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
♦ERROR
%
0 -11.3 2.0 7.2 17.6 0 16.6 26.5 7.9 12.5 20. 20.5 30.9 34-5 81.9 44.9
# Error is the ratio of difference between actual and estimated income 
and personal taxes to the forecasted income and personal taxes.
Source: Computed from actual and estimated data on income and
personal taxes appearing in Appendix *\.
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As can be observed from the above table also, the errors appeared to 
have been growing larger with time. Between 1968/69 and 1982/82, with 
an exception of 1972/73 and 1975/76, the errors grew from a level of 
-113% to 44.9%.
A regression analysis of the actual taxes against the forecasts 
revealed some interesting results as well, which in general support 
the observations made above. The regression equation appears below.
AP = -235.32 + 1.513 (EP) (5)
(-2.03) (16.9) R 2 = .935 DF. + 14
(AP stands for actual Income and Personal taxes, EP is the forecasts, 
and the figures in parenthesis are t-values)
In view of the significant values of t-statistics, the constant 
and the co-efficient on the forecast, are significant. The R2=
0.953 also indicate a high level of association between the actual 
taxes and the forecasts. The negative intercept has no meaning 
because we do not expect to have negative tax collections when there 
are no estimates. However, the greater-than-unity value of the co­
efficient (1.513) is a clear indication of the extent to which the 
estimates have been underpredicted. These results are confirmed 
further by a graphic presentation of the actual and forecasted taxes. 
Figure 8:1(e) below refers.
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A comparison of the regression line and the perfect forecast line 
in Figure 8:1(e) above confirms the point of ever growing 
i-inderprediction errors. The divergence between the two lines has been 
growing further and further as this source of tax continues to expand. 
As it was mentioned earlier, this category is an important source of 
revenues. This means that as the errors continue to grow, which is a 
clear indication of lost control on the prediction process, much more 
volatility is induced to the total recurrent revenue. The observed 
phenomenon might point to a deliberate condition of concealment or a 
condition of conservatism when it comes to estimating the revenues 
from this source. This situation appears to be supporting a point 
raised earlier about budget, makers in LDCs having a tendency to
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estimate their revenues with a bias on the low side. However, a more 
objective assessment of this outcome can be made after a discussion of 
the process of making the forecasts which is done below (see p. 265)•
(v) Motor Vehicles Licence and Taxes
Although this is just a small source of revenues, its analysis 
revealed that there were more underpredictions than overpredictions. 
Table 8.6 below presents the errors.The errors in Table 8:6 range from 
-14% to 60%. In a number of periods, particularly 1971/72, 1973/74, 
1974/75 and 1981/82, the errors are quite substantial.
When regression analysis is taken on the forecasts and the 
outturn, represented by equation (7) below, it is observed that the 
coefficient on the forecast is greater than unity which confirms the 
underprediction tendency.
AM = 0.122 + 1.086 (EM) (7)
(.22) (9.95) R2 = 0.87
(AM stands for actual vehicle licence and taxes; EM is the forecasted 
vehicle licence and taxes, and the figures in parentheses are the t- 
values).
TABLE 8:6
FORECAST ERRORS IN VEHICLE TAXES AND LICENCES
PERIOD 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
+ERROR
% 11 -6.9
21.2 -6.8 -30.4 0 61.3 60 20 0 9.1 -14.3-10.5 1.8 40 24.2
* Error is the ratio of difference between actual and forecasted taxes to the forecasted 
Vehicle Licence and Taxes.
Source: Computed from actual and estimated data on Vehicle Lienee and Taxes. appearing
in Appendix 1.
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(vi) Miscellaneous Taxes and Licence
An analysis of this source of revenue shows that the predictions 
have actually been completely out of control. As shown in Table 8.7 
below, the errors have been quite substantial, ranging from -100% to 
181%. On the whole, there has been more underpredictions than 
overpredictions.
The significant errors make the relationship between the actual 
and the forecasted miscellaneous taxes and licence insignificant. The 
latter can be discerned from regression equation (8) below.
AL = 66.088 - 0.17345 (EL) (8)
(2.7) (0.706) R 2 = 0.03
(AL stands for the actual miscellaneous taxes and licences; EL is the 
forecasted miscellaneous taxes and licences. The figures in the 
parenthesis are the t-values).
The high value of t-statistic for the constant indicates that the 
latter is significant, while the coefficient on the forecasted 
miscellaneous taxes and licences appears insignificant. Worse still, 
the R2 = 0.03, is so low thus rendering the whole relationship 
insignificant. Even the negative sign on the coefficient is 
unexpected. All these point to the fact that predictions in this area 
has been out of control.
TABLE 8:7
FORECAST ERRORS IN MISCELLANEOUS TAXES AND LICENCES
PERIOD37/8 38/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 31/2 82/3
♦ERROR




4.5 3.7 15.9 32.6 -11.7 37.5
/
25.4 104.5 50. -100.
± Error is the percentage ratio of difference between actual and forecasted miscellaneous 
taxes and licences to forecasted miscellaneous taxes and licences.
Source: Computed from actual and estimated data on miscellaneous Taxes and Licences
appearing in Appendix 1.
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(vi) Parastatal Dividend
The analysis of predictions in this category of revenue point to 
a mixed situation. While in the early years (say from 1969/70 to 
1974/75) there were more underpredictions, the more recent years 
pointed to a tendency to overpredictions. Table 8:8 below gives the 
errors of prediction.
The magnitude of the errors is also an issue of concern. They 
range from -42% to 104%. A regression analysis of the actual 
dividends and the estimated dividends give some interesting results as 
well. Equation (9) below refers.
AD = 15.64 + 0.8417 (ED) (9)
(70.) (5.9) R2 = 0.74, df. 12
(AD stands for Actual Dividends, ED is the Estimated Dividends, while 
the figures in the parenthesis are the t-values).
The high value of R2 = 0.74 indicates that the association 
between the actual and the forecasted revenues is signficant. The 
significant co-efficient in the forecasted dividend which is less than 
unity is a clear sign of the existence of a tendency to overpredict, 
although when the errors are physically examined it is observed that a 
greater number of periods had underpredictions. An inspection of 
graph below - figure 8:1(f) shows also that more of the plotted points 
lie to the perfect forecast line, which is a sign of underprediction. 
The significantly large overprediction errors has certainly influenced 
the regression results to their favour.
TABLE 8t8
FORECAST ERRORS OF PARASTATAL DIVIDEND
PERIOD 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
♦ERROR? 104.2 13.5 28.6 0 -3.4 2.9 -32.1 11.7 6.5 0 -16 -41.8 -20 39.4
* Errors: is the ratio of difference between actual and predicted dividends to the
predicted dividends.
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III. CONSIDERATION AND EVALUATION OF FACTORS USED IN FORECASTING
The various sources of tax revenue will be discussed in detail in 
this section. The same classifications as used in Section II above 
will be used here.
Most of the factors which are supposed to be used for forecasting 
revenues were mentioned briefly in Chapter 7 above where some 
forecasting conceptual issues were dealt with in some detail. Though 
they will be mentioned once again here, however, more emphasis will be 
pit on the evaluation part.
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(i) Import Duties
The factors that are supposed to be used in forecasting custom 
duties are the expected foreign earnings and the likely quantum of 
imports as forecasted and co-ordinated by the Bank of Tanzania. 5 
Expected foreign earnings presumably refer to those earnings 
derived from export of goods and services. Moreover, if these 
expected foreign earnings data are to be used in the forecasting 
process, it means that such data has to be available to the Treasury 
(forecasters) probably by December, meaning six months in advance. 
Given that the country relies mainly on agricultural products for its 
foreign exchange earnings, the production of foreign earnings 
forecasts presupposes the existence of a good system of forecasting 
agricultural production at least a year in advance. One would really 
be naive to assume that such an efficient forecasting system exists in 
Tanzania. After all, weather alone in the past decade has been so 
devastating that it has been difficult to tell what is going to happen 
a few months later, let alone a year. On the other hand, agricultural 
commodity prices in the internal markets have never been very stable. 
This makes it difficult to predict what prices the next sold 
commodities will fetch.6 The inquiry with the Commissioner of 
Customs and Sales Taxes about the use of such data showed that such 
forecasted foreign earnings are never used in the forecasting process. 
The Bank of Tanzania that is supposed to provide the data does not 
even include forecasts in its economic reports. [A perusal through the 
latter*s * Economic Bulletin* does not provide evidence of that.65] 
Moreover, the economic reports are published quite late. For example, 
the report for 1982 came out in late 1984.
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The second type of base used to forecast custom duties is the 
likely quantum of imports. Import duties have been levied on 
consumable goods mainly. A small amount is levied on intermediate 
goods, but capital goods were not charged the duty at all until 
1979/80 when a rate of 10% was imposed.7 A number of factors have 
made it difficult to obtain data on imports as well. Before the trade 
liberalization policy came into effect in 1984, all importers used to 
get import licences from the Bank of Tanzania (BoT). The moment the 
importer had received such licences, it was a sort of a guarantee or 
firm commitment by BoT to grant the foreign exchange required. This 
implies that import forecasts could be obtained in advance based on 
the total amount of the import licences. However, if we may invoke 
our knowledge of balance of payments crisis that the country has been 
going through in the last decade, (see Chapter 3) it is doubtful 
whether the Bank would issue all the licences required in a year some 
six months or more in advance. On inquiring, the office of the 
Commissioner of Customs and Sales Tax could not produce any evidence 
of information obtained from BoT about import forecasts, which were 
used in forecasting import duties. Nor was it possible to get the 
data from the BoT because all documents had been burnt in 1984 in a 
fire that destroyed the Bank's building.
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The situation has even got more difficult with the introduction 
of J trade liberalization *. Imports are no longer controlled by BoT 
through the import licence systems. Importers who do not have to use
BoT foreign exchange make importation directly without getting a
licence from the Bank.7b
My interview with the the office of the Coiranisioner of Customs 
and Sales Tax clearly revealed that such forecasted import data are 
not used in the generation of the forecasts. What takes place is that
the taxes are predicted on the basis of prior year tax collection
performance and the collection already made in the current period, and 
from it a guess is made of the likely import duties in the next 
period. The amount would be determined by adding or deducting a 
certain percentage, which is determined arbitrarily, on the expected 
import duties in the current period. There was no evidence of any 
quantitative methods being used to generate such estimates. No 
wonder then that the significant errors discussed in 1(b) (i) above 
have resulted.
(ii) Hie Export Duties
Export duties are supposed to be forecasted using projections in 
exports.8 The problems of forecasting exports are similar to those 
of forecasting foreign earnings which were discussed in III(i) above. 
Since the export duties would be earned on exports of agricultural 
produce mainly, a knowledge of exportable quantities and price of each 
product is essential. Given the difficulties of forecasting both 
quantities and prices of exports, the estimation of export-duties is 
done by taking into account the past trend, especially by considering
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performance in the prior year and the period already covered in the 
current period. Some percentage is then added or deducted on the 
expected current period*s taxes to give the next period*s estimates.
In discussing the problem with officers responsible, there was no 
evidence of quantitative methods having been put to use to generate 
the forecasts. The consequences of using arbitrary methods to 
forecast export duties are certainly reflected in the substantial 
errors observed in 11(b) (ii) above.
(iii) Consumption and Excise Duties (Sales Tax)
The Sale Taxes are levied on both imported and locally 
manufactured goods. The predictions are supposed to be based on type 
and quantum of goods likely to be produced locally and imported, 
having regard to their rates.9 The Commissioner for Custom and 
Sales Tax is responsible for generating the forecasts.
The prediction of sales taxes based on imports suffers the same 
problems as those discussed for import duties which also depend on 
imports. This issue will not be discussed further in this section.
On the other hand, for the forecaster to generate the projections 
based on data on locally produced goods, it implies that they have to 
collect data on production and sales plans from most of the important 
manufacturing units. In view of the fact that this information has to 
be with the Commissioner around December/January so as to enable him 
to prepare the projections in time, it also implies that the 
manufacturing units have to have their plans well prepared in advance. 
Surely one needs a very efficient management system to be able to 
provide such information that much in advance. First, most companies
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have been experiencing serious production problems. As discussed in 
Chapter 3 above, most of the big manufacturing units which depend on 
imported raw materials and spare parts have had serious production 
disruptions associated with the balance of payments crisis. The 
latter circusmstances preclude the preparation of reliable plans. 
Secondly, other deficiencies in the management system, especially 
those of inadequacy in the accounting systems, also add to problems of 
preparing reliable plans in time. Problems of accounting in the case 
of parastatal organisations will be examined below when income and 
personal taxes prediction factors are discussed.
The current practice of forecasting sales taxes related to local 
production els revealed during the interviews is that most of the 
forecasting is done at district level. The Sales Tax officers in the 
districts are supposed to carry out a * survey* in their districts of 
production and sales targets in most of the manufacturing units which 
produce in large quantities and which have their products heavily 
taxed as well. For example, some of the products which would have 
been covered in the survey would include beer, cigarettes, textiles, 
petrol etc. On the basis of the data collected through the survey, 
the district sales tax officers are supposed to prepare their 
projections of sales tax for their districts, which are then sent to 
the regional officers. The Regional Sales Tax officers are supposed 
to consolidate the estimates from the districts and forward them to 
the Head Office - the department of Customs and Sales Tax in the 
Ministry of Finance. Here they are consolidated further. Although 
the officials interviewed at the department of Customs and Sales Tax 
indicated that projections forwarded from district level are supported
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by details of survey data used in the projections, however, they could 
not provide any evidence of the data. If such data is provided from 
the districts, then it is not kept in official office records or
files. This implies that the Head Office does not use such data to
check thoroughly the estimates received. And in view of some of the 
problems mentioned earlier which are faced by companies and which 
would preclude the preparation of the plans in time, it is quite 
likely that the unreliable * survey* data collected are used to give an 
impression of what sales trends are likely to be. What also became 
apparent during the interview is that the burden of explanation of any 
difference between collections and estimates falls on the district
officers. However, since the Sales Tax is one of the major sources of
revenues, there is a continous review of performance trend to ensure 
that the targeted taxes are collected. The district sales tax 
officers are supposed to make a fresh assessment of expected 
companies9 performances after six months which would lead to a review 
of the estimates. And it is after this middle-of-the-year review that 
it is decided whether to change the rates or to include new tax bases 
so as to ensure the initial projections are attained. The latter has 
certainly led to the success in prediction over this area. It was 
observed in 11(b) (iii) that the prediction errors were very low in 
this category.
(iv) Income and Personal Taxes
The Commissioner for Income Tax is responsible for forecasting 
revenues from the above source. The basis of estimating the expected 
taxes is expected profits and the wage bill. Profits are for
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estimating income tax, while wage bills are for estimating personal 
taxes.11 In the case of profits, the income tax department sends 
out a questionnaire to all important companies requesting them to 
supply information regarding the estimated current year's profits.
The response to this inquiry is generally poor. Why the poor 
response? First, as will be seen below in the case of parastatal 
companies, for most companies the accounts are in arrears for several 
years. In the absence of recent year's accounts, the companies have 
no basis for determining the expected profits in the current period. 
Moreover, the companies also know that such information - if provided, 
could be used to make a provisional assessment under the presumptive 
assessment provision. Secondly, most companies in the private sector, 
with an exception of a few subsidiaries of multinational companies 
operating there, are individual or family companies.12 The tax 
officials admitted that the response from these private companies is 
very unsatisfactory, simply because those owning the companies would 
not like to disclose their position.125 And since the enquiry is 
not legally enforcible, there is not much the department can do.
In the case of parastatal companies, a look at their state of 
accounts for a few past years clearly shows why they cannot provide 
the information required by the Treasury.
267
TABLE 8:9
ACCOUNTS OF PARASTATAL COMPANIES IN TANZANIA 


















No * No % No % No % No %
1975/76 270 198 72 26 70 35 111 56 17 8 N/A N/A
1976/77 300 212 56 18 76 35 113 53 21 9 75 35
1977/78 320 228 92 28 76 35.5 122 53.5 30 13.2 N/A N/A
1978/79 329 347 100 30 76 30 138 55 33 13 81 32
1979/80 300 200 100 30 76 38 103 51.5 23 n.; N/A N/A
N/A = Not Available
Note: The accounts which were not submitted are in arrears for
more than a year.
Source 1. The Role of public Sector in the Economic Development 
of Tanzania. Proceedings of a Workshop held in Arusha, 
Tanzania, on 27-29 September, 1983. Economic Research 
Bureau, Dar es Salaam, 1984. Table I p. 145 
2. Ministry of Finance, 1981/82 Budget Speech,
Dar es Salaam, p. 9.
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Although some knowledge of expected profits is crucial in 
determining expected profit taxes, it was surprising to learn that the 
department itself has not made an attempt of assembling profit data 
that was with it. If expected profits data from companies was not 
forthcoming, for sure historical profit data lying with the department 
could provide the starting point for making the projections. What a 
senior official in the department commented about using the historical 
data is that the number of tax accounts (clients) was too big for the 
department to be able to extract the data. He indicated they had 
about 40,000 accounts. But why do they keep such accounts if they 
cannot use them? Presumably the information system is not geared 
towards the production of such reports.
As far as wage bills are concerned, my request to see the figures
which have been used by the department to prepare the forecasts was 
not met either. I was referred back to the Bureau of Statistics.
Such an attitude clearly suggests that the data were not available and 
were not used for forecasting. But would it be easy to get such data 
from the Bureau of Statistics? Under the current circumstances and 
practices it is impossible for the Bureau to be able to get planned 
data. How could the same companies which had failed to provide data 
to the income tax department manage to supply such data to the Bureau 
of Statistics? On the other hand, since companies and government 
departments file personal tax returns every month with names of 
employees, the income tax department could actually compile past wage 
bills from the same returns. Such historical data could be used to 
project expected wage bills which in turn would be used to project the
personal taxes. This alternative is not exploited either. In view of
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the restricted information flow in Tanzania coupled by lack of 
initiative on the part of the tax authority, the forecasting for this 
source of tax has ended up being an intuitive one. This is evidently 
clear from the significant errors which were observed in 11(a) (iv) 
above. And even if the underprediction is deliberate, as argued above 
(p ), it could be argued that this is a manipulation without control, 
although the underpredictions were successionally accomplished.
Other taxes such as the motor vehicle taxes, the dividends etc., 
have no specific factor bases which have been suggested for using in 
their projection. The manual recommends that annual trend for the 
past years could be used to project them.13 This method could 
produce reliable results if used properly, especially if quantitative 
techniques are used. But the department does not employ any 
quantitative techniques in its forecasting. Judgemental methods 
appear to be used more, but the results do not reflect a good use of 
the methods either. The evidence for the poor judgement is the 
substantial errors observed in the case of the motor vehicle licence 
and taxes, miscellaneous taxes and licence, and the parastatal 
dividends in Section II above.
The lack of proper forecasting techniques should be seen as a 
system problem rather than a problem of an individual department or 
unit. There seems to be no appreciation for improvement by officers 
responsible, from the Treasury Principal Secretary down to the 
departmental heads. The forecasting errors which were observed in 
nearly all cases of tax sources have been going on for years, and yet 
the administration does not take any efforts to reform the system. 
Consequently forecasting continues to lose its meaning.
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(vi) DIAGNOSIS OF DEVIATIONS AND RECOMMENDATION F O R  IMPROVEMENT
The weaknesses which were pointed out in Section III above which 
resulted from the failure of the forecasters to use any identifiable 
method in generating the forecasts make it difficult for the forecast 
deviations to be diagnosed appropriately and be able to locate the 
major sources of the errors. If quantitative methods had been used, 
it would be possible to analyse the errors in relation to the 
variables involved and be able to spot out the causes of the errors.
In situations where forecasting has been done systematically, it has 
been suggested by Mosley that forecasting errors could be caused by at 
least four factors.14 These are:
(a) changes in the data for the past since the forecast was 
made,
(b) incorrect forecasts or assumptions for exogeneous variables,
(c) errors in the specification of the model
(d) errors of judgement made in * imposing * coefficients in 
deviance of the evidence of the statistical relationship 
between past data.
However, since in the Tanzanian case the methods used in 
forecasting are fortuitous, it is not possible to analyse the errors 
using the above four factors. Due to this limitation, the analysis in 
this section will therefore confine itself to three major issues. 
First, some of the factors which were identified in III above under 
the major sources of revenue will be considered in terms of their 
stability vis-a-vis the stability of the revenue sources. To
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accomplish the latter, instability indices will be constructed and. 
used. Secondly, an attempt will be made to try to determine the 
relationship between the revenue sources and their taxable base. The 
purpose of carrying out the latter analysis is actually to try to find 
out whether there are any variables that could be used, in quite 
simple form, to derive more reliable estimates. Thirdly, the errors 
which were determined in Section II (b) above will be analysed further 
to determine the degree of predictability of the various sources which 
could help to sort out the predictables from the unpredictables; which 
would actually imply that the unpredictable sources should have more 
attention drawn to them. Since the sources of revenues are limited to 
Tanzania, it can not afford to lose any taxable base already 
identified.
(i) Instability Indices and Equation Relationships
The instability index used is the one used by Idachaba15 which is
the normalized co-efficient of variation defined as:
I = 100*S/R
where I is the index of instability, S is the standard error of 
estimate obtained from a linear regression of the variable concerned 
on time, and R is the mean revenue over the time period.
(a) Import Duties
In this category of revenue, the instability indices constructed 
were as appears in Table 8:10 below. From the latter, the imported 
intermediate goods factor appears to be the least unstable while the
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imported consumption goods factor is the most unstable. The import
\
duties are expected to be as stable as the base from which they are 
mainly derived. The category of imports which suffer high duties is 
the consumption goods type. The intermediate goods suffer lower 
rates. The high instability in import duties could therefore be 
related to the high instability in consumer goods1 imports, although 
the more stable intermediate goods imports help to moderate 
fluctuations in import duties to some extent. Implied in this 
analysis is the fact that those factors which appear to be more 
stable, for example the intermediate goods factor and the imports 
factor, should be used to determine a simple model that could be used
TABLE 8:10: INDICES OF INSTABILITY FOR IMPORT DUTIES FACTORS
FACTOR INDEX
Intermediate Goods - imports 10.5%
IMPORTS 12.0%
Exports 14.3%
Actual Import Duties 25.3%
Capital Goods - Imports 31.4%
Consumption Goods - Imports 31.7%
Source: Computed from actual data of variables listed for the 
period 1967/68-1982/83.
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in the future to either predict or countercheck the accuracy of 
predictions made using other techniques.
The equations which have been developed with the above factors as 
the predictory variables, which cover the period 1967/68 to 1982/83, 
appear below as equations (8A) to (12), in order of strength based on 
R2 .
Equation




AI = 316 + 0.0992 (CA) 0.68 (9)A
(6.3) (5.5)
AI = 240 + .116 (IN) 0.65 (10)
(3.6) (5.1)
AI = 161.7 + 0.094 (X) 0.46 (11)
(1.4) (3.5)
AI = 187.5 + 0.304 (00) 0.36 (12)
(11.4) (2.7)
AI = Import Duties; CA= Capital Goods Imports; IN = Intermediate Goods 
Imports; M = Total Imports, X = Exports; CO = Consumption Goods 
imports; the figures in parentheses are t-ratios.
The results indicated that total imports* association with 
the import duties is higher than in the rest of cases. The capital
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goods have come second, although differing just slightly from 
intermediate goods (eq. 10). If we are to merge stability of 
variables with degree of association, then total imports and 
intermediate goods ought not be considered for use in predictions. I 
would not hesitate therefore, to recommend equation (8)A which uses 
imports as the independent variable.
(b Consumption and Excise Duties (Sales Tax)
The factors used in the instability analysis are selected locally 
manufactured products which normally carry high rates. The variables 
were taken in quantities (as reported) rather than in shillings. The 
instability indices appear in Table 8:11 below.
TABLE 8:11: INDICES OF INSTABILITY FOR SALES TAX VARIABLES
VARIABLE INDEX (%)
IMPORTS (As in Table 8:: 10 12.0
CIGARETTES 13.8
CEMENT 17.8





CONSUMPTION GOODS IMPORTS 31.7
Source: Computed from actual data of variables listed for the 
period 1967/68-1982/83 mainly from Economic Surveys.
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Though we have reasonably low rates of instability for the major 
sources of the sales tax, the index for the sales tax itself is rather 
high. This could be a reflection of the complex nature of this tax 
which covers a wide range fo products with differing rates.
No equations have been constructed for the factors measured in 
quantities. However, manufacturing sector output has been used as one 
of the variables. Moreover, since sales tax is also levied on 
imports, the latter has been taken as an explanatory factor as well. 
The results of regression appear below as equation (13) to (16)
C = -1026.8 + 1.14 (IN) R2 =.88 13
(-3.1) (10.1)
C = -856 + 1.12 (V) + 0.02965 (M) R* =.87 14
(-21) (1.7) (.1125)
C = -834.52 + 1.933 (V) R* =.87 15
(-2.5) (9.54)
C = 1082.2 + 0.46 (M) R* =.83 16
(-2.7) (8.5)
C = Sales Taxes; IN = Intermediate goods imports; V = industrial 
(manufacturing) output; M = imports; the figures in parentheses are 
t-values.
In all the equations the values of R 2 are high. In equation
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(13) the regression co-efficient is very significant. Although sales 
taxes from intermediate goods would not be substantial as only low 
rates are charged, the latter comes out as a strong factor influencing 
the explained variable. Equation (14) which picks up both 
manufacturing output and imports, has the latter factor (imports) 
appearing insignificant. The t-value is quite low. Equation (15) 
which uses manufacturing output as the explanatory factor, is also 
strong with significant co-efficient. This is a better alternative to 
equation (14). Equation (16) which uses imports as the explanatory 
variable, emerges out as a strong one as well. In view of the fact 
that most of the sales tax comes from local manufacturing and imports, 
I would therefore recommend that equations (15) and (16) be used to 
countercheck the predicted Sales Tax estimates.
(c)Income and Personal Taxes 
The factors used in the determination of instability indices are the 
national wage bills and the national net operating surplus. The 
indices appear on Table 8:12 below
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NET OPERATING SURPLUS 
INCOME AND PERSONAL TAXES 
PARASTATAL ORG. PROFITS
Source: Computed from actual data of variables for the period
1967/68 to 1981/82. Wage bills and Net operating surplus 
as reported in U.N.O. (various years). Year book of 
National Accounts, Vol. I., Also some data on Income and 
Personal Taxes and Parastatal organisations profits as 
reported in United Republic of Tanzania, (various years), 
Economic Surveys.
Some equations which were constructed to relate the tax category 
to the factors for the period 1967/68 to 1981/82 are as follow:
I = 188.5435 + 0.1085987 (S) R* = 0.96 (17)
(-1.96) (17.686)







I = -399.90 + 0.04153(S) + 0.1685(W) R* = 0.969 (19)
(-2.7) (1.11) (1.82)
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(I is the actual Income and Personal Taxes; S is the net operating 
Surplus , while W is the Wage Bills. The figures in parentheses are 
the t-ratios).
The results of Table 8:12 above indicate that the latter category 
of tax is less stable than the bases from which it is derived. The 
regression results as presented in equations (17) to (19) reveal a 
strong association between the tax and the determinant bases. While 
the two bases (equations (17) and (18) appear significant in the 
individual analysis, however, when they are combined in equation (19), 
the operating surplus base emerge with a weak regression co-efficient 
(due to the low value of t-statistics). And, inspite of the strong 
fits, the regression coefficients appear to be very low while the 
constants are large negative values. The latter implies that it is 
only a small part of either the national bill or the profits that is 
mobilised as taxes. As will be suggested in (ii) below, that is an 
area that ought to receive greater administrative attention.
(d) Export Duties
In this case the exports instability index was computed and was found 
to be 14.2% while that for the export duties was 107.2%. Stability in 
exports has not helped to stabilize export duties. Moreover, the 
correlation between the export duties and the exports is very weak. 
From equation (20) below R2 = 0.26
E = -113.5 + 0.083 (X) R 2 = 0.26 (20)
(-0.7) (2.2)
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(E is the export duties; X is the exports; and the figures in 
parentheses are t-values).
The low relationship observed in (20) above implies that the 
exports as a whole cannot be used to project the export duties. The 
possible cause of this low relationship could be explained by the fact 
that in the more recent period, particularly after 1979/80, export 
duties have been levied on very few export products. The bulk of the 
exports, especially those of agricultural nature, have been exempted 
from tax (see Chapter 6 for further discussion). This has led to the 
situation that the share of export taxes to the total taxes is very 
insignif icant.
(ii) Predictability Ranking
The average errors for each category of tax were used to 
determine the least predictable and the most predictable types of 
revenue . The ranking on the basis of error size appear on Table 8:13 
below. The lower the average error, the more predictable the item is. 
Form the table is is clear that consumption and excise duties appear 
to be the most predictable source. However, the Income and Personal 
Taxes, which is the second most important source of recurrent revenue, 
has quite a high average error (30.1%). In addition to ranking 
according to the average error, the coefficients of variations of the 
errors were determined for each category of tax and then ranked in 
descending order. The data appears in Tables 8-14 (a) and (b) below. 
Whether the Absolute* or ’true* mean is used, the results indicated 
that the type of taxes which had more stable errors were the income 
and personal taxes, the Vehicle Tax and licences, the import duties,
280
and consumption and excise duties. The other three, namely,
Parastatal dividends, the export duties and miscellaneous taxes, were 
the most unstable. In view of the results in Tables 8-13 and 8-14, 
the Taxes which should be emphasized are those with low average errors 
but also with stable errors. The income and personal taxes could be a 
cause of conem because of its high error. While we cannot recommend 
that this important source should receive less emphasis, however, it 
could be recommended that the department of income tax should be 
strengthened further. But for the other sources which look less 
predictable, such as Export duties and the miscellaneous taxes and 
licences (Table 8-13), the government could disband the Sections 
involved, particularly where the government's administrative costs are 
higher than the collections from them. In any case, where some 
administrative efficiency can be increased, it is better for the less 
predictable sources to be retained.
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TABLE 8:13: ERRORS RANKING 
TAX SOURCE_________________AVERAGE ERROR MAXIMUM ERROR
1.CONSUMPTION AND EXCISE DUTIES 8.3% 34.4%
2.MOTOR VEHICLE LICENCE AND TAX 17.4 61.2
3.IMPORT DUTIES 19.6 58.9
4.PARASTATAL ORG. DIVIDENDS 21.5 81.1
5.INCOME AND PERSONAL TAXES 30.1 134.7
6.EXPORT DUTIES 36.6 324.8
7.MISCELLANEOUS TAXES AND LICENCES 94.6 666.0
Note: l.The average error is determined by taking the mean
absolute error Actual Error-Estimate Error) divided by 
the mean estimate value (^  (estimate) )
2.The maximum error is determined by taking the maximum 
absolute error divided by the mean estimate value.
Source: Computed from actual (data appearing in Appendix 1)
and estimates data for the various categories for the 
period 1967/68 to 1982/83.
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TABLE 8-14(a)
RANKING OF TAX SOURCES USING THE INDEX 
OF OO-EFFICIENT OF VARIATION OP ERRORS









1.Income and Personal taxes 
2.Vehicle Tax and Licences 
3.Import Duties






RANKING OF TAX SOURCE USING THE INDEX OF 
COEFFICIENT OF VATIATION OF ERRORS.
TYPE OF TAX COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION
(True Mean used)1
1. Income and Personal taxes 133.9%






t = the ’’true" mean takes account of arithmetic sign of the error, 
the "absolute” mean does not 
Source: Computed from error data of the various tax sources.
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What other options are available for reducing the errors?
Several methods have been suggested.16 The first method of reducing 
the forecast errors is for the Treasury to accept the errors which 
arise from existing forecasting systems as a "structural datum" and 
attempt to remove them by applying realization functions to the 
forecasts generated through the present methods of forecasting. The 
realization function are those appearing as equations (1), (2), (3), 
(4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) above. The adjusted raw forecasts 
give lower average errors in most cases compared to errors of the 




COMPARISON OF ERRORS COMPUTED USING THE UNCORKEd'ED 
ESTIMATES AND THE CORRECTED ESTIMATES
AVERAGE ERRORS BASED ON





1. TOTAL CURRENT REVENUE 7.7%
2. IMPORT DUTIES 19.6
3. EXPORT DUTIES 36.6
4. CONSUMPTION AND EXCISE DUTIES 8.3
5. INCOME AND PERSONAL TAXES 30.1
6. MOTOR VEHICLE LICENCE AND
TAXES 17.4
7. MISCELLANEOUS TAXES AND
LICENCES 94.9









Source: Computed from error data of the various sources.
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TABLE 8:15 (b)
COMPARISON OF ERRORS COMPUTED USING THE 
UNOOKRECTED ESTIMATES AND TOE CORRECTED 
ESTIMATES
MAXIMUM ERRORS BASED ON 
UNOORKECTED CORRECTED
CATEGORY OF TAX REVENUE____________ ESTIMATES______ ESTIMATES
1. TOTAL RECURRENT REVENUE 65.2% 44%
2.IMPORT DUTIES 58.9 63
3.EXPORT DUTIES 324.8 261
4.CONSUMPTION AND EXCISE DUTIES 34.4 32
5.INCOME AND PERSONAL TAXES 134.7 56
6.MOTOR VEHICLE LICENCE AND TAXES 61.2 50.0
7.MISCELLANEOUS TAXES AND LICENCES 666.0 503.0
8.PARASTATAL DIVIDEND 81.1 110.0
Source: Computed from error data of the various sources.
Another method of reducing the errors is for the Treasury to 
adopt a system of preparing budgets more frequently than is done now. 
This could be done by having supplementary estimates every three 
months, a move that would place the Treasury in a better position to 
assess the economic environment that underlines the predictions.
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SUM M ARY
The Chapter examined in detail the process of forecasting 
revenues in Tanzania. In analysing the actual revenues in relation to 
the forecasted revenues, the following observations were made.
(i)The total tax revenue had a bias towards underprediction with 
modest yearly variations. These variations did not exhibit any growth 
or decline pattern.
(ii)The individual tax sources exhibited different magnitures of 
forecast errors. The consumption and excise duty tax had the minimal 
errors with an average of 8.3%. This was a source of encouragement 
because this tax now contributes about 40% of the tax revenues. The 
Income and Personal taxes, which is the second most important source 
of revenue (contributing 28% of tax revenues), was a source of 
disappointment. The average forecasting errors amounted to 30%. The 
other tax sources were also a source of concern for they emerged with 
quite high errors. The case of miscellaneous taxes and licences 
appeared to be much worse than the rest of the items, due to its high 
average error of about 95%.
(iii)In the case of Income and Personal Taxes, there was an all­
period underestimation which led to some suspicion that this was done 
deliberately presumably with the intention of using the extra 
resources as a cushion against uncertainty due from the other less 
predictable tax sources.
In examining the various variables which were supposed to be used 
in forecasting the various tax items, it became apparent that it was 
difficult for the authorities to have the data on time. The three
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main factors considered to be contributing to delays in getting the 
prediction variables data include:
(i) the restricted information flow system in 
Tanzania.
(ii) economic imbalances in all sectors that created 
uncertainty which made it difficult to make 
forecasts of the predictor variables.
(iii) Lack of initiative and effort on the part of tax 
administrators to retrieve and use historical 
data obtainable in the tax departments.
The failure to have some access to the data for the predictor 
variables led to the use of judgemental techniques in forecasting.
The latter situation had a limitation on the amount of quantitative 
anlaysis that could be done on the forecast errors observed.
Some other vital tests performed involved the derivation of 
instability indices of the various variables related to or forming tax 
bases. The indices were used to check how instability in a tax item 
was related to instability in its predictor variable. The most stable 
variables were then used to develop simple regression models which 
could be used for future forecasting. For the three major tax items, 
the following variables were recommended.
Consumption and Excise Duty Industrial Outputs or Imports




As regards ways of reducing the forecast errors, it was 
recommended that the Treasury should emphasize those taxes which 
emerged with small errors, with the implication that the less 
predictable taxes should be disbanded altogether. Secondly, the 
Treasury could use the realization functions to correct the raw 
forecasts generated through the present system. And thirdly, the 
government should have more regular supplementary estimates.
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NOTES
1.Caiden, N. and Wildavsky, A. (1974), Planning and Budgeting 
in Poor Countries, New York, John Wiley & Sons, pp 68-69
2.The Share of consumption and excise duty to total recurrent 
revenue computed from data appearing in Appendix grew from 11% 
to 1967/68 to 41% in 1982/83.
3.The share of income and personal taxes to total revenue computed 
from data in Appendix grew from 19% in 1967/68 to 28% in 1982/83.
5. Uni ted Republic of Tanzania. (1984). Manual of the Budget 
Process in Tanzania, p.21 Dar es Salaam: Treasury.
6.Prices of agricultural commodiites sold to World Markets by 
Tanzania were discussed and plotted on graph in Chapter 3 and 
the observations made were that most of the products were 
subject to extraordinarily erratic movements, although the prices 
had experienced an upward movement over that period.
6B.see the Bank of Tanzania’s ’Economic Report’ (1982). There is 
no evidence of forecasts. Moreover, it is published a year or 
more late.
7.Ministry of Finance, Budget Speech -1979/80, Dar-es-Salaam p.28
7B.Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Economic Survey
(Swahili) page 106. It is clearly mentioned that import 
licences were not required for imports not requiring foreign 
exchange from the banks.
8.Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Planning and Economic 




12.Note that in Tanzania there is no Stock Exchange or Share 
Market for selling company shares.
12B.This observation is quite in agreement with an earlier 
theoretical observation noted in Chapter 6
13.Ministry of Finance, et. al. op cit. page 22
14.Mosley, P. "When is a Policy Instrument not an Instrument”? 
Fiscal Marksmanship in Britain 1951-84” Journal of Public 
Policy. Volume 5, No. 1 (1985)
15.1dachaba, F.S. "Revenue Stability in Developing Countries.
Ghana". Public Finance. Volume 30, No. 7, (1975) page 99 
16.See for example the recommendation by Mosley (op cit. page 78).
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CHAPTER 9
POKEIQJ GRANTS AND LOANS FORECASTING - AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
I INTRODUCTION
The vital role of foreign inflows in a developing country's 
developmental effort need not be overemphasized. Tanzania's public 
investment, especially in the last decade, has depended considerably 
on foreign grants and loans. The ratio of foreign inflows to total 
development budget has remained above 40%.1 Thus, it can be argued 
that the macroeconomic contributions of foreign inflows into the 
economy of a developing country which is short of both skilled human 
and other capital resources will continue to override the 
disadvantages likely to arise as a result of relying on foreign 
inflows.2 Dependency on foreign resources, whether aid or resources 
obtained from private lending sources, can obviously exacerbate 
economic problems if used unwisely. As pointed out by World Bank, if 
aid is not coordinated and managed properly, the desired impact would 
be compromised, by way of heavy indebtness and distortions of national 
objectives.3 Those countries which have put foreign resources into 
well planned investments supported by good policy framework and strong 
executing institutions have in recent decades achieved quite 
remarkable economic development.4 This implies that Tanzania's 
economy still stands a good chance of benefiting from the foreign- 
resource inflows provided that there is proper coordination and 
management for such external resources which should be invested under
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conducive economic and political policies.
Proper management starts at the planning level of which budgeting 
or forecasting is part and parcel. This chapter presents an 
evaluation of forecasting of foreign inflows in the Tanzanian context. 
Since the focus of the study is to identify the extent to which 
inefficiencies in budgeting (especially forecasting) have contributed 
to the current economic problems, the hypothetical framework of 
analysis is contructed and states that: inability to control the 
variables which determine the level of foreign loans and grants 
(inflows) contributes towards the uncertainty that has been a 
characteristic in the actual inflows.
Finally, the chapter is organized as follows: In Section II the
forecasts are anlaysed in relation to the outturns. The analysis will 
consider both aggregated and disaggregated loans and grants. In 
Section III the deviations are diagnosed in relation to factors used 
in the forecasting process. In section IV some attention is paid to 
the performance of a few selected donors, as well as a few sectors, in 
disbursing funds. In section V the scope for reducing forecasting 
discrepancies is considered. Finally there will be a summary.
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II ESTIMATES IN RELATION TO OUTTURNS - A SCIENTIFIC MEASUREMENT OF 
VARIATIONS
The purpose of this section is to explore the extent of 
variations of actual outturns from the forecasts. The external 
resources under consideration are those already agreed upon between 
Tanzanian Government and the donors, although the funds might still be 
in the possession of the latter. Therefore, our forecasts analysis 
relates more to an internal process of allocating the funds in a 
particular period. My investigation will therefore be one of looking 
at the problem of either under- or over-utilization. Surely this is a 
problem to be associated more with the spending agencies and 
departments, although the Treasury and the Ministry of Planning and 
Economic Affairs have to bear the ultimate responsibility for any 
inefficiencies occurring in the allocation and utilization of 
government resources. The analysis will consider the grants and loans 
on a combined basis and then on a separately basis. Although the 
period for analysis has been 1967/68 to 1982/83, due to lack of 
disaggregated data in the most recent years (1980/81 - 1982/83), the 
separate analysis for loans and grants is based on the period 1967/68 
- 1979/80.
(a) Total external loans/grants: Forecasts in relation to outturns
In general, forecasting of external finances in Tanzania appears 
to be saddled with problems. In most cases the estimates are never 
realized. A comparison of the forecasted external finances with the 
actual external finance reveals that there has been some under­
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realization in most of the periods. In thirteen periods out of the 
sixteen years under study, the actual receipts fell short of the 
forecasted amounts. The absolute deviations between the forecasted 
revenues and actual collections appear in Table 9:1 below.
An examination of the results of a regression between the actual 
values and the forecasted values, appearing below as equation (1), 
reveals that the level of discrepancy between the two variables is 
high. Ideally, a perfect forecasting would require that the constant 
should be zero, and the coefficient on the forecast variable should be 
unity.5
Af = 266.4 + 0.4265(Ef) R2 = q .87 (1)
(2.5) (9.4)
(Af stands for Actual external revenue, Ef is the forecasted external 
revenue while the values in parenthesis are t-ratios).
In equation (1) above, both the constant and the coefficient are 
significant as confirmed by the strong values of "t" taken at the 5% 
level of significance. The high value of constant points to some 
tendency for the forecasts to be quite different from actual values. 
Equally, the low value of coefficient which is equal to 0.4265, is 
quite less than unity, and it implies that the forecasts are far from 
being perfect.
TABLE 9: 1: FORECASTING ERRORS IN TOTAL EXTERNAL FINANCING
PERIOD 1967/68 68/69 69/70 70/71- 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78
!-----
78/79 79/8U 80/81 81/82 82/83
ERROR(%) 2670 1866 -39 4 -6 -31 -35 -13 -48 -23 -42 -37 -45 -54 -64 -29
Note: The error is the percentage ratio of difference between the actual and
estimated external finances to the estimated external finances.
Sources: Computed from data appearing in Appendix 9A-1
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A graphical presentation of the realisation equation in relation 
to the perfect forecast line, (figure 9:1 below) confirms further that 
there has been a tendency to overpredict, and with passage of time, 
the imperfection in forecasting has been increasing as is revealed by 
the growing divergence between the perfect forecast line and the 
realisation line.
FIGURE 9:1. FORECASTS AND OUTTURN SCATTERPLOT.
Actual Inflows 
Tsh. in mill.
Perfect Forecast Line 
(Plan = Actual Inflows)
80
Realization Line
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An examination of the pattern of errors indicate that there has been a 
tendency for them to increase with time. This is clear from the 
trend line (equation (2) below) developed. Considering the t-values 
at the 5% level of significance, the constant and the coefficient are 
significant.
Ef = -2465.9 + 156.2(T) R2 = 0.91 (2)
(-7.9) (11.2)
(Ef is the forecast errors, and T is the Trend)
The high negative value of constant points to the dominance of 
negative values, in other words, the over predictions. The positive 
sign on the coefficient on time points to the tendency of the errors 
to increase with time.
(b) Grants: Forecasts in relation to out-turns
An analysis of the grants (the actual and forecasted grants 
revenue) does not present a different pattern from that observed in 
the case of the combined external finances discussed above. The 
tendency in forecasting is one of over-predictions. In nearly all the 
periods the under-realization was of a great magnitude. The errors 
appearing in Table 9:2 below clearly show that the under-realization 
was significant, with errors ranging between 9% and 99%.
TABLE 9:2: FORECASTING ERRORS IN GRANTS
PERIOD 1967/68 68/69 69/ 70 70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/7/ 77/78 78/79 79/80
ERROR%
i----
-18 -99 -'U -96 -4 b -44 -42 -8 -35 -25 -42 -4 b 9
Source: Computed from data appearing in Appendix 9A-2
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When the actual receipts and the forecasted receipts are regressed on 
each other, the results obtained, as depicted in equation (3) below, 
confirm that there has been underrealization. Though the constant 
value is insignificant, due to the low value of t-ratio, however, its 
negative sign indicates the existence of some systematic tendency for 
the forecasts to be too high. The coefficient which is significant - 
in view of the high value of t-ratio, is, however, far less than 
unity, which is an indication of imperfect forecasting, leaning 
towards overprediction.
Ag = -24.09 + 0.78314(Eg ) R2 = o.86 (3)
(-0.3) (8.14)
(Ag is the actual grant receipts, while Eg is the forecast 
grant revenues. The figures in parentheses are the t-ratios)
A graphical presentation (figure 9:2 below) also confirms that
there has been a tendency to over-predict. The plotted regression
line lies to the right of the perfect line, and as time passes, the
two lines appear to be moving further apart from each other. This
divergence stands for the widening discrepancies between the forecasts 
and the actual outturns.
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FIGURE 9:2. FORECASTS AND OUTTURN SCATTER PLOT.
Actual Inflows 
Tsh. in mill.
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(c) Loans - Forecasts in relation to outturns
Forecasting of loans has remained equally imperfect as in the 
case of grants. The general tendency is for overprediction. The 
forecasting errors have remained significant, ranging from 10% to 65%. 
The errors appear in Table 9:3 beloiv.
TABLE 9: 3: FORECASTING LOAN ERRORS
PERIOD 1967/68 68/69 69/7U 70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80
ERROR(%) oO o o -47 -15 -26 -29 -31 -16 -55 -21 “31 -65 -10
Source: Computed from data appearing in appendix 9A-3
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When the forecasts are analysed in relation to outturns using 
regression analysis, we observe that the value of the coefficient, 
which is equal to 0.56, is about half of unity, which implies that the 
forecasts are far from being perfect, and the bias is towards over- 
prediction. On the other hand, the existence of a rather high value 
of constant, (though insignificant due to the very low value of t- 
ratio), implies further that the actual realizations vary 
significantly from the forecasts. Equation (4) below presents the 
perimeters discussed in the above paragraph.
A1 = 98.13 + 0.56(E1 ) R2 = o.70 (4)
(0.89) (5.0)
(A1 is the actual loans (realized), El is the forecasted loans.
The figures in parentheses are the t-values which are tested 
at the 5% level of significance).
Finally, the graphical presentation of the above equation line in 
relation to the perfect forecast line confirms further that in most of 
the periods, the tendency has been one of overprediction. It is only 
in the first couple of years, 1967/88 and 1968/69 that there was 
under-prediction. With an exception of the latter two periods, the 
scatter points for the rest of the study period lie to the right of 
the perfect forecasting line, a phenomenon pointing to 
overpredictions. The graphs and the scatter plots appear in figure 
9:3 below.
In short, the forecasting of external revenues point to a
J > O k
tendency of overpredicting. The errors appear to be significant, and 
they have been growing in absolute terms as the forecasts themselves 
have been growing. In the next section those variables which have 
been used in determining the forecasts will be analysed.
FIGURE 9:3. FORECASTS AND OUTTURN SCATTER PLOT.
Actual Inflows Perfect Forecast Line
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III DIAGNOSIS OF DEVIATIONS IN RELATION TO FACTORS USED IN 
FORECASTING
We have already seen in section II above that there were 
significant variations between the forecasts and outturns of the 
external revenues. Such variations reflected, overpredictions. But 
before we explore the causes for the overpredictions, it might be 
worthwhile to raise and clear a few pertinent issues related to the 
nature of the forecasts, and secondly, to highlight the qualitative 
and quantitative factors that are taken into consideration in 
generating the forecasts.
As regards the nature of the forecasts, it is in order to point 
out that they do not reflect the same qualities of *unknown* or 
’expectations* as in the case of domestic revenues. They in fact 
reflect or represent firm committments of financial resources expected 
to be expended in the respective fiscal year. This implies that the 
variations observed in section II above ought to be perceived as 
under-or over-utilizations rather than under-or-over-predictions. Why 
has it not been possible for the government to use true predictions 
(in the sense of the revenues expected to be negotiated and collected) 
in the annual budget?
To begin with, the use of external resources is, to a large 
extent, for the capital expenditure part of the government budget. 
Recurrent expenditure part of the budget is not financed, in practice, 
through externally mobilized financial resources.6 Given that the 
capital budget is for projects (investments) mainly, the implications 
are that the sources of funding must be certain before implementation
306
can take place. Unlike local resources which can be collected in a 
matter of weeks or months, external funds require negotiations with 
potential donors, which could take a long time to finalize. The 
latter circumstances are due to the fact that Tanzania has had no 
strong influence or control over the donors* policy decisions about 
aid giving. Moreover, considering the fact that, until late 1970s the 
donors preferred to give the aid through the project mode,7 which 
implied that they had to see appraised projects, and sometimes carried 
out their own re-appraisal, it becomes quite apparent as to why the 
aid recipient has to work on what has already been negotiated and 
agreed upon rather than on mere expectations. Thus, faced with the 
problem of timing and weak bargaining power, one has to resort to 
working on commitments. However, Tanzania could exert more influence 
on the donors by developing its own firm aid policies which, for 
example, could put more emphasis on those donors who are willing to 
accomodate its acceptance conditions, especially over the type and 
form of aid that is given, its timing and also over the mode of 
disbursing the funds. The latter might sound an unpractical 
proposition for a country that is severely constrained financially, 
but it could really be worthwhile, if need be to restructure and cut 
down on the volume of investments and accept less donations and loans 
which are more attuned to the country*s real needs, and which give 
better value to the country. It is stressed by World Bank (and also 
Cassen) that if external assistance is to be useful to the recipients, 
then the donors must change their current policies over aid giving. 
However, for such changes to take place, the recipients have to 
initiate policy as well over aid and economic programmes etc.8
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can be argued that the onus to push for the aid policy reforms on the 
part of donors lies mainly with the recipients. Tanzania could learn 
a lot from the case of India (Cassen 1986: pp.88-89) where recipient 
control is manifest.
The next issue to be examined briefly is that of factors 
considered by Tanzania in projecting external revenues.
Apparently, there appear to be no concrete factors used in the 
forecasting of external (aid) revenues. The type of factors which one 
could at least expect to see being used in determining the level of 
external financing could be, for example, the past or planned level of 
National output (GNP), past levels of National Investments (Capital 
Formation), past or expected levels of exports and imports, past 
levels of aid disbursed, etc. But what one sees is quite a different 
approach, which actually does not relate the external financing to the 
country's potential capacity to either absorb it or service it. This 
general weakness is apparently a manifestation of the institutional 
weaknesses existing over development planning whereby investment 
levels are not set in relation to any concrete national economic 
measures. The latter is discussed further in chapter 11 below. Thus, 
the main approach of determining the expected level of external 
funding is one whereby a list of projects is prepared which is then 
used to approach potential donors who in turn make a commitment to 
provide the finance. The precise procedure followed is as presented 
below.
STEP 1 The project is identified and approval to continue with
its feasibility study is secured from Dev-Plan by the
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implementing institution.
STEP 2 Feasibility study is done by the implementing institution.
7
In this case, external technical assistance to assist in 
the preparation can be sought from Treasury (Division of 
External Finance).
STEP 3 The project (with feasibility study) is further presented
to appropriate authorities for approval, which should 
include Dev- Plan and Economic Committee of Cabinet (ECC). 
The order of flow for the various channels appears below:
Regional projects
SPONSORING 'I REGIONAL S PRIME MINISTER OEV. PLAN \ ECC
UNIT S DEV. COMMITTEE
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309
STEP 4 The appraised project is presented to potential donor for
obtaining external finance by Treasury. The Treasury is 
expected to know the likely possible source of external 
f inance.
STEP 5 The identified donor undertakes a re-appraisal of the
project before approval and sponsorship offer is granted.
STEP 6 A formal agreement of project execution is signed between
Tanzania and the Donor country or Institution.
STEP 7 Finally, the project is included in the annual plan(s).
Such committed amounts in fact become the ’forecasts* for the 
budget year. The process of spotting the potential donors depends on 
two main factors. The first factor is the country’s long-term 
programme agreements with certain donors. Such agreements indicate 
the extent to which the donor is willing to assist in the development 
effort and they normally indicate the amount they can contribute on a 
multi-period basis. For example, countries such as Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland, Canada, and Germany, have adopted forward aid 
undertaking policy for all its recipients including Tanzania. 9 In 
Tanzania, consultations are held in March/April each year to fix the 
assistance content of the next two calendar years, and these figures 
normally form the basis for necessary project preparation.10 
Secondly, a donor’s indicated preference or interest act as a guide in 
identifying potential donor. The interest in this case could be in
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the form of involvement in the preparatory stage of the project etc.
In view of the above exposition, it is indeed clear that the 
estimates which are shown in the budget book are not, technically 
speaking, unknown forecasts of external finances which the government 
expects to secure during the year. They are infact estimates of 
expected disbursements in the period.
This is even to dismiss those critics who have argued that 
Tanzania's forecasts of foreign aid are unrealistically optimistic, 
and budgeted foreign aid appears to be based on the residual needed to 
meet hopes for expenditure levels, with the residual likely to be 
double the historical trend for aid flows.11 There in fact appears 
to be an apparent confusion between aid predictability and aid 
absorption capacity. For example, in discussing aid modality in 
Tanzania, Mushi's focus was on the unpredictability of aid but his 
analysis and explanations are those for underutilization of aid.12
To ascertain the extent to which the annual development budget is 
very specific and certain in as far as foreign financing is concerned, 
an examination of the 1977/78 Annual Plan (DevPlan: 1977) indicates 
for each single project the share of foreign funds, its nature 
(grant/loan) and the donor. And as has already been said above, the 
amount indicated is firmly committed by the donor.
We can now examine the possible causes of the variations observed 
in section II above. The "under-predictions” or rather under­
utilization can be attributed to a number of factors, four of which 
appear to be most important. These are:-
(i) Inadequate counterpart resources (Funds and manpower).
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(ii) Problems related to balance of payments crisis (applies mainly to 
projects with large foreign exchange content).
(iii)Inavailability of local projects inputs in required quantities.
(iv) Aid procedures being too complicated for Tanzania’s 
administrative capacity.
(v) Policies regarding aid composition emphasised project aid which 
led to inflexbilities in aid utilization.
(vi) Underspending of committed external finance caused by non- 
fulfilment by Tanzanian Government of policy conditions imposed 
by donor.
The above factors are discussed in detail below:
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(I) Inadequate counterpart resources (funds and manpower)
Most donors who support development projects under the project aid 
mode, have a funds (costs) contribution policy which requires the 
recipient to contribute a certain minimum percentage towards local 
costs. Local costs generally include costs for factor (labour, 
materials) payments not requiring foreign exchange, together with any 
local taxes which might be levied on any imported products, wages and 
salaries etc. The insistence on local contribution underlines the 
general belief that external finance ought to be used only as 
supplement rather than as substitute. As pointed out by World Bank; 
foreign capital allows a country to invest more than it could if it 
used only national savings.13 The latter implies that the foreign 
inflows should be a motivation for the country to save and invest 
more.14
The share of local costs that the recipient is expected to 
contribute varies enormously with different donors. Some studies done 
on Tanzania in this respect have attempted to classify the major 
donors according to four categories of contributing policies.15
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Policy Category. Country
(1) Can meet all local China, EDF under Lome 2,
 costs if necessary The Netherlands
(2) Can only meet U.K. (can meet 50% of some local costs
a specified part World Bank (80% of project cost
contributed externally)
USAID (75% of project contributed 
externally)
USAID (SH.20,000 is to be put in a trust 
by Tanzania for each technician 
aid-technical Assistance.
(3) No ceiling or guidelines DANIDA, NORAD, SIDA, CIDA, WEST GERMAN 
on local cost financing
but flexible
(4) Inflexible on local cost France 
financing
A priori, it could be argued that when the government accepts 
foreign assistance it implicitly demonstrates that it can mobilize 
enough savings to meet her share of the local cost. But how is it then 
that the counterpart funds is a burden that prevents full utilization 
of the external funds? Two factors can help to explain this. First, 
there is under- costing of projects at time of preparing the
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feasibility study. Secondly, project designs often do not anticipate 
actual inflation rates. Inflation related costs arise due to time-lag 
between when the projects feasibility study is done and when actual 
implementation takes place. For a country where the inflation rate 
has been sky-rocketing,16 project input costs are likely to change 
significantly as well. If allocation of funds during budgeting is 
based on the original costing, obviously implementation problems are 
bound to emerge. The situation is made worse if the response to 
accept and act on the additional local costs is slow. My interviews 
with officers in the Capital Budgeting and Programming Division of 
DevPlan clearly indicated that there was a problem of meeting in time 
(by DevPlan), the unanticipated increased local costs. On the other 
hand, if they are to be absorbed by donors then there will be new 
negotiations which take time. Increased costs have surfaced clearly 
in reports prepared which compare project physical (performance) 
completion with project financial (performance) completion. The 
higher level of completion on financial performance compared to the 
physical performance in nearly all sectors must surely be explained 
partly by cost underprovision. It is only after the project has 
reached 100% physical completion that cost overuns which are over 25% 
per project,17 are known. Table 9:4 below indicates the divergence 
between physical and financial performance for 1974/75 and 1979/80 
when detailed project reports were compiled.
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Table 9:4 DEVELOPMENT PLAN FULFILLMENT
1974/75 1979/80
Physical Financial Physical Financial
MINISTRIES 41.05% 81.2% 35.6% 62.2%
PARASTATALS 41.7 75.6 35.8 50.8
REGIONS 57.8 97.1 46.1 67.1
TOTAL 51.4 80.1 40.5 56.3
Source; Adapted from A Performance Review of Tanzania*s Annual Plan 
for 1979/80, table 3 p6. Dev. Plan.
To cite an example of how increased costs due to underprovision and 
inflation could pose a serious problem, in one road construction 
project, (Makambako to Songea) which was undertaken in two phases 
(Phase I - Makabako-Wino & Phase II - Wino-Songea), in the 1st Phase, 
costs increase due to inflation amounted to Ts.153 mill. (58.8% of 
original estimate). Since local resource mobilization was constrained 
this led to delays in the completion of the project.18
(ii)Problems related to balance of payments crisis
Projects which have a large foreign exchange content, and whose 
materials to be imported are not covered fully in the external finance 
package, are likely to suffer delay in implementation.19 Release of 
foreign exchange in large amounts has always been a problem, and
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delays in project implementation increase when the contract is awarded 
to a local company. Its voice will not be heard at the Bank unlike a 
foreign company which might exert more pressure on the government and 
bank authorities so as to complete the project on time. From table 
9:5 below it is quite clear that most institutions are never able to 
exhaust all the funds allocated to them. Infact the spending 
situation has deteriorated with the passage of time. In the latest 
period, 1979/80, the level of funds utilization was much lower than 
1974/75. Variation exists among the spending agencies as well.
Table 9:5 DEVELOPMENT UTILIZATION CAPACITY Tsh. in millions.
Spending 1974/75 1979/80
Agency .Planned J l ) Ant,»l Plamedq
M'TRY 838.4 680.8 81.2 2886.0 1796.0 62.2
P'TAL 1135.6 858.4 75.6 4537.1 2305.2 50.8
R’ONS 324.4 314.9 97.1 726.7 489.5 67.4
Note: Spending Agency is the Implementing Agency. M ’TRY stands for 
Ministry: P'TAL stands for Parastatal, while R*ONS stands for 
Regions.
Source: DevPlan. (1980), APR, Adapted from: Table 1 p.4.
The regions which handle small projects which do not require a lot of 
foreign exchange have a higher utilization capacity than the rest 
which carry out more grandiose projects. Even the Ministries have a 
higher ratio of utlization compared to parastatals which are involved
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in developing more complicated industrial projects.
(iii) Unavailability of local projects inputs in required quantities
Projects undertaken require materials such as cement, steel,
nails, wire, roofing materials etc. With the balance of payments 
crisis, industries which have a high import content in their raw 
materials and accessories, find themselves working far below their 
normal capacity, sometimes experiencing short time closures. These 
shortages in locally produced materials cause a tremendously big delay 
in implementation of projects thus tying up both foreign and local 
funds. In fact in an effort to reduce the discrepancy in the funds 
utilization observed in table 9:3 above, Dev. Plan is attempting to 
incorporate material planning in its financial planning.20 The 
implication is that financial resources wil be allocated to projects 
only to the extent that they are supported with locally produced 
inputs, except where direct importation is assured.
(iv) Aid procedures too complicated for Tanzania's administrative 
capacity.
The weak reporting and accounting systems in Tanzania do affect 
the disbursement of external resources as well. The severity of the 
problem increases with the disbursement method adopted. If the 
’direct payments’ method is used where the donor pays directly for the 
goods and services, then problems of accounting might be less although 
reports on the projects will still be demanded. If the ’cash 
payments’ method is used, then poor accounting and reporting could 
affect disbursements because further funds would be released only 
after filing progress reports. Disbursements get delayed further when 
the ’reimbursement* method is used. In the latter case timely
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reimbursement can take place if the project progress reports are 
accurate, sufficiently detailed and supported by relevant expenditure 
documents and works certificates, and the claims are lodged on time.
In the Manual for External Finance it is cited that some reimbursement 
cases have taken three years before the funds are received.21 If we 
examine some projects * physical implementation reports for the periods 
1974/75 and 1979/80, the reason for delays in disbursement of external 
funds to Tanzania become clear. Some projects had no reports at all, 
some were suspended while others were not started, and this would 
affect whatever external finances were attached to the projects.22







Not clearly reported 12 1.0 313 15.8
Not started 49 3.9 109 5.5
Suspended 21 1.7 27 1.4
Not completed 696 55.9 1140 57.4
Computed 447 35.9 358 18.0
On going 19 1.5 38 1.9
Total 1244 100 1985 100.0
Source: APR Table:2 p.5. (Dev. Plan (1980) Op.cit.) 
N.B. Projects for parastatals, Ministries and Regions.
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Moreoever, if some project reports cannot be ready even after the year 
of implementation has ended, one wonders how many reports can be 
obtained in time in the course of the year of implementation.
(v) Policies regarding aid composition emphasized project aid which 
had led to inflexibility in aid utilization.
A recent World Bank and IMF study has indicated that for many 
years the bulk of aid was in the form of project aid (Cassen 1986. 
p. 104). According to the study, programme aid featured only in the 
late 1960s and early 1980s (Cassen 1986: p.150). The report further 
emphasizes the lack of coordination of project aid by both donors and 
recipients. This has led to what the report terms * project 
proliferation* implying that "aid projects are planted here and there 
in an almost haphazard way and in excessive numbers". This project 
congestion has exacerbated existing manpower and administrative 
shortcomings. Moreoever, this project proliferation makes excessive 
demand on complementary resources required from the recipient (Cassen 
op.cit. pp.219-221). While the latter report accepts the necessity 
for programme aid (a line of action already adopted by many donors) 
which would help to reduce the recipient*s burden on complementary 
domestic resources - recurrent and local costs in the budget, foreign 
exchange, or manpower, it however emphasizes the need for better 
coordination of aid, and secondly the need for policy dialogue which 
would lead to the setting up of clear tasks or objectives to be 
accomplished. (Cassen op.cit. pp.232-233). Thus, a better mix of 
project and programme aid would enhance the absorptive capacity of the
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recipient to utilize efficiently any additional resources placed at 
its disposal.
(vi) .Underspending of committed external finance being caused by non- 
fulfilment by Tanzanian Government of policy conditions 
imposed by donors.
Although it is not possible to determine the exact amount of 
committed external finance which Tanzania could not utilize solely 
because of its failure to fulfil some of the policy conditions imposed 
by the donors, on grounds of the other factors discussed above, 
however, there is no doubt that its failure to reach an agreement 
with IMF and the World Bank led to the withholding of the structural 
adjustment programme funds by the donors. The failure in policy 
dialogue between Tanzania and IMF/World Bank has been highlighted by 
Cassen (1986, op. cit. pp.90-92). Besides, as highlighted further in 
Appendix 2 p. 537-9 below, an agreement between the two (Tanzania and 
IMF/World Bank) was concluded in the late part of 1986. But from late 
1970s (mainly 1979), Tanzania could not draw most of the funds agreed 
upon with IMF and the World Bank. For example, in late 1979 and 1980 
Tanzania had some credit facilities made available by IMF which would 
have covered about three years. However, due to its failure to fulfil 
some of the policy conditions or targets, inter alia, a substantial 
devaluation of the currency, a reduction in government spending, a 
reduction in government budget deficits, a substantial adjustment of 
agricultural producer prices, and interest adjustment etc. the lending 
programme fell apart. (Green, 1983: op.cit. pp.358-9; Also Payer,
1983: op.cit. pp.799-800 etc.) Although the case of Tanzania versus 
IMF/World Bank has been thoroughly documented, we also know (mainly
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through the media) that the other official donors, mainly bilateral, 
withheld their structural adjustment loans pending the reaching of an 
agreement with IMF concerning the policy targets that would have to 
be fulfilled by the Government.
OECD has also pointed out some major procedural obstacles to 
effective aid implementation. Most of the points raised by the latter 
support those mentioned above.2 3
IV CASE STUDY OF SELECTED DONORS AND SECTORS PERFORMANCE IN FUNDS
DISBURSEMENT
(i) Donors •performance
The index that will be used to measure the pattern of 
performance of donors in disbursing funds committed in a particular 
year is the annual and average disbursement/commitment ratio. Only a 
sample of countries and multilateral institutions have been taken. 
Table 9:7 below gives ratios for the chosen countries between 1975 and 
1983, for which the data were available.24 As can be seen from the 
ratios in table 9:7, there has been varying performances within a 
country and among the countries under observation. The desirable 
level of performance would be one of 100%, whereby disbursements equal 
commitments. A ratio less than 100% implies that there has been less 
efficiency in transferring the funds, while any ratio above 100% could 
imply two things. First, is the interperiods overlapping of 
disbursements, which confirms the inefficiency that exists, and 
secondly, it implies the transfer of funds on an adhoc basis, that is 
without formal commitment. In the absence of detailed data, it is not 
possible to decompose the excess disbursements to those of 
"Overlapping" and those of "adhoc" transfer.
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Table 9:7 DISBURSEMENT/(X)MMI,IMENT RATIO (%TAGES)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Av.
ROW
1 U.S. 97.7 124.5 85. 46 89.2 99.4 129.4 232.5 101.4
2 W.GERMANY 36.6 82.4 90.8 102.2 78.2 142.3 84.5 134.4 85.8
3 SWEDEN 89.2 31.8 158.4 50.2 470.5 92.5 94.5 113.9 83.6
4 NE’LANDS 89.6 64.0 76.7 107.1 81.6 95.4 115.5 104.5 88.4
5 CANADA 113.4 10.5 83.7 60.6 213.2 202.9 45.8 130.8 67.8
6 NORWAY 145 130.5 303.9 72.5 139.9 64.8 146.2 120.7 113.1
7 U.K 139.3 28.5 39.7 243.5 169.7 284.1 118.9 94.6
8 IDA 47.3 80.1 24.5 73.6 23.5 83.5 195.2 109.4 66.4
9 ECC 16.9 92.6 113.2 100 75.7 48.9 231.6 85
10 ALL SOURCES COMBINED
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 ALL
54.6 93.5 67,0 54.7 77,1 74.1 85,6 97.4 96.4 116,1 82.6
Source: Computed from data provided in OECD (various years)
Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing 
Countries, Paris OECD. See Appendix 9, Table 9A-4
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Looking at the overall ratios, countries such as U.S. and Norway 
have had ratios exceeding 100%. The rest of the sampled countries had 
their ratios below 100%. The IDA has not been doing very well. Its 
average ratio is about 66.4%, the lowest. The variations in ratios 
among countries and institutions are bound to arise because efficiency 
in disbursements has depended on factors such as type of projects 
undertaken, project complexity, availability of local materials, 
location of the project, proximity to good transportation system etc. 
Since projects are financed chiefly on a source of finance (country) 
basis, those supporting projects marked with obscurity and hence some 
implementation problems are bound to go through a slow process of fund 
disbursing.
When individual countries * ratios are compared with the combined 
ratios appearing in Table 9:7 row 10, not much difference is 
observable. In nearly all the years, the combined ratios have 
remained below 100%, which also implies that even the overlapping does 
not help to improve the disbursement performance. The average ratio 
of 82.6% in the combined situation reflects the average situation in 
the individual countries* performance.
In view of the above observations we can conclude that funds 
utilization, represented by the disbursements, have been lagging 
behind the committed funds. This problem does not appear to be 
related to only a few countries, it is rather a general one.
To have much more enlightment about the disbursements problems a 
further sectoral analysis is done for the purpose of identifying the 
length of time taken to disburse loans in the sectors so as to 
identify the sectors which take longer to exhaust funds allocated to
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their projects. The data analysis is presented in table 9:8 below.
The data considered for the above analysis pertains to all loans 
taken between 1970/71 and 1980/81 which are listed in the 
appropriation accounts under project title. The allocation of the 
projects among the sectors is a subjective one, which implies that the 
analysis is just a rough measure, which therefore, should be 
interpreted with caution.
It can be observed that disbursements for some projects in 
certain sectors take quite a long time compared to the rest. 
Disbursements in the water projects, agriculture, education and 
electric power projects take quite along time to complete. On the 
average the latter take more than four years, with some cases taking 
seven and eight years, especially in the agriculture and education 
sectors. In the case of electric power projects and infrastructure 
(roads, bridges, railways, airports etc) sector, disbursements take 
much shorter time for projects to complete. The average period for 
the latter is between one and four years. In the case of projects 
grouped under the heading * General*, disbursements were observed to 
take between two and four years.
Table 9:8 Disbursement of loans to Sectorial Projects 
Started between 1970 & 1971: Year taken
Number of projects taking years shown below
Years 1 2 3 ' 4 5 6 7 8
Sector
WATER SUPPLY 2 4 3 1
AGRICULTURE 1 2 3 1 2 1 1
EDUCATION 2 1 1
HOUSING 2




11 4 2 1 4
ECONOMIC INVESTMENTS 
(Hotels & Plantations)
N/F N/F N/F N/F N/F N/F N/F N/F
SHARE ACQUISITION IN CDs N/F N/F N/F N/F N/F N/F N/F N/F
COMPENSATION N/F N/F N/F N/F N/F N/F N/F N/F
GENERAL $ 0 3 1 3
Notes: N/F No new fundswere acquired between 1970 and 1981
$ Projects falling under this category are those which 
couldnot be identified directly with the sectors 
listed in the table. The nature of project undertaken 
was not indicated explicitly.
Source: Prepared from loans information presented in Appropriation 
Accounts Volume (Various Years).
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In sectors where disbursement appear to take a long time, on a 
priori grounds it could be concluded that they are the sectors which 
cover the rural areas which are difficult to reach in all respects. 
Water, education and agriculture projects in rural areas cannot be 
developed as smoothly as those projects undertaken in the urban areas 
where infrastructure and supportive facilities are developed, and 
where even the quality of the unskilled labour, which is expected to 
participate a lot in project development is much superior (experience 
wise) compared to that in the rural areas.
In view of the above, the variations which were noted in section 
II (between estimated and actual foreign resources) would inevitably 
arise. The environment under which the projects are undertaken, in 
the sense of the concentration of projects under the water supply 
sector, Agriculture, Education and infrastructure sectors, which cover 
very remote areas of the country, have an imparing effect on the 
implementation of projects. The external funds, which normally have a 
strict spending supervision from the donors, would therefore not be 
used as scheduled.
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v THE SCOPE FOR REDUCING UTILIZATION DISCREPANCIES
The discussion in this section has to shift to consider external 
funds utilization rather than forecasting, for reasons already 
explained in the above sections. The suggestions which will be raised 
below will therefore be aimed at reducing the gap between the external 
funds allocated to projects at the budget time (ie. predicted 
disbursement) and the actual outturn.
Aid utilization underlines the problems of harmonizing 
expenditure programmes with revenue in LDCS. The underutilization of 
committed aid could tempt an analyst to think that Tanzania is unable 
to conceive enough expenditure programmes to absorb the aid, implying 
that expenditure is the constraint rather than revenue. The study has 
certainly exposed the complexity of aid management, from both a donor 
and recipient point of view, and this has tended to underline the 
’’vicious circle” of resource inadequacy. It needs to be stated clearly 
that the constraints are on revenues, both local and external. The 
donor policy of tying aid to specific projects, a procedure which does 
not give the government a chance to reallocate the resources to other 
projects or programmes which could absorb them much faster, implies 
that such aid did not help to alleviate the revenue problem. Thus, 
those projects with implementation problems result in unspent funds, 
giving a general impression of failure by government to prepare 
adequate expenditure programmes.
A number of suggestions have been raised that could help to 
close the gap between commitment and disbursement. If we are to 
assume that such a gap has arisen out of the failure of the recipient
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economy to absorb the external resource put at its disposal, then the 
recommendations which have been pointed out by Cassen (as part of 
World Bank report) are most relevant. It has already been pointed out 
above that beginning with 1980, official donors (bilateral and 
multilateral) have realized that the poor economies relying on 
concessional lending need more of programme aid in contrast to the 
earlier emphasis on project aid (Cassen et.al. 1986 p. 150). The World 
Bank’s structural adjustment lendings are typical of the new direction 
in aid programmes (ibid p.82). But the report clearly points out that 
there is need for a more organized approach to aid give and take for 
it to be effective. Two areas of policy changes are emphasized. The 
first one is policy dialogue, while the second one is coordination and 
management. Policy dialogue refers to the exchanges between the 
donors and the recipient about the domestic policy framework required 
for the recipient which will influence the outcome of an aid transfer 
and the behaviour of the economy as a whole (Cassen 1986. p.69). It 
is assumed that when there is genuine understanding on what policies 
ought to be pursued by the recipient, then, policy conditionality 
which is a necessary counterpart of the programme aid needed by the 
poor economies, can be accepted by the recipients as constituting less 
of outside imposition. However, the success of the policy dialogue 
will depend on two factors, relevant mainly to the recipients. The 
first one is an improvement in negotiating skills, while the second is 
the strengthening of decision making capacities and economic policy­
making institutions (Cassen 1986. p.97).
As far as coordination and management is concerned, the past 
practices which led to aid overload (uncontrolled proliferation of
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projects), donor competition in the recipients environment, and lack 
of consideration for complementary domestic resources etc. (Cassen 
1986 pp 220-21) ought to be rectified. Coordination refers to both 
the donors and the recipients. On the part of the donors, it is 
argued that there should be a proper assessment of the needs of the 
recipient so that the resources which are mobilized will be related to 
such needs. Secondly, the donors ought to develop a system that will 
ensure that basic economic and technical analysis and information 
about a certain recipient is provided which would assist in making 
decisions on aid levels, project type, and category and aid 
administration (Cassen 1986. p.224). On the part of the recipient, 
coordination should emphasize on negotiation, implementation and 
monitoring of aid, with special focus on the implication of aid on 
manpower, recurrent costs and foreign exchange. To achieve the 
latter, it is advised that the recipients should set up a strong 
central unit in the government with complete central overview of the 
aid process. Such unit would provide link to the donor coordinating 
institutions, and within the country, to provide the necessary 
machinery for implementation and monitoring (Cassen 1986.p.232).
Besides the points raised above on *dialogue* and coordination, 
which stress the prerequisites for effective aid programme, there are 
others too which need to be examined. One suggestion is to make 
project aid more flexible, in the sense of the recipient being given 
powers (by donors) to shift funds from one year to another, and 
between projects.2 5 The practices of donors vary with the budgetary 
and financial control procedure prevailing in their countries (See 
Appendix 9 Table A-l). While some donors allow for automatic carry
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forward, others insist on extra authorization to be obtained for 
unspent funds. Although authority to transfer would be granted 
eventually, however, the time that lapses could be the problem.
Hence, a more flexible system of transferring funds to the next 
period, especialy where such funds are committed to a distinct 
physical project, could speed up the utilization and mitigate against 
the loss of purchasing power. As regards transferring funds among 
projects, the supporting argument posited for it is that it would 
enable the planners to substitute certain projects which fail to take 
off (Mushi et.al. 1982 p.32). While the principle of virement is 
acceptable for improved planning and budgeting,26 in view of the 
fact that project planning, implementation and monitoring in Tanzania 
is very weak, allowing for such transfers could usher in even greater 
chaos. From table 9:6 above we even saw that there was no clear
reports on a large number of projects. I therefore find no valid
grounds to support the idea of virement.
Other recommendations which could reinforce the management part 
of external finance handling include:
(i) The government should train special finance officers who should 
be very conversant with various donors disbursement requirements 
to be attached to ministries, regions and other agencies to give 
instant advice to fund users, to assist in preparing the 
required reports and to be required to report to Director of 
External Finance immediately of any externally funded project 
that appears to run abnormally slower than scheduled.
(ii) Projects * feasibility studies ought to be revised regularly, in 
advance of project phase implementation so that the realistic
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external and local costs are known so that appropriate funds 
allocation action can be taken well in advance.
(iii) Project negotiations ought to emphasize more on simplified plan 
of operation. Project teams, which could include a donor*s 
resident overseers,27 should be given more powers to make 
necessary alterations on a project without involving a change in 
the original agreement.
(iv) Aid negotiations should insist on less rigorous (tight) 
procedures for assessing the projects. These reports, whether 
accounting or physical, have to be within the capabilities of 
the resources available.
(v) Aid negotiators should insist on disbursements mechanisms which
give government a chance to use fully funds offered. For 
example, the reimbursement mode which entails spending local 
funds first and then asking for reimbursement could lead to the 
project not taking off at all given the general shortage of 
funds; and if the project happens to have a high import content 
it would suffer more. The suggestion here is that the cash and 
the direct payments (goods and services delivered) methods 
should be preferred.
(vi) Donors should be involved more in preparing the feasibility 
studies so that they have a clear understanding of the 
environment under which the project will be established. 2 8
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(vii) The government should request donors to assist through long-term 
programme agreements as is done by some countries such as 
Norway, Sweden, Netherlands and multilaterial institutions such 
as UNDP. Such arrangements would stabilize short and medium 
term planning and instill confidence in projects implementation, 
especially where financial carry-overs arise, 
viii. In combatting funds underutilization, there is also a need to 
re-examine the type of projects undertaken. Sometimes some of 
the projects have been of too large scale and of high technology 
(very capital intensive) nature. Apart from such projects coming 
to be "white elephants" after development, their establishment 
has always been saddled with problems. The higher the import 
content of the project's capital goods, in both local and 
external funds, the greater is the delay in competition. These 
delays tie-up the funds. Going for small scale projects which 




This chapter has examined empirically the estimation of foreign 
borrowing in the course of budget preparation. Two categories of 
external financing were examined, namely loans and grants.
A comparison of the estimates with the outturn indicated that 
there was a significant amount of over-estimation, beginning in 
1969/70. This over-estimation was characteristic of both grants and 
loans. In relative terms, the grants over-estimation ranged between 
8% and 99% with an average error of 29.9%, while in the case of loans 
the over-estimation ranged betwen 10% and 65% with an average error of 
35%.
An investigation of the variables which are used in predicting 
the amount of external financing required made it apparent that the 
predictions are done in quite a haphazard fashion. The latter 
reflected the lacunae of an explicit foreign credit policy. The 
guidelines available put emphasis on the terms of loans (ie 
concessional ones) which should be observed in securing the loans, and 
nothing is mentioned about the volume of loans. However, because of 
revenue uncertainty which manifests in project demands exceeding by 
far the available resources, the government is pushed into a situation 
of accepting any forthcoming external resources. So, the practice of 
determining external resources requirement has been based on what can 
be secured from the donors, without regard to its impact on other 
resource balance in the economy. Thus, the amount entering the 
budget estimates are those contracted. In view of the latter, it 
was argued that the discrepancies observed in both loans and grants
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cases represented external finance under-absorption. Consequently, the 
analysis proceeded with the identification of those factors which 
caused such underutilization. The major factors identified were; lack 
of adequate counterpart resources - in terms of both funds and 
manpower; problems of input shortages related to the country’s balance 
of payments crisis; inavailability of locally produced inputs for the 
projects in required quantities; and finally the donor and recipient 
aid handling procedures which were prohibitive to fast disbursement.
In a further examination of performance in funds disbursement by 
some selected donors, it was shown that most of the donors had 
disbursed less than committed. Among those selected, it was only 
U.S.A. and Norway which appeared to have disbursed (on the average) 
more funds than the committed amounts. But it was also argued that 
the disbursement ratio depended on a number of factors, such as: the 
volume of aid, type of project sponsored, and the geographical 
logistics of the project etc. The latter implied that those donors 
financing rural-side projects were likely to suffer lower 
disbursement ratios compared to those donors supporting urban-based 
projects.
Furthermore, an attempt was made to identify procedural and 
policy changes which, if undertaken, could help to reduce the under­
utilization of external funds. Those which were stressed included, 
inter alia; an evolvement of a policy dialogue which should stress on: 
formation of an appropriate policy framework, and an identifcation of 
clear programmes and objectives which are to be accomplished; and 
secondly, an evolvement of a more effective system of coordinating and 
managing such aid. The latter action is demanded from both sides ie,
336
the donors and the recipients, although the latter is expected to do 
more by way of identifying effective aid and executing institutions. 
The latter points are emphasized in recognition of the current efforts 
by donors to give more of programme aid to the poor countries whose 
capacity to absorb further aid was declining due to lack of domestic 
complementary resources.
Finally, in considering the results of the above analysis in 
relation to the hypothesis stated in the introduction, we can conclude 
that variations in the actual inflows are not an outcome of improper 
specification of variables used in deriving the estimates. Given that 
the estimates indicated are confirmed inflows, variations in 
utilization can be attributed to other variables such as poor project 
planning, poor financial management and control etc. Some of the 
latter variables will be examined further in the chapter on 
development expenditure budget where projects screening is examined.
In spite of the later, the fact that there are some factors which 
cause the underutilization of resources already committed continue to 
confirm the general hypothesis that inefficiencies in the budgetary 
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CHAPTER 10
RECURRENT EXPENDITURE FORECASTS - AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
I INTRODUCTION
This Chapter examines empirically the forecasting of recurrent 
expenditure in Tanzania. The investigation is done with the purpose 
of ascertaining whether the errors of forecasting are caused by 
improper specification of predictor variables or not. The findings of 
the above investigation are intended to substantiate the general 
proposition that the present economic problems have been caused partly 
by poor management of public expenditure.
The Chapter will explore in detail the factors which have been 
used in predicting recurrent expenditure at both national (Treasury) 
and spending agency (Ministries and regions) level, with the purpose 
of determining how such factors have caused the forecasting errors 
observable. Some evidence collected from official (publications) and 
non-official (collections from Ministries including interviews) 
sources will be used to support the arguments raised in respect of the 
techniques used to prepare the forecasts. Wherever necessary, some of 
the constraints which affect budget preparation as a whole will be 
raised. Such constraints include, inter alia, legal, political, 
economic, environmental and time factor. The ultimate purpose of the 
analysis is to see how the errors can be reduced given that the 
behaviour of the factors used in forecasting is known.
The types of expenditure that will be covered include aggregate
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and disaggregated current expenditure. The disaggregated expenditure 
will be on Ministerial basis. In addition to discussing the original 
forecasts, the supplementary estimates will be discussed as well.
The lack of research literature on Tanzania's budgetary system 
will certainly limit the further verification of my findings. What is 
expected to happen in lieu of the latter is to have such findings 
compared with what has been happening in other developing countries 
where some literature is available.
The Chapter outline will be as follows. In Section II the 
forecasts will be analysed in relation to the outturn. In Section III 
the predictor variables used in forecasting current expenditure will 
be discussed. In Section IV an examination of supplementary estimates 
in relation to the recurrent expenditure will be done. Also those 
factors which cause the setting up of the supplementary budget will be 
evaluated. In Section V a diagnosis of deviations in forecasts will 
be made and the scope for reducing the discrepancies will be explored. 
Finally, there will be a summary highlighting on the critical results 
discovered in the other sections.
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II FORECASTS IN RELATION TO OUTTURN
(a) Aggregate forecasted current expenditure in relation to outturn.
In general, a comparison of the forecasts in relation to the 
outturn does not indicate abnormal forecasting errors. The size of 
the errors has also remained fairly low. The errors appear in Table 
10:1 below.
TABLE 10: 1 CURRENT EXPENDITURE FORECASTING ERRORS.
Yr.’67-72 72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 
E. (%) INS 6.5 14.2 26.2 18.5 12.4 1.9 19.0 18.5 8.5 13.9
NOTE: (1) INS = Insignificant errors. E.= Errors, Yr.= Years.
(2) Errors = is the ratio of difference between actual and the 
forecasted value to the forecasted values.
Source: Computed from data in Appendix 10 Table 10A-1
From the above table 10:1, the maximum single period error is 
just 26.2%. A computed average error amounts to 11%. The latter 
figures do not appear to be extraordinary or extremely large.
When the absolute error figures (outturns less forecasts) are 
checked for trend pattern, it can be observed from equation (1A) below 
that there has been an increase with time. (The equation appears to be 
a good fit in view of the high value of R2 , and also the 
coefficient on Trend is significant too due to the high value of t- 
ratio)
E = 249.33 + 92.487 (T)
(-1.34) (4.8) R2 = .62 (1A)
(E is the absolute errors, T is the trend and the figures in
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parentheses are t-ratios.)
The positive coefficient on the trend points to the growth in 
errors over time.
When the errors are expressed as a percentage of the forecasts 
and then regressed on time, they also indicate an upward trend, but 
the equation appear to be very weak : R2 = 0.25. The t-statistic is 
also barely high to confirm the strength of the coefficient. Equation 
(IB) below refers:
E = 0.01366 + 0.00903 (T) R2= 0.25 (IB)
(0.33) (2.15)
(E is errors in % tage, T is trend, figures in parentheses are t- 
ratios)
A further observation of the errors reveals a general tendency 
to under predict. The errors presented above are of positive nature 
implying that the actual expenditures have been exceeding the 
forecasts. The underprediction becomes apparent from a regression 
function of the actual expenditures regressed against the forecasted 
expenditures, and also from a scatter diagram of the forecasts and 
outturns data. The latter appear as equation (1) and figure 10:1 
below:
A = 45.7 + 1.1005E
(.28) (43.0) R2 = 99 (1)
(A stands for the actual current expenditure while E is the forecasted 
expenditure. The figures in parenthesis are t-ratios)
The equation is a good fit on the strength of the high value of R 2 = 
0.99. Similarly, the coefficient appear to be significant in view of 
the high value of t-ratio. The Constant is insignificant as a result
3^8
of the insignificant value of t-ratio considered at the 5% level of 
significance. The coefficient, which is the area of interest, has a 
value of 1.1005 which is greater than unity. This points to the 
tendency to underpredict.
An examination of figure 10:1 below shows that all the data 
plots and the plotted equation line lie to the left of the perfect 
forecast line which is a clear sign of under predictions.
FIGURE10:1• FORECASTS AND OUTTURN SCATTER PLOT
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(b) Disaggregated forecasted current expenditure in relation to 
outturn.
The discussion in this section focuses on Ministerial forecasts. 
The latter has been adopted rather than the other functional 
classification of expenditure eg. Social, economic and general 
services, because it was easier to identify the forecasts with 
Ministries which gave more reliable data. On the other hand, over the 
period of study, there have been a number of Ministrial re­
organizations which make a compilation of the data difficult. To 
overcome the problem, some effort had to be made to regroup some of 
the Ministries so that consistent data for analysis could be obtained.
In general, performance in forecasting has varied among the 
Ministries. While others have experienced modest forecasting errors, 
others have seen quite large errors. The forecasting errors of the 
various Ministries appear in table 10: 2 below, in the order of 
largest average error to the lowest average error.
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Table 10 ; 2 PERCENTAGE FORECASET ERRORS IN PARTICULAR 
MINISTRIES
MINISTRY OF________ MINIMUM___________MAXIMUM_________ AVERAGE
ERROR (%) ERROR (%) ERROR (%)
Defence & National
Service -2 + 741.8 70.6
Finance & Dev Plan -4.4 + 73.6 27.5
Foreign Affairs 0 + 47.1 23.0
Home Affairs 0 + 25.7 15.3
Communications, Labour
& Works 0 + 85.7 12.9
Agriculture, Forestry
& Wildlife 0 + 75.8 11.9
Information & Tourism 0 + 25.0 10.1
Industries, Commerce
Minerals & Power 0 + 25.4 9.5
Lands, Settlement &_
Water Development 0 + 16.7 6.4
Health & Social
Welfare +1.7 + 17.8 5.9
National Education 0 + 24.0 4.7
Note: (1) Maximum Error = Maximum absolute error as a % tage of budget 
estimate.
(2) Average Error = Average absolute Error as %tage of budget 
estimate.
Source: Computed from data appearing in appendix 10 Table A-2
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When the Ministerial expenditure out turns are regressed on the 
forecasts, we observe that some Ministries have tended to 
underpredict, as was the case in total recurrent expenditure, while 
others have been overpredicting. The coefficient on the estimates has 
been used to judge whether it is over-or underprediction case. A 
coefficient greater than unity implies underprediction, and if it is 
less than unity, it implies overprediction. From table 10:3 below, 
group A stands for underpredictions while group B stands for 
overpredictions.
TABLE 10:3 REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR VARIOUS MINISTRIES 
GROUP A
MINISTRY__________ EQUATION______________________ R2 NUMBER
DEFENCE A = 101.68 + 1.402E
(.64) (5.6) 0.69 (2)
HOME AFFAIRS A = -23.5 + 1.23E
(-2.8) (48.7) 0.99 (3)
FOREIGN AFFAIRS A = 1.38 + 1.158E
(.199) (12.6) 0.92 (4)
JUSTICE A = 0.27 + 1.06E
(-.31) (56.4) 0.995 (5)
GROUP B
EDUCATION A - 25.05 + 0.95
(1.86) (31.9) 0.99 (6)
HEALTH A = 17.08 + 0.935E
(3.4) (38.6) 0.99 (7)
AGRICULTURE A = 9.544 + 0.99L3E
(.60) (10.3) 0.88 (8)
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COMMWORKS A = 2.686 + 0.983E
(.28) (14.4) 0.94 (9)
LAND A = .397 + 0.98E
(.25) (19.3) 0.96 (10)
INFORMATION A = 3.79 + 0.87E
(2.2) (17.6) 0.96 (11)
FINANCE A =-11.92 + 0.772E
(-1.7) (12.1) 0.91 (12)
INDUSTRIES A = 1.99 + 0.912E
(1.04) (18.8) 0.96 (13)
(For all equations, A stands for actual expenditure, E stands for the 
predictions, while the values in parenthesis stand for t-ratios. R2 
is the correlation coefficient.)
Note: (1) The Significance of the coefficients on the predictions are 
confirmed by the high values of t-ratios which have been 
tested using a 5% level of significance.
(2) In all the equations the high values of R2 confirm that 
the regression functions are strong.
Although the Ministries which indicate a tendency to 
underpredict are fewer (4 in number) than those which appear to have 
overpredicted (8 in number), a situation observable from table 10:3 
above, they however have influenced the overall results (the 
underprediction) which were noted in part (a) above. This is due to 
the large errors (represented by the average errors in table 10:2 
above) observed especially in respect of the Ministries of Defence and
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National Service, Home Affairs, and Foreign Affairs.
Given the errors observed in this section, we now need to know 
the factors which have been taken into account in generating the 
forecasts. This is tackled in section III below.
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III CONSIDERATION AND EVALUATION OF FACTORS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN
PROJECTION OF RECURRENT EXPENDITURE
In chapter 7 above, the conceptual framework for projecting 
expenditure was outlined. In looking at forecasting factors which had 
been outlined for Tanzania (chapt 7 part III), it was pointed out that 
the manual guidance had not been sufficiently detailed to provide a 
tight criteria for forecasting the recurrent expenditures. Moreover, 
this weakness was seen to have a greater impact on the category of 
*other charges* expenditure than was the case for "personal 
emoluments" expenditure. In the case of ’personal emoluments* there 
is usually no room for manipulation because one is concerned with 
paying out actual salaries and wages and meeting other statutory 
obligations (e.g. payroll taxes, pension, payroll levies and other 
allowances etc) related to employment. Problems can therefore be 
anticipated in the category of ’other charges* where payments are not 
fixed in nature and where statutory obligations are limited.
In practice then, what factors are taken into account in 
forecasting both ’personal emoluments* and ’other charges* categories 
of recurrent expenditure?
(i) Personal emoluments: The factors which are considered in 
estimating expenditure related to employment appear to be uniform for 
both Ministries and regions.1 The increase and reduction of number 
of posts in any Ministry or region is controlled by the Ministry of 
labour, Manpower Development and Administration. Any change in 
manpower establishment has to be approved by the latter, otherwise
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unapproved post will not be funded by Treasury. 2 Salaries and Wages 
paid in government departments are covered in government salary 
schemes so that the costing of staffed positions is just a matter of 
using the correct salary scale. Other factors, which are borne in 
mind include expected new employment and promotions; incremental dates 
and amount of increments for each employee; contributions to provident 
fund and pension scheme, expected employee-transfer (for estimating 
disturbance allowance); expected overtime man-hours, etc. Applying 
most of these factors is fairly straightforward because there are 
standard rates set for nearly each cost item considered in compiling 
emoluments estimates. Moreover, each accounting officer is required 
to file with the Treasury a list of all employees to support his 
estimates. The latter is provided under form TFN351C for staff 
specification appearing below as Exhibit 10:1.
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Exhibit 10:1
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SOURCE: Ministry of Finance (Ibid,) p.35
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(ii) Other charges: This category covers all other expenses of non­
employment nature which fall under recurrent expenditure. In this 
category there were a lot of variations in the factors which were 
taken into account in generating the forecasts. Such variations 
however reflect the inadequacy of guidelines given in the manual 
mentioned above, a situation already highlighted in chapter 7 
above. Apart from lack of clear guidance as to what factors and which 
formulae to use in preparing their forecasts there are other 
administrative problems which have in fact pushed budgeting into a 
quasi-chaotic situation. This will be discussed in brief below.
In general, most of the Ministries and regions interviewed 
indicated a deep sense of dissatisfaction, and to some extent some 
frustration, over the way the Treasury manages the budget preparation. 
This has had some negative effect on the officers involved in the 
budget; some becoming very pessimistic indeed about what they expect 
to be allocated by Treasury. Such hardened attitudes have been 
reflected in the process of preparing the forecasts, as will be shown 
below. However, the cause of the indignation is not Treasury alone. 
The Ministries and the regions are to be blamed as well for the 
deficiencies observed in budget preparation. What are these short­
comings?
The problems inherent in the Treasury and spending agencies 
could be summarized as follows. On the part of Treasury, the main 
problem is its delay in releasing the "ceilings" and the other 
guidelines which are part of its Circular No.I. As shown on Table 7:1 
(chapter 7 above) which indicates the key dates on the budget cycle, 
the Treasury Circular No.I is expected to be released to spending
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agencies between December and January. But what happens is that the 
circular reaches the agencies between late February and March. For 
example, Treasury Circular* No.I of 1982/83 was dated 2nd March 1982, 
while that for 1983/84 was dated 26th February 1983. This implies 
that the circulars were released after those dates. Nearly all the 
Ministries which are located in Dar-es-salaam, the same as Treasury, 
indicated that they received the circulars between February and March. 
The situation is even worse on the part of the Regions because, first, 
they are located away from Dar-es-salaam which prolongs the delivery 
time and secondly, their dispatch has to go through the Prime 
Minister’s office through which their expenditure forecasts are 
channelled. And as if not conscious of time factor in budget 
preparation, the Treasury arranges for discussions of budget estimates 
with spending agencies beginning mid-March. For example, exhibit 10:2 
below which is a part of the 1983/84 circular dated 26th February 
1983, schedules accounting officers to submit draft estimates by Mid- 
March. Budget examination is scheduled to be completed by first week 
of April.
EXHIBIT 10:2. SCHEDULE FOR SCRUTINY OF BUDGET: 1983/84.
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In view of the above, the spending agencies are actually put under 
unnecessary time pressure and denied the opportunity to adjust their 
forecasts to the * ceilings* sensibly. In practice, most spending 
agencies have to start preparing the expenditure forecasts as early as 
December so that the compilation can be completed well in time by 
early March when they are due for review with Treasury. Thus, the 
lately received * ceilings* do not pass any advantage to the agencies. 
Consequently, any arbitrary adjustments on the padded estimates to 
reflect the * ceiling* levels would inevitably lead to unwarranted 
friction within the spending agency and possibly with the Treasury 
itself.
The second cause of dissatisfaction as pointed out by some of 
the regions and ministries about Treasury is that the latter does not 
stick to the *ceilings* in approving agency estimates. For a few 
years where the ceiling figures could be obtained, it is quite clear 
that approved estimates have been higher than the ceiling amounts. 
Moreover, the variation from the ceiling amounts has been growing with 
time. As can be observed from table 10:4 below, the excess amounts 
have grown from 10% in 1979/80 to 32.1% in 1984/85. Sometimes, those 
who have tried to stick to the *ceilings* have come to consider 
themselves penalized when they discover that other agencies which 
exceeded the * ceilings* got away with it. Conceptually, the success 
of using ceilings depends mainly on how they are administered. As has 
been pointed out by Caiden and Wildavsky; after setting the ceilings, 
first, it should be indicated that if there are special situations or 
expenses which are absolutely necessary, then special justification 
should be presented, and secondly, Treasury ought to show even-handed
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treatment of the spending agencies. 3 But does the Treasury 
administer the ceilings as proposed above? An examination of the 
circular No.Is reveals that Accounting Officers are advised to ensure 
that all inevitable expenditures are accorded due consideration.4 
Some of the Ministries, especially that of Health, indicated their 
awareness of the flexibility point in ceilings. Also the Treasury 
budget officer whom I interviewed and who personally reviews some of 
the ministerial estimates, pointed out that "during budget scrutiny 
(review) the accounting officer is required to substantiate the 
reasons for any overstated estimates. The same applies to understated 
estimates."5





APPROVED %TAGE OF APPROVED EST.
ESTIMATES TO CEILING AMOUNT
1979/80 7,077 7,788 110.0%
1980/81 7,734 9,342 120.8%
1981/82 9.192 11,605 126.3%
1982/83 10,404 14,144 135.9%
1984/85 13,716 18,119 132.1%
Source: Various Treasury Circular No.I, United Republic of Tanzania. 
The latter implies that the 'ceilings* are not intended to be used in
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a very rigid manner, which also implies that those seeking additional 
resources have to put in a well supported argument. Those agencies 
which prepare themselves well, manage to convince the Treasury to 
accept their overstated estimates. For example, in the case of 
Ministry of Health, the finance officer who was interviewed 
confidently indicated that he considered the discussion between Health 
and Treasury as a (budget) "bargaining move" and how much is cut that 
is above ceiling "depends on defence put forward."6 The losers 
would be those who do not study the circulars carefully; those who are 
ill-prepared and disorganised in presenting their draft estimates. It 
is interesting to note that most of the circulars point out to non- 
observance of laid down procedures for forecasting expenditure related 
to newly completed development projects. While such forecasts are 
supposed to be presented separately, and have funds set and held by 
Treasury, most accounting officers do not follow that procedure and 
the funds set aside are therefore not used to finance directly the 
recurrent needs of the new projects.7
On the other hand, the spending agencies are to be blamed in one 
main respect. That is, they are disorganized in as far as the budget 
function is concerned. In this respect reference is being made to the 
absence of a unit or section in the Ministry or region that deals with 
budget issues throughout the year. In all the Ministries and regions 
I visited, it was only the Ministries of Finance (Treasury) and Health 
which had sections dealing with the budget. Besides, these two had a 
member of staff who was trained in finance and/or accounting who was 
competent enough to handle the budget. In the other 
Ministries/regions there were no regular staff assigned to deal with
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budget matters. Some personnel to deal with the budget were mobilized 
during the budget preparation season. In other cases, as reflected 
below, even some administrative staff were made responsible for 
preparing the budget. The most common practice was for the 
Accountants to take up the budget responsibility during the budget 
preparation season.
MINISTRY/REGION STATUS OF OFFICER ANY FORMAL
INCHARGE OF THE TRAINING IN
__________________________ BUDGET______________ACCOUNTING/FINANCE
Arusha Region Regional Accountant Yes
Kilimanjaro Region Regional Accountant Yes
Kagera Region Regional Administrative officer Not clearly
pointed out
Coast Region Not mentioned clearly N/A
Ministry of Agriculture Chief Accountant Yes
Ministry of Water, Director of Manpower,
Energy & Minerals Development & Administration No
Ministry of Industries Chief Accountant Yes
& Trade
Ministry of Director of Manpower,
Communication & Works Development & Administration No
Ministry of Lands Manpower Management
&  Natural Resources Officer No
Even where accounting heads took responsibility for preparing the 
budget, the pressure of other accounting duties meant that less time 
was spent on the budget preparation function. Much worse could even
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be said of the administrative officers who were put in charge of 
coordinating budgeting. Lack of proper training in finance is itself 
a big obstacle towards appreciation of the ground work that has to be 
done to produce reliable estimates. The case of the Ministry of 
Communication and Works could help to demonstrate the point of poor 
budget management. The administrative officer8 who was in charge of 
preparing the estimates pointed out during the interview that 
estimates prepared by the various sections in the Ministry were 
consolidated and forwarded to Treasury without doing any preview at 
Ministry level. This means that the Ministry was relying on the 
Treasury review to adjust its draft estimates. Such approach could 
lead to two situations. First, the Ministry would appear before 
Treasure review session without much information and policy support of 
draft estimates presented. Secondly, the draft estimates would appear 
heavily padded to the Treasury officials which could lead to severe 
cuts. Consequently, the estimates preparation is turned into an 
unrealistic, and incomprehensible exercise.
The untimely and improper use of the ceilings coupled with 
disorganized regions and Ministries have in general led to a situation 
where expenditure forecasts are not prepared in any systematic manner. 
Various approaches have therefore been used to prepare the forecasts. 
Some agencies use trend extrapolation to forecast their expenditures, 
while others use a combination of trend, standard cost rates for 
certain expenditure items, and some percentage to cover price changes 
and protect against cuts. The use of trend extra-polative methods 
which take into account: the prior year expenditure; the current 
period’s first six months performance; and expectations for the
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remaining six months in the current period, is common among the 
Ministries and the regions. This serves as a quickway of preparing 
their forecasts due to time constraint, and secondly, as a way of 
ensuring that what they requested would not fall below the expected 
actual expenditure for the current period. As regards using standard 
cost rates, this approach was expected to be more common among the 
regions than the Ministries. Such rates were expected to be used in 
most of the common services run by the regions. For example, the 
regions are responsible for financial administration of health, 
education, (schools) water supply and other social services, and road 
maintenance etc. In order to maintain equal service standards 
throughout the country, they are expected to estimate their 
expenditure using rates worked out by Ministries which have a 
responsibility on policies for such services. For example, the rates 
for determining the expenditure for running hospitals, dispensaries 
and clinics in the regions would be those proposed by the Ministry of 
Health, while those for education expense, would be proposed by the 
Ministry of Education. For maintenance, the regions would apply rates 
proposed by the Ministry of Communication and Works. The latter would 
include rates for roads, buildings and motor vehicles etc. Although 
the regions are supposed to use the rates, however, there have been 
some problems too. These problems are caused by the ’ceilings’ set by 
Treasury which do not allow an expression of the real needs of 
spending agencies. At national level the ’ceilings’ are of course 
important because they try to make expenditure stay within the realm 
of financial possibility.9 And in order to accommodate the ever- 
increasing prices of goods and services, Treasury through its circular
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No Is advises the Accounting Officers to cut down on the volume of 
goods and services ofered.10 However, the failure by Treasury to 
provide for the real needs of the spending agencies has forced the 
latter to adopt less systematic and very arbitrary methods in 
forecasting their expenditure. Even the standard cost rates are 
ignored because the requests are not granted along such lines. For 
example, in the case of Coast Region, they indicated that they provide 
for an increase of 25% over prior year’s expenditure, together with 
inflating some items so as to ensure that they get much of what they 
need if some cuttings are made on their requests. On the whole, the 
regions appeared to be quite bitter about the way the budget 
preparation is handled because, the time spent on preparing the 
forecasts is not rewarded by the budget examiners who tend to insist 
on * ceiling* amounts. Their case is an unfortunate one because they 
do not meet the Treasury budget scrutinizers directly. The regional 
estimates are normally scrutinized by the Prime Ministers Office with 
a Treasury official in attendance. Since there are twenty regions 
involved, review approach has been one of insisting on realigning the 
draft estimates with the ceiling amounts provided by the Treasury. As 
far as the Ministries are concerned, they discuss their estimates 
directly with Treasury, and if they have convincing arguments then 
they have requests above the ceiling amounts approved.11 On the 
other hand, most spending agencies (Ministries and regions) appear to 
have some consolation on supplementary budget. If the amount 
allocated is considered inadequate, then the Accounting officer 
involved is supposed to prepare either a supplementary - or - 
reallocation request. The latter is the only procedure available for
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dealing with shortfalls in allocations. The topic of supplementary 
estimates is dealt with in section IV below.
In short, the evidence available indicates that budget 
preparation is far from being systematic. The Treasury's ceilings are 
released too late to be an effective guide to those preparing the 
expenditure forecasts. Sometimes draft estimates prepared using some 
reliable criteria are rendered useless because they have to be trimmed 
down to tally with the ceiling amounts. Consequently, some spending 
agencies have decided to present expenditure requests which are 
heavily padded to protect themselves against the cuttings. Likewise, 
such a haphazard way of preparing the estimates makes it impossible 
for the government to have a clear picture of what real public 
expenditure ought to be. Needless to mention, the expenditure 
programmes would deviate from the governments' policy objectives, thus 
making it difficult to achieve a control of the economy.
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IV A STUDY OF SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGETS
The main budget is approved by the Parliament in mid-June of 
every year. Subsequent Parliamentary Authorisations after the 
beginning of the year and before the end of year are termed 
supplementary estimates. The reasons for having such supplementary 
estimates will be discussed later, but first we look at their size and 
trend.
(a) Magnitude of Supplementary budget in relation to aggregate 
recurrent budget.
The Supplementary estimates being discussed below are those of 
recurrent expenditure nature. Table 10:5 below shows the magnitude of 
the Supplementary estimates in absolute terms and also as a ratio of 
actual recurrent expenditure. The share of Supplementary Estimates in 
total recurrent expenditure has remained between 0 and 11%. In the 
absence of a standard to relate these ratios to, it is not easy to 
conclude whether the supplementary estimates play a significant role 
or not. Nevertheless, the range of 0 to 11% does not appear to be too 
excessive. To a large extent the overall spending has been tied to 
the original approval. This appears to refute, in the Tanzanian case, 
the idea of "repetitive budgeting" which has been identified mainly 
with developing countries by authors such as Caiden and Wildavsky.12 
In fact the years which show exceptionally high ratios such as 1978/79 
and 1981/82, had unusual occurences which required additional 
funding. In 1978/79 the country was drawn into a war with Uganda 
and additional resources had to be voted for defence purposes.13 In 
1981/82 the government had to request an additional vote to meet
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salary increases to all government employees announced in July 
1981.14
TABLE 10:5 SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES OF RECURRENT EXPENDITURE NATURE




as a%tage of actual 
Recurrent Expenditure Date passed
(Tsh. in millions) in Parliament
1969/70 84.3 5.5 March & June 1970
1970/71 74.5 4.6 April & June 1971
1971/72 45.0 2.8 Jan & June 1972
1972/73 128.1 6.1 Feb & June 1973
1973/74 183.5 6.4 Nov 1973,Mar.1974
1974/75 302.8 6.9 March 1975
1975/76 0.3 0.01 March 1976
1976/77 216.9 4.6 Jan 1977
1977/78 192.4 3.5 Oct 1977 & Feb, 
May &  June 1978
1978/79 892.1 10.8 Jan & June 1979
1979/80 79.6 0.9 April & June 1981
1980/81 0 0 April 1981
1981/82 1,200.9 9.1 April & June 1982
1982/83 284.0 1.9 June 1983
Source: Acts and Bills of the various years involved (United 
Republic of Tanzania).
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There is no clear explanation on why the Government has not resorted 
to endless supplementary estimates. Nevertheless, one is tempted to 
suspect that the past practice was a continuation of the system in use 
during the colonial period (ie prior to 1961), and secondly, the fact 
that the Government adopted a laxe policy on deficit financing (ie. 
bank borrowing), as discussed further in chapter 12 below, precluded 
the necessity for having supplementary estimates whenever need for 
additional funds arose.
In order to know the trend pattern of the supplementary 
estimates, some trend analysis was carried out, which involved 
regressing the estimates against time. This regression was done for 
both the absolute amounts and the ratios appearing in table 10:5 
above. Equation (14) is for the absolute amounts, while equation (15) 
below is for the ratios.
S1 = -105.7 + 38.83 (Ti) R2 = 0.22 (14)
(-0.47) (1.8)
S2 = 0.0533 - 0.000902 (Tij
(2.33) (-0.406)
R2 = .01 (15)
(Si is the amount of supplementary estimates, Ti is trend, S2 is the
ratio of supplementary estimates to actual recurrent expenditure, and 
the figures in parentheses are the t-ratios,)
In looking at the strength of the constants and coefficients on trend 
using t-ratios which are tested at a 5% significance level, they apear
\371
to be quite weak in both equations. The correlation coefficients 
(R2) are also very low indicating that the equations are a bad fit. 
The weak parameters notwithstanding, in equation (14) we can still 
draw the conclusion that the supplementary estimates have had an 
upward trend given the positive coefficient on the trend. This is 
expected because one would expect the value of supplementary estimates 
to increase with the increase in size of the recurrent budget as a 
whole. For equation (15), the supplementary estimates in relative 
terms have shown a decline; this being evidenced by the negative 
coefficient on the trend.
The supplementary estimates do not appear to bear any strong 
relationship with the actual recurrent expenditure. As can be seen 
from equation (16) below, the association between the two as supported 
by the correlation coefficient (R2 = 0.27) is quite weak. However, 
the coefficient on the recurrent expenditure variable is significant 
(supported by the significant value of t-ratio tested at the 5% 
significance level) and its positive sign indicates that the 
supplementary estimates have moved in the same direction with the 
recurrent expenditure.
S = 12.42 + 0.042(R) R 2= 0.27 (16)
(0.86) (2.12)
(S stands for Supplementary estimates, R is the actual recurrent 
expenditure, while the figures in parenthesis are the t-ratios).
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(b) Evaluation of factors leading to setting up of the Supplementary 
budget.
For developing countries, the uncertainty that exists over 
revenue mobilization compels the Treasury to limit the expenditure in 
relation to available revenues. The use of the ceiling is part of the 
effort to ensure that agency requests are pruned in advance to match 
expected revenues. Consequently, when the ceilings are observed, some 
spending agencies find themselves being allocated much less funds than 
what they need. In Section III above the point of agencies looking 
forward to satisfy a part of their needs through the supplementary 
estimates was raised. But in view of presentation in table 10-5 
above, the supplementary estimates have been limited. Why? For the 
Treasury to organise a supplementary estimates budget would depend on 
the availability of surplus revenues. Although revenue targets in 
most years have been exceeded (see Chpt. 8), however, such excesses 
were infact outdone by the increases in recurrent expenditure. The 
latter is discernible from the recurrent budget deficit experienced, 
especially after 1978.15 Therefore, the low levels of revenues 
preclude the authorization of additional expenditure during the 
supplementary estimate budget.
Another factor that restricts the use of supplementary estimates 
is the existence of a proviso in the financial regulations which 
requires the applicant to state why the need for extra provision 
cannot be resolved by way of reallocation within the Ministerial or 
Regional vote concerned.16 This implies that unused codes within a 
Vote can be used to satisfy arising needs by an Accounting officer 
without seeking virement approval from Treasury. Sometimes funds are
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moved between Votes (ie. inter Ministerial/Regional transfers). The 
authority to transfer funds between the votes lies with Treasury which 
would actually raise reallocation warrants to signify the 
transfer.17 Other funds which can be transferred by Treasury 
without first seeking parliamentary authority in form of supplementary 
provision, is the civil contingency fund. The fund is established in 
order that "payments for urgent services, the need for which could 
not have been foreseen and provided for, are not held up pending the 
approval of Parliament for the necessary supplementary 
provision."18
In scrutinizing some of the reallocation warrants which could be 
obtained from Treasury it became apparent that a substantial amount is 
reallocated by Treasury. Table 10:6 below helps to exemplify the 
point.
TABLE 10:6 REALLOCATION OF FUNDS BETWEEN VOTES THROUGH REALLOCATION
WARRANTS.
Reallocation Reallocations as a %tage of






* The estimated recurrent expenditure has been used in place of actual 
expenditure.
Source: Adapted from Reallocation Warrants of respective years.
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A comparison of the above reallocations with supplementary estimates 
ratios presented in table 10:5 above shows that sometimes the funds 
reallocated by Treasury do exceed what is allocated by Parliament 
through supplementary provision. For example, in 1980/81, while there 
were no supplementary estimates, reallocated funds amounted to 12.3% 
of actual recurrent expenditure.
It is now clear that those additional requests which cannot be 
settled through reallocations are the ones which receive Parliamentary 
Supplementary-provision. The priority for Supplementary alocations 
appear to lie with non-development oriented services touching 
sensitive areas like defence, police, prisons etc. To illustrate this, 
I have listed the reasons for granting the supplementary funds of 
T.sh. 284.0 mill, in the 1982/83 period which appeared in table 10:5 
above. The breakdown and the explanations appear in Table 10:7 below.
TABLE 10-7: THE DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLEMENTARY ALLOCATIONS
FOR THE YEAR 1982/83.
Ministry or Amount Allocated
Region Involved____________________________________ (Million Tsh).
(1) Defence 133.3
Nature of expenses 
To meet expenses such as transport and travelling, 
ration (food supplies), petrol office stationery, spares, 
vehicle maintenance and personal emoluments for 
"Trade Allowance".
(2) National Service 20.4
Nature of expenses.
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To meet recruitment costs for 4000 volunteer recruits,
payments for "Trade Allowance" and to cover price
increase on various items.
(3) Home Affairs 130.2
Nature of expenses.
(i) To meet transport costs for employees while on duty,
(ii) To cover costs for "Economic saboteurs" operation 
including special tribunals costs,
(iii) For purchasing new vehicles for the departments of 
Police, Prisons and Imigration,
(iv) To cover price increases on office stationery, spare 
parts and petrol.
(v) To pay for salaries of new police recruits - 1266 in 
number.
(vi) To meet extra costs on rising number of prison 
inmates
(vii) To meet extra costs on increased number of students 
taking driving lessons inclusive of food supplies, 
petrol, spare parts, transports and vehicle 
maintenance. _______
Total___________________________________________________ 283.9
Source: The United Republic of Tanzania, Supplementary Estimates of 
Expenditure, Dar-es-Salaam, Government Printer.
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V DIAGNOSIS OF DEVIATIONS IN FORECASTS AND SCOPE FOR REDUCING THE 
DISCREPANCIES
The discussion in section III above in respect of the factors 
used in forecasting expenditure, clearly indicated that at both 
national level (Treasury) and spending agency level (Ministries and 
Regions) there were no explicit factors used in the projection of 
expenditures. Agencies involved in the budget-making appeared to have 
been working under extreme time pressure, thus failing to take 
advantage of forecasting techniques which could produce more reliable 
results. As pointed out by Wright et al, because of the rush involved 
in the preparation of the budget the Mresult is that too often the 
budget expenditure forecasts will be "guesstimates" based on partially 
informed judgement"19 Whatever forecasting techniques have been used 
in Tanzania, they can best be described as judgemental techniques. To 
use the words of Wright et.al, "the method(s) make use of historical 
data, but it fails to use data in systematic mathematical 
projections.20 In the case of the spending agencies, it became quite 
obvious that the forecasts had been made with a minimum of hard data 
base.
Where quantitative techniques are lacking, it is not possible to 
give a systematic analysis of the variations between the forecasts and 
the outturns. In the Tanzania situation, besides pointing out that 
the judgemental methods have been used, we also need to add that the 
Treasury’s intention has been one of having a fixed budget. There are 
three grounds to support this. First, the practice of budget 
management does not point to any circumstances where the expenditure
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budget was linked (pegged) to any exogenous variable, whether 
revenues, or GNP or inflation etc. Neither is there evidence showing 
expenditure being adjusted to reflect the actual position of such 
exogenous variable(s). Without giving any supporting work, the 
Treasury official interviewed said that such exogenous factors are 
used to set the expenditure budget initially, presumably the ceilings. 
But even the latter (ceilings) are not enforced as has already been 
pointed above where approved expenditure was seen to have exceeded 
them by a significant margin. Secondly, the budget is set in fixed, 
prices, without paying attention to volume or quanta of goods and 
services to be provided. This implies that further changes in the 
prices ought to be absorbed by the spending agencies by reducing the 
quanta of goods and services.21 Thirdly, the budget does not carry 
any items which cannot be put under control by using fixed (ceiling) 
allocations. In this case reference is made to transfer payment 
items, such as social benefit allowances which, in practice, would be 
variable depending on the entry and exit of those entitled and not 
entitled respectively. The country does not operate such schemes. The 
second form of transfers which could make the budget vary are the 
subsidies given to some national institutions for, say, price 
adjustments, or loss recovery etc. For the years that the aggregate 
figures of such transfers are available (see table 10:8 below), the 
pattern that is discernible (as a ratio of total recurrent 
expenditure) is one of a decline, from 18.4% in 1971/72 to 5.5% in 
1980/81. When this trend is compared with the upward trend in the 
prediction errors (see section II.p3^6 above), it could be concluded 
that the transfers have not been influencing significantly the
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unpredictability of the recurrent expenditures. The inverse 
relationship between the prediction errors and the subsidies help to 
support the point of the budget being fixed.
TABLE 10:8 SUBSIDIES OF A CURRENT EXPENDITURE NATURE
Period Subsidy*
(Shs in millions












Note: * - The amount excludes transfers abroad.
However, it is not clear as to what 
categories of items the amount was 
transferred for 
Source: IMF, Government Finance Statistics
Yearbook 1985, Vol IX - Table C Tanzania.
The types of subsidies granted has varied from year to year. As 
regards consumption subsidies on goods, it is pointed out by Green 
et.al that the government is generally opposed to that. For example,
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after 1980 it is only maizemeal that was receiving subsidy, and 
consumer subsidies amounted to 1.5% of the budget. On the other hand, 
the government has been in favour of producer (ie excess transport and 
handling cost) subsidies which in some years has reached about 10% of 
the recurrent budget.22 Since the yearly statistics are not readily 
available, it is difficult to assess their particular impact on the 
predictions. The other type of subsidy whose forecasted amount could 
be determined quite accurately is that relating to compensations to 
various corporations for losses incurred. For example, during the 
1981/82 some amounts were paid to National Bank of Commerce for debts 
incurred by National Milling Corporation. Also some amount was paid to 
Tanzania Railway Corporation to help it meet some debt obligations 
incurred under the East African Community. Some other amounts were 
paid to Air Tanzania Corporation to assist in ameliorating some of its 
financial difficulties. 23 Thus, most of the subsidies paid have a 
fixed costs element in them, although some, especially producer 
subsidies, would vary with activity in the period.
In view of the points raised above, namely, the use of 
judgemental forecasting, the absence of any exogenous variable(s) used 
explicitly; and the fixed nature of the budget, the deviations 
observed in aggregate recurrent expenditure can therefore be 
attributed to one possible cause. This is poor financial management 
and control (or administrative supervision) on funds disbursement. In 
picking up the latter reason, it is tantamount to stating that the 
errors observed in section II above arose because the spending 
agencies were not prudent and budget-limit conscious to avoid 
overspending. The corollary of the latter is that the financial
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management and control systems, such as accounting, auditing, 
reporting and monitoring, especially those in the spending and 
authorizing agencies, have been inept and inefficient to deal with the 
task. There is enough evidence to corroborate the latter point.
As far as government accounting systems are concerned, their 
position is appalling. First, the government has been having staff 
problems of qualified accountants. As reported in the budget speech 
of 1976/77, the Minister of Finance and Planning clearly indicated how 
the problem had arisen. He pointed out that following the 
decentralization of accounts which followed the Government 
decentralization of 1972, it became necessary to spread the few 
accountants the Ministry had to regions, and this measure had caused a 
relative deterioration of accounting in some Ministries and 
regions.24 The problem of accountants has continued to deteriorate 
inspite of efforts to train more junior staff, mainly because of the 
expansion of activities in both public and private sectors which have 
been recruiting their accounting staff from the already strained 
labour market. The understaffing in the accounting departments is 
duly reflected in the state of government accounts. Between 1972/73 
and 1975/76, the accounts were in such a mess that the Ministry of 
Finance and Planning decided that the Accountant General should 
concentrate on accounts beginning with 1975/76 hoping to form a more 
solid base for subsequent accounting years, and also use such accounts 
to rectify those accounts of the previous years.25 The same 
accounting problems have continued to be reported in subsequent budget 
speeches.2 6 It should also be stressed here that the problems of 
accounting are further constrained by lack of supportive facilities,
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especially machines. Before 1974, all accounting officers had to 
prepare their accounts using the computer kept at the Treasury. There 
were serious access problems, especially for the regions which were 
located away from the computer centre in Dar-es-Salaam. Although some 
desk calculators were introduced beginning of 1974, the lack of spares 
and replacements have continued to keep the problem alive, thus 
hampering the preparation of accounts and reporting. 2 7
When the accounting systems do not work properly, the 
effectiveness of the other systems, namely auditing, reporting and 
monitoring suffer also. As far as reporting is concerned, the 
spending agencies are supposed to prepare four types of reports for 
Treasury's use.28 The first report is the 'Flash Report' which is 
prepared monthly, and is intended to show the month's incurred 
expenditure. The purpose of the report is to enable the Treasury 
monitor government liquidity, plan cash flows, and also plan short 
term borrowing. Besides, the reports help the Treasury to keep track 
of expenditure performance of all votes. The second report is the 
Quarterly progress report which is intended to show both financial and 
physical performance for each expenditure item. In fact the second 
Quarter (December) reports also become the basis for the mid-year 
review. The third report is the mid-year report which reports on 
expenditure performance for half the year up to November, and gives 
projected expenditure for December and for the remaining half year. 
This report is used for two purposes. The first one is to facilitate 
the preparation of financial adjustment measures to be taken, and 
secondly, is to form the basis for projecting preliminary estimates of 
the following year. The fourth report is the 'Fourth Quarter Progress
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Report* which is intended to show the cumulative expenditure to the 
end of the year, and compares performance with budget plans. In 
practice, as revealed by the officer interviewed (see note 5 below), 
all of these reports are submitted to the Treasury by the spending 
agencies. In fact the quarterly financial releases are made on 
condition that the reports have been submitted. But these reports are 
submitted to the Treasury without being authenticated. Since we are 
interested in the accuracy of the reports, the fact that the Treasury 
has been complaining about the appalling state of the accounts as 
pointed out above, clearly indicates that such reports are fraught 
with errors.29 And because the accounting officers (including the 
Accountants) are not held responsible and reprimanded if there are 
major discrepancies observed in relation to the subsequent audited 
reports, such laxity on the part of Treasury continues to encourage 
fraudulent reporting. If the Treasury were to be very strict with 
say, the accuracy of the flash reports, there would not be any reason 
why the other accumulative reports should not be accurate. But false 
reports have meant that the projections made which are based on them 
are also faulty. Moreover, although such reports are prepared on 
schedule, they do not, however, contribute towards timely preparations 
of the accounts. Since the accounts are submitted late for auditing, 
errors which could have been averted through timely audits are 
discovered when it it rather too late. The weaknesses in the 
accounting systems have therefore led to expenditure being incurred 
over the authorized levels.30
The paucity in controls is well demonstrated by the late 
approval by parliament of excess expenditure incurred by spending
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agencies. This appears in table 10:9 below. Column I and 4 are the 
ones of interest showing the year of spending and when approval in 
retrospect is made by Parliament. These excess expenditures were 
discovered after the audit were completed. Worth noting also is the 
deteriorating situation after 1971/72 - when decentralization of 
government took place.
TABLE10:9. EXCESS EXPENDITURE APPROVED BY PARLIAMENT IN 
RETROSPECT
C.l_____ C^2_______  C.3____________ C.4
Year Amount %  of Recurrent Date passed by Time Dil
(Tsh.) Expenditure Parliament (C.4-C
1968/69 33.8 2.8 March 1970 1
1969/70 33.4 2.2 June 1971 1
1970/71 39.3 2.4 June 1972 1
1971/72 23.2 1.5 June 1973 1
1972/73 70.3 3.1 March 1978 5
1973/74 111.6 3.9 March 1978 4
1974/75 0.1) 7.9 June 1983 8
343.6) July 1978 3
1975/76 87.7 2.0 April 1981 5
1976/77 73.2 1.6 April 1981 4
1977/78 103.0 1.9 October 1981 3
1978/79 864.0 10.4 27.4.1982 3
1979/80 220.4 2.4 June 1983 3
1980/81 657.4 6.5 April 1984 3
Source: Acts and Bills of the various years involved (United 
Republic of Tanzania.)
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Besides diagnosing the errors from the systems * operation point of 
view, the errors were also checked for their association with the past 
increases in development expenditure using regression analysis. The 
model used was of the form : Et = a +bDt-l whereby Rt is the
recurrent expenditure error in time-t and D^-l is the developoment 
expenditure change in time t-1, The test was done for various 
Ministries and the equations appear in table 10-10 below.
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TABLE 10:10: REGRESSION RESULTS OF RECURRENT EXPENDITURE
OVERSHOOTS IN RELATION TO DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE, 
Equation________________R2________ Number
MINISTRY OF
HEALTH : Rt = 5.965 + 0.5036 D^-l 0.431 (1)
(2.5) (3.14)
COMMUNICATION : Rt = 2.1956 - 0.1271 Dt_l 0.24 (2)
(.38) (-2.03)
AGRICULTURE: Rt = 5.746 + 0.132 D^-l 0.225 (3)
(0.84) (1.94)
FINANCE: Rt = -198.44 + 1.625 Dt-1 0.22 (4)
(-3.08) (1.92)
HOME.,AFFAIRS : Rt = 35.97 + 1.228 Dt-1 0.211 (5)
(3.06) (1.87)
LANDS: Rt = 0.113 - 0.2245 D^-l 0.15 (6)
(0.1458)(-0.448)
EDUCATION: Rt = 3.79 + 0.1339 Dt-1 0.13 (7)
(0.13) (1.41)
INDUSTRY : Rt = 0.9438 + 0.003896 Dt-1 0.15 (8)
____________________ (-0.48) (1.23)
(The figures in parentheses are t-ratios.)
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As a whole the results do not point to any significant 
relationship between the recurrent expenditure overshoots (errors) and 
the increase in development expenditure. Judged on the basis of the 
correlation coefficient, it is only equation (1), ie the Ministry of 
Health, which showed a modestly significant relationship as depicted 
by the R 2 = 0.431. Moreover, the t-values for the coefficients were 
also significant, (tested at the 5% level of significance). The 
results obtained for the Ministry of Health could be expected because 
of its development expenditure’s tendency to engender a high 
recurrent costs needs. In view of the fact that the determination of 
the forecasts does not provide fully for the recurrent costs, it would 
be expected that the pressure for higher spending would eventually 
lead to the approved expenditure being exceeded. (The topic of 
recurrent costs implication of development expenditure has been 
discussed in chapter 13 below). For the other Ministries, the 
correlation coefficients are very low, implying a rather insignificant 
association. Moreover, the t-values for the coefficients are mostly 
insignificant (tested at the 5% level of significance), except in the 
case of Ministry of Communication and Works. However, in the latter 
case (equation (2) it is interesting to note that the sign on the 
coefficient is negative which demonstrates the point that development 
expenditure on communication and works does not generate immediately a 
higher need for recurrent costs (implying it has a low recurrent 
coefficient) as was the case for the Ministry of Health. To 
summarize, there is not much empirical support to suggest that the 
recurrent expenditure errors were caused by the increase on 
development expenditure.
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In view of the latter and the other arguments presented above 
regarding accounting systems, manpower shortages, the fixed nature of 
the budget etc., I tend to support the hypothesis that the errors 
observed above have their roots in the poor management of the budget. 
Therefore, in lieu of the latter, the propositions made below for 
reducing such errors hinge considerably on budgetary controls which 
require some reforms. The corrective measures to be taken are listed 
below.
(a) First, senior officers in spending agencies who are responsible 
for overseeing the implementation of expenditure programmes need to be 
induced to the whole concept of budgeting. In various Budget 
speeches (ie 1979/80 p. 19, 1976/77 pp. 16-17 etc) and in various 
Treasury Circular No.I (ie of 1982 p.5; of 1983 p.4) there are 
complaints by Treasury about irresponsible Accounting officers 
(Warrant Holders) who do not get involved either in the preparation 
of the forecasts or in proper spending supervision. The latter could 
be due to a lack of awareness of the importance of the budget,and 
their direct personal responsibility. It would not be surprising to 
find that most of the senior accounting officers look down on the 
financial function and relegate it to the Accountants.
(b) The organization of budgeting in each Ministry and region should 
be placed under a separate section, and should not be left diffused in 
accounting or administration sections. Specialized units could 
coordinate the finance management situation more effectively than 
happens now. The case of the Ministry of Health already discussed 
earlier is a clear example of how a separate section could function 
effectly. Follow up (montoring) of the budget can also be achieved if
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there is a staff attached to the budget work all year round.
(c) There is an urgent need for the Treasury to restore the confidence 
of the spending agencies through proper administration of the 
ceilings. The problems of late circulars which convey the ceilings 
and other guidelines have already been discussed above. In this 
respect the Treasury should try to observe the December/January 
deadline for releasing the ceilings. Likewise, it should stick to its 
ceilings, and if circumstances change for the better or worse,
Treasury can invite requests for supplementary estimates or cuts 
respectively.
(d) The Treasury should exert greater effort to dispel the miscontrued 
concept of Ma government cheque never bounces" from the minds of the 
Accounting Officers and Accountants who often allow bank overdrawing. 
Equally, bank Managers who allow the overdrawings should have their 
credentials questioned.31
(e) The government has to operate discriminating incentive schemes for 
the scarce professions such as accounting so as to be able to achieve
high work efficiency, retain its employees, and get skilled people to
recruit. In every budget session there is a reference to poor
accounts, lack of properly trained accountants, etc. and yet the
Government is the biggest trainer. Accountants who see their
counterparts in companies getting tea, free meals and company car
would be lured away easily. Salaries of Accountants could be pegged
to those paid in the public corporations and private companies. In
short, although it can be insisted that more training should be done,
the underlying problems of low efficiency and retention have to be
tackled as well.
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(f) The Parliament should press the Government to discipline those 
officers who cannot keep their spending within the budgeted levels. 
Maybe the government should consider dismissing from duty the 
Accounting officers who are found guilty of frequent excess spending.
(g) The Parliament should impose a legal constraint that would compel 
the Treasury to balance its recurrent budget. The current practice 
does not show that recurrent expenditure is fully integrated with 
recurrent revenues. A compulsory interface of expenditure and revenue 
would make it mandatory for the Treasury to review and adjust the 
expenditure budget to tie-up with revenue mobilization. This could 
imply having more frequent supplementary budget approvals which would 
consider both increments and cuts to the previous approvals.
(h) The Treasury ought to initiate (compulsorily) research work on 
expenditure. During the interview it became apparent that there had 
been a paucity of research on the budget. Not even a single research 
paper could be provided by Treasury. Lack of research kept Treasury 
in the dark about its own work and also about what the agencies were 
doing.
(i) The Treasury should consider installation of microcomputers in 
every Ministry. The latter could facilitate data accumulation, 
analysis, and reporting. Some lessons could be drawn from the case of 
Ministries of Agriculture, and Livestock Development in Kenya where 
microcomputers helped to reduce problems of budgeting and financial 
management. 3 2
(j) The ceilings should focus at policy priorities. The Treasury 
Circulars do not spell out the priority areas for each Ministry and
Region in support of the ceiling figures passed down. The implication
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of a failure to set priorities were that, the Treasury could not 
demand from the spending agencies to defend their draft estimates on 
policy grounds. To set out priorities would inevitably require more 
time than is feasible under the present budget cycle, because some 
programmes being funded hitherto would have to be evaluated in terms 
of their satisfying the set priority objectives. Moreover, the 
Treasury would be required to hold more preliminary discussions with 
spending agencies so that the priority guidelines are set based on 
sound ground.
(k) To underscore the point raised in (j) above, the Treasury should 
develop special (standard) rates for determining expenditure, which 
have to be adhered to by itself and the spending agencies, which 
should cover sensitive areas such as education, health, water supply, 
road and building maintenance, equipment and plant maintenance etc. 
Those preparing the forecasts would then be required to apply the 
rates to either the level of past investment, or any other 
quantifiable measures such as number of students, number of hospital 
beds etc. (This topic has been discussed further in chapter 13 below 
concerning recurrent costs problems).
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VI SUMMARY
The chapter has analysed in detail the forecasting of recurrent 
expenditure in Tanzania. The focus was on the predictor variables 
which are used in generating such forecasts, and the extent to which 
misspecification of such variables caused the actual expenditure to 
vary from the forecasts. Indeed the hypothesis that was to be tested 
in this chapter was formulated to cover the latter. Some interesting 
results were observed.
Foremost, the analysis showed that there had been some 
variations between the forecasts and the outturns. Such variations 
were more pronounced in the more recent years, beginning with 1972/73, 
and they pointed to a tendency of under-predictions.
In examining the factors which are used in forecasting 
expenditure, it was observed that less substantial factors had been 
used. Even the claims of using trend extrapolation raised by Treasury 
and the spending agencies could not be substantiated. Some agencies, 
especially regions, had also raised some claims of using some standard 
cost rates which are passed down by Ministries responsible for 
overseeing certain social policy matters. Such standard rates were 
not used effectively because budget requests were not accepted by the 
Treasury on needs basis but on resource availability basis. In the 
absence of explicit factors used in forecasting, the projecting 
methods used appeared to be of judgemental nature, which were applied 
in very erratic manner.
Besides using judgemental techniques to prepare the forecasts 
the issue of Treasury adopting a * fixed budget* was raised also. The 
expenditure budget was not expected to vary. In view of the latter,
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it was argued that the perceptible forecasting errors had resulted 
from poor management and control of the budget. This new revelation 
therefore posed some problems of confirming the hypothesis. The 
hypothesis could be confirmed if it were to be interpreted in terms of 
lack of controls which are essential in keeping the actual 
expenditures within the fixed budget limits.
Another important issue that was raised in the chapter was that 
of * ceilings* which are set by Treasury. The contribution of ceilings 
was argued to be less effective for two reasons. First, they reached 
the spending agencies very late in which case they could not be used 
effectively, and secondly, they were not binding. The point of non­
sticking became clear when some years* * ceilings* were seen to have 
been surpassed by the approved expenditures by big margins. Failure 
to stick to the ceilings raised some doubts, especially on their role 
in effecting changes in the national economy. One could rightly 
presume that when the ceilings are set they have in purpose a fiscal 
policy objective. Therefore, by deviating from such preconceived 
levels it would imply a disruption of the intended economic 
adjustment-objective. Moreover, further doubts are raised when the 
ceilings are perceived as having been set without using any systematic 
quantitative techniques. In view of the latter, one won*t hesitate to 
take sides with Wright et al. on their argument that for a poor 
country, "the target is to provide accurate estimate of expenditure 
without necessarily thinking of fiscal policy use to stimulate or damp 
down the national economy."33
Finally, some measures to take to reduce the spending budget 
discrepancies have been suggested. Such corrective measures are
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directed towards budget management improvement. The main emphasis was 
placed on measures such as raising the awareness and apprehension of 
those dealing with budget; initiating some improvement on the 
administration of ceilings; increasing perquisites on accounting staff 
for the purpose of increasing efficiency and staff retention; urging 
the banks holding spending agency accounts to be more vigilant and 
strict on overdrawing; for government to do more frequent budget 
reviews which would eventually integrate expenditure forecasting with 
revenue forecast; considering installation of micro-computers to 
facilitate data compilation and processing; and finally for Treasury 
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Treasury. See for example, United Republic of Tanzania, Budget 
Speechs: 1976/77 pp.15-6, 1978/79 p.21 etc.
30.See for example, Budget Speech, 1979/80 p.18, where it is clearly 
indicated that expenditures are not kept within authorized amounts 
because of poor control systems. (Minister of Finance (1979),
Budget Speech, 1979/80; Dar-es-salaam, Government Printer 
(Swahili).
31.Ibid. p. 19.
NB. The practice of having the Banks act more strictly against 
agencies overdrawing started in 1976/77. The Banks were instructed 
to issue warning to agency involved when drawing from the bank 
account reached 85% of funds deposited. However, inspite of such 
early warning system, prudence in spending among some accounting 
officers wasn’t forthcoming. During 1977/78, a year after the 
system was introduced, it is pointed out that some extra Sh.110 
million were spent without authority on recurrent expenditure.
32.Leonard D.K., Cohen J.M, and Pinckney T.C. "Budgeting and Financial 
Management in Kenya’s Agricultural Ministries." Agricultural 
Administration No. 14 (1983): p. 117.
33.Rabin J. and Lynch T.D. op. cit. p.216.
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C H A P T E R  1 1
DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE FORECASTS - AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
I. INTRODUCTION:
This chapter examines empirically the forecasting of development 
expenditure in Tanzania. The analysis will attempt to determine the 
extent to which the outturns deviate from the forecasts, and then 
explore the causes of such deviations. The purpose of carrying out 
the analysis referred to above is to determine the extent to which 
misspecification of variables used in predicting the development 
expenditure has contributed to the level of variation between the 
forecasts and the outturns. Conceptually, this is an attempt to 
confirm the proposition that: it is the improper setting of the 
predictor variables which has caused the discrepancies in forecasting. 
However, implicitly I am endeavouring to confirm the general 
proposition that inefficiences in budget management have contributed 
to the present economic crisis.
The analysis will consider both aggregated and disaggregated 
development expenditure. It would have been appropriate to carry out 
the analysis on on-going and new projects on a separate basis.
However, the presentation of development estimates does not 
differentiate between the two categories. The reasons for the latter 
will become clear in further discussions in subsequent sections. 
However, it suffices to mention that all project programmes which are 
considered for financing will have been approved in advance by 
DevPlan, and so it is upon the implementing agency to allocate the
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funds allowed under the ceilings procedure among its projects. This 
might not be the best way to allocate project expenditure. I have 
raised the issue in the recommendations section in this chapter.
In the case of disaggregated expenditure consideration is 
along Ministerial basis. For classification purposes, the concept of 
’development expenditure’ is taken as is used in the Tanzania 
situation. This implies that it is taken for granted that all the 
expenditure that falls under this category is really meant for 
development purposes, which also implies that all the expenditure that 
is meant for development has been included. The idea behind this 
definition is to say that development expenditure differs from capital 
expenditure, the latter not necessarily being focussed towards 
development. However, as has been noted by Caiden et.al, even if one 
was to go through all the expenditure, it is not easy to make a 
distinction between expenditure that is solely for development and 
that which is not for development. The reason being that it is 
difficult to specify the contents of economic expansion, that is to 
define in other words, those goods and services whose increase 
constitutes a process of economic growth.1 In view of the latter, 
it should not be surprising therefore, to see defence capital 
expenditure etc. being discussed under the concept of ’development 
expenditure’.
The chapter outline is as follows. Section II examines 
forecasts in relation to outturns, at both aggregate and disaggregate 
level, while section II present an evaluation of factors taken into 
account in projecting development expenditure. Section IV analyses 
supplementary estimates of development budget nature in terms of size
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and their determining factors. Section V present diagnosis of the 
discrepancies observed between forecasts and the outturns, and also an 
examination of the possibility of reducing such discrepancies. The 
final section will present a summary of the discussion.
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II FORECASTS IN RELATION TO OUT TURN
(a) Regression of aggregated actual development expenditure on 
forecasted expenditure.
The forecasting of development expenditure does not appear to be 
perfect. There has been some significant variations between the 
outturn and the forecasts. The forecasting errors appear in Table 
11:1 below.
The errors appear to be significant in general. In relative 
terms, they range from 7.4% to 44.6%. The average error is about 
22.4%. Though high in value, they however do not appear to reflect a 
very strong trend pattern. A linear regression analysis of the 
absolute errors showed that the errors have been declining with time. 
This is implied from the negative coefficient on the trend variable 
appearing in equation (1) below.
E = 239.68 - 108.8(T) R* = 0.51 (1)
(0.86) (-3.8)
(E is the absolute error variable, T is the trend, while the figures 
in parentheses are the T-ratios: At the 5% level of significance while 
the constant remains insignificant).
Furthermore, when the errors are expressed in percentage and regressed 
on time, a declining trend is also observable. The negative 
coefficient on the trend appearing in equation (2) below points to 
such decline.











75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/8t 81/82 82/83
ERROR
% 2*f.2 44.1 -13.2 -8.8 -25- -30.7 -21 -24.6 -44.6 -7.4 -23.2 -10.3 -27.9 -32.*f -21.4 -8.6
NOTE: Error - This is the %tage of difference between outturn and 
forecasts to forecasted expenditure.
Source: Computed from data appearing in Appendix 11: Table 11A-I.
403
E = 0.5113 - 0.23(T) R2 = 0.25 (2)
(0.5) (-2.18)
(E stands for the error ratio, while T stands for Trend. The figures 
in parentheses are the T-ratios: At the 5% level of significance the 
coefficient on trend is significant, but the constant is not 
significant. Moreover, overall the regression is very weak due to the 
low value of R2 = 0.25)
When the errors are examined for under - or over prediction 
tendencies, one can observe that in two period 1967/68 - 1968/69, 
there was underprediction, while in the rest of the fourteen periods, 
1969/70 - 1982/83, there were some over-predictions. A further 
examination of a linear regression function of the outturn in relation 
to the forecasts, and also of a scatter plot points also to a general 
tendency to over-predict. Such overprediction tendency can be 
discerned from equation (3) below where the regression coefficient is 
just about three fourths of unity (0.74680.)
A= 120.3 + 0.7468 (E) R 2 = 0.957 (3)
(0.7) (17.6)
(A stands for actual expenditure while E stands foir the forecasted 
expenditure. The figures in parenthesis are t-ratios. At the 5% 
level of significance, the coefficient of 0.7468 is significant, while 
the constant is insignificant.)
From Figure 11:1 below it was also observed that most of the data
plots and the forecast equation line lie to the right of the perfect
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forecast line which is a clear sign of a tendency to over-predict. 
Worth noting also from the same figure is the feature that the 
divergence between the perfect forecast line and the forecasting line 
has been increasing overtgime, which actualy continues to underline 
the tendency to over-predict.















How is this general tendency to over-predict reflected in the 
disaggregated development expenditure? The analysis appears in the 
next sub-section.
(b) A linear regression of disaggregated actual development 
expenditure on disaggregated forecasted expenditure.
An analysis of the Ministerial outturn in relation to the 
forecasts reveals that the forecasting function is quite out of 
control. The forecasts appear to have been quite ambitious. The 
forecasting errors are apparently significant in all cases. The 
errors for all the Ministries appear in table 11:2 in a summarized 
form.
TABLE 11:2 Ministerial Error Summary 
Ministry of Average Error(%) Maximum Error(%)
Information & Tourism 67.8 300.0
Health 50.7 77.5
Finance & Planning 46.6 223.7
Education 40.5 - 81.0
Lands, Settlement 34.7 55.7
Communication & Works 30.8 53.0
Agriculture, Forestry & 30.3 72.6
Wildliffe
Defence 27.2 51.0
Industries & Commerce 26.7 88.9
Home Affairs__________________ 11.3______________________ 50.0
Source: Computed from data appearing in Appendix 11 Table A-2
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Implied from these errors is that the Ministries are incapable of 
utilizing most of the resources allocated to them through the 
budgetary process. Some of the Ministerial errors, especialy in the 
case of Ministries of Information and Tourism, Health, Finance and 
Planning, and Education, as shown in Table 11:2 above, are far greater 
than the average error of 22.4% for aggregate development expenditure 
observed in subsection (a) above.
Besides being very significant, the Ministerial errors indicate 
a tendency to over-predict. These results can easily be discerned 
from linear regression results of the outturn vis-a-vis the forecasts. 
These results are recorded in table 11:3 below. In group I we have 
underpredictions while in group II we have overprediction cases. The 
strengths of the regression fuctions are confirmed by the high values 
of R2, with an exception of the Ministry of Information and Tourism 
(equation (14)) which has a low value of R 2= 0.26. The coefficients 
on the forecast variables appear to be significant also given the 
significant values of the t-values which have been tested at the 5% 
level of significance. From Table 11:3 below, it can also be observed 
that equations (5) to (8) have quite low coefficients and this implies 
a high level of forecasting imperfection. Some of the Ministries 
involved, such as Health, Finance and Planning, and, Communnications 
and Works etc. are the ones which had largest average errors recorded 
in Table 11:2 above.
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Table 11:3 Regression results of outturn in relation to forecasts for 
the Ministries for the period 1967/68 to 1982/83.
Group I: Underpredictions Equation H? Equation No
Ministry of Home Affairs A=-3.33+1.087E 0.99 (4)
(-2.3) (32.1)
Group 2: Overpredictions:
Ministry of Health A= 8.517+0.352E 0.69 (5)
(2.1) (5.6)
Ministry of Communication A=116.92+0.3994E 0.68 (6)
and Works (3.8) (5.5)
Ministry of Finance A= 10.37+0.495E 0.66 (7)
and Planning (0.36) (5.2)





Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Agriculture




A= 0.849+0.703E 0.75 (9)
(0.96) (6.5)
A= -6.536+0.7083E 0.84 (10)
(-0.4) (8.5)
A= -5.224+0.7174E 0.92 (11)
(-0.21) (12.97)
A= 15.37+0.742E 0.91 (12)
(0.32) (12.3)
A= 22.5+0.8.65E 0.85 (13)
(0.64) (9.0)
A= 0.4718+0.8711E 0.26 (14)
(-0.15) (2.2)
(A stands for the Ministerial expenditure outturn, E stands for the 
Ministerial forecasts, while the figures in parentheses are the t- 
ratios.)
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A further comparison of the nature of development expenditure 
errors noted above with those of recurrent expenditure (discussed in 
chapter 10) points to the following observations. First, while the 
errors for total development expenditure pointed to a tendency to 
overpredict, in the case of recurrent expenditure the situation was 
one of underprediction. Secondly, the development expenditure errors 
were much larger (average error was 22.4%) compared to those of 
recurrent expenditure (with average error of 11%. Thirdly, at 
Ministerial level, for most of the cases there was no distinguishable 
pattern between the errors of the two categories of expenditure. As 
revealed by some linear regression functions (table 11-4 below) it was 
only in the case of Health that there was a significant relationship. 
This is revealed in equation (15) below. Both the correlation 
coefficient (R2=0.575) and the t-values were signifiant. In the case 
of Defence, equation (16), the association was rather weak 
(R2=0.28), although the t-values for the constant and that 
regression coefficient were significant. For the other cases examined 
(equations 17, 18, 19, 20), the association between the two variables 
was insignificannt as evidenced by the low correlation coefficient.
Moreover, a comparison of the Ministerial average errors (see 
Tables 10-2 and 11-2) does not point to any perceptible pattern. That 
is, those Ministries with the largest recurrent expenditure errors do 
not necessarily emerge with the largest development expenditure 
errors. The latter differential observations could imply that the 
causes of the two categories of errors differ and are therefore 
explained by different factors. Those diferences will be unveiled 
after a discussion of the causes of the development expenditure errors
VlO
that is to follow.
Table 11:4 Regression results of recurrent expenditure





Re = 15.70 + .2518 DE 
(5.9) (4.35)
Re =101.10 - 3.893 De
(2.1) (-2.34)
EDUCATION Re = 5.4615 + 0.0814 DE
(1.4) (.86)
AGRICULTURE Re =11.47 + 0.1005 DE
(0.76) (0.24)
COMMUNICATION RE = 9.09 + 0.1305 DE
(.63) (.26)














(Re stands for recurrent expenditure errors, while De stands for the 
development expenditure errors. The figures in parentheses are the t- 
vaiues. The t-values are tested at the 5% level of siginificance).
Having seen the nature and magnitude of the errors,we can now 
move on to the next section which examines the predictor factors used 
in setting out the forecasts.
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III CONSIDERATION AND EVALUATION OF FACTORS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN 
PROJECT DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE.
Development expenditure in Tanzania is planned and incurred on 
projects basis, forming the Annual Plan. The Ministry of Planning and 
Economic Affairs (Dev-Plan) is responsible for coordinating the Annual 
Plan. The work of preparing the annual development expenditure 
forecasts normally starts even before the scheduled time for budget 
preparation. For example, some projects may have the feasibility 
study done some months or years in advance, but they are shelved until 
such time that funds for developing them are available. Therefore, 
the annual forecasting would involve a process of selecting those 
designed projects which can be financed during the period. A number 
of factors are considered in determining what projects ought to be 
implemented.
The factors which are used in determining the level of 
expenditure will be examined from two points of view. The first 
perspective is that of foreign supported projects, while the other is 
the locally funded projects. In the case of foreign aided projects, 
which actually comprise the bulk of projects implemented (see Table 
11-9(b) - below) the major factor is the availability of the external 
funds during the budget period. All projects with committed foreign 
funding in the fiscal year are normally included in the annual plan. 
Meanwhile those foreign funded projects requiring local counterpart 
funds will be allocated such funds depending on the project costs and 
the scheduled work during the budget period.
On the part of locally supported projects, whether on-going 
projects or new ones, two main factors are considered. The first
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factor is the general expenditure policy that the government desires 
to be pursued during the fiscal year. If the policy to be pursued is 
one of expenditure retrenchment, then such projects are considered 
accordingly. The other major factor is local revenue availability. 
There are two main sources of local revenues, namely, the surplus from 
the recurrent budget account, and borrowings from banks and other 
financial intermediaries. The position of these sources has been 
discussed in detail below. The main observations made in respect of 
such sources is that, they do not provide much room for increased 
expenditure. Therefore, the locally financed projects are the ones 
which have to be squeezed between the foreign aided projects 
expenditure and the ceiling set for total development expenditure.
The formal process of development budget forecasting starts with 
the DevPlan issuing the general guidelines. The guidelines comprise 
of expenditure ceilings which are broken down into local and external 
funds. The ceilings are set after considering the factors highlighted 
above, namely availability of disposable external funds, government 
expenditure policy and revenue position. These guidelines do 
highlight briefly sectors or activities which ought to receive some 
priority; which implies that the allocation that is done by DevPlan in 
setting the ceilings reflect in broad terms the priority accorded to 
each spending agency. Detailed programme priorities are not reflected 
in the guidelines. The onus to decide what programmes should be given 
top priority which should conform to general government policy rests 
with the spending agencies.
In principle, the projects to be undertaken are supposed to be 
in compliance with the medium and long term plans.3 But, beginning
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with 1982, the emphasis was on the locally prepared Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) that was launched there upon. In the SAP, 
the policy emphasized was one of consolidating on the on-going 
projects rather than just embarking on new projects. In practice, the 
annual plans never reflected substantially the policy objectives of 
the medium and long term plans, and nor have they conformed to the 
objectives of SAP. Instability in development revenues plays a 
crucial part. Heavy reliance on foreign financing for development 
projects has sometimes meant selecting projects which will receive 
attention from Donors, rather than what is critically essential for 
the country as laid down in the medium and long-term plans. Secondly, 
other economic instabilities such as drought, transportation 
bottlenecks, dead-locked negotiations with IMF reducing external 
credit, and balance of payments problems etc. push the government into 
assuming priorities which are focussed on the impending crisis (ie 
short-term management of the economy) rather than on its predetermined 
long-range goals. The latter has been summarized ably by Stein as he 
pointed out that "in the case of Tanzania, annual planning does not 
set targets aimed at disaggregating the long-term and medium goals.
It bears little or no relation to these planning exercises. The 
primary thrust of annual planning is budgeting domestic and foreign 
development funds to particular projects."4
Other factors which have to be taken into account in preparing 
the development expenditure forecasts are those generally required for 
project preparation. Sectorial programmes are prepared in the form of 
district projects. As has been pointed out in the Manual for 
Budgetary Process in Tanzania, the "objects of expenditure are
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recorded by project.”5 In practice, all new projects submitted to 
DevPlan are required to be supported by detailed feasibility 
studies.6 The latter are expected to show the viability of the 
projects. The techniques of assessing such viability will depend on 
the nature of project being undertaken. Profit-oriented projects have 
different appraisal procedures from the non-profit ones. Those 
intended to join the parastatal sector have to employ cost/benefit 
analysis including discounting techniques. The costs determined by 
such analysis become the development budget estimates which are 
apportioned over the years that the installation takes place. For the 
profit-oriented projects it is quite possible to make an assessment of 
both costs and monetary returns simply because their products will 
have to be marketed.
On the other hand, projects whose viability is assessed in terms 
of welfare benefits, such as roads, schools, hospitals etc. do not 
employ elaborate cost/benefit analysis techniques as in profit- 
oriented projects. In most cases acceptance/rejection decisions are 
political in nature which reflect lobby pressure. The appraisal that 
is carried out concentrate on cost minimization. The process involves 
assessing the alternatives of presenting the project. For example, 
in the case of a road construction project a decision is made in 
advance on the type of road to be constructed, say a highway or an 
ordinary tarmac road or an all seasons earth road. Then engineering 
consultants and quantity surveyors are engaged to prepare bill of 
quantities. On the basis of the latter the government invites tenders 
for carrying out the job, indicating cost estimates. The quotations 
could come from any institution, either government or non-government.
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The accepted tender value becomes the project estimates to be spread 
over the construction period. The quality of appraisal carried out in 
respect of a project will of course depend on size of the project, 
secondly, quality of planning staff available to carry out the study, 
and thirdly, availability of data to be used in the appraisal. The 
paucity of skilled and experienced manpower and that of data has often 
been stressed, and they have been affecting the quality of appraisals 
very adversely. The detailed feasibility studies are normally carried 
out after project proposals have been approved by DevPlan. The latter 
normally sponsors the studies in the case of non-parastatal proposals, 
which sometimes might involve requesting technical assistance from 
foreign agencies. The parastatal organizations can however initiate 
their own feasibility studies, but still, DevPlan’s approval is 
essential. The purpose of Dev-Plan endorsing such proposals is to 
ensure that, in principle, all development programmes conform to the 
medium and long-term plans. At the spending level, the planners who 
allocate funds to projects have a clear knowledge of those projects 
with external funding because negotiations with the Treasury, Dev Plan 
and the donors are done well in advance. Problems can only arise in 
establishing the amount of local funds that are to be allocated to 
each project, either as full project costs or as counterpart funds.
In the absence of clearly defined government policy priorities over 
what will be accepted for funding in the short run, the practice by 
the spending agencies over locally funded projects has been one of 
trying to accomodate as many projects as is possible to the ’ceiling’ 
amount allocated. This phenomenon has been discussed further below in 
section IV where the consequences have also been noted.
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IV A STUDY OF DEVELOPMENT SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGETS
(i) Magnitude of Development Supplementary Estimates in relation 
to aggregate development expenditure during 1967/70-1982/83.
During the period 1969 to 1983 the Government had to resort to 
supplementary estimates to to-up the initial allocations. These 
supplementary provisions have been quite a significant share of the 
total development expenditure. As can be seen from table 11:5 below, 
the proportion of such supplementary estimates to actual development 
expenditure has varied from 2.2% to 28.6%.
However, these supplementary estimates do not show any strong 
trend pattern. This can be discerned from the results of trend 
analysis appearing in equation (21) below. The strength of the 
equation, measured by R2 =0.39, appear to be weak. However, the 
positive sign on the significant regression coefficient indicates that 
there has been some growth. But when the estimates are taken as a 
proportion of actual development expenditure and then regressed on 
time, getting R 2=0.15; the latter is too low for the equation to be 
interpreted. Moreover, the regression coefficient is insignificant. 
This is clear from equation (22) below.
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Table 11:5 Supplementary Estimates ALLOCATED OVER 1969-83
Year Amount of Proportion of Date passed
Supplementary Supp. Estimates in Parliament
Estimates to Actual Dev.
__________ (mill. Tsh) EXPENDITURE
1969/70 38.6 6.3% Mar.& June *70
1970/71 21.4 2.6 Apr.& June *71
1971/72 19.5 2.2 Jan.& June *72
1972/73 66.7 7.0 Feb.& June *73
1973/74 219.9 13.5 No.* 73&Mar *74
1974/75 116.0 6.8 March 1975
1975/76 421.5 25.3 March 1976
1976/77 240.0 7.2 Jan. 1977
1977/78 951.0 28.6 Oct.77,Feb, 
May & June78
1978/79 1233.6 26.0 Jan.& June *79
1979/80 587.8 11.3 Apr.& June *80
1980/81 638.0 13.4 Apil 1981
1981/82 - - -
1982/83 926.0 21.0 June 1983
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, (Various Years) 
Acts and Bills,




S2= 0.0384 + 0.00885 (T) R 2= 0.15 (22)
(0.62) (1.5)
(Si is the supplementary expenditure estimates variable, while S2 is 
the variable of ratio of supplmentary estimates to actual development 
expenditure. T is the time series, while the figures in parentheses 
are the t-ratios which were tested for criticalness at the 5% level 
significance.)
On the other hand, the supplementary estimates appear to be 
exhibiting a relatively mild relationship to the actual development 
expenditure. This can be discerned from equation (23) below where 
R2= 0.40. The significant positive regression coefficient implies 
that the estimates have been increasing generally with the actual 
expenditure over the years. This also implies that such estimates are 
an important part of the budgetary process.
S = -12.867 + 0.14462 D R2 =0.40 (23)
(-0.76) (2.81)
(S is the supplementary expenditure estimates, while D is the actual 
total development expenditure. The figures in parenthesis are the t- 
ratios tested for their criticalness at the 5% level of significance.)
(ii) Evaluation of factors leading to setting up of the supplementary 
budget.
The supplementary estimates in the case of development 
expenditure budget are prepared for a number of reasons. Foremost is 
the availability of extra revenues in the course of the year. Such 
extra revenues could arise from local and/or foreign sources. During
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the interview with Bali (op.cit), it was expressed explicitly that 
allocation of local funds at the initial budget stage was limited 
because of the fear of massive budget deficits. The latter implied 
that if revenue mobilization improved in the course of time, those 
projects underprovided would be allocated more funds. Secondly, 
additional local funds would be allocated to projects sponsored from 
outside if the project management complained of counterpart funds 
under-budgeting. On the other hand, during the year some negotiations 
and financing agreements are concluded between the government and 
foreign donors. If funds under such agreements are made available 
during the period, then authority is granted for the project to either 
begin, if it is a new one, or continue, if it is an on-going one.
Sometimes some projects are omitted by spending agencies from 
the original budget presentation if the ceiling amount is too small, 
but then they continue to pressurize the government to reconsider such 
cases. Depending on their importance, some are accepted and granted 
funds through the supplementary estimates. In principle, these are 
the reasons which compel the parliament to authorize the supplementary 
estimates. For further exemplification, the supplementary estimates 
for 1982/83 will be examined in detail, as an example, to trace the 
reasons given to support such authorization. Worth noting is the fact 
that in 1982/83 about 47% of the supplementary funds allocated came 
from external sources and a few locally-based independent 
institutions. The rest 53% was mobilized from normal local government 
sources.8 The allocations were for the following reasons:
(1) increased input costs related to price changes etc.
(Sh. 221.8 million or 24%)
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(2) Projects omitted from the initial budget but reconsidered later 
(Shs. 232.6 million or 25%)
(3) Other unforeseen events (Sh. 30 million or 1/3%)
(4) Some errors of omission in the initial budget 
(Shs 35.5 million or 3.8%)
(5) New agreements with donors (Shs. 395.7 million or 43.6%)
The reallocations highlighted above reflect the problems that he 
government faces in projecting development expenditure. Uncertainty 
over local and external revenues accentuate the prediction problem. 
Projects which are linked to foreign funding have to wait until some 
agreement is reached, and that is when the Parliament authority to 
execute them is granted (The procedure for handling foreign aided 
projects was outlined in chapter 9 above (p.307).
With the latter in mind, we can now turn to the task of 
diagnosing the deviations (errors) and see the policy measures which 
can be adapted to reduce the problem of forecasting.
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V DIAGNOSIS OF THE DEVIATIONS AND SCOPE FOR REDUCING THE DISCREPANCY 
From the analysis presented in Section II above, it became 
apparent that development spending has generally fallen short of the 
planned levels. As noted, the overpredictions have persisted in the 
last fourteen years. In fact some underspending have occurred even in 
those years when planned expenditure saw some retrenchment. For 
example, from Appendix 11 Table A-I it can be seen that planned 
expenditure declined in nominal terms from 1979/80. The underspending 
has of course far reaching implications on the macro economy. 9
These deviations can be explained by a number of interrelated 
factors, which typically reflect the fiscal crisis that persists over 
the economy. However, in view of the fact that these factors are 
interwoven, it is not possible to decompose the errors in any period 
and associate them with specific factors. These factors are discussed 
below.
(i) Volatility in Development Revenues.
Overall, development revenues are not derived from stable and 
flexible bases. The three main sources, namely, surplus on recurrent 
budget, borrowings from local financial intermediaries, and borowings 
from external sources are not quite stable in terms of assuring the 
Treasury that the funds will for sure be available as planned. A 
surplus from recurrent budget has been realized in only a few years, 
namely 1967/68 to 1973/74 and 1977/78, as can be observed from table 
11:6 below. Even as a percentage of actual development expenditure, 
it is quite insignificant.
TABI.EK 11:6 SURPLUS FROM RECURRENT BUDGET FDR DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE
MILLIONS OF Tsh.
'YEAH 67/68 68/69 69/70 70/71 71/72 72/71 73/71* 7V75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83
SUBP.
(defic) -k8i 17 83 53 263 133
.
16 -666 -388 575 519 -1610 - H 72 -126*f -225** -1227
SUEP./ 
DEV. EXP. 3.7 13.6 6.** 29.8
—
13.9 1.0 17.7 15.6
(Surp. stands for surplus, while (defic) stands for deficit represented by a -Ve sign) 
(Surp./der. exp. stands for surplus/deTelopment Expenditure expressed in tftage)




Regarding local borrowing, the government has a maximum limit for 
borrowing from the Banks, mainly the Bank of Tanzania. The annual 
limit is normall\' set in the Finance and credit planlOf an(j[ this is 
the amount included in the budget estimates. A comparison of the 
estimated borrowings with actual borrowing clearly indicates that the 
upper limit has been surpassed in various years, as is shown in Table 
11:7 below. In fact, in most of the years when the ceiling level was 
exceeded, the government had to borrow from other Banks. For example, 
in 1974 and 1975 when the government had reached its ceiling at the 
Bank of Tanzania, it had to circumvert the law by going to borrow from 
the National Bank of Commerce. After this period the government had 
to initiate an amendment to the Bank of Tanzania Act (No. 12 of 1965) 
so that it could borrow more when it became absolutely necessary. The 
latter clearly demonstrates that this source of revenue is not very 
open, and besides, the government risks the adversity of excessive 
money supply when production is falling.
TABLE 11: 7 BANK BORROWING TREND
_________Millions of Tsh.
Year 73/74 1977/781974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/8!
Estimated
Borrowinq 300 300 150 500 700 711 1667 1551 2850 4376
Actual
Borrowinq 613 834 570 _ 232.3 3056.7 2804 2916 3276 4206
Excess
Borrowinq 313 534 420 _ _ 2346 1137 1365 426 -
Source: United Republic of Toanzania, Annual Plans, The Economic Survey, Various years.
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As regards external funding, there has been overdependence on it 
for funding development expenditure. The close relationship between 
Development expenditure and external funding is confirmed by a linear 
regression function. From equation (24) below the high value of 
correlation coefficient (R2= 0.936) and the significant t-value of 
the regression coefficient (t-14.28) clearly point to the strength of 
the association.
D= 20.8 + 2.2645 A R2 = 0.936 (24)
(0.098) (14.28)
(D is the actual development expenditure, A stands for the external 
revenue (loans/grants), and the figures in parentheses are the t- 
values-tested at the 5% level of significance. The data used was for 
the period 1967-83).
As can be seen from table ll:8(a) below, the expected 
contribution of such external funds towards the budget over the study 
period, ranged from 1.1% to 74%, while, the outturn was as shown in 
table 11:8(b) below where the contribution ranged from 23.7% to 70%.
TABLE 11:8(A) EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION OF EXTERNAL REVENUE TO 
DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE
™  £7/68 68/69 69/70 70/71 71/72 72/73 73/7** 7**/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83
PLAN.
EXTERN.
Funds. 3.04 5.7** 230.2 320 535.5 746.6 1044 1191 1967 180** 2352 3848 4219 4030 4897 2584
$tage or 
Plan. Dey.
Sxpagd. 1.1 1.8 32.7 35.1 **5.3 54.1 50.6 52.7 65.3 51.5 5**. 3 72.7 58.7 57.5 74 53.7
PLAN* ECTERN. FUNDS - stands for Planntd External Funds. (”f*Sh. I p  PTlllO 
Plan. Dar. Expand. - stands for Planned Deyelopment Expenditure.
SOURCE: United Republic of Tanzania, The Economic Survey, various 
years.
TABLE ll:8(b) ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION OF EXTERNAL REVENUE
TO DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE,
YEAS 67/68 68/6? 6?/70 70/71 71/72 72/73 75/7^ 7V75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83
A.E.R. 8^ .2 123 ^k2 330 50i* 518 681 1039 1033 11*02 1369 21*27 2320 1872 1795 1852
3»taga
of
A.D.S. 2^.5 26.7 2?*7 ??.8 ?7 5**.2 1*1.8 61 61.9 1*3.2 41.1 51.1 H .8 ??•? 31*.6 1*2.1
A.S.R. - stands for Actual Xxttrnal Sartnua. (in millions of Tsh.) 
A.D.S. - stands for Actual DeYalopmant Expanditura
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, (Various Years) The 
Economic Survey, various years.
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The aid-expenditure ratios are certainly high, especially in the 
1970s and early 1980s. The realization ratios (actual revenues to 
actual expenditure) have certainly been lagging behind the expectation 
ratios (estimated external revenues to estimated expenditure). The 
latter can be deduced from the simple linear regresion (equation (25))
whereby the regression coefficient is less than unity.
A = 26.22 + 0.3511 E R2 = 0.38 (25)
(4.2) (2.94)
(A is the realization ratio, E is the expectation ratio, and the 
figures in parenthesis are the t-values. Though the regression is 
quite weak, however, the parameters are significant in view of the
high values of the t-statistics tested at the 5% level of
significance.) Besides, it has already been demonstrated above 
(chapter 9 pp. ) that there were very significant overpredictions in 
external revenues.
Moreover, an analysis of the development expenditure errors (see 
table 11:1) in relation to the Aid errors (chapter 9 table 9-1) using 
linear regression analysis indicates that the two are closely related. 
From equation (26) below which has a high value of R 2 = 0.68 and a 
significant value of t-value, a strong association is detectable.
D = -20.2384 + 0.02254 A R 2 = 0.68 (26)
(-6.04) (5.5)
(D is the development expenditure error (in %tage) and A is the Aid 
error (in %tage). The figures in parentheses are the t-values. The
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period covered is 1967-83).
In pointing out to the strong correlations between development 
expenditure and external funding, we are postulating that the 
instability in external revenues is a major cause the development 
expenditure instability. By looking at the expenditure instability 
index (a normalized coefficient of variation)12 of 24.91 vis-a-vis 
that of external revenues ie 28.03, we can certainly detect an element 
of closeness.13 This is not to say, however, that the instability 
in development expenditure is caused by aid only. The other factors 
discussed below (not easily quantifiable) must have contributed to the 
instability.
The heavy dependency on external funding could have three main 
restrictive effects on development expenditure. First, the timing of 
the disbursement of the external funds does not necessarily coincide 
exactly with the government’s fiscal year. This discrepancy of wrong 
timing of disbursements of external funds was noted in the 1979/80 
Annual Performance review (APR) as being one of the causes of poor 
project performance.14 Secondly, since some of the project 
implementers fail to fulfil some of the loan and/or grants conditions, 
in terms of producing timely and properly prepared and documented 
claims and financial reports, consequently delaying further 
disbursements, the effect is one of holding up the use of any local 
counterpart funds pertaining to the projects affected. This delay in 
disbursing funds due to lack of timely reperts and claims was observed 
to be a major obstacle on project implementation in the 1979/80 
APR.15 Thirdly, given that most donors require the recipient 
government to provide local counterpart funds as was noted in chapter
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9 p. above, failure to provide sufficient funds for the local costs, 
will hold up the external funds and since the latter comprises more 
than 35% of the development budget (see table 11:8(b) above), projects 
implementation get hampered. The problem of underbudgeting was 
vividly expressed by the Dev. Plan officer who was interviewed. Also, 
the latter was stressed in the 1979/80 APR as being a serious 
problem.16 Some examples of projects with big underestimations have 
been cited already in chapter 9 above - table 9A-3 of Appendix 9.
It can therefore be argued that the lack of dependable and 
flexible development revenue bases destabilize the expenditure plans 
tremendously. The impact has been felt in terms of having far less 
amount being spent when compared to the forecasted amounts.
(ii) The problem of poor project designs and inadequate feasibility 
studies.
Since development expenditure deals with projects which have to 
be designed and costed, faulty designs also produce wrong costings.
Any corrective changes conceived on the design during implementation
tend to hold up spending as well. In the 1979/80 APR, poor project 
preparations in the sense of poor assessment of factors and costs
etc., and poor project approval were stressed as having contributed to 
delays in project implementation.17 Moreoever, an investigation of
the cost overruns in ten of the more egregious cases in Appendix 9
table 9A-3 indicated that seven out of ten cases had been caused by
incomplete information on the projects. As remarked by Stein, it 
means that the * planners had poor concept of the projects or failed 
to adequately investigate the cost of the projects.*18
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The problem of poor designs and evaluation was also stressed by World 
Bank in its Audit Preview Report of its sponsored projects.19 As 
pointed out in the latter report, these faulty project designs 
impelled the implementers to make some drastic changes which sometimes 
changed the content of the project completely. The consequences of 
the latter action was a delay in project execution and funds 
disbursement.
(iii) Paucity of project inputs and competent local contractors.
It has been pointed out by Caiden and Wildavsky that if a 
project has to be built in time, the following, inter alia, are 
required; availability of materials; ability to import commodities; 
and distribution of skills in the population etc.20 The problems of 
project inputs, whether locally produced or directly imported, imposed 
a big restraint on project implementation. Besides, the problems of 
input shortages is aggravated further by the existence of 
unprofessional and incompetent local contractors who may draw some 
project funds and do nothing, on the pretext of shortages of inputs. 
These problems of shortages in materials, infrastructure etc. have 
been emphasized further by Stein in respect of the projects with cost 
overruns cited above (p. ).21 Besides, as pointed out by Stein,
the ’’virtual lack of any material balances or any attempt at utilizing 
even crude input tables were bound to induce shortages and 
inconsistencies.”22 The problem of input shortages and lack of 
material balancing was also pointed out in the 1979/80 APR as being 
critical on project implementation. 2 3 Moreover it should also be 
stressed that the shortage of local contractors inevitably leads to 
hiring of of foreign contractions who have to acclimatize to the new
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environment, sometimes at the expense of the project time.
Practically, most of the large scale projects, especially those 
sponsored by donors, are undertaken by foreign contractors.
Experience on such projects, such as those listed on Appendix 9 table 
9A-3. above, indicate that they are never completed on time.
IV Paucity of local skilled manpower in project planning management,
control and monitoring.
Development expenditure planning in Tanzania is a decentralized
bottom-up process in which spending agencies identify, design and
appraise the projects and then forward them to Dev. Plan for approval.
They of course process the projects while taking into consideration
the guidelines passed downwards by Dev Plan. This decentralized
system of planning for projects is emphasized in the Manual for
%
budgeting. 24 Moreover, as it can evidently be seen from Table 11-9 
below, which considers the distribution of rural projects proposed at 
various levels, the expenditure planning system emphasizes a bottom-up 
approach. The implications of what has been demonstrated below, it 
can be argued, is that much of the project appraisal is done without 
much expertise. How many qualified economists, engineers, accountants 
etc. do we expect to find at village or district level? The shortage 
of skilled staff in every sector is an irrefutable fact. The 1979/80 
APR clearly indicated that paucity of planners in centres other than 
Regional and Ministerial centres was an issue of concern. The few 
available planners were allocated to the planning section in the 
Ministries and Regions first; although the projects are not proposed 
at these centres.
432
TABLE 11:9. PROPORTION OF RURAL PROJECTS PROPOSED AT VARIOUS
LEVELS
Pre--Decentrali zation Post-Decentralization





Number of projects 32 201
Source: Adopted from Stein op.cit Table 4p.28.
They only receive already worked out proposals from agencies under 
them.25 And even if the planners were available at the lower levels, 
still, shortages of other skills which are essential for providing 
inputs into the plans, would continue to undermine the quality of 
plans produced.
In addition, the Ministries and Regions lacked staff to control 
and monitor projects being implemented under them. At Dev-Plan 
itself, the officer interviewed expressed his concern over the 
staffing position of the project implementation and monitoring unit. 
While the establishment allowed employment of four experts, however, 
three vacancies still existed. This has been pointed out by Stein 
also as he notes: "although Dev-Plan has the structural means to 
monitor projects, they are also seriously understaffed that they have 
no time to exercise this prerogative." 26
In the past years only two comprehensive Annual Performance
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Reports were prepared; one for 1974/75 and another for 1979/80. Other 
operating Ministries lacked control and monitoring staff as well. For 
example, the Ministry of Communication and Works, which actually 
implements most of the construction projects of the government, 
clearly indicated that its planning division lacked qualified staff, 
especially engineers, to visit regularly the projects it was 
supervising which were scattered all over the country.27 The lack of 
implementation reports produced by Dev-Plan became an issue of concern 
to the government and Parliament, to the extent that the latter had to 
organize itself into various commitees which would visit the projects 
and file reports to the Parliament.28
(V) Ineffective ceiling and project selection methods by Dev Plan.
Under fiscal stress, ceilings ought to be a more effective tool 
of controlling expenditure trends. Ceilings should not be used only 
as a tool to restrain the growth of expenditure, but they should 
reflect more on the effort to change the budgetary process so as to 
dampen the pressure for expenditure and strengthen the capacity for 
restraint. In the absence of adjustment on the budgetary process, the 
government may find itself spending more than it wants to.29
It is now evidently clear that in Tanzania, ceilings have been 
used to curtail the amount that can be requested by spending agencies
(except for foreign-aided projects), rather than being an instrument
of prioritizing on programmes which fall within the medium and long
term plans.
Failure to use the ceiling mechanism appropriately has led to a 
diminishing control by Dev-Plan on project selection. Although, in
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theory projects could be rejected by Dev-Plan if they are not 
consistent with planning goals, in practice, very few, if any, are 
rejected provided the cash ceiling has not been pierced. 30 Such 
practice reflects deficiencies in the planning system which are 
clearly highlighted in the 1979/80 APR where it is indicated that the 
government policy of consolidation on on-going projects launched in 
1982 under the Structural Adjustment Programme does not appear to be 
working because of the increasing number of projects being undertaken. 
This implies that the planners do not put adequate priority on on­
going projects.31 Consequently, more projects find themselves 
competing for the scarce financial and material resources available 
thus causing more delays in implementation.
(VI) Other miscellaneous contributing factors
Other minor factors have been observed to be contributing to 
delays in spending. The first one is that of unfounded assumptions 
about local participation in the form of self-reliance, especially 
contributing labour, in developing the projects, (APR. op.cit. p.28). 
Self-reliant contribution is a common proposition during appraisal and 
approval of projects originating from Villages, Wards and Districts. 
But this exaggerated commitment disappears when the public is called 
upon to make their contribution. Consequently, funds which had been 
released and were to be expended upon first satisfaction of the self- 
reliant condition, are found to be held up.
Other limiting factors are related to the general economic 
instability. The galloping inflation changes input prices 
drastically. In Chapter 9 (p.308) the example of Makambako-Wino road
435
project was cited and inflation alone had contributed to 57.8% cost 
increase over the initial target cost. Other government abrupt 
changes such as huge tax increases, across the board salary and wages 
increases for all workers in the nation etc., do also impose some 
difficulties on projects implementation because the additional funds 
have to be sought out first.
It is interesting to note at this juncture that the factors 
which caused the prediction errors in development expenditure differ 
somehow from those noted in the case of recurrent expenditure. While 
in the former it has been argued that three crucial factors have 
contributed to the imperfection in forecasting, ie. the uncertainty 
over the revenues, serious institutional weaknesses which contribute 
towards poor project designs, valuation, approval and monitoring, and 
paucity of factor inputs, on the other hand, for the recurrent 
expenditure prediction errors it was observed that poor financial 
management and control was the main cause. Thus, while in the 
recurrent budget case it could have been much easier to manage the 
budget implementation in relation to the budget plans, in the other 
case it would not have been that easy because of the country's 
dependence on foreign revenues to finance its programmes.
Having seen what appears to be the plausible causes of the 
underspending, we can now examine the possible reform actions that 
could reduce such underspending. Given the resource constraint, there 
are certainly no quick policy propositions for ameliorating such 
problems. However, from the points raised above, coupled by some of 
the supporting evidence provided, there appears to be a glimse of hope 
for improvement in the shortrun provided that some appropriate policy
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measures are initiated. What could these measures be:
(i) Improvement on ceiling setting and project approval.
The current practice of using ceilings as a means of limiting 
funds requests without considering in detail the programmes (projects) 
themselves ought to be reformed. The cash-based ceilings invite 
spending agencies to try to accommodate as many projects as they can 
within that cash limit, sometimes with some project costs understated, 
so as to invite acceptance. Once they are funded the government will 
have to bear the brunt of the upward adjusted costs in the future.
The reform required involves some adjustment to the budget process, as 
outlined below:
(i) The government should initiate a development budget preparation 
to start approximately 12 months before the commencement of the 
fiscal year to which it pertains.
(ii) All spending agencies should submit a list of their appraised 
projects to Dev-Plan, say in the first month of the period 
allocated for preparation.
(iii) The Dev-Plan should then use its internal resources and even 
hire private services to re-evaluate the proposals to ensure 
that factor costs are fairly considered.
(iv) Then Dev-Plan should draw three lists. First list should be of 
on-going projects; Second list should comprise of new projects 
ranked as high priority, while the third list should comprise of 
new projects ranked as low priority. Priority would not be 
judged only on basis of fulfilment of medium and long-term 
development objectives, but also in terms of financial and
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material resource availability, regional balance etc.
(v) The three lists should be presented to the Economic Committee of 
Cabinet (ECC) for indepth consideration and approval of the 
classification between low and high priority projects. 
Consideration for inclusion in the annual plan should be on the 
list of on-going and high priority projects. The low priority 
list should be deferred till next budget season.
(vi) After ECC has examined the projects and has given its approval, 
Dev- Plan should hold the list till the time for issuing the 
guidelines (normally December/January)
(vii) Dev Plan in conjunction with Treasury should carry out its mid­
year review, done normally in November/December, which should 
enable it to prepare the baseline (extrapolations for next 
budget) expenditure to be used in preparing the ceilings. The 
revenue prospects (local and foreign) should be considered in 
determining the baseline.
(viii).The list of on-going projects should be accorded first 
preference in the baseline amount. Then the balance of the 
baseline should be allocated to the high priority list. If all 
the new projects cannot be funded within the balance, then 
Dev-Plan should prepare another short list from the high 
priority list with a careful consideration of sectorial and 
regional balance.
(ix) The allocations made based on the baseline and the list of 
projects to be funded should be forwarded to ECC for further 
consideration. The projects eliminated should also be examined 
before they are included in the list of low priority for
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deferment.
(x) DevPlan should prepare the general guidelines based on the 
approved list of projects which should be sent back to the 
spending agencies. The guidelines should also make it clear 
that the projects on the low priority list have ben deferred to 
the next budget season.
(xi) Spending agencies should prepare action plan or implementation 
schedule, cash flows etc. which should be submited with project 
proposals, including any additional comments where necessary.
(xii) DevPlan should then prepare the formal Annual Plan, and make any 
adjustment in case of changes in circumstances.
This process would also imply that those projects supported by 
external aid which fall in the low priority list would have to be 
shelved, unless the donors are willing to waive counterpart local 
costs. This suggested process of setting ceilings based on projects 
rather than cash, would also give some impetus to the top-down process 
of budget preparation, which would infact compliment the presently 
emphasized bottom-up process. A firm grip on the annual planning 
process by Dev Plan is indispensable if the economy is to be steered 
to the right growth direction.
(ii) Reinforcement on Control and Monitoring Staff
The government has to take a deliberate action to reinforce the 
control and monitoring staff. The latter is an indispensable 
ingredient of sound financial management. At DevPlan, the Project 
implementation and Monitoring unit should have all the three vacancies 
filled, and if possible, to be supported with experienced expatriate
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staff who can assist in developing a flexible system for data 
accumulation, analysing and reports preparation, which focus on the 
crucial issues of financial control. Moreoever, the unit could be 
reinforced with a microcomputer. The reported success in producing 
accurate and timely reports in the Minsitries of Agriculture and 
Livestock Development in the Republic of Kenya could be a telling 
illustration of how such microcomputers can be useful in tackling data 
processing and assist in introducing other necessary reforms, even 
where adequate skilled labour lack.32
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VI SUMMARY
The results of the analysis done in this chapter indicated 
clearly that expenditure outturn does not match the expenditure 
forecasts. It was shown that actual spending has been lagging behind 
predicted expenditure, thus pointing to a tendency to over-predict.
The latter phenomenon was observed in both cases of total development 
expenditure and the sectoral expenditures. Moreoever, inspite of the 
prevalence of an overall tendency to overpredict, some supplementary 
approvals had been granted as well. Such extra approvals were 
observed to involve both on-going and new projects, and considered 
local and external funds. Most of the funds authorized (about 76%) 
were an addition to the list of projects, while the rest (24%) were 
authorized to cover increased costs on on-going projects.
It was further indicated that development sjpending was planned 
and executed in form of specific projects rather than general 
programmes. Consequently, the projects were considered for funding 
when design and feasibility studies had been carried out. But the 
quality of the design and appraisal, it was argued, depended more on 
the size and nature of project. Small scale projects in the rural 
areas would demand less rigorous appraising than the large scale type 
usually undertaken by the Ministries and Parastatal organizations. 
Besides, the other important factor influencing the quality of project 
appraisal, was noted to be the distribution of skilled planning 
manpower. At national level (Ministries and Public enterprises) it 
was more likely to find some qualified staff (local and expatriates) 
compared to the villages level.
In examining the factors which were considered in generating the
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forecasts, it was shown that three of them were more influential.
These were the expected disposable foreign funds; the past and 
expected trend in local revenues - namely the surplus from the 
recurrent budget and the borrowings from Financial Intermediaries; and 
finally the development expenditure trend itself. These factors were 
seen to be of only financial consideration nature, and the forecasts 
did not consider other more important non-financial factors which 
have been pointed out to have perverse impact on project spending.
The financial factors were themselves seen to be quite unstable, 
and to some extent to be beyond the control of the budgeters. The 
latter implied that total resource inflows were far short of the pre­
conceived levels. The non-financial factors which were not considered 
seriously, and which, therefore, affected programme implementation 
included; imbalances in local material resources; scarcity of foreign 
exchange to import materials, equipment, spare parts, etc; scarcity of 
local contractors; and scarcity of planners and controllers at all 
levels of planning. Institutional weaknesses were also seen to affect 
the rallying of expenditure plans behind the medium-and long-run 
objectives. Consequently, there was a failure to comply to set 
policies. A good example mentioned of non-compliance to policies was 
that of failure to ensure that priority was accorded to on-going 
projects as part of S.A.P’S objectives. On the contrary many new 
projects continued to be approved.
Furthermore, the chapter examined the scope for reducing the 
discrepancy between the expenditure outcome and the forecasts. One 
major reform suggestion made in respect of the budget process is that 
of having the DevPlan assume more decision-making powers over
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development expenditure programmes. The current practice of preparing 
the expenditure plan clearly shows that the top-down process of 
deciding on expenditure priorities is ineffective. DevPlan appears to 
be playing the role of compiler (ie consolidating programmes suggested 
by spending agencies into the Annual Plan) rather than that of planner 
and controller. The second suggestion made is that of re-enforcing 
the control and monitoring units with competent manpower; especially 
at DevPlan where the Sectoral operational reports are supposed to be 
analysed and management reports prepared.
In short, what has been exposed in this chapter, clearly 
demonstrates that the development programmes are out of control of the 
budgeters. The persistent divergencies between planned expenditure 
and realization typify the distortions which are imposed on the 
economy in general. If budgeted expenditure were to be perceived as 
embodying the objectives or goals of the short and long-term plans, 
then failure to accomplish the targeted levels imply a failure to 
attain the pre-set objectives. Some very scarce resources (local and 
foreign) have been wasted by being allocated over a broad spectrum of 
projects, most of which could not be put into operation as planned 
because they could not be completed in time. But all these resulted 
from a failure to consider comprehensively the critical factors which 
affected project implementation as a whole.
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NOTES
1. Caiden N, and Wildavsky A, (1974). Planning and Budgeting in Poor 
Countries, P. 93, New York, etc. John Wiley & Sons.
2. The criterion for deciding on whether it is an under - or over 
prediction is the size of the coefficient on the forecast 
variable. If the coefficient is greater than one, that indicates 
a tendency to underpredict, while a less than unity coefficient 
would signify overprediction.
3. Between 1964/65 and 1980/81, three formal plans (five-year plans) 
were launched. However, due to the ensuing poor economic 
performance (discussed in Chapter 3 above) in the late 1970s and 
early 1980*s, the fourth five-year plan which was to be launched 
in 1980/81 had to be suspended.
See Stein H. "Planning and the crisis in Tanzania" University of 
Dar-es-Salaam, Seminar paper (1982) Unpublished pp.7-12.
4. Ibid. p. 18.
5. United Republic of Tanzania (1984). A mannual of the budget 
process in Tanzania - Dar-es-Salaam p.39.
6. Ibid p.41.
7. This point was raised by a high ranking official who was 
interviewed at the Ministry of Communication and Works.
8. United Republic of Tanzania, Supplementary Estimates of 
Expenditure No.l of 1982/83, Dar-es-Salaam. Government Printers.
9. The importance of government development spending on the macro 
economy of a LDC like Tanzania cannot be over emphasised. Its 
impact can be examined from two points of view. One is 
expenditure’s instrumental role of stabilizing and steering the
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economy towards growth, while the second is that of developing 
productive and infrastructural capacity. For any LDC, the role 
played by such an instrument is not explicitly gauged as is the 
case for the industrialized countries. The conflict in roles 
played by such instruments is caused mainly by the internal and 
external economic disequilibrium experienced by the LDCs. How 
does this conflict arise? It has been postulated that under 
conditions of widespread unutilized productive capacities (in the 
form of unemployed labour and spare equipment), a further 
injection of government investment would lead, to growth of 
production and of real national income (Eshag (1983) op cit p.39). 
But the latter could take place only under conditions of internal 
and external balance (those leading to raw material shortages, 
transport bottlenecks, skilled personnel shortages etc.) which are 
a characteristic of the LDCs. In LDCs, unemployment is due to 
structural problems (ibid. p.221). But as pointed out further by 
Eshag (p.22) ’’attempts to bring such capacity into production by 
stimulating effective demand when some industries are operating at 
full capacity are likely to lead to price rises in the latter 
industries and to a growth of imports.” So using government 
spending as an instrument of stablization would not be very 
effective. Thus, given the less diversified structure of 
production and the relatively low level of economic activity in 
LDCs, their problem is one of ensuring that sufficient productive 
capacity is created without engendering inflation as opposed to 
stimulation of effective demand. It is in the context of this 
latter role that a failure to implement the expenditure plan ought
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to be assessed.
10. Credit to the government is in the form of either advance or 
purchases of government securities. The Bank of Tanzania Act 
(No.12 of 1965) imposes limits to this lending to the government. 
As Hyuha points out "The total amount outstanding at any time of 
advances made and Treasury bills held by the Bank shall not exceed 
one sixth of the annual budgeted revenue (equal to 2 months 
revenues at the average monthly rate for the year."
(Hyuha M. "The financial superstructure in Tanzania : Credit 
Sources, provision and control" pp.97-8 in Univeirsity of Dar-es- 
Salaam (1984). The Role of Public Sector in the Economic 
Development in Tanzania;Dar-es-Salaam Economic Research Bureau.)
11. United Republic of Tanzania (1977) Budget Speech, 1977/78, Dar-es- 
Salaam. Government Printers p.14.
12. Idachaba F.S. op. cit. p.99 (or see Chapter 8 p.31 for the outline 
of the index determination). The indices were developed from the 
estimated Trend equations relating development expenditure and 
external loans/grants to time covering the 1967-83 period.
Index for development Expenditure = 100 x 621.673 = 244.9%
2496.32
Index for Aid = 100 x 306.425 = 28.03%
1093.19
13. It should be noted that the proposition made above about external 
revenue instability contributing towards development expenditure 
instability does not necessarily contradict other findings about 
the role of foreign borrowing and grants in reducing expenditure 
instability that is caused by other revenues instability, (see for
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example Lim (1983) op.cit p.448). The critical conditions that 
determine whether the external revenues will have a stabilizing 
effect or not on the expenditures is the extent to which 
expenditures depend on foreign revenues, and the control that the 
government has over such sources. It has already been discussed in 
chapter 9 above the lack of control by Tanzania over the external 
revenues. On the other hand Lim (ibid p.448) has shown how 
foreign borrowing and grants can have a stabilizing effect on 
expenditure provided that the government has the ability to 
exploit such sources whenever needs arise. The logarithmic 
function that he estimated covering 45 LDCs taking data for the 
period 1965-73 was as shown below. The negative regression 
coefficient on FB and FG indicate stabilization effect on the 
expenditure instability.
Log. E = 0469 + 0.915 Log R - 0.081 Log IR - 0.169 Log DB 
(1.833)(405.6) (-4.614) (-32.19)
- 0.217 Log FB -0.004 Log FG 
(-38.776) (-5.510)
E and R are the instability indices for government expenditure and 
revenues, respectively, IR is International Reserves holdings, DB, 
FB, FG, are the averages of domestic borrowing, foreign borrowing 
and foreign grants respectively as a %tage of government 
expenditure. The f igures in parentheses are the t-ratios.)
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C H A P T E R  1 2
FISCAL DEFICIT PROJECTIONS: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
I INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the practice of forecasting government fiscal 
deficit is examined in detail. In practice, the budget deficit that 
is allowable in any fiscal period is set through the Finance and 
Credit Plan which is a component of the Annual Plan.1 In respect of 
the budget, the Finance and Credit Plan normally considers in some 
detail government revenue and expenditure trend, the revenue and 
expenditure projections for the fiscal year to which the plan 
pertains, the expected surplus from recurrent budget, non-bank 
domestic borrowing, money supply and credit allocation to government, 
and external loans and grants.2
The concept of government fiscal deficit as will be used in the 
analysis, is a derivation from a conventional budget. The latter 
stands for a non-comprehensive or non-standardised budget, which 
implies that the budget items are not analysed and regrouped according 
to their impact on any policy target.3 I have therefore defined the 
concept of fiscal deficit in broad terms, to mean increase in public 
(government) debt. The latter would therefore comprise of the domestic 
borrowings from banks and non-bank sources, and the foreign 
borrowings. Foreign grants are not considered as part of the deficit 
because they do not form part of public debt.4 This treatment of 
fiscal deficit on an overall basis is also consistent with the 
IMF’s classifications, where foreign grants are treated as ordinary
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revenues.5
This chapter is more or less a summary of what has already been 
discussed in those chapters which have dealt with forecasting of 
revenues and expenditures. However, the chapter affords the chance to 
see budget forecasting in its totality rather than through the 
components. Undoubtedly, a clear understanding of the structure and 
trend in overall fiscal deficit is vital in as far els economic policy 
implementation is concerned. Moreover, it encourages proper budget 
planning when it is understood what has been the position on fiscal 
deficit. But also of secondary importance about overall fiscal 
deficit is to know the extent of the increase in public debt for its 
servicing in the future.
Although this chapter is looked at els an extension of the other 
forecasting chapters, we, however, continue to conduct the analysis 
under the guidelines of a hypothesis which states that: failure to 
specify correctly the predictor variables (or factors) which influence 
fiscal deficit have contributed to the significant errors of 
forecasting.
In tackling this topic, the discussion will take the following 
course. In section II the projected fiscal deficits sure compared with 
the outturns, an analysis that will also involve using regression 
methods. Moreover, the forecasting errors taken as a proportion of 
GDP will be examined. In section III the errors will be diagnosed so 
as to determine the causes of errors. In section IV, possible 
measures of reducing the errors will be discussed. Finally, there 
will be a summary.
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II PROJECTED GOVERNMENT FISCAL DEFICIT IN RELATION TO OUTTURN - 
ACTUAL DEFICIT REGRESSED ON PROJECTED DEFICIT
An examination of the forecasted and actual overall deficit 
during the 1968-82 period reveals that in some few periods (about 
l/3rd of the years) there were some underpredictions, while in the 
rest (2/3rds of the years) there were overpredictions. This 
observation is quite clear from column 3 of Table 12: 1 below.
TABLE 12:1. FORECASTING ERRORS OF FISCAL DEFICIT 
(IN ABSOLUTE TERMS)
(Shs. in millions).
PERIOD GOVERNMENT SECTOR GOVERNMENT SECTOR ERRORS ERRORS
Borrowing requirement financial deficit $ as % of
(Forecast) (outturn) GDP #
1 2 3 4
shs shs shs
1967/68 410 305 -105 -1.5
1968/69 313 412 + 99 + 1.3
1969/70 824 369 -455 5.5
1970/71 927 688 -239 -2.7
1971/72 919 555 -364 -3.6
1972/73 1229 360 -869 -7.6
1973/74 1651 850 -801 -5.8
1974/75 1683 1865 + 182 + 1.1
1975/76 2095 1804 -291 -1.6
1976/77 2116 855 -1261 -5.3
1977/78 3008 1936 -1072 -3.4
1978/79 3177 4134 +957 +2.8
1979/80 5269 5261 -8 -0.1
1980/81 4249 4865 +616 +1.5
1981/82 4671 5373 +702 + 1.6
Note: $ - The negative figures stand for overpredictions, while the 
positive ones stand for under predictions.
# - The GDP figures used in the computation are those in 
current values.
Source: IMF: International Financial Statistics, Year Book; The 
United Republic of Tanzania (Various years), The Annual 
Plans and The Economic Surveys.
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When the actual fiscal deficit is regressed against the 
projections, the coefficient results point to a general tendency to 
underpredict, a phenomenon which does not tie-in with the visual 
observation made from column 3 of table 12: 1 above. Equation (1) 
below reveals such results.
A = -548.103 + 1.163E R2 = 0.90 (1)
(1.97) (11.09)
(A stands for Actual fiscal deficit, while E stands for the forecasts, 
the figures in parentheses are the t-ratios).
In view of the high value of R2 = 0.90, and t-ratios, the 
regression function appears to be a strong one and, at the same time, 
the constant and the coefficient on forecast variable are significant 
too. The coefficient on the forecast variable which is greater than 
unity points to the tendency to underpredict. However, the 
significantly high negative value of the constant has the connotation 
that there has been some significant overpredictions on the forecast 
variable.6 Therefore, taking into account a combination of the 
regression results and the error-inspection observation, it can be 
concluded that the tendency has been one of overpredicting. The 
latter point is also discernible from figure 12:1 below, whereby most 
of the plotted points lie to the left of the perfect forecast line.
On the other hand, when the fiscal deficit (actual and 
forecasted) and the errors sure expressed as a ratio of GDP, we observe 
the following. The average deficit forecast stood at 10.34% while the
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average actual deficit stood at 9/4%. The average error (computed 
from absolute figures) amounted to 2.55%.? Since the same base of GDP 
has been used, ie actual GDP (Note 7 (b) op cit) to compute the 
percentage ratios, a comparison of the 10.34% (for forecast) with the 
9.4% (for outturn) clearly points to the tendency to overpredict.
When the forecasting errors are examined for their trend 
pattern, they do not point to any distinguishable pattern. Such 
observation can be discerned from the results of a linear regression 
of such errors against time. Equation (2) below represents such 
results. The regression function apj)ears to l>e very weak due to the
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low value of R2= 0.16, which points to the insignificance 
association between the errors and trend. Furthermore, the t- 
statistics for the coefficient on time, tested at the 5% level of 
significance, appears to be quite low, pointing to the insignificant 
of the coefficient. Hence our conclusion that the errors do not point 
to any clear trend pattern.
E = -0.0423 + 0.00289(T) R2 = 0.16 (2)
(-2.5) (1.5)
(E stands for Error as a ratio of actual GDP, while T stands for 
Trend. The figures in parentheses are the t-ratios.)
Ill FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE FISCAL DEFICIT AND A 
DIAGNOSIS OF THE ERRORS
It has already been mentioned above in a nutshell that the 
government fiscal deficit setting falls within the Finance and Credit 
Plan. The objective of the deficit, in general, is to satisfy the 
government spending requirements. A scrutiny of the Finance and 
Credit Plan blue print clearly indicates that three factors are 
considered in justifying the level of government spending, which in 
turn supports the level of deficit financing required. Such 
determinant factors, however, tend to underscore the need to mobilise 
resources and create capital investment as the major objective of 
deficit financing. The latter implies that the other roles which are 
usually satisfied through deficit financing, such as employment
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stimulation, inflation control, balance of payments control etc are 
accorded less weight. The fact that a significant share of the 
borrowing is expected to come from external sources - as already 
discussed in chapter 11 (p. 426 ), clearly demonstrates the extent to 
which the objective is one of creating productive capacity, rather 
than being of stabilization nature. (This point was discussed further 
in Chapter 11 note 9).
What then are the factors considered?
The three factors considered include:8
(i) degree of implementation of the prior period plan
(ii) The aims and targets of the medium - term development 
plan (relevant only for period between 1964/65 and 
1979/80 when there were medium-term plans prepared)
(iii) present committments
The successful use of the above factors, especially number (i) 
and (iii), depends on the timely availability of accurate and relevant 
data. This implies that both financial and physical reports for 
revenue and expenditure have to be available promptly. The weakness 
in respect of the information systems in Tanzania have already been 
underlined above (Chapter 10, 11) where the awful state of accounts 
and lack of timely financial and physical reports on projects was 
pointed out. To supplement what has already been exposed about the 
paucity of data systems, it might be worthwhile to point out what 
Resnick (1981: pp. 227-228) observed about techniques and limitations 
of data. He said, "many planning problems appeared at the technical 
level, most obvious was the universal problem of poor and unavailable 
data for planning. In addition to the usual data problems found in
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third world countries eg short time series, poor quality in existing
series coverage etc  the accounting systems were not suitable for
collecting those data, even when the needs were clear. For example, 
Resnick continues "although the country was committed to reducing 
imports, increasing the use of local materials, and conserving foreign 
exchange and planning its uses, no one knows the import content of 
government and public corporation expenditures, the methods of import 
procurement for projects, and the systems of payment for specific 
projects. No single institution controlled such information, and it 
was not possible to put it together from the knowledges of all the 
institutions involved". It can therefore be submitted that the use of 
such factors in the past remained only intentional because the pre­
requisites for their use, i.e. the relevant background information, 
were not readily available. As regards factor number (ii) i e the 
aims and targets of medium-term development plan; it calls upon the 
planners to ensure that that the plans drawn are in line with the pre 
outlined development policies. It therefore requires project 
priorities to take into account longrun development objectives.9 
Thus, its nature as a determinant factor can be said to be more 
superfluous compared to the other two factors, although its observance 
is also of prime importance. How then can the latter factors 
discussed above account for the occurrence of the errors observed in 
Table 12:1 above?
In order to carry out a more comprehensive diagnosis of the 
forecasting errors, a further decomposition of the errors into the 
components has been done. The main components considered include; 
recurrent revenues (taxes and non-taxes), foreign grants, and
456
government expenditure which is decomposed further into recurrent and 
development categories.10 The fiscal deficit errors which pointed 
to a tendency of overprediction, implied that the level of deficit 
envisaged in the plans could not be attained. This short-coming can 
be explained by performance in the component items appearing in Table
(12): 2 below. Beginning with revenues (Taxes and non-taxes), the 
general tendency to underpredict (see chapt. (8): p236 ) had a 
favourable impact on the deficit. More revenues were realised than 
predicted, and this was likely to reduce local borrowing generally, 
although, as we shall see below, current expenditure overshoot more 
than offset such revenue increase. As regards external grants, the 
performance has been one of over predicting (see chapter (9) p298 ), 
which would appear to have an increasing effect on fiscal deficit. 
However, it has already been mentioned above that fiscal deficit is 
quite associated with both development projects and external funding. 
The external grants which enter the budget are normally related to 
development projects. Therefore, when there is short realization of 
such grant funds, it imposes a severe constraint on project 
implementation, with the consequence that local borrowing which would 
provide the counterpart funds is held-off. Thus, the level of fiscal 
deficit is held down because of the under realization of the external 
grants revenues.
On the part of current expenditure, there has been a tendency to 
under-predict too (chapter 10 p 346). The constraint that it might 
place on the fiscal deficit can be understood after the errors have 
been compared first with the recurrent revenues (taxes and non-taxes)
- their main source of financing. As can be seen from table 12: 2
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below, between 1967/68 and 1971/72 current expenditure forecasting 
errors were insignificant, and therefore, any recurrent revenue 
surplus or deficit achieved affected directly the fiscal deficit.
















1967/68 + 1.1 0 0 +0.9 -0.2
1968/69 -1.2 0 0 +1.9 +3.1
1969/70 + 1.1 +0.1 0 -1.1 -2.3
1970/71 +0.3 +0.1 0 -0.9 -1.3
1971/72 +0.4 -0.3 0 -2.9 -3.0
1972/73 0 + 1.5 + 1.2 -3.7 -4.0
1973/74 +1.9 +0.2 +2.5 -3.1 -2.7
1974/75 -1.7 -0.2 +5.3 -3.3 +4.0
1975/76 +0.5 -1.4 +3.8 -7.6 -2.9
1976/77 +3.0 -0.9 +2.2 -1.1 -1.0
1977/78 +1.1 -1.6 +0.3 +3.2 -2.4
1978/79 -0.5 -2.8 +3.9 -1.6 +5.6
1979/80 +0.3 +0.5 +3.9 -5.3 -2.2
1980/81 0 N/A + 1.9 -5.5 I/C
1981/82 +0.8 N/A +3.6 -3.3 I/C
Note: 1. Error is def ined as the difference between the outturn and
the forecast of the item involved expressed as a ratio of 
actual GDP of year to which it pertains.
2. N/A - not available - in these years the grants amounts 
were presented in estimates books as a combined figure 
with loans.
3. I/C - incomplete
Source: The erros of Revenues, Grants and Expenditure have been
computed from absolute errors presented in chapters 8, 9, 
10, and 11 above. The GDP figures used are as appears in 
Appendix 1 below.
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However, from 1972/73 to 1981/82, the excess of actual current 
expenditure over the forecast was quite pronounced. The excess 
expenditure was offset by excess in recurrent revenues where the 
errors were positive, but the extent of cushioning depended on the 
magnitude of the excess of both revenues and expenditures. Where the 
revenue errors are zero or negative, e.g. in 1972/73, 1974/75, 1978/79 
and 1980/81, the expenditure errors either consumed away any 
anticipated surplus on recurrent budget, or it led to deficit 
financing on the recurrent budget, which eventually increased the 
overall fiscal deficit. Likewise, where the positive revenue errors 
could not cover the expenditure errors fully, as in 1973/74, 1975/76, 
1979/80 and 1981/82, the impact was one of creating deficit situation 
on the recurrent budget, which again, affected the overall fiscal 
deficit. In short, therefore, the errors on the current expenditure 
increased the errors on fiscal deficit, the degree of which depended 
on the extent to which the errors in revenues provided a cushion.11
As regards Development expenditure the observed trend was one of 
underprediction (see chapt. 11 p 401). However, in this case the 
development expenditure errors cannot be used to account for the 
fiscal deficit errors because of the mutual interdependency between 
development expenditure and fiscal deficit, except of course where 
deficit financing is used for meeting current budget revenue 
shortages. In chapter 11 Table 11:8a it was indicated that the 
external funds* proportion of total financing of planned development 
projects was on the average, more than 50%, while the actual 
utilization of such funds amounted to about 40% of total development 
expenditure. The failure to utilize the external funds as planned was
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also seen to hold-off the use of any local funds budgeted for the 
affected projects (p 429). And yet, the external funds (both grants 
and loans) and the local funds (mainly borrowing from banks and other 
financial intermediaries) comprise the chunk of the anticipated fiscal 
deficit. Thus, to provide a plausible explanation for the occurrence 
of the errors in fiscal deficit, we have to turn back to the earlier 
hypotheses (chapters 9 and 11) which attempted to explain the failure 
to use the committed external funds and to implement the development 
projects. Without going through much of what was argued to be the 
main constraints on funds utilization and project implementation, it 
suffices to summarize here-upon that stringent and rigid disbursement 
conditions on the part of the external funds coupled by poor project 
planning, poor project management and lack of proper and prompt 
monitoring and reporting, disrupted the plans, and in turn pushed down 
the expected level of fiscal deficit.
IV POSSIBLE REMEDIAL MEASURES
The determination of fiscal deficit in Tanzania has been seen to 
be based on non-formalarized approach. The absence of any systematic 
formula for generating the revenue and expenditure forecasts in 
Tanzania became apparent from the preceding chapters 7, 10, and 11 
above. Consequently, the perverse repercussions of such inordinate 
forecasting are by and large reflected in the overall fiscal deficit.
Possible policy measures for reducing forecasting errors in 
revenues and expenditure have already been suggested in the respective 
chapters. Nevertheless, since we are now looking at the budget
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structure in its totality, some additional measures which could help 
to reduce the deficit errors are suggested below.
Although the main policy thrust in setting the deficit levels is 
to mobilize resources for expansion of productive capacity, as was 
mentioned earlier, we should not, however, lose sight of the fact that 
government borrowing (from external and local sources) is not the sole 
but a component of the finance and credit plan. The remaining 
sectors, namely public corporations sector, and the private sector, 
have their share of borrowing too, especially from local banking 
institutions, set in the Finance and Credit Plan. Assuming that the 
latter plan is set with various policy objectives, for example, those 
of prices and employment stabilization, investment creation, balance 
of payments stabilization etc. a failure by the government to fulfil 
its share in the plan would inevitably undermine the attainment of 
such objectives, and, at the same time, deprive the other sectors what 
they might have needed for their operations and expansion. Therefore, 
with the indisputable evidence of continuous over-prediction of the 
fiscal deficit, there is need for urgent corrective action to be taken 
in respect of the management of the Finance and Credit Plan.
The present system of setting the Finance and Credit Plan has a 
time horizon of one year. Once the plan has been published and put 
into action on the mid-June Budget Day, it is rarely revised in the 
course of the year. The economy to which such a plan is applied is 
quite versatile, and the prevalent structural imbalances tend to 
render the plans less operational. Whatever planning assumptions are 
made are invalidated by the continuously changing economic 
circumstances. Thus, a way to over-come such problems is to shorten
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the planning horizon. The time horizon that is being suggested here 
is one of 3 months. The binding plan figures should be those for the 
next 3 months, while those for the ensuing period should be treated as 
tentative until when they are confirmed. The shortening of the 
planning horizon is in addition to some earlier recommendations 
(chapter 8, 10 and 11) that the government should consider having a 
budget more frequently than once a year, say on a quarterly basis. We 
may find some justification for such a change in the fact that the 
same approach has been recommended for an economy like that of Britain 
which actually experiences less budget uncertainties than 
Tanzania’s.12 The shorter run budgets and plans would probably 
reduce the errors, although such a reform would inevitably lead to 
extra administrative costs.
Secondly, the government should endeavour to establish an 
autonomous "think-tank". Although the problems relating to data 
availability have already been mentioned, this does not imply that 
there is no raw data being generated through the existing 
administrative system. What lacks mainly is the machinery to capture 
and analyse it. Some ministerial staff, especially those of Treasury 
and Dev.Plan who are supposed to prepare reports of analytical nature, 
find themselves entrenched in routine functions. The Bureau of 
Statistics under Dev.Plan that is responsible for collecting data is 
not oriented towards analytical work. Hence, an institution that 
would provide a thorough analysis of fiscal matters ought to be 
created. During the field research and through discussions with 
Treasury and Dev.Plan officers, it became apparent that there were not 
analytical papers (reports) prepared about the state of government
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sector finances inspite of the very many political discussions and 
also pressures from institutions like IMF and World Bank. Moreover, 
the absence of scientific end-users of raw data generated has adverse 
effects on information systems development.
Thirdly, as pointed out by Mosley,13 the errors which arise 
from existing forecasting systems could be accepted as a structural 
datum and their removal could be made through the application of the 
realization function to the initial (raw) forecasts. The realization 
function appears as equation (1) above. The corrected forecasts 
produce smaller average errors i.e. amounting to 2.27% (see appendix 
12, table 12A-1) compared to an average error of 2.55% (see p. 4^2 
above) relating to the unmoderated raw forecasts. As further pointed 
out by Paul (1985 p. 79), although the same method of correction could 
be applied to budgeting forecasts for future years, nevertheless, this 
is no guarantee of better forecasts in the future. Indeed, as can be 
seen from figure 12.1 above, deviations from the estimator are greater 
in recent years compared to earlier years.
Fourthly, the government should concentrate its efforts on the 
revenue sources which are less versatile. As regards local revenues 
the important sources which appeared to be more predictable (with 
smaller average errors and smaller coefficients of variation) were 
Income and Personal Taxes, Consumption and Excise Duties, Vehicle 
licences and Import Duties. So, the Treasury should concentrate on 
the latter. For the external revenues, the government should 
concentrate on those donor sources that it reckons it can exert 




The chapter has attempted to examine the process of forecasting 
of fiscal deficit in Tanzania. Fiscal deficit has been defined 
broadly to mean public debt. The importance of fiscal deficit in the 
economy of Tanzania was underlined, especially for its role to 
mobilize resources for creating productive capacity which has remained 
quite underdeveloped. Because of this vital role it was urged, a 
failure to fulfil the planned deficit was bound to aggravate the 
economic woes.
The analysis of the forecasts in relation to the deficit outturn 
revealed that the government had not been able to realize fully the 
levels of borrowings anticipated in the Finance and Credit Plan. The 
regression results pointed to a general tendency to overpredict the 
budget deficit. The latter problem of overprediction was also linked 
to the forecasting errors observed in the budget components. It was 
argued that a composition of the underpredictions in revenues, current 
and development expenditure had contributed to the overprediction in 
fiscal deficit. Moreover, the underprediction in revenues were more 
than offset by the underpredictions in expenditures. On the other 
hand, the fiscal deficit forecasting errors did not point to any 
particular trend over the period of study.
The core of the problems in forecasting fiscal deficit was seen
to be embedded in the predictor factors which appeared to be beyond
the control of the planner and budgeters. Since the fiscal deficit
was an outcome of the planning of revenues and expenditures, it was
argued that those weaknesses which were recorded in respect of the
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latter were quite responsible for the outcome in fiscal deficit 
forecasting. The main problem, it was argued, lay in the field of 
information management, where it was pointed out that the existing 
information systems did not provide timely and accurate trend data 
that were an essential prerequisite to sound planning decisions. 
Moreover, the problems involved in drawing the external resources, by 
and large the most important source of borrowing, were seen to have 
exacerbated the problems of managing the fiscal deficit, mainly 
because the government lacked an effective control on the management 
of the external funds.
In considering the possibilities for reducing the descrepancies 
in fiscal deficit forecasts, three policy measures were suggested, 
which are over and above those already suggested in respect of the 
budget components in the preceding chapters. It was reckoned that 
there was a need to shorten the forecasting period from a year to 
three months, which would in fact put the planners in a position to 
effectively take into account the changing economic circumstances, and 
secondly, the government ought to establish an autonomous institute 
that would provide it with better analysed information, reports and 
ideas. The institute’s quest for information would also be an input 
towards the development of an appropriate information systems in 
Tanzania. Thirdly, it was suggested that the forecasts generated 
through the present system should be corrected using the realisation 
function developed from past forecasts and actual data.
In view of the analysis results, our hypothesis that the 
forecasting problems have been caused by a failure to make proper 
assessment of the determinant (predictor) factors is confirmed. The
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implications of a failure to generate reliable forecasts are indeed 
serious because, it means that in the short-run the annual plans are 
invalidated and at large, the management of the economy does not, 




1. Resnick I.N. (1981). The Long Transition: Building Socialism in
Tanzania. London. Monthly Review Press pp 216-217
Annual Planning was introduced as part of the Second five year 
plan (1969/70 - 1973-74), which had a goal of promoting Planning 
in each of the five years between major plans. Financial 
planning was introduced into the annual planning process in the 
fiscal year 1971/72 with the goal of setting priorities for the 
use of financial resources by government, public corporations, 
and private firms, which became guidelines for the allocation of 
loans by the country1 s lending institutions. Included was 
capital as well as recurrent liquidity requirements.
2. United Republic of Tanzania (1978) The Annual Plan pp 4-7 Dar­
es-Salaam. Government Printers.
3. The case for a standardized budget is well put by Chelliah as he 
pointed out that if the fiscal balance is aimed at influencing, 
say aggregate demand or net worth of the public sector or money 
supply, then the fiscal deficit ought to be determined by 
considering budget items which have the desired impact on such 
policy targets.
(Chelliah R.J. ’’Significance of alternative Concepts of budget 
deficit,” IMF Staff Papers Vol. 20 No 3 (1973) pp 745-6.
4. Ibid, P 74
5. The classification refered to in this chapter is that used in
the IMF's Financial statistics year book.
6. It has been pointed out by the National Institute of Economic
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and Social Research that when the Constant in the A = a + b F is 
negative, it indicates to some systematic tendency for the 
forecasts to be too high.
(National Institute of Economic and Social Research 1983 'The 
assessment of the National Institutes forecasts of GDP 1959-82' 
National Institute Economic Review No. 105 (August) p. 32)
7. (a) The following computations were done to arrive at the
following average measures:
(i) Average forecasted deficit as a ratio of GDP
A is the actual deficits, G is the actual GDPs, while N is the 
number of observations.
(iii) Average Error as a ratio of GDP
n n
(J^Fi/N) / (JTGi/N) = 2169.4/20980.2 = 10.34%
i=l i=l
F are the forecasts, G stands for the actual GDPs, while N
stands for the number of observations
(ii) Average actual deficit as a ratio of GDP
n n
(^~Ai/N ) / (^Gi/N) = 1975.5 / 20980.2 = 9.4%
i=l i=l
Gi/N) (8021/15)/(314703/15) = 2.55%
i=l i=l
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E stands for errors, while S stands for the actual GDPs. N is 
the number of observations.
(b)Both forecasts and actual deficits have been taken as a share 
of actual GDP because of lack of data on planned GDP. When the 
Annual Plan is prepared, there is hardly a mention of the 
expected GDP. The absence of GDP forecasts axe better explained 
by the paucity of statistical data, which even makes the 
compilation of actual GDP equally flawful. This problem has 
been discussed in detail by Stein (1982: p. 17) who pointed out 
that the methods of accumulating GDP data are faulty to the 
extent that they render the GDP statistics somewhat meaningless. 
Presumably, the realization that even the actual GDP figures are 
very unreliable, deters the Dev. Plan from preparing any GDP 
forecasts.
8. United Republic of Tanzania (1978) Annual Plan op cit p 5
9. The non-observance of the medium and long term plans when
preparing the annual plans was pointed out in chapter 11 p.^12)
10. Some remarks about accuracy of the results presented on table
12: 2 are in order. Ideally, the fiscal deficit forecasting 
errors (as a %tage of GDP) noted on p.457 above ought to equal 
to revenues (taxes and non-taxes) plus grants minus 
government expenditure. This equality does not, however, 
materialize because the budget data presented in different 
sources differ. The data being used in this study have been 
compiled from different sources. The end result is the 
disagreeing errors data in tables 12: 1 and 12: 2, and this
469
typically reflects the weak information systems that prevail in 
Tanzania.
11. The resultant higher budgetary deficits in a country like 
Tanzania due to increase in expenditure and the failure of tax 
revenues to catch up is well supported by Selwyn as he pointed 
out that "since it is easier for expenditure to move upward than 
downward, in countries where tax revenue cannot be adjusted 
easily to meet higher spending, budgetary deficits inevitably 
increase.
(Selwyn, Percy "The Planning of Public Expenditure Discussion 
Paper, IDS University of Sussex, DP 140 (October 1978) p 6
12. Mosley P. "When is a Policy Instrument not an Instrument?
Fiscal Marksmanship in Britain, 1951-1984" Journal of Public 
Policy Vol 5 Part I (February 1985) p 79
13. Ibid pp 78-9
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PART 4.
This part presents two important chapters. Chapter 13 looks at
the problem of recurrent costs in the Tanzanian context. The
analysis concentrates mainly on sectoral resource allocation, although 
the problem is also examined at macro-level.
Chapter 14 presents a summary and recommendations of the study. 
The latter concentrates only on the important issues observed in the 
study. More detailed summaries and recommendations can be found in
the chapters where the analysis has been done.
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C H A P T E R  1 3
THE RECURRENT COST PROBLEM - AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
I INTRODUCTION
The historical practice surrounding the determination of both 
expenditures and revenues has been examined in the preceding chapters. 
However, such analysis did not examine in detail and on a long-term 
basis the more pressing problem of underfinancing of recurrent costs. 
The latter was highlighted in chapter (2) as being a critical problem 
in Tanzania. In the following analysis the problem will continue to 
be examined under the general hypothesis that the problems of under- 
financing have been caused by improper specification of factors used 
in determining recurrent expenditure. The recurrent costs problem is 
studied as a long-term problem which ought to be seen as having 
developed from problems arising from the short-term determination of 
both recurrent and development expenditure.
Though in the past some efforts could have been made to cut down 
on recurrent expenditure during the budget annual cycle, so as to have 
a balance with recurrent revenues, however, in the long-run the 
cumulative effects of such cuts could develop into the problem of 
underfinancing which has come to characterise most of the developing 
economies.
The consequences of the underfinancing of installed capacity 
could be very severe. Government's social and economic goals get 
threatened, a situation that is now quite likely to continue into the
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distant future. In this chapter the analysis will therefore attempt 
to establish the causes of the problem and the extent to which the 
problem has affected some sectors.
The paucity of information in Tanzania at macro and sectorial 
level will certainly restrict the analysis. Even where some data is 
available, they are not complete for all years. This implies also 
that some of the results obtained from the analysis have to be 
interpreted with caution.
The definition of *recurrent costs* which was adopted in Chapter 
2 above will continue to be the basis of discussion. To reiterate, 
the term *recurrent costs* is defined as that part of expenditure in 
the operating budget which is periodic in nature, covering both 
personnel costs and materials, plant, spare parts, fuel etc needed to 
ensure the normal operation of the capital investment.*1
The order of the discussion is expected to take the following
course. In Section II some tests are carried out to determine the
magnitude of the problem in Tanzania. The analysis will focus at both 
aggregate and disaggregated data. In Section III the causes which 
have led to the emergence of the recurrent cost problem in Tanzania 
will be explored in some detail. In Section (IV) some policy 
propositions on how to tackle the problem are presented. This will 
draw ideas mainly from various authoritative sources which have looked 
at the problem in respect of LDCs. Moreover, the suggested policy
measures ought to be taken as being supplement to the other
suggestions made in the preceding chapters.
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II THE RECURRENT COST PROBLEM IN TANZANIA; A SCIENTIFIC MEASUREMENT
In this section a number of indicators will be used to determine 
the magnitude of the recurrent cost problem in Tanzania. Such 
indicators will be applied to both aggregate measurements relating to 
the public sector, and sectorial measurements. On the latter, only a 
few ministries have been chosen for testing purpose due to either lack 
of data or data incompleteness. The Ministries (sectors) chosen 
include; Education; Health and Social Welfare; Agriculture, Forestry 
and Wildlife; Communication, Labour and Works; and Lands Settlements. 
Moreover, some detailed analysis of some subsectors of Ministries of 
Education and Health is expected to be carried out. However, due to 
the incompleteness of data used in the analysis, the results obtained 
will have to be interpreted with caution.
The first task that needs to be dealt with is that of identifying 
the parameters and variables which can expose the existence of 
recurrent cost problem. Various measures have been suggested to that 
effect: Gray and Martens have used the ratio of current expenditure
on purchases of goods and non-wage services to government wages and 
salaries as an indicator of imbalance in current expenditure.2 As 
added by Heller et al, Gray and Martens* ratio is a coefficient of 
effectiveness.3 However, Heller et al have raised some criticism 
over Gray*s et al ratio.4 As they point out, ''While it provides a 
rough measure of the existence of a recurrent cost problem in the 
present, it has the expected disadvantages of an aggregate measure in 
that inter-sectorial differences are not only lost in the aggregate, 
but may unduly bias the results". Secondly, they point out that the 
measure provides only a presumptive measure of an imbalance in the
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allocation of resources in the sense that the adequacy of the amount 
of materials and supplies complementing manpower is subjective. The 
third criticism is that the measure provides no indication of the 
adequacy of the wages expenditure in a sector in an absolute sense. 
They add "satisfactory balance of input may be indicated when the 
level of wage expenditure is nevertheless inadequate". To overcome 
the shortcomings highlighted above, Heller et al suggest that it is 
preferable to evaluate the adequacy of other recurrent inputs relative 
to the manpower of a given sector, although the problems of 
aggregation and subjectivity would still remain, and issues relating 
to the quality of manpower assigned to a sector would be ignored. 5 
The improved version of Gray’ s et al indicator produced more 
consistent results (identifying countries with recurrent cost problem 
from those without) over the sample of countries analysed compared to 
the original indicator.6
The other indicator which could be used to detect the existence 
of a recurrent cost problem, especially that caused by excessive 
demands on the expenditure side, is the one that examines the shares 
of total expenditure on:-
(a) general public services, defence, social security and welfare,
interest payments etc, which are for non-development activities
(b) development activities including expenditure on wages, other
goods and services. 7
Finally, there are those indicators which diagnose the future 
likelihood of a recurrent cost problem for a country. The indicators 
which have been suggested by Heller et. al. include:-8
(I) Foreign financing as a share of total expenditure
475
(II) Capital expenditure as a share of total expenditure
(III) Foreign financing as a share of capital expenditure.
(IV) The buoyancy of revenue.
According to Heller et al, although all the latter four 
diagnostic indicators appeared to produce some form of results, 
however, it is only indicator (III) above which produced results that 
could differentiate countries with a serious recurrent cost problem 
from those without. It is pointed out that its strength lies in the 
fact that a high degree of capital expenditure financed from external 
sources allows a country to maintain a momentum of capital expenditure 
significantly higher than could be financed from the country’s own 
domestic fiscal capacity. And if a country does not receive external 
recurrent financial aid, then the ensuing pressure for recurrent 
expenditure could outstrip the country’s available financial 
capacity.9
The doubts expressed in respect of the indicators which are based 
on aggregate measurements are a sufficient warning to us that we 
should not put too much emphasis on them. This implies that we should 
look for indicators which are based on micro-data analysis. In this 
study I will examine the macro-data based indicators just briefly. At 
micro level the analysis will focus on the trend of financing sectoral 
operations. Worth noting here is the fact that the analysis does not 
extend to cost-effectiveness analysis which would establish whether 
the few resources allocated to spending agencies are put to efficient 
use. The emphasis in this chapter is on the volume of resources 
allocated.
The Ministries of Education, and Health have been chosen for
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further micro-analysis. The latter involves looking at, say, the 
direct recurrent expenditure incurred per student over time, or the 
direct recurrent expenditure available for a doctor over time. A 
falling rate of financing would imply the existence of the recurrent 
cost problem, and vice versa.
Reviewing briefly the indicators which are based on macro data, 
the first to be examined is the ratio of * other purchases of goods and 
services* to wages and salaries* for the period 1971/72 to 1980/81 
based on recurrent expenditure. The results are presented in 
table(13):I. The year 1978/79 saw an abnormally high ratio of 273.4%, 
which can be attributed to the high expenditure incurred in respect of 
defence for financing the Uganda War which began in 1978/79.10 
However, the fluctuations experienced in the ratio can not lead us to 
a decisive conclusion.
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TABLE 13:1: INDICATOR (NON-WAGE EXPENDITURE TO WAGE/SALARY
EXPENDITURE) OF RECURRENT POST PROBLEM
Year Other Purchase of Wages & Ratio
Good & Services Salaries
(I) (II) <I)/(II)
(Tsh. in mill.) (Tsh. in mill.) (%>
1971/72 553 615 89.9
1972/73 725 803 90.3
1973/74 1163 1140 102.0
1974/75 1780 1594 111.7
1975/76 1469 1729 85.0
1976/77 2204 2019 109.2
1977/78 2291 2587 88.6
1978/79 5687 2080 273.4
1979/80 4005 2246 178.3
1980/81 5075 2871 176.8
SOURCE: IMF. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, Vol. VIII
1983, P. 728
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The second macro-data based indicator examined is the non-wage 
expenditure per manpower. The results appear in table 13:2 col III 
below. They point to a pattern more or less the same as depicted in 
table 13:1 above. The rate fluctuate, in spite of an upward trend, 
and we can not draw some conclusions about the existence of the 
recurrent cost problem.
The third macro-level indicator examined is the ratio of non­
development oriented expenditure to total expenditure. The purpose of 
this analysis is to detect if the former has been demanding an 
increasingly higher share, which would imply that the recurrent cost 
problem exists. The results appear on table 13:3. The interperiod 
fluctuations appearing in col. Ill clearly discounts the idea of 
lasting demand on expenditure by this category of expenditure. Once 
again it is difficult to decide whether the recurrent cost problem 
exists or not.
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TABLE 13:2. INDICATORS OF RECURRENT COST PROBLEM
Year Expenditure on other Number of Public Expenditure
Purchase of Goods &  Service Employees Per Employee
Services























SOURCE: United Republic of Tanzania. (Various Years) The Economic
Survey. Also, IMF. Government Finance Statistics Year 
Book, Vol. VIII 1983 p. 728
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TABLE 13:3: SHARE OF GENERAL EXPENDITURE ON TOTAL EXPENDITURE
Year Total Expenditure General Expenditure# Ratio
(mill shs) (mill shs) (X)
I II 111= II/I
1967/68 1409.1 639.2 45.4
1968/69 1646.5 651.1 39.5
1969/70 2137.2 888.9 41.6
1970/71 2460.6 922.5 37.5
1971/72 2665.0 1023.9 38.4
1972/73 3182.2 1276.2 40.1
1973/74 3990.0 1263.0 31.7
1974/75 6076.0 2133.0 35.1
1975/76 5968.2 2220.7 37.2
1976/77 7946.8 2986.7 37.6
1977/78 8894.1 3476.1 39.1
1978/79 13035.9 6265.1 48.1
1979/80 14413.0 6461.4 44.8
1980/81 14895.0 6621.6 44.5
1981/82 18997.5 8955.2 47.1
1982/83 18993.0 9524.3 50.1
Note: # This expenditure covers general public service expenditure, 
defence, interest payments, pensions, social security and 
welfare services.
SOURCE: IMF.1983. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. Vol.VIII
United Republic of Tanzania. (Various Years). Economic Survey
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When the analysis is carried out at Sectorial (Ministerial) 
level, to a large extent the results remain indecisive because of 
inconsistency in data available. The analysis done is one of looking 
at the share of ’other goods and services’ to ’wages and salaries’ for 
a number of Ministries. The results appear in Table (13): 4 below. 
Although the data were collected from official government sources, the 
extreme variations between two consecutive years, and also the lack of 
data (incompleteness) for certain years clearly point to some 
imperfection in recording system. This problem is complicated 
further, I presume, by the various reorganisations (separations and 
merging of ministries) which take place quite often, and which may 
cause trend figures to vary widely if proper data recording measures 
are not taken. Therefore, the very high ratios which appear for some 
years which may indicate a favourable allocation of resources to the 
operations and maintenance sector, have to be interpreted with 
caution. For the Ministry of Education, the ratios appeared to be 
taking a downward trend between 1967/68 and 1980/81. As can be seen 
from table (13): 4 above, between 1967/68 and 1972/73 the ratios 
varied between 594% to 3603%, but after this period the ratios ranged 
between 161% and 340%. The latter results could clearly be a pointer 
to the development of a recurrent cost problem.
The other Ministry with interesting results is that of Health and 
Social Welfare. As can be seen from table (13): 4 above, the ratios 
appear to be taking an upward trend, changing from 102% in 1967/68 to 
421% in 1981/82. This has the implication that more resources have 
been going to the operations and maintenance over that period.
TABLE (13) 4; RATIO OF EXPENDITURE ON OTHER GOODS AND SERVICES TO WAGE EXPENDITURE
PERIOD 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82
7» Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
MINISTRY OF
EDUCATION 2281 594 694 3471 3796 3603 233 INC 257 223 181 298 31-3 340.5 INC
MINISTRY OF 
HEALTH &
SOC. WELFARE 102 104 174 215 165 242 215 INC 153 219 481 A65 493 495 421
AGRICULTURE |
FORESTRY &
WILDLIFE I  297 87 161 142 2122 1595 1718 INC 139 365 120 *23 920 295 263
COMMUNICATION !
LABOUR & WORKS 380 313 754 2226 2226 2220 238 INC INC INC INC 614 348 INC INC
LANDS AND '
SETTLEMENTS 28 32 25 1049 204 221 357 INC 63 84 175 285 230 222
SOURCE: Computed from data of Ministries as reported in: United Republic of Tanzania. (Various Years). 
Appropriation Accounts.
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However, the data presented here is only for the Central Ministry 
and it does not include the expenditure channeled through the regional 
authorities for running of regional-based hospitals, dispensaries and 
Health centres. A better perspective of the total health spending 
will be gauged when a further analysis is shown below. The other 
three remaining Ministries, namely Agriculture and Forestry, 
Communication, Labour and Works, and Lands and Settlements, do not 
give clear trends as in the case of the two former Ministries. The 
fluctuations and the incomplete data in such Ministries preclude the 
drawing of meaningful conclusion.
When the recurrent cost problem is assessed using more detailed 
micro level indicators, the results were quite conclusive. The 
analysis is done on operations of the Ministries of Education and 
Health. In the Ministry of Education, two very important sub-sectors 
were considered. These were the Primary Schools and the Secondary 
Schools sub-sectors. In Health, the sub-sectors considered included 
Curative Services, Preventive Services, Rural Health Centres, and 
Dispensaries and Clinics. In both cases, both financial and human 
resources flows over the period were considered.
Starting with the Primary Schools sub-sector, two important 
measures were computed. The first is the students-teacher ratio, and 
the second is the average expenditure per student. As can be seen 
from table (13): 5 below, the students-teacher ratio has been fairly 
stable over the period, although between 1972/73 and 1976/77 some 
strain appeared to have been building up on the teachers. Worth 
noting also is the fact that over the 1967/68 - 1981/82, the teachers* 
increase was 412%, while the students increase was 374%11, Though the
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analysis does not take into account the quality of teachers involved, 
the staffing efforts taken so far are significant. Expenditure per 
student in nominal terms appears to have grown modestly inspite of 
some fall in early 1970s. But in real terms, it is quite clear that 
the problem of financing operations exists. By 1981/82 only a 
quarter of what was being spent in 1968/69 was allocated to each 
student. And bearing in mind that the teachers wages are included in 
this rate, which actually never see a retrenchment, all it implies is 
that the cut down has been on other goods and services expenditure, 
which has deprived the teachers the supportive services they require 
for effective teaching.
TABLE 13:5. PRIMARY SCHOOL RESOURCE ALLOCATION INDICATORS.
YEAR 67/68 68/69 69/70 70/71 71/72 7 2 / 7 3 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82
STUDENTS/ 
TEACHER 
RATIO 46 47 47 45 47 48 51 53 50 48 46 42 41 43 43
N.E/
STUDENT 81 173 177 152 167 INC 101 147 163 198 198 197 220 232 299
R.E/
STUDENT 81 173 171 140 143 INC 66 71 76 76 76 67 58 48 48
N.E/STUDENT- Nominal Expenditure per Student 
R.E/STUDENT- Real Expenditure per Student
NOTE. I’he nominal expenditure has been deflated using the National 
Price Index.
SOURCE: Computed from figures appearing in Appendix 13 Table 13A-1
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Moreover, if we compute a rough measure of recurrent expenditure 
implication of cumulative investment, ie. the primary school 
recurrent budget divided into cumulative development expenditure on an 
annual basis, we get a coefficient of between 1.5 and 3.0 for the 
years between 1970/71 and 1981/82. 12 When such coefficients are 
compared to Heller’s coefficients on primary schools of between 0.06 
to 7.0,13 clearly those of Tanzania are below the average of 
Heller’s figures (equal to 3.47), which could be an indication of 
under f inane ing.
On Secondary Education, the students-teacher ratio as appears in 
table (13) 6 below, again appears to be very satisfactory. The range 
has remained between 17 and 21 students per teacher. However, as far 
as the direct expenditures for running the schools is concerned, some 
of the data available were quite incomplete. Nevertheless, for the 
few years that data could be obtained, the following results based on 
table (13): 6 can be observed. As regards expenditure for running 
schools column 2(b) between 1975/76 and 1979/80, the allocated 
expenditure per student in real terms assumed a downward trend, 
although there was a modest increase in 1980/81 and 1982/83. For the 
second category of expenditure considered, that of maintenance and 
running of plant, equipment, motor vehicle etc (column 3(b) it can be 
seen that the expenditure allocated in real terms declined quite 
significantly between 1975/76 and 1982/83, except for 1977/78, 
although there had been an upward trend in earlier years. This 
decline can also be observed for expenditure on general expenses 
(column 4(b)) especially after 1977/78. The resource allocation was 
more uncertain on the special expenditure, column 5(b), where there
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has been wide variations. Such declines in allocations imply that the 
secondary schools have been hard hit by this problem of 
underfinancing, a situation that has also been highlighted by Green et 
H i . 11*
TABLE 13:6. INDICATORS OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION TO SECONDARY SCHOOLS.
YEAR Ratio of Expenditure on Maintenance School general Special
students running; of and running expenses on expenditure
to schoolsi (3300) expenditure utilities, (1800) Renewal
teacher per student (1400) plant. office expenses of equipment,
machinery, uniforms etc motor vehicles,
equipment per student Plant etc
etc per (code 1300)
student.
Col. 1 Col. Col. Col. Col. Col. Col. Col. Col.
NO 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 5a 5b
Nominal Real Nomi­ Real Nominal Real Nominal Real
nal
shs shs shs shs shs shs shs shs
1967/68 21 INC 14 14 INC . 14 14
1968/69 20 INC - 23 23 120 120 38 38
1969/70 19 INC - INC - INC INC -
1970/71 19 INC - 41 38 182 168 36 33
1971/72 19 INC - 37 32 120 103 7 6
1972/73 21 INC - 57 44 166 129 8 6
1973/74 19 INC - 79 51 141 92 22 14
1974/75 20 INC - INC - INC - INC -
1975/76 18 1019 491 76 36 108 52 6 3
1976/77 18 970 419 80 35 128 55 7 3
1977/78 17 1178 453 103 40 154 59 26 10
1978/79 18 1193 406 98 33 160 55 63 21
1979/80 18 1102 288 126 33 126 33 82 22
1980/81 18 1878 391 116 24 116 24 93 19
1981/82 19 INC - INC - INC - INC -
1982/83 18 3636 461 132 17 132 17 76 10
$ The nominal figures were deflated by general Price Index to get real 
expenditure
NOTE: expenditure per student; INC - incomplete
SOURCE: computed from Appendix 13 Tab.13A-2
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As regards Health, some financial and non-financial resources 
allocation measures were also examined. However, due to 
incompleteness in the detailed annual data, a shorter time span was 
considered for analysis. Moreover, for lack of complete data, it was 
not feasible to develop cumulative investment figures for comparison 
with the recurrent expenditure. Nevertheless, for the limited data
that was available the following was done. To begin with, the
expenditure allocated for the functions of curative, preventive and 
rural health services were evaluated in relation to the medical 
personnel as a rough indicator of resource flow to the health sector. 
When we consider the indicator based on the senior medical personnel, 
ie doctors, Assistant Medical Officers and Medical Assistants, it can 
be observed from Column 2 of Table (13):7 below that in nominal terms 
the expenditure available per personnel grew just modestly. In real 
terms (column 2 (b)) there was a very sharp fall in the resource 
allocated, from sh 117,000 in 1972 to shs 38,000 in 1982. A similar 
situation is observable when all the staff are taken into account - 
column 3 & 3(b). Moreover, when the expenditure is related to the 
number of patients (in-and out-patients) who attended hospitals, 
dispensaries and health centres it is observed that in real terms, the 
expenditure per patient declined from shs 2.07 in 1972 to 1.13 in 
1982. The latter appears in column 4(b) of Table (13):7. It is 
worthwhile to note that while financial resources available to both 
medical staff and patients declined, on the other hand, the number of 
doctors increased by 92% and rural medical aids by about 435% at the 
same time. The deterioration in services relative to expansion in
capacity that has taken place is further corroborated by Green et al.
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They pointed out that "trained personnel are increasingly available 
but drug, vaccines, equipment, kerosene for refrigerators and fuel for 
transport increasingly are not”. They continue, "by 1982/83 drug 
imports were 1/3 optimal levels on the national 300 basic drug list 
versus about 2/3 in 1979/80 ^  The latter clearly shows that the 
problem ol financing health operations has continued to worsen 
overtime, consequently widening the gap between what has been provided 
and is functioning and actually available to people.
TABLE 13:7. INDICATORS OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR HEALTH PURPOSE.






NOMINAL REAL NOMINAL REAL NOMINAL REAL
Col. 2 Col.2b Col. 3 Co 1.3b Col. 4 Col.4b
'ooo shs 'ooo shs 'ooo shs 'ooo shs shs shs
1971/72 140 117 24 20 2.41 2.07
1972/73 INC INC INC INC INC INC
1973/74 202 124 35 22 3.05 1.98
1974/75 230 113 40 20 3.70 1.90
1975/76 203 87 37 16 3.56 1.71
1976/77 209 77 37 14 4.00 1.73
1977/78 270 79 43 14 4.77 1.83
1978/79 234 68 40 12 5.03 1.71
1979/80 224 54 38 9 5.25 1.37
1980/81 248 47 42 8 6.25 1.30
1981/82 258 38 43 6 7.00 1.13
NOTE: t includes Doctors, Assistant Medical Officers and Medical Officers.
* includes Doctors, Assistant Medical Officers, Medical Officers, 
Nurses, Midwives, Rural Medical Aids and Health Auxiliary.
$ The nominal figures were deflated using the general price
index to get the real figures.
INC Incomplete - data not obtained in sufficient details
Both In and Out patients for hospitals, Dispensaries and Rural
Health Centres are covered.
SOURCE: Computed from Data appearing in Appendix 13 Tab.13A-3
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Finally, I will examine an indicator which diagnoses the future 
likelihood of a recurrent cost problem. The measure which was 
identified above as being effective is the ratio of foreign financing 
els a share of capital expenditure. Some analysis regarding the latter 
was done in chapter 11 (Table 11:8(b) p. 426). The unweighted average 
for the period 1967-83 was 43%, with a range of 23.7% to 62%. When 
the latter ratio is compared to intercountry average ratios appearing 
below, which were compiled by Heller et.al. ( 1985: p.47) for 
countries which were/were not experiencing a recurrent cost problem 
over the period 1977-81, we are tempted to infer that the Tanzanian 
situation is less severe. Even Heller's (et.al ibid.) ratio for 
Tanzania of 37.6% is very low, which would imply that Tanzania is 
unlikely to encounter a recurrent cost problem. Nonetheless, the 
problem exists in Tanzania in principle, and therefore, some of these 
ratios have to be interpreted with caution, for two main reasons. 
Foremost, they can not be taken as the only perfect measure of the 
recurrent cost problem. There could certainly be other measures, such 
as those used above by me, which clearly point to the existence, and 
hence a future likelihood of the problem. Secondly, the years upon 
which the analysis is based could have been the period of low activity 
for certain countries, which would certainly bias the results.
Nevertheless, on the strength of some of the high yearly ratios 
observable in chapter II which are larger than some of the 
intercountry averages given above, this indicator certainly gives 
enough clue to suspect the development of a recurrent cost problem.
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Ratios for Countries with recurrent cost problem
Average Ratio
African group 64.5% ie Tanzania ratio was 37.6
Asian group 47.8%
Latin American group 56.8%
Ratios for Countries without recurrent cost problem
African group 45.7%
Asian group 31.8%
Middle East & Latin America 13.1%
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III POLICY DEFECTS CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROBLEM OF RECURRENT COSTS
In Section II above, some of the tests carried out showed that 
the recurrent cost problem exists in the Tanzanian public sector, 
especially in the more recent past. Such results are further 
confirmed by a World Bank Survey which pointed to the existence of the 
problem in Tanzania.16 Moreover, the existence of the problem could 
easily be inferred from the exposition made in chapter (3) above where 
the salient features of the economy were examined. In the latter, 
some structural economic problems were seen to be afflicting the 
various productive sectors, which had led to a fall in general output 
and sectorial output, especially in agriculture and industry. The 
interdependence of the various sectors has meant that the problems 
related to a fall in production spread to the public sector as well. 
The fact that the recurrent cost problem in the public sector is 
rooted in structural economic problems is well demonstrated by Howell 
as he points out that such problem could be termed a ’’structural” 
rather than *cyclical’ one.17
In view of what has been observed above, what then are the 
specific policy measures which have caused this problem? Those factors 
which are thought to exacerbate the problem can be classified into two 
groups. There are those related to inadequacy in fiscal policy 
measures, or what Heller et al have termed ’overall budgeting 
constraints’, and secondly, there are those related to misallocation 
of resources in the economy.18
(a) Overall budgeting constraints
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The first cause of the problem is the failure of fiscal policy 
measures to mobilize enough resources to fund all the uses to which 
they could be put. The inadequacy of revenue was identified by the 
World Bank Survey as being a big constraint.19 Moreover, such 
revenue shortfalls are further substantiated by the occasional 
existence of recurrent budget deficits, especially in the last 1970s 
and early 1980s, as indicated in chapter 12 (p 458 ) above, although 
they (deficits) give only a partial impression of the problem because 
they do not, however, represent the optimal level of revenues and 
expenditures which would ameliorate the recurrent cost problem. The 
inadequacy of revenues can be examined in two ways. First, is how a 
country's tax effort compares to its taxable capacity, and secondly, 
whether the authorities' overall economic policies are conducive to 
the economy performing near to its potential level.2 0 In 
considering the country's tax revenue trend in Chapter 6 (p.154-155 ) 
above, it was observed that the revenues had been growing just 
modestly. However, a comparison of Tanzania with other developing 
countries point to some modest effort in mobilizing tax revenue. The 
comparison is based on Tait's et al work, who did analysis for more 
than 47 developing countries.21 In general, Tanzania's performance 
in mobilizing resources from taxation appear to be above the average 
of the other countries. Its share of taxes in GNP improved 
tremendously between 1969-71 and 1972-76. While in 1969-71 the tax 
ratio in GNP was 13.9% (Average for 47 countries was 15.1%), during 
the 1972-1976 it had risen to 18.9% (Average for 47 Nations was 
15.8%). The data appears in Table (13): 8 below.
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TABLE 13:8. TANZANIA*S TAX PERFORMANCE COMPARED TO AN AVERAGE
OF 47 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
TOTAL DIRECT INDIRECT INCOME TRADE PRODUCTION
TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX TAX
OVER GNP OVER GNP OVER GNP OVER GNP OVER GNP OVER GNP
TANZANIA 18.94 5.96 12.99 5.86 4.51 8.48
AVERAGE 15.8 5.15 9.81 4.77 5.55 4.26
SOURCE: Tait A.A. et.al. op.cit. p. 156
Moreover, over the periods 1969-71 and 1972-76, Tanzania improved 
its index of International Tax Comparison (ITC) from 1.034 to 1.336. 
For 1969-71 using the latter index, Tanzania was ranked 21st among the 
47 nations analysed. 23 Furthermore, a look at the development of 
the ITC indices between 1966-68 and 1972-76 indicates that Tanzania 
was in the group of high rising tax effort.24
Even, when the sample of countries was increased to 63 and ITC 
indices computed, Tanzania still falls in the group of countries with 
a high ITC index (greater than 1.10).25
Although Tanzania does not emerge as the best in mobilizing 
taxes, nevertheless, the progress that is so far discernible ought to 
be appreciated. This implies, therefore, that the source of the 
problem in revenue mobilization does not lie mainly with tax effort, 
but rather with economic policies which retarded economic growth. It 
has already been mentioned above how production has been falling in
the key productive sectors. The major factors which have often been 
emphasized for the fall in production in LDCs relate to inconducive 
economic policy measures. As summarised by Heller et al, such 
policies included, inter alia, limits on prices of key agricultural 
commodities, interest rate controls and credit rationing, excessive 
government employment policies, over-valued currencies, and 
inefficient and over-extended public enterprises.26 Failure to 
initiate timely policy adjustments to correct for such practices, as 
was the case in Tanzania,27 led to economic stagnation which in turn 
eroded the tax bases. A good example of a base that lost its 
importance is the foreign trade which until 1969/70 (see table (6):1 
(b) p. 164) had been a major source of revenue. The fall in tax 
income from such a source could be explained by the fall in exports.
The second major constraint contributing to the problem is the 
failure of fiscal policy measures to control excessive growth in non­
development expenditure, which tended to impose a great pressure on 
the revenues mobilized. The expenditure involved is that for general 
services (civil, culture, defence, information and broadcasting); debt 
service and interest payments, subsidies and transfers to individuals, 
international organizations, and public enterprises. Policies such as 
those aimed at employing all secondary schools and college graduates 
contribute to the growth in this areas of spending. Also the 
government's policy to support Liberation Movements around its 
boundaries, especially on the Mozambican and Ugandan side, was bound 
to keep defence spending high.28(a) As pointed out by Jennings, 
these non-development expenditures are oftenly given higher priorities 
over other expenditure needs, especially when there is pressure for
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cutting spending.2 8
The third major constraint is related to the built-in tendency 
for certain categories of expenditure to generate a greater demand for 
expenditure than others, consequently putting greater pressure on the 
limited revenue resources mobilized. The categories of development- 
oriented expenditure which have this tendency to generate higher 
spending needs are those related mainly to basic needs such as health 
and education etc. 2 9 As it has been pointed out by Carruthers,
’’basic needs projects in health, education and rural development have 
higher *r’ (recurrent expenditure coefficients) values, but also that 
the revenue prospects (with the exception of housing) are worse than 
directly productive projects.”30 The latter idea about higher ’r’ 
values is confirmed further by Heller’s ’r* coefficients apeparing in 
Appendix 13 Table 13A - 4. From the latter, the *r* coefficients in 
education and Health sub-sectors lie above 0.11 mostly, while the 
other sectors such as agriculture, construction, roads, etc they 
hardly go above 0.10. Thus, for Tanzania which has been putting 
tremendous emphasis on basic needs, it should be expected that the 
recurrent expenditure will be rising quite rapidly. Hence, the 
emergence of the recurrent cost problem.
(b) Misallocation of resources
The next categories of factors causing recurrent costs problems 
are those related to institutional weaknesses. Foremost, is the 
problem of weak budget planning and forecasting. The planning process 
in Tanzania which evaluates projects in the light of development goals 
and considers their recurrent expenditure implications prior to
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project approval is certainly deficient. Projects have been accepted, 
either financed locally and/or externally, without considering their 
future expenditure implications. This institutional weakness led to 
significant expansion in development investment in the country 
compared to the growth that was expected in revenues (local tax 
incomes, fees charged and foreign earnings etc) to finance the 
recurrent costs. For example, while monetary gross capital formation 
remained fairly constant over the 1972-82 period, ranging between 20% 
and 25% of GDP, exports fell from 23.2% in 1972 to 7% (as a ratio of 
GDP) in 1982. This export fall would certainly limit imports in every 
sector.
Another factor that is closely related to deficiencies observed 
in the planning process and which could be an obstacle to the ideal of 
optimal resource allocation, is that of separating the development 
budget from the recurrent budget.31 The repercussions of this 
separation is aggravated further by the existence of two Separate 
Ministries (Finance, and Planning and Economic Affairs) which deal 
with the two budgets. In Tanzania, over the study period, there has 
always been indecision as to whether the activities of Finance and 
Planning should be under one Ministry or under two separate 
Ministries, although for most of the time they have remained 
separate.32 Since decisions on the two budgets follow separate 
lines of approval, it has always been the case that those handling 
development budgets fail to take account of the recurrent cost 
implications of projects, particularly as a large proportion of the 
development budget is extemaly financed. 33 The development budget 
preparation practice until 1983/84 never incorporated recurrent costs
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implications in its proposals. It is only recently (1984/85) that 
this idea has been included in development budget preparation 
(evidenced by new forms designed to tap that information, which are a 
part of the guidelines issued by the Ministry of planning and Economic 
Affairs.) In fact, the weaknesses already highlighted in chapter (10) 
and (11) on the forecasting of expenditures, which included, inter 
alia, inadequacy of information or data, shortages of skilled and 
experienced finance and accounting manpower, poor financial* 
management skills etc, contribute further towards the problems of 
having a proper coordination of the two budgets, which for the time 
being fall under the two authorities.
While the factors discussed above could be said to play a more 
central role in precipitating the problem of recurrent costs, there 
are others also which contributed to the worsening of the situation. 
For example, external shocks manifesting in worsening terms of trade, 
particularly the rise in oil (petrol) price followed by a rise in 
manufactured products and a disproportionate increase in prices of 
primary products exported by Tanzania in the 1970s and early 1980s 
(Chapter 3 page 70), indeed put a serious burden on the government 
for the importation of inputs required for all sectors. Secondly, 
because of the diversity of donors who support Tanzania, each of them 
preferred to embark on a new project rather than pick on a project 
already financed by another donor. This phenomenon having been 
encouraged by institutional weaknesses within Tanzania itself, as 
highlighted above, and as further discussed in detail in chapter 9, 
led to the excessive pile up of completed projects that the economy 
had no sufficient resources for operations and maintenance. However,
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this donor*s attitude of looking at new projects only is easing away 
after the realization of the gravity of the problem of operations and 
maintenance. Many donors had been reluctant to finance the operating 
costs inspite of a call to that effect by DAC.34 But now some 
donors have found it necessary to provide financial resources for 
budget programmes, especially for rehabilitation of investment in 
sectors such as transport, agriculture, etc.35 which have been 
crumbling down over some years for lack of maintenance. It has already 
been pointed out (chapter 9) that the donor emphasis now is on 
programme lending for structural adjustment purpose.
The effects of the recurrent cost problem in both manpower and 
material terms have been severe for every sector of the economy. The 
irregular and insufficient supply of imported raw materials and spare 
parts due to the shortages of foreign exchange have led to a 
strangulation of activities of all industries. Secondly, aging and 
out-of-order facilities do not get proper maintenance. Consequently, 
the process of decapitalization has been hastened. Generally, the 
vicious circle of bottleneckes, shortages etc. put the economy in 
debilitating crisis, which threatens the living standards and the 
basic needs fulfillment of much of the nation.36 And as Green et al 
further point out "Unless some way is found of restoring economic 
activity to its previous levels and/or resuming economic growth, 
improvements in health, education, sanitation and nutrition will not 
be possible and even present achievements in these fields may come 
under severe threat.37 Constraints in manpower supply also 
contribute to the worsening social services. Expansions in health, 
education and community welfare facilities have consequently
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engendered a greater demand for such services which have placed a 
greater strain on personnel available. And yet, as observed in 
Section II above, resources allocated for such services in real terms 
have been declining overtime.
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IV POSSIBLE REMEDIAL POLICY MEASURES TO EASE THE RECURRENT COST
PROBLEM
Various authoritative sources (Heller, 1979: Heller and Aghevli 
1985; Gary and Martens, 1983, Jennings, 1983; etc) have tried to 
pinpoint some policy measures which, if pursued by the countries that 
are experiencing this problem of under financing, could at least bring 
some recovery. But there is also some form of consensus over the 
difficulties that loom over these countries which would preclude any 
quick recovery. Structural weaknesses are seen as a great obstacle 
towards increased domestic resource mobilization. As Jennings points 
out, "given their structural weaknesses, raising each country’s 
recurrent revenue recovery factor through improved fiscal systems, 
domestic savings, and user charges, will be limited."38 Moreover, 
where the tax effort is already high as was pointed out above for 
Tanzania, and where the tax bases have been eroded considerably due to 
the economic stagnation, a more ambitious tax effort could be a 
disincentive to the productive sectors.
The structural weaknesses also restrict external resource 
mobilization arising from exports of goods and services. And yet 
these foreign revenues appear to be the critical factor towards 
economic recovery. Therefore, any policy measures taken must aim at, 
first, breaking the ’vicious circles’ of shortages and bottlenecks in 
inputs supply, and secondly, to ensure that any economic recovery or 
growth set in motion is sustained. It appears, therefore, that the 
most significant measure that ought to be taken to break the ’vicious 
circles’ is for the country to receive more concessional aid. As 
Jennings points out, "a positive response by donors to assist in the
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recurrent cost problem is therefore essential."39 The aid should be 
targeted more at programmes aimed at macro economic policy reforms. 
Support to the structural adjustment programmes would therefore be 
very necessary at the moment.40 The response from the donors to 
meet such resource needs has never been outrightly forthcoming. There 
has of course been some flexibility in extending the donations for 
recurrent costs, although not directly as many recipient countries 
would wish to have. As pointed out by Howell, (1985 pp 13-14), some 
donors provide some allowances and operating costs for additional 
project-led activities. For example, in the sector of agriculture, a 
substantial proportion of expenditure on the projects is, in effect, 
recurrent costs support although it comes under a capital heading.
Also some donors have increasingly become compelled to finance local 
recurrent costs to protect their capital investments, or even to get 
projects approved where local contributions simply cannot be provided. 
The latter has led to the "rehabilitation and maintenance" projects. 
Moreover, there are other forms of aid which indirectly contribute a 
form of local recurrent cost financing. These include debt relief, 
export compensation schemes, food aid, and balance of payments 
support. However, most donors remain reluctant to go beyond their 
current practice of financing only offshore recurrent costs. The 
reason advanced by Howell (1985 p. 14) for such reluctance is that the 
donors find it difficult to monitor and assess the impact of aid 
investment if * funds* disappear into a general revenue account. To 
provide for the local recurrent costs would therefore represent an 
abdication of responsibility for overseeing their investment. While 
the latter holds to be true, however, there are other reasons as well
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which could account for the donors* reluctancy to give general 
(budget) funds support. Some interests which could motivate a donor to 
grant aid were highlighted in chapter 9 above. One basic interest 
was seen to be the promotion of its own strategic, political and 
commercial interests. Donor*s domestic political considerations as 
articulated by the aid lobbies, would certainly be interested in 
seeing that aid granted brings home the benefits of, say export 
promotion, political and ideological control, and even security 
strategy. Uhearmarked aid would give the recipient greater freedom to 
use it at discretion. So, any aid disbursement measures compromising 
such objectives would be less palatable to the lobbying groups. The 
latter implies that, for the hard pressed nations to bring under 
control the recurrent cost problem, the donors have to change their 
attitudes towards aid policy. They should give more of non-project 
aid which would help to ease mainly the problem of imported inputs for 
operation and maintenance.
But, while we criticize the donors for being less willing to 
provide local recurrent cost support, we also need to extend the 
criticisms to those recipient countries, Tanzania being an example, 
which have failed to take advantage of the aid available, for their 
inflexibility to initiate in time economic policy changes which would 
tie up with donor *s expectation of what ought to be the threshold 
(Cassen et. al. 1986: pp. 90-92).
Although the thrust of the proposition made above is for more aid 
to be provided to Tanzania, however, the dangers of having the public 
budget and other institutions rely on aid revenues for their recurrent 
costs, ought to be spelt out. The distortion experience gathered so
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far related to development projects which depended on aid funds mainly 
should be reckoned with and brought to bear upon decisions made 
regarding reliance on aid for local recurrent costs. Such foreign 
dependency can only lead to further loss of control of national plans 
and objectives, political independence etc. How suspect external aid 
is, is well put by Nyerere. He pointed out that "external aid of 
which we have received a great deal in recent years - is by its nature 
temporary and unreliable. It must not become the basis of 
development; our plans should not rely upon it."41 On the other 
hand, economic and social policies which have not accomplished the 
desired results ought to be reformed by the government. At a macro 
economic level, some policy reform measures which Tanzania could 
undertake, (some have already been initiated) include the 
following.42
(i) Carry out a thorough appraisal of the operating budget and 
cut less essential recurrent expenditure especially in the area of 
employment and outdated services etc.
(ii) Cut down on development investments and allocate more 
resources to the recurrent budget, giving a higher priority to the 
maintenance and operation of existing programmes. In fact the 
government could decide on a capital-recurrent budget ratio which 
could be a guide for those preparing the budget. 42<b>
(iii) increase the tax effort of the public sector, and the 
elasticity of the tax system where possible, to boost resource flows 
to the public sector.
(iv) The government should introduce economic user-fees in areas 
where free services have been offered, but which can be marketed such
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as non-tertiary education, medicine, water supply etc. Those without 
the ability to pay could be exempted under a means test system.
(v) At project selection level, the government could change the 
composition of the investment programme to favour projects with lower 
recurrent expenditure implications.
(vi) Modify the technology of projects to have higher present 
investment costs with a benefit of lower future recurrent outlays.
The latter two points listed above ((v) and (vi)) actually call 
upon the government to be more sensitive to the type of technology and 
its future implications as opposed to just accepting a project simply 
because it can produce the goods/services targeted at. Moreover, the 
need to fall on environment - related projects is well demonstrated by 
Jennings. As he puts it, ’’more appropriate technology, including more 
community self-help projects may be required, and project efficiency 
should be monitored and ’White elephants’ allowed to die".43
Long term policy measures that need to be taken to sustain any 
economic growth initiated which would in turn broaden the tax bases, 
include, allowing the economy to operate more on a free market basis, 
especially for the government to stop controlling prices of goods and 
services from agriculture, industries and transport etc; but also to 
allow the foreign exchange rate to assume a fairer international 
market exchange rate. This implies also that subsidies on consumables 
have to be lifted so that the consumers will pay the market prices for 
the goods or services they consume.
Other actions that the government ought to take include improving 
the performance of local planning, budgeting and accounting systems. 
Planning and budgeting need to be intergrated. This implies bringing
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the activities of Dev.Plan and Finance under the same agency to 
improve coordination of project and recurrent expenditure budgeting. 
Such move would bring rationality in the allocation and management of 
resources.44 Moreover, the use of recurrent cost coefficients in 
both planning and budgeting should be developed. Heller has led the 
way in this respect, and the coefficients developed by him could be 
used to test the adequacy of financing provided for on-going 
programmes.45 But on top of the coefficients developed by Heller, 
is the model he developed which could be used to test for the fiscal 
viability of a given development plan by testing for consistency 
between implied economic growth rate and the plan’s targeted growth 
rate.46 Using such a model in the planning process could flash a 
warning whenever an imbalance between expected revenues and planned 
expenditure is likely to arise due to a failure of the model-implied 
growth in GDP not reaching the planned rate. However, to be able to 
utilize such a model fruitfully, more reliable data have to be 
produced by the system, a task that is yet to be seen.
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V SUMMARY
The chapter has attempted to analyse the problem of recurrent 
costs as it occurs in Tanzania. Various tests applied to the 
Tanzanian situation. Those comparing development-oriented expenditure 
with non-development oriented expenditure, did not point to a 
worsening situation on recurrent costs mainly because of fluctuations 
in the indicators which made it difficult to draw some meaningful 
conclusions. However, very significant results were obtained from 
tests extended to Ministries of Education and Health, which indicated 
that, in real terms, some declining resources were being allocated to 
the important programme areas. In other words, though the human and 
capital resources had been developed to an appreciable level, however, 
the supportive inputs or services were not put at their disposal in 
sufficient quantities. Hence, the quality of services rendered by 
such sectors suffered considerable decline or detereoration.
The causes of the problem were seen to emanate from two main 
sources. There are those related to budgetary constraints, which 
hinge mainly on revenue mobilization capabilities and the increasing 
expenditure demands. The second set of causes were seen to be related 
to lack of rationality in allocation of resources. Institutional 
deficiences, especially at Treasury and Dev.Plan, were seen to be 
contributing to the problem of resource misallocation. Other causes 
of the problem were seen to be those relating to international 
involvement, especially in the sector of trade, whereby poor terms of 
trade had led to a strangulation of vital imports. In spite of the 
existence of the problem, priority in Tanzania continued to be
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accorded to capital investments which were highly supported by aid 
funds, and which certainly engendered more needs for recurrent 
financing. Moreover, due to the overall shortage of financial 
resources to support operating needs, less priority was accorded to 
recurrent costs until lately when the economy and services fell into 
unbearable crisis.
Some policy measures of ameliorating the recurrent cost problem 
have been suggested too. Some of them are not new to the government 
because some initiatives towards their implementation Eire discernible. 
Suggestions made above such as removing controls on exchange rate and 
producer prices are being implemented already. Similarly, suggestions 
such as reduction in investments and cutting down on recurrent 
expenditure in non-important areas have started to be implemented.
The impact of the reforms taken so far is yet to be seen. But there 
are other suggestions made which have not received any significant 
attention so far. These include the granting by donors of more 
programme concessional aid to the country, the merging of planning and 
finance activities by the government to enhance rational allocation of 
resources, and finally the selling of some of the public enterprises 
to the general public so as to raise funds and reduce the subsidy 
burden on the government. The latter notwithstanding, the success of 
any policy reform measures recommended and taken will depend on the 
government’s ability to get skilled personnel to handle some of the 
difficult analytical tasks and also its ability to develop adequately 
its accounting and reporting systems. Needless to say, the paucity of 
data precludes proper assessment of the situation, and hence a correct 
understanding of the problems.
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
i prraopucTioN
The study has examined a number of theoretical and practical 
issues relating to resource allocation decisions in the Tanzania 
public sector. Five crucial questions were raised in chapter 1 (p.6) 
and addressed in the study. In general I have examined questions such 
as: how is the existing pattern of expenditure and revenue explained?, 
and secondly, how is the making of the new budget explained? Within 
the domain of the public budget, these issues were examined with a 
purpose of trying to establish, first, the efficiency with which the 
budgetary system has managed to allocate the resources which are put 
at its disposal, and secondly, the extent to which the major 
discrepancies could be reduced. In the wider context the expectation 
has been that, an efficiently managed budget would ensure that policy 
decisions and measures taken upon the economy would stand a better 
chance of success.
The justification for pursuing the study would not have been put 
then by Bird when he pointed out that; "empirical work will be more 
useful to policy makers the more it focuses on changes and on details, 
for the actual reality and basic issues of policy lie there. Careful 
detailed quantitative study of particular issues in particular 
countries is the kind of empirical research which is really needed in 
development finance." (Bird (1978) p. 56).
Some problems in data availability were encountered, but as was 
hinted in the introductory chapter, some efforts had to be made to 
assemble and sort out the data that could be gathered. In certain
515
analytical cases, shorter periods had to be considered as a way of 
overcoming the problem of data incompleteness. Nevertheless, the 
results obtained so far can be relied upon, pending further studies 
based on more complete data.
In the next couple of sections, I will conclude on the major 
findings of this study. The policy implications of the findings will 
be highlighted as well.
II SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS
The discussion in this section follows the same chapter pattern 
as used in examining the problem. That is, some significant findings 
related to the hypotheses which were tested empirically will be 
presented first, to be followed by findings related to the empirical 
observations about the forecasting aspects of the budget. The summary 
focuses more on the results of the aggregate measures analysed.
The first task that was picked up in the study was one of 
identifying the hypotheses which had been posited to explain the 
behaviour of expenditure and revenue in LDCs. This sorting out 
exercise had to be done because; given the economic development of the 
LDCs, some hypotheses which had been developed on a background of 
developed nations* circumstances could not apply to the former without 
some modification or a reformulation. Moreover, most of the 
hypotheses thought to be appropriate to the LDC environment had been 
formulated based on cross-sectional data of a group of countries, 
rather than on individual countries. Because of this, the 
generalizations made were likely to differ from those obtained from a 
study of the latter. Though most LDCs have similar poverty
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characteristics, their economic structures could be quite dissimilar. 
Such structural differences could in fact render some of the 
hypotheses based on group studies irrelevant in the individual country 
study case.
The investigation on the hypotheses which explain the behaviour 
of expenditure in Tanzania revealed a number of significant factors, 
which comprised of: the share of tax revenue in GDP (referred to in 
the text as the revenue constraint), the external receipts, and the 
demographic factor of population. The tax revenues and external 
receipts factors combine to account for the total financing (except 
where local deficit financing is used). The fact that expenditure 
trend has been responding to the tax revenue that is collectible every 
year implies that the periodical instability of revenues would affect 
the stability of expenditures directly, thus making it difficult to 
implement expenditure policies.
On the part of external receipts, the findings were quite 
important, because they underlined the dependency that has developed 
between public expenditure and itself. The implications are that any 
form of instability in external receipts (in the form of 
interuptions, cuts or postponements) would affect the implementation 
of any expenditure policy in the short run, while in the longer run it 
would leave the government with massive expenditure programmes to 
finance that would probably be beyond the national financing 
capabilities. The recurrent cost problem discussed in chapter 13 
above is a clear example of the long term consequences of dependency 
on foreign receipts.
Besides the three factors discussed above, another factor whose
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influence on expenditure had been argued to be a strong one, but 
turned out to be (statistically) insignificant, is the "stage of 
development’1 which had taken a political-historical perspective of 
development in Tanzania. The factor was indexed by a dummy variable 
as no other more appropriate index could be devised to cover it. It 
is therefore suggested that the results obtained should be interpreted 
with reservation, pending further research in this area.
Another interesting observation related to the association 
between public expenditure and economic development. The results of 
this study have underlined the hypotheses that there is no significant 
association between expenditure trend and economic development 
(represented by ’per capita income* )• These findings were not 
unexpected in any case. This was so because, if a large share of 
expenditure has been financed through external aid and domestic 
borrowing, it implies that the pattern of spending would not be in 
line with the pattern of economic development. These negative results 
have far reaching overtones. In the short run there will be the usual 
problem of underfinancing of programmes due to the lack of national 
resources, while in the long run this condition might make it 
impossible for the government to implement other policy measures 
adopted. One major area of implementation failure would be on domestic 
credit policy. The government would be forced into further domestic 
borrowing due to the high levels of expenditures which cannot be 
supported with tax revenues mobilized from the economy. Looking back 
at the questions raised in chapter 1 (pages 5 & 6), in particular 
numbers 1,2, and 4 about influences the economic development, external 
receipts and tax revenues have on the pattern of expenditure, it is
518
possible to say that the latter two variables have a strong influence, 
but the economic development variable as represented by Per Capita 
Income had insignificant influence. Besides, it has been established 
that population has a strong influence too.
On the part of revenue behaviour, the factors which were tested 
empirically for their influence on its pattern, and which showed some 
significant results, included: the share of mining in GDP; the share 
of agriculture in GDP; and the level of economic development (indexed 
by ’per capita income’). The agricultural variable was explained in 
terms of its influence on the purchasing power of the local population 
from whom most of the local transaction taxes (sales taxes and excise 
duties) were derived. Therefore, it would be appropriate to consider 
it as a predictor variable. The mineral variable had a strong 
influence, but because of its insignificant contribution in the GDP. 
it was argued that there was no point in considering it as a predictor 
variable.
On the p»rt of the economic development index (ie per capita 
income) the positive confirmatory results could not be a surprise 
because, according to various international comparative studies, 
Tanzania appeared to be above average in tax effort. Secondly, the 
fact that a large share of this per capita GDP is agriculture share, 
the latter helps to raise the overall GDP influence. Thirdly, the 
pressure to finance the escalating expenditure, at a time when 
production in the key productive sectors was falling, implied that any 
tax handle available was taxed heavily. Thus, the strong relationship 
between economic development and revenue pattern was quite expected.
The confirmation of the ’per capita income’ factor has far
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reaching implications in setting stabilization policies related to tax 
revenue. Any expectations of changes in levels of revenue have to be 
based on changes in par capita income. But we saw already in chapter 
3 above that projections of GDP were not readily available. This 
implies that the system of predicting GDP (ie per capita income) 1ms 
to be improved tremendously.
On the other hand, some insignificant results were obtained in 
respect of other factors which had been thought to be quite 
influential on revenue pattern. One of these factors was the ’degree 
of openness’ which wets deconfirmed. The empirical testing had used 
various proxies such as: exports share in GDP; imports share in GDP; 
and the sum of exports and imports in GDP. The deconfirmation in the 
Tanzanian situation conflicted with other studies’ findings which had 
confirmed that the ’degree of openness’ had a significant influence on 
the revenue pattern. Nevertheless, the reality of the Tanzanian tax 
revenue structure and tax handles dictated quite a different 
relationship. While in certain developing countries most revenues are 
derived from one or two export commodities, ie. certain hard minerals 
or petrol minerals, in the case of Tanzania, such a situation does not 
exist. The structure of taxes indicated that between 1954 and 1984, 
seldom had the foreign trade taxes (export and import duties) reached 
a 30% level of total tax revenues. Hence the absence of any strong 
influence on the revenue pattern. Another factor that did not have a 
significant influence on tax revenues was aid. This could be 
interpreted to imply that decisions made on tax revenue mobilization 
are not influenced by the flow of external receipts.
Looking back at some of the questions raised in chapter 1 (p.6),
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particularly questions 1 and 2, it could be said that we have been 
able to establish that tax revenues are strongly influenced by the 
economy's output, but not influenced by the flow of aid to the 
country.
Besides looking at factors which influence both revenues and 
expenditure, we also looked at the question of stability of the two 
items. In the case of revenues we found out that the amount of 
instability was relatively high, and it was argued that this could 
have some destabilizing impact on expenditure. On the part of 
expenditure, there were some major fluctuations for which an attempt 
was made to explain the main turning points.
The second level of empirical investigation analysed the 
techniques used in predicting and controlling expenditures in 
Tanzania, as well as the nature and the magnitude of the forecast 
errors resulting from the imperfections in the forecasting process. 
Basically, the underlying objective in carrying out the investigation 
was to detect the factors which were used in predicting the various 
components of expenditure and revenue, and secondly, to see whether 
such factors had any relationship with those discussed under the 
various hypotheses in chapters 5 and 6.
Besides, in order to know the main causes of the variations 
between the budget forecasts and the outturns, the predictor variables 
identified through the investigation were analysed further in terms of 
the extent of misspecification and instability so as to determine the 
scope of their influence on the forecast errors.
What become quite apparent out of the investigation was that 
the forecasting process, whether for expenditure or revenues, had not
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utilized any systematic method to generate the forecasts. In the case 
of revenues, while past trends had been used to set up the 
preliminary estimates used mainly for setting up the expenditure 
ceilings, however, the determinants of the official estimates did 
not utilize any of those predictor variables identified by the 
Treasury itself, nor those identified in chapter 6 above. In the case 
of external finance, the investigation revealed that the system in use 
managed to identify the potential sources and amounts quite 
effectively. It was observed that only firmly committed external 
resources were included in the budget estimates. However, scane 
problems on the latter were identified in relation to the allocation 
of the available resources among projects and to spending agencies. 
This will be discussed further below. Thus due to the inadequacies in 
the forecasting process, the study revealed some significant 
variations (errors) between the forecasts and the outturn. In the case 
of tax revenues we observed some under-predictions, while in the case 
of external finance the analysis revealed some underutilizations. On 
the part of recurrent expenditure, the tendency was one of under- 
predicting, while for the development expenditure the investigation 
pointed to some over-predictions.
The causes of these discrepancies (ie. under- and over­
predictions) can be summarized as arising from either local factors 
(ie. weaknesses within the Government itself) and/or external factors 
(ie. those not within the control of the Tanzanian Government). As 
regards local factors, in general, certain weaknesses within the 
Government system tended to undermine the forecasting procedures.
Such weaknesses included, first, shortage of skilled manpower,
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especially those required for planning, finance and accounting 
functions which contributed to both delays in processing information 
and an overall poor performance. Secondly, poor data collection and 
information systems imposed some difficulties on the forecasting 
process. Thirdly, the fluctuations in economic performance posed a 
problem of uncertainty, especially when it came to predicting items 
such as tax revenues. However, there were some specific points on each 
category of budget items which led to the discrepancies. As far as 
the tax revenues are concerned, the imvestigation revealed that 
sometimes there was a lack of initiative on the part of the tax 
administrators to retrieve some of the data that lay in their own 
office files. The use of such data would certainly have improved the 
outcome of the forecasts. On the part of recurrent expenditure, 
certain practices at Treasury level tended to undermine the procedure 
of preparing the forecasts. In particular, it was noted that 
inconsistencies at Treasury, especially in relation to setting the 
ceiling levels and subsequent approvals, made most of the spending 
agencies lose confidence and commitment to the budget determination 
function. On the part of development expenditure, some institutional 
weaknesses, mainly in the area of planning, encouraged the tying of 
development projects to external finance. Moreover, the planning 
system failed to ensure that proper appraisal procedures were carried 
out to determine accurately both the investment costs and the 
associated recurrent costs. Such weaknesses undermined of course the 
determination of reasonably accurate forecasts.
The second source of the discrepancies are external factors. The 
influence that external factors may have on policies undertaken by a
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government is well put by Hinchliffe and Allan (1983, op. cit. p. 962)
as they pointed out that "external events may be equally or more
important in determining eventual outcomes than any efforts of 
planners or politicians." The two factors which the authors singled 
out are the changes in world commodity prices, and the role of foreign 
aid and foreign investments. The fluctuations in commodity prices in 
the international markets upset internal plans as a whole, mainly by
causing scane fluctuations on the foreign revenues which are so vital
for supporting the imports. The budget which depends on the foreign 
earnings for both tax revenues and imported goods and services will 
certainly be affected adversely as well. On the part of foreign aid, 
the mode in which the resources are transfered does affect internal 
policies. As argued in the text, the donors might have various motives 
in extending the aid. And in view of the fact that the recipient is 
in a desperate financial condition, he is sometimes pushed into 
accepting a funding that works to his disadvantage. Some obvious 
problems related to aid were seen to include costly tied aid, wrong 
timing of disbursements, donors* insistence on new projects, lack of 
donors* interest to work jointly on an identified project, and 
sometimes the lack of interest to support vital operational costs etc. 
Other external factors which indirectly affect the accuracy of the 
forecasts include the occurence of the unexpected such as wars and 
droughts. These external factors have the impact of reducing the 
national income which eventually determines the outcome of revenue and 
expenditure targets.
The problem of poor forecasts can not be said to be limited to 
Tanzania alone or to LDCs only. It was pointed out in the text that
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even in a country like Britain the forecasting process is not 
perfect. But of course in the case of LDCs the situation is more 
precarious because the budget problems tend to combine with other 
economic problems to add to the misery. Studies such as those of 
Caiden and Wildavsky (1974, op. cit.), and Cassen (1986, op. cit.) 
clearly point to the intractable budget problems of the LDCs.
Looking back at question 5 on chapter 1, the study has been able 
to reveal the non-systematic use of predictor variables in forecasting 
expenditures and revenues. These results confirm the existence of the 
conditions of uncertainty, lack of skilled human resources, lack of 
reliable data or information to be used in the generation of the 
forecasts etc. in LDCs.
My study has pointed out quite clearly what the implications of 
the forecasting problem are. On the part of tax revenues the 
underpredictions reflect less effort to make a proper assessment of 
the tax potential (implying that taxable capacity in the country was 
understated). Moreover, given that the revenues have to be mobilized 
when no clear information is available about the tax handles, the 
consequencies are that a few easily taxable sources will have to bear 
the burden, thus undermining private savings and the incentive to make 
further investments. Besides, unplanned high taxes on incomes and 
products (or expenditure) tend to push up wages and prices, thus 
leading to a more inflationary situation.
On the other hand, the implications of failing to allocate 
foreign funds efficiently are a real issue of concern. On the budget, 
external funds have directly caused a tremendous rise in government 
expenditure. While in the past external support was mainly for
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project expenditure, on the other hand, the Government was left with 
a task of meeting any consequencial recurrent expenditure, undoubtedly 
at a level beyond that for which internally generated resources could 
cater. Other side effects of the inefficient allocation of external 
funds have been the rise in indebtness, the pile up of unintegrated 
super structures which can not be operated for lack of working capital 
resources and sometimes skilled manpower. Again, the implications 
associated with the external funds are not confined to Tanzania alone. 
As pointed out by various studies, eg. Cassen (1986, op. cit.) World 
Bank (World Development Report 1985) etc., many developing countries, 
especially the very poor, have found themselves entangled in 
intractable economic problems related to their past external drawings.
The overall implications resulting from the discrepancies and 
disjointed decisions made on revenues, external funding and 
expenditure, were automatically reflected in, first, the severe 
problems of recurrent costs. The Government (as well as other LDCs) is 
unable to operate efficiently both economic and social services. Frc«n 
the study it became quite apparent that the meagre recurrent resources 
available were used to service salaries and wages, without providing 
adequately the complementary resources or facilities to render the 
services anticipated. Consequently, many of investments have run into 
serious capacity underutilization or complete disuse. The main causes 
of the recurrent cost problem were seen to be, first, the low level of 
local revenue mobilization, and secondly, the lack of support of such 
costs by the aid donors (although there has been a change of direction 
by most donors to finance operating and maintenance costs) etc. The 
second overall implication is the rise in budget deficits which can
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not be sustained by the current level of economic output and growth. 
These budget deficits have become a great source of economic 
instablility. Their rise also meant a failure in the domestic credit 
policy, which was in fact critical in as far as the demand side policy 
measures to stablilze the economy were concerned. There is no doubt 
that the external credits obtained pushed the Government to expand 
local credit so as to finance the local costs components of the 
projects.
In short, we are in no doubt that the repercussions of the 
distortions associated with the poor budget forecasts on the rest of 
the economy are of a debilitating nature. Any instruments associated 
with taxation and expenditure are rendered ineffective, thus 
incapacitating the overall fiscal policy and other macro- economic 
policies adopted to stabilize the economy and stimulate (economic) 
development. Besides, other policy targets such as income 
distribution, basic needs satisfaction, welfare benefits etc. cannot 
be accomplished as expected.
Ill RECOMMENDATIONS
What has been brought to light through this study is that the 
budgetary system in Tanzania is lacking stability. The instability 
arises from the uncertainty that prevails over revenue sources 
(mainly local) and the unabating expenditure demands.
To enhance the reliability of the budget forecasts, the 
following reformative measures could be adopted. The first reform 
relates to adoption of a more flexible budget process. This could be
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done in two ways. The first method involves the shortening of the 
forecasting horizon from the present period of twelve months to 
probably three or six months. Such a move would enable the Government 
to accommodate more of the changing predictor variables environment. 
The second variant, as suggested by Caiden et.al. (1974, op. cit. 
p. 316), is one of letting the budget process be geared to making ad 
hoc decisions on resource allocation against a background of what is 
known about revenue and expenditure at the time. Thus, while the 
current twelve months forecast horizon could be retained, the initial 
budget that is prepared is treated as a best estimate of the minimum 
amount that must be spent to carry out existing activities. Any 
department or spending agencies which might have requests above the 
budgetary base would have to approach Treasury at any time of the year 
with their justification. Equally, Treasury would have to go through 
departmental budgets to check on programmes which ought to be 
terminated. The authors think that this approach would increase 
certainty by assuring the spending departments of the base amount, and 
secondly, by allowing Treasury to allocate resources on a more 
realistic basis.
Another area requiring reform is that of development projects 
and external financing. The study clearly indicated that the latter 
two are intertwined. While we assume that the Government will still 
continue to rely on external financing, given the paucity of export 
revenues for financing capital imports, there are some measures which 
could be adopted to improve coordination and the management of the 
two. The experience of other developing countries which have had some 
success in budgeting and external aid management will be reflected
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upon as well. What are these measures? First, in view of the present 
internal resource crises, the Government should prepare a set of 
acceptable criteria which will be used to choose the most flexible aid 
donors to work with. But a prerequisite to the latter would be the 
establishment of a strong institutional structure (ie. an effective 
aid management team), as is being done in other LDCs such as India, 
and Kenya (Cassen, 1986, op. cit. pp.227-29). The aid management team 
would at the same time be involved in negotiations, which at the 
moment are thought to be a part of the causes of the difficulties that 
the LDCs are facing over aid management. The Government would 
therefore endeavour to assume control of aid flows, particularly in 
terms of having powers to marshal the external funds around to 
bottleneck spots in the economy. Similarly, the Government should be 
able to determine the nature of aid, in terms of its demands for 
programme needs versus project needs. The example of Papua New Guinea 
is most relevant in this respect. Due to the latter*s success in 
budget (and aid) management, donors have adopted a more flexible 
approach in extending aid to it (Hinchliffe et. al. 1983, op. cit.).
Beyond the problem of aid management and coordination, is the 
issue of harmonization of development and recurrent budget. Foremost, 
the Government has to avoid pegging down development expenditure to 
foreign aid, as is currently the practice. The advantages of such a 
move are, first, it will be possible to avoid the internal resource 
imbalances (associated mainly with the counterpart domestic resources) 
which are ravaging the economy at the moment. Besides, the latter 
could also help to lessen the possibility of dislocation of 
expenditure that might arise from sudden aid cuts or other forms of
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aid interruptions. But even more important is the act of integrating 
the two budgets (ie. development and recurrent budget) which would be 
determined as one entity. This goes beyond the act of merging the 
Ministries of Finance, and Planning and Economic Effairs. All 
expenditures have to be considered against the available revenue 
resources on a priority basis without a major division of the 
expenditure into categories. The successful example of Papua New 
Guinea could be a good source of reference. As documented by 
Hinchliffe et. al. (1983, op. cit. p.969):
(i) there is no such thing as capital budget and a recurrent budget
(ii)analysis for each proposed new activity incorporates total costs 
for the first four years.
(iii)projects funded by foreign aid are treated in precisely the same 
way as are domestically funded projects.
(iv)a project for additional road maintenance, additional supplies to 
hospitals, expansion of national high schools....etc. competes 
directly with a proposed new road, new school,or new food production 
project.
Another area that requires particular attention is that of 
supervising resources allocated for investment purposes. The 
department responsible for project monitoring and reporting should be 
staffed adequately in order to be effective. As reported by Caiden et. 
al. (1974 op. cit. p. 297), a country like Sri Lanka managed to speed 
up the implementation of projects through a division of ’Plan 
Implementation* which was responsible for helping those involved in 
implementing the projects work out schedules of construction, and it 
sent out expediters into the, field for first hand observation etc.
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Therefore, project implementation would work better in the Sri Lankan 
way than is currently practised where the understaffed department 
waits for reports to be sent by the implementing agencies.
Another important measure to improve budgeting is the 
determination of the rate of current expenditure per shilling unit of 
development expenditure incurred for each major government sector 
activity. Such rates would certainly provide a more reliable means of 
predicting expenditure based on the cumulative investment made. The 
rates would have to be reviewed occasionally to accommodate any 
inflationary situation.
As far as improving the role of budget in stabilization policies 
is concerned, a number of measures could be taken. First, the 
forecasts which enter the stabilization policies could be improved by 
being corrected using the realization functions which were developed 
in chapters 8 to 11 above. Using such adjusted forecasts will 
eventually limit the size of forecast errors, thus allowing 
stabilization policy outcomes to be within targeted levels.
Secondly, as regards stabilization policies based on tax revenue 
instruments, the government could lean more on the readily predictable 
sources of taxation ( those with high buoyancy coefficients and those 
which appeared to be more stable) such as income and personal taxes, 
consumption and excise duties, import duties, and parastatal 
dividends, for policy decisions. The less predictable sources should 
be ignored in the policy determination process.
On the other hand, there are some general reformative measures 
which, if initiated, could help to strengthen the budgetary process. 
These include: increasing the pace of development of the personnel
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required in budgetary functions, such as accountants, financiers, 
economists and statisticians. Secondly, efforts have to be made to 
equip the key expenditure and revenue offices with working machines 
such as micro-computers which would help to store and process 
information. Thirdly, the information systems should be developed or 
organized to provide more relevant information. As pointed out by 
Caiden et. al. (1974, op. cit. p. 313), ’officials in the finance 
ministry should find out what they actually use and first reduce the 
flow to just that. No new data should be collected without asking 
who will use what bit at what time for what particular decision. ’ 
Finally, those measures which can produce more accurate and speedier 
accounting have to be taken. The latter would certainly involve 
rationalizing the accounting methods and procedures in use.
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IV THEORETICAL IMPLICATION AND WHAT IS LEFT FOR FURTHER STUDY.
This study has not come out with any new theory relating to 
budgetary systems in developing countries. However, it has been able 
to demonstrate the extent to which the hypotheses developed based on 
group country data could produce different results when applied to 
individual country data. However, a new idea that we have managed to 
bring to the limelight, which hitherto has not received much attention 
in development finance is that of the role of external finance in 
influencing expenditure trend. Other hypotheses had considered 
external financing for its role in complimenting local revenue 
mobilization effort, but this was not evidenced in the analysis.
While this study has focussed on the understanding of the 
factors and decision rules which determine various budget outputs in 
Tanzania, a lot more precise work on the budget behaviour itself and 
its precise influence on the turbulent economy need to be undertaken. 
At least future researchers would find the task relatively easier in 
the light of my modest contribution. Nevertheless, this presupposes 
significant improvements in data collection, and the quality of that 
data both of which are imperative for studies of this kind.
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APPENDIX 1
SOURCES AND RELIABILITY OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND OTHER
STATISTICS IN TANZANIA.
The study with the various conclusions drawn will not be 
complete without some assurance on the source of the data used in the 
various analyses, and the extent to which they can be relied upon. The 
statistics to be covered are mainly of two categories. The first 
category is that for public budget (expenditure and revenue 
inclusive) data, while the second category is that relating to GDP and 
its components.
In the text where some data has been reproduced in a table, the 
main source has been indicated. However, most of the data have not 
been reproduced in the main text, but are presented below in this 
Appendix.
Some details about the source of the data.
(i) Public expenditure and revenues.
The statistics for expenditure and revenues for the period 
1953/54 to 1971/72 are an aggregate of both Central and Local 
Government activities. The local governments were formally abolished 
in 1972. Beginning 1972/73, all Government expenditure and revenue 
data are for the central government.
The statistics of actual expenditure and revenues are based 
mainly on Government accounting records, the main source being the 
Economic Survey which is published each year. For those years when the 
latter was not being published, the main source of data was the Annual 
Statistical Abstract which was prepared by the Government (ie. the 
Economic and Statistics Division of the Treasury). Some of the data in
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the Statistical Abstracts relating to the period to 1953/54 to 1964/65 
have also been published by Chadwyck-Healey Ltd (Cambridge).
The second source of data, particularly the estimates, are the 
various Estimates Volumes. The main ones are the Financial Statements 
and Revenue Estimates Volume, and the Estimates of Expenditure (Supply 
Votes and Development) Volumes II, III and IV.
As regards foreign loans and grants, three main sources were 
used. These were the Economic Survey which was relevant for the yearly 
actual and estimates figures, and the Appropriation Accounts which 
were very valuable for the data on outstanding external debts.
(ii).Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Statistics.
As regards the GDP and its components figures, the main sources 
have been the Economic Survey, the Statistical Abstracts etc.
Besides the internal sources of data, other external sources had 
to be used as well for their valuable data. The latter sources 
comprise of the International Monetary Fund’s Financial Statistical 
base, and the United Nations Orgamization’s National Accounts 
statistical base. Tanzania as a member of the latter institutions, she 
supplies them with information regularly. Therefore, these sources 
were checked for information whenever it was necessary. Such 
information was used also to countercheck the information that was 
obtained from the local sources.
RELIABILITY OF THE STATISTICS.
The local sources of the statistics are not free of problems. In 
the text itself it has often been mentioned of the problem that the 
Government faces over information systems. The paucity of human
535
skills, the inadequacy of complementary facilities such as accounting 
and data processing machines, etc. affect adversely the data that is 
generated by the Government machinery. These deficiencies cause some 
delays to functions such as preparation of accounts and auditing. 
Invariably, these functions are critical for ensuring that the mass of 
information produced by the various agencies can be relied upon. Since 
the accounts are not prepared on time, the information that is 
entered in the various published sources raise some doubts over their 
accuracy. Sometimes it may even take a number of years before some 
audited data are available. The gap in Tanzanian data in the more 
official sources such as the IFM, the World Bank and the UNO, is a 
clear indication of the manitude of the information problem that the 
country faces. Thus, in using whatever Government data is availlable, 
it becomes quite obvious that the most recent ones are likely to have 
more serious errors than the more old data. Therefore, the longer is 
the serial data, the more reliable are the results. This problem of 
deficiencies in data appear to be common to both developing and 
developed countries alike. The fact that the data supplied to the 
various international organisations change from year to year, for both 
developing and developed countries, is an undisputable evidence of the 
existence of this data problem, although it is more acute in the case 
of the former. The latter notwithstanding, whatever data is availlable 
has to be used for analysis. We only have to be cautious about the 
inferences we draw from such analyses.







































































































































# in 1980 prices.
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ENTRY PADIV 31- VEHTAX
1954- 1 .000000 6.00000
1955- 1 .000000 7.00000
1956- 1 .000000 7.00000
1957- 1 .000000 8.00000
1958- 1 .000000 9.00000
1959- 1 .000000 10.0000
1960- 1 .000000 10.0000
1961- 1 .000000 9.00000
1962- 1 .000000 10.0000
1963- 1 .000000 12.0000
1964- 1 .000000 11.0000
1965- 1 .000000 21.0000
1966- 1 .000000 21.0000
1967- 1 .000000 .25.0000
1968- 1 .000000 60.0000
1969- 1 .000000 27.0000
1970- 1 49.0000 40.0000
1971- 1 42.0000 47.0000
1972- 1 63.0000 32.0000
1973- 1 46.0000 42.0000
1974- 1 86.0000 21.0000
1975- 1 106.000 16.0000
1976- 1 76.0000 12.0000
1977- 1 95.0000 12.0000
1978- 1 114.000 12.0000
1979- 1 200.000 12.0000
1980- 1 210.000 34.0000
1981- 1 143.000 56.0000
1982- 1 200.000 70.0000
1983- 1 347.000 77.0000



























































































































































































































































































































































































A P P E N D IX  1
16
in millions.
5^0 A P P E N D IX  1
B> RECURRENT DIRECT INDIRECT
REVENUE# TAXES# TAXES#
ENTRY TORE 1 DITA 14 INDITEX
1954- 1 442.000 136.000 152.000
1955- 1 433.000 126.000 164.000
1956- 1 412.000 112.000 158.000
1957- 1 448.000 122.000 176.000
1958- 1 446.000 122.000 172.000
1959- 1 462.000 108.000 196.000
1960- 1 494.000 112.000 206.000
1961- 1 497.000 122.000 214.000
1962- 1 537.000 121.000 264.000
1963- 1 583.000 124.000 342.000
1964- 1 890.000 142.000 329.000
1965- 1 1018.00 154.000 400.000
1966- 1 1088.00 224.000 414.000
1967- 1 1210.00 233.000 507.000
1968- 1 1327.00 264.000 589.000
1969- 1 1442.00 339.000 661.000
1970- 1 1542.00 352.000 827.000
1971- 1 1626.00 448.000 917.000
1972- 1 1931.00 532.000 899.000
1973- 1 2318.00 602.000 1325.00
1974- 1 3009.00 697.000 1903.00
1975- 1 3984.00 1007.00 2263.00
1976- 1 3909.00 1070.00 2341.00
1977- 1 6129.00 1377.00 3031.00
1978- 1 7095.00 1648.00 3768.00
1979- 1 6812.00 1556.00 4201.00
1980- 1 7757.00 2407.00 4369.00
1981- 1 8872.00 2730.00 5360.00
1982- 1 9783.00 3224.00 6005.00
1983- 1 13645.0 3228.00 7524.00
1984- 1 15466.0 3966.00 9599.00































A P P E N D IX  1
TOTAL CURRENT ECONOMIC SOCIAL























































































































































































































































































































ENTRY EDEX 19 HEX 20 AGREX 21 DEFEX
1954- 1 47.0000 30.0000 26.0000 6.00000
1955- 1 66.0000 37.0000 30.0000 12.0000
1956- 1 71.0000 45.0000 29.0000 12.0000
1957- 1 85.0000 48.0000 34.0000 13.0000
1958- 1 94.0000 48.0000 36.0000 13.0000
1959- 1 99.0000 52.0000 38.0000 14.0000
1960- 1 93.0000 56.0000 43.0000 13.0000
1961- 1 90.0000 57.0000 44.0000 1.00000
1962- 1 123.000 65.0000 63.0000 6.00000
1963- 1 134.000 66.0000 72.0000 12.0000
1964- 1 170.000 55.0000 95.0000 22.0000
1965- 1 219.000 55.0000 76.0000 33.0000
1966- 1 176.000 63.0000 113.000 44.0000
1967- 1 181.000 63.0000 133.000 62.0000
1968- 1 194.000 75.0000 144.000 88.0000
1969- 1 221.000 86.0000 174.000 78.0000
1970- 1 289.000 118.000 218.000 127.000
1971- 1 337.000 152.000 278.000 174.000
1972- 1 379.000 158.000 253.000 260.000
1973- 1 423.000 206.000 322.000 288.000
1974- 1 543.000 290.000 523.000 494.000
1975- 1 757.000 426.000 945.000 730.000
1976- 1 842.000 425.000 845.000 726.000
1977- 1 1007.00 523.000 859.000 910.000
1978- 1 1327.00 669.000 852.000 1349.00
1979- 1 1574.00 724.000 944.000 3298.00
1980- 1 1613.00 721.000 1319.00 1110.00
1981- 1 1738.00 789.000 1450.00
f
1612.00
1982- 1 2440.00 981.000 1399.00 2308.00
1983- 1 2524.00 1020.00 1469.00 1555.00
1984- 1 2890.00 1130.00 2272.00 2660.00
2 2
















































































































































































































































TOTAL IMPORT EXPORT SALES
REVENUE DUTIES DUTIES TAX
YEAR ESTIMATE ESTIMATES ESTIMATES ESTB
1967/68 939 350 47 144
1968/69 1294 404 55 190
1969/70 1520 350 58 390
1970/71 1654 380 68 422
1971/72 1823 348 61 507
1972/73 2356 394 88 644
1973/74 2613 368 112 935
1974/75 3990 648 201 1689
1975/76 3828 525 157 1593
1976/77 4563 577 240 1980
1977/78 5738 605 533 2184
1978/79 6865 950 541 2664
1979/80 7645 1150 410 3236
1980/81 8870 675 400 4825
1981/82 10571 1020 60 5829













































EVENTS WHICH HAVE OCCURRED SUBSEQUENT TO 1982/83: THE CUT-OFF
DATE FOR THE STUDY.
This study has considered in  d e ta il events prio r to the Fiscal 
Year 1982/83. However, a number of changes have taken place in  the 
course of the subsequent years. Such changes need to be visualized in  
the lig h t of the policy dialoque that had been going on between 
Tanzania and Aid Donors, with IMF and the World Bank being the main 
proxies articu la ting  the reform policy conditions of the la t te r .
Between 1982 (when Tanzania launched its  own version of 
structural adjustment programme) and 1986, there had not been an 
agreement between Tanzania and Aid Donors ( i .e .  IMF and World Bank) on 
what the Tanzania's domestic reform policy should exactly constitute  
(see Cassen, 1986: pp.90-92). However, the country had been 
implementing some of the policy targets in  the self-prepared 
structural adjustment programme. The most bold reform measures which 
had been taken by the Government were those of eliminating subsidies 
on agricultural inputs, especially on fe r t i l iz e rs , and on foodstuffs, 
mainly on maize and rice . The la t te r  were in itia te d  in  the 1984/85 
budget. Moreover, in  the same period (1984/85), the export-crop 
producer prices were raised by between 40%-55% nominal prices. The 
raising of agricu ltural producer prices was i ts e lf  a continuation of a 
policy already adopted in  previous years. (Msambichaka, Rugumisa and 
Amani, 1985: pp.3-4).
Other reforms which were in itia te d  in  1984 in  the area of
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agricu ltural products included the removal of a wide range of products 
from the l i s t  that was controlled by the state marketing boards 
(World Bank, 1986: pp.74-75). On the part of the rate of foreign 
exchange, the sh illin g  was devalued by 26% against the do llar in  1984 
(Msambichaka, e t. a l.  o p .c it. p. 3 ). On the part of public spending, 
effo rts  to restrain  public expenditure were in itia te d  which included 
introduction of school fees in  1984/85 and the cut down in  public 
administration employment in  1985/86 (Budget Speech, 1986/87: pp. 17- 
18).
The above measures were not, however, su ffic ien t to convince the 
IMF and the World Bank of the Government ’ s efforts  to in it ia te  
reforms. The policy dialoque continued u n til the middle of 1986 when 
an agreement was reached. The basic conditions of th is  agreement as 
can be detected from Tanzania’s 1986/87 budget included, in te r a lia :
1). Establishing a system of exchange rate adjustment and control 
that would fa c il ita te  the achievement of favourable terms of trade 
with other countries. This measure (coupled by a formal devaluation of 
about 40% in  1986) has led to a devaluation of the sh illin g  against 
the sterling  pound by 216% ( i .e .  from Tsh. 24 to Tsh. 76 over the past 
one year).
2 ). Export-crop producer prices were raised by between 30%-80%.
3). Increase in  trade and imports lib e ra liza tio n .
4 ). Abolishing subsidies to Parastatals.
5 ). Balancing the budget ( i .e .  equating expenditure to revenues).
6 ). Adjusting the level of in terest rates.
7 ). Imposition of further charges (fees) on education, especially 
secondary schools and colleges with the exception of the Universities,
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the Insitu te  of Finance Management, and the In s titu te  of Development 
Management.
The effects of these drastic measures on the economy and the 
budget, coupled by the new foreign money released as part of the 
agreement, are yet to be seen.
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APPENDIX 3.
A DEFINITION OF PUBLIC SECTOR.
The term "public sector" is  used in  connection with a c tiv itie s  
performed by the Central and Local Government. The a c tiv itie s  are of 
two types. F irs t we have the socio-economic functions which include 
services lik e  education, health and welfare services, social 
insurance, and the protective services such as police, f ir e  and the 
administration of justice. The la t te r  have also been labelled "pure 
public goods", which have been defined further by Brown e t. a l .  
(1978: p. 27) as those goods with the characteristics that "each 
individual’s consumption of such a good leads to no substitution  
from any other individual’s consumption of that good". Such goods 
carry the characteristics of non-excludability and non- 
re je c ta b ility . The case of national defence has been used by Brown 
e t. a l . ( ib id . ) to exemplify the concept of pure public goods 
further, in  that, i f  a country is  provided with defence services, i t  
is  extremely d if f ic u lt  to exclude anyone who lives within that 
country from being defended. On the other hand, a p a c ifis t liv in g  
within a country is  defended whether he likes i t  or not. Therefore, 
for such pure public goods, exclusion is  e ither technically not 
feasible or, i f  technically feasible, expensive to apply. 
Furthermore, the pure public goods are considered to be non-rival in  
consumption in  that the addition of one more consumer w il l  not lead 
to subtraction from any other individual’s consumption of that good. 
In  addition to these pure public goods discussed above, there is  a
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second category referred to as "mixed goods”. These are private  
goods with production or consumption externalities  associated with 
them. The existence of technological ex terna lities , in  the sense 
that the production and consumption a c tiv itie s  of one agent or group 
of agents affec t the levels of production and consumption of other 
agents, influences the decisions of producers and consumers 
resulting in  an allocation of resources that d iffe rs  from that which 
the perfectly competitive market would have produced in  the absence 
of externa lities . Externalities are seen to generate market fa ilu res  
which are corrected by government. Depending on whether the 
externality  is  one of "social cost" or "social benefit", the 
government can counteract market fa ilu re  by e ither forcing a 
reduction of output of those goods that are overproduced (eg. those 
causing pollution) or, i t  may encourage the production of those 
goods that are underproduced by, fo r example, d irec tly  producing the 
service (eg. education or health services), or by providing 
consumption or production subsidies. The second category of 
a c tiv itie s  carried out by the public sector in  Tanzania is  that of 
undertaking d ire c tly  productive investments, a function that ought 
to have been performed by private or market sector. A p r io r i, the 
absence of local enterpreneural, local savings and lack of in terest 
by foreigners to invest in  Tanzania forced the Government to take up 
the in it ia t iv e  of developing the various economic sectors. As 
already highlighted in  Chapter 3, the Government has a substantial 
investment interests in  d irec t productive sectors. These investments 
operate as public corporations (known as Parastatal Organizations) 
with th e ir  financial and management separated from the parent
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m inistries under which they were created.
This study concentrates more on the f i r s t  category of a c tiv itie s  
which involve the provision of the mixed and pure public goods, and 
which also depend fu lly  on the government budget for th e ir  
financing. The finances are provided in  the annual budget that is  
approved by the Parliament in  mid-June of every year. The Budget 
covers both expenditure and revenue forecasts of the ensuing period.
The Paras ta ta l Organizations * budgets interface with the 
government budget takes place in  two ways. F irs t there is  the stage 
of setting up the corporations. In  the la t te r  case the in i t ia l  
capita l is  subscribed by the Government through the development 
budget. The second stage is  when the Government has to intervene to 
subsidize loss making corporations. In  practice, the la t te r  do not 
have to account d ire c tly  to the Government fo r the resources 
transfered to them, unless they are requested to do so. Normally, 
the corporations* accountability is  to the Board of Directors. The 
Government gets to know how the resources have been used through the 
corporations* Annual Reports. The la t te r  pattern of reporting is  
certa in ly  very d iffe ren t from the one used by government departments 
which have to report to the Treasury about th e ir  spending on monthly 
and quarterly basis.
In  short, in th is  study the public sector a c tiv itie s  w il l  be 
considered in  as much as they f a l l  within the recurrent and 
development expenditure budget which is  financed by Government 
revenues.
F inally , another point that requires some c la r ific a tio n  is  that
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of the treatment of Local and Central Government in  the study. The 
Local Governments existed upto 1972, when they were abolished. This 
study has combined the figures of the two levels of government. The 
two have been combined because, in the case of the local 
governments, the amounts which were being spent a t that level were 
re la tiv e ly  small, and secondly, most of the revenues were of 
grants nature ( ie . from the Central Government).
APPENDIX 6.
TABLE6A-1: REGRESSION RESULTS ON REVENUE -GDP ELASTICITY,
(FOR THE PERIOD 1953/54 TO 1983/84)
REGRESSION EQUATION. R2
Log(R) = Log-3.7744 + 1.225Log(Y) 0.99
(-19.2) (57.6)
Log(F) = Log-1.8395 + 0.8406Log(Y) 0.88
(-3.5) (14.7)
Log(L) = Log-10.085 + 1.749Log(Y) 0.98
(-23.4) (37.4)
Log(S) = Log-11.689 + 1.901Log(Y) 0.97
(-21.0) (32.5)
Log(I) = Log-5.6726 + 1.2762Log(Y) 0.98
(-17.1) (35.5)
SYMBOLS USED.
Y - GDP at current prices.
R - Total recurrent revenues(taxes)
F - Foreign transactions taxes.
L - Local transactions taxes.
S - Sales taxes.
I - Income taxes.
The figures in parentheses are the t_ratios, which were tested for
significance at the 5% level of significance^
All parameters were considered to be significant in view of the 
high values of t statistics.
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1967/68 84.2 3.04 81.16 26.7
1968/69 122.8 5.74 107.06 18.66
1969/70 142.0 230.2 -88.2 -0 .39
1970/71 330 319.6 10.4 0.04
1971/72 504 535.5 -31.5 -0 .06
1972/73 518.3 746.6 -228.3 -0.31
1973/74 681.3 1044.3 -363.0 -0.35
1974/75 1038.6 1191.0 -152.4 -0.13
1975/76 1032.6 1967.8 -935.2 -0 .48
1976/77 1402.1 1804. -401.9 -0.23
1977/78 1368.8 2352. -982.2 -0.42
1978/79 2427.2 3848. -1420.8 -0.37
1979/80 2320. 4219.3 -1899.3 -0.45
1980/81 1872. 4050. -2178. -0.54
1981/82 1795. 4897. -3102. -0.64
1982/83 1852. 2584. -732. -0 .29
25950.08 11293.62
Average Error = ( £ l3 | /N ) / ( l 2 /N )  
= 705.86/1621.88 
= 43.5*
Maximum Error = 3102/1621.88 
= 191.3*
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, Economic Survey, Various Years.
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1967/68 2.5 3.04 -0.54 -0.18
1968/69 0.1 5.74 -5.64 -0 .99
1969/70 0.4 1.4 -1 .0 -0.72
1970/71 0.1 2.2 -2 .1 -0 .96
1971/72 37.8 70.1 -32.3 -0 .46
1972/73 62.4 110.7 -48.3 -0.44
1973/74 214.4 366.7 -152.3 -0.42
1974/75 377.3 408.0 -30.7 -0.08
1975/76 468.7 717.2 -248.5 -0.35
1976/77 625.5 831.6 -206.1 -0.25
1977/78 709.1 1216.2 -507.1 -0.42
1978/79 1158.0 2123.0 -965.0 -0 .46
1979/80 2231.0 2061.0 170.0 0.09
7916.88 2369.58
Average Error = ( 5 / 3 l / N ) / ( 2 l 2  /N) 
= 182.28/608.99 
= 29.9%
Maximum Error = 965/608.99 
= 158.5%
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, Economic Survey, Various Years.
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1967/68 81.7 0 81.7 -
1968/69 122.7 0 122.7 -
1969/70 121.5 228.8 -107.3 -0.47
1970/71 269.7 317.4 -47.7 -0.15
1971/72 347.4 469.4 -122.0 -0 .26
1972/73 455.9 635.9 -180.0 -0 .29
1973/74 466.9 677.6 -210.7 -0.31
1974/75 661.3 783.0 -121.7 -0.16
1975/76 563.9 1250.6 -686.7 -0.55
1976/77 776.6 972.4 -195.8 -0.21
1977/78 783.2 1135.8 -352.6 -0.31
1978/79 687.2 1927.0 -1239.8 -0.65
1979/80 1666.2 1836.0 -169.8 -0.10
10233.9 3638.5
Average Error = (^7/3/ /N )/(J E 2  /N) 
= 279.89/787.23 
= 35.6%
Maximum Error = 1239.8/787.23 
= 157.5%
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, Economic Survey, Various Years.
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Table 9A-4: Data for Commitments. Disbursements, and Computed Ratios.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
•  V « J  1 4 /  *
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Commitments 34.8 24.9 20.0 23.9 32.5 33.2 19.3 8.6
Disbursements 34 31 17 11 29 33 25 20
% 97.7 124.5 85 46 89.2 99.4 129.5 232.5
WEST GERMANY
Year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Commitments 57.8 36.4 62 78.8 267. 4 38.3 69.8 27
Disbursements 21.2 30 56.3 80.5 209 54.5 59 36.3
% 36.6 82.4 90.8 102.2! 78.2 142. 3 84.5 134.'
SWEDEN
Year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Commitments 58.1 181.6 72.2 185.9 16.6 82.7 78.1 60.8
Disbursements 51.8 57.7 114.4 93.4 78.1 76.5 73.8 69.3
% 89.2 31.8 158.4 50.2 470.5 92.5 94.5 113.!
NETHERLANDS





























Year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Commitments 17.9 92.4 110 47.2 9.1 13.4 76.8 25.9
Disbursements 20.3 9.7 92.1 28.6 19.4 27.2 35.2 33.9

























































































Year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Commitments - 8.4 69.5 117.1 30.6 33 14.5 36.9
Disbursements - 11.7 19.8 46.5 74.5 56.0 41.2 43.9
% - 139.3 28.5 39.7 243.5 169.7 284.1 118.9
OVERALL
Year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Commitments 409.1 637.8 762.1 877.2 946.6 702.6 728.4 524
Disbursements 274.3 348.8 587.5 649.6 810.2 684.6 702.0 609
% 67 54.7 77.1 74.1 85.6 97.4 96.4 116
Source: OECD: Geographical Distribution of fin a n tia l flows to 




THE CARRYrOVER OF UNDISPURSED APPROPRIATIONS
Country
Financial limits on 
the carry-over 
authority








Canada Undlsbursed funds 
lapse
- - -
Denmark Undlsbursed funds 
lapse
Funds ifnder cer­
tain heads aay be 
carried over to- 
next FT to com­
pensate for over 
expenditure else­
where
Finland -Grants can be carried 
forward with no H a l t
-Loans lapse
The two following 
fiscal years
Autoaatlc
France Funds In principle 
lapsing but usually 
a 10# carry-over 
authority
3ne year Minister of the 
budget
Soae appropria­
tions for capital 
assistance bene­
fit from a non- 
lapsing provision
Germany Undlsbursed funds In 
principle lapse(l)




Carry-over la not 
additional to new. 
ly voted appro­
priations
Netherlands Undlsbursed funds In 
principle lapse(2)
Parliament with 
the Minister for 
Developaent Co­
operation
Minister can indl> 





New Zealand Undlsbursed appropria­
tions lapse
Norway -Multilateral aid 
lapses
-No lialt on the carry­
over of bilateral and 
aultl-bl funds
Two years Ministry of 
Finance
•
Sweden Unlimited carry-over 
authority
- Automatic -
Switcerland Undlsbursed funds 
lapse
- - -
United Kingdom Fluids lapse except 
for a £15 alllion 
carry-over facility
On* year Autoaatlc
















1) In (one case* carry-over for an individual itea aay be specifically or generally allowed 
by legislation.
2) Funds lapse in principle but undertakings on aid voluae are regarded as cuaulative.
Source: Adapted from OECD (1981) Compendium of Aid Procedures. 




Project Investaent Costs Fron Selected Projects of Third
Five Year Planning Period (in -M illions of Shillings)
P r o j e c t . *In itia l'E stim ates  Actual Costs Change
Ilwatex Expansion 413*90 413*90 b
Ilusona Textile  M il l* * * 424*60 565*oa 33*07
Tabora Spinning M il l 313*50 245.00 (21.85)
Ubcya Textile  M il l 433*70 *433*70 “ o-
Polyester Cotton Blend 305*00 869*00 184*92
ICiltcx Expansion 96*3.0 252.33 162*02
Ubungo Garoents 29*70 ’ 15.4 (48.15)
Ur.afUcL Expansion 6*90 6*90 0
Ubungo Spinning M~ni 162*35 185*90 14*51
Tanga Cenent Factory*** 676*32 843*19 24*67
libeyn Cenent Factory * 595*66 * 714*35 19*93
national Bicycles 53*50 67*20 25*61
Insulated tfire Cables 19*20 36*90 92*19
libeyn R im  Inplencnts*** 42*00* 85*00 102*38
Motor Vehicle Assenbly 31.00 ’50*00 61*29
Transforaers nnd Switch Ccars* 774*705 90.108 20*62
Iiorogoro Sjjoe Factory 108*20 228*00 110*72
Ilmnza Tannery** 32*50 40*40 24.30
Powier Detergent*** 57*62 59*04 2*11
Pharnaceuticals***' 49*26 72*00 46.16
Polysacks* 30*00 40*75 35*83
Moslil Malt Pro ject** 200.00 223,452 11.73
Total 4,156.115 5,537.52 33.24
Notes: Cost overuns due to delays (*), Due to incomplete information (**)
Source: adapted from Stein, Howard, Planning and the Crisis in Tanzania, 
Table 3, p.26. University of Dar es Salaam (Seminar Paper).
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APPENDIX 10
TABLE 10A-1;RECURRENT EXPENDITURE DATA.
C ol.(1) C o l.(2) C o l.(3) Col.4
YEAR ESTIMATED ACTUAL ACTUAL LESS = (3 ) / ( l )
EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE ESTIMATE (* )
1967/68 1065 1065 0 0
1968/69 1186 1186 0 0
1969/70 1527 1526.7 -0 .3 0
1970/71 1631 1631.4 0.4 0
1971/72 1596 1596 0 0
1972/73 2087 2223 136 6.5
1973/74 2513 2869 356 14.2
1974/75 3464.3 4373 908.7 26.2
1975/76 3630 4300 670 18.5
1976/77 4183 4702.5 519.5 12.4
1977/78 5461 5563.3 102.3 1.9
1978/79 6971 8295 1324 19.0
1979/80 7788 9229 1441 18.5
1980/81 9342 10136 794 8.5
1981/82 11605 13214.1 1609.1 13.9
1982/83 14144 14871.5 727.5 5.1




TABLE 1QA-2: MINISTERIAL ERROR DATA.
(A ll Sh. Figures are in m illions) 
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL EDUCATION





0 -4  
-1 .6  -
-1 -8 -11 47 
















-13 0 -32 
-2 .2  -  -3 .4
MINISTRY HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE











21 17 1 15 





YEAR 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
ERROR (Sh) 17 17 -8 5 5 -18 -12
ERROR (* )  11.4 7.7 -3 .0  1.8 1.7 -4 .9  -3 .4
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Appendix 10, Table 10A-2 continue.
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SERVICE
YEAR 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5 75/6 76/7
ERROR (Sh) 21 4 2 -10 14 -4  27 -124 62 -43
ERROR (%) 40.4 6 2.5 -6 .7  9.9 -2 9.2 -34.3 14.8 -32.1
YEAR 77/8 78/9 79/80 . 80/1 81/2 82/3
ERROR (Sh) -33 1554 639 U35 372 724
ERROR (* )  -5 170 487.8 741.8 22.8 52.9
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND WILDLIFE.











4 -5  
.8 -6 . 1 -0
1 8 
.5 2
YEAR 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
ERROR (Sh) 2 20 -5 -36 75 11 -25 60
ERROR (*) 2 10.9 -4 .9 -29 75.8 8.5 -16.3 39
MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS, LABOUR AND WORKS.
YEAR 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5 75/6
ERROR (Sh) -9 5 59 -7 -3 -16 -14 6 -1
ERROR (*) -19 5.3 43.1 -4 .3  -2 -17.8 -15.6 85.7 -10
YEAR 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
ERROR (Sh) -1 0 -54 41 8 -1 0
ERROR (*) -9 .1 - -16. 7 13.3 11.9 -1 .0 —
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Appendix 10, Table 10A-2 Continue.
MINISTRY OF LANDS. SETTLEMENT AND WATER DEVELOPMENT.
YEAR 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5 75/6
ERROR (SH) -2 ^2 4 I 6 0 0 2 1
ERROR (S)-10.5 “9.5 12.5 -12.5 6.3 -  -  16.7 16.7
YEAR 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
ERROR (Sh) 0 ^1 ^2 7 0 -1 0
ERROR (%) ~ -3 .3  -5 .6  17.1 -2
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS 
YEAR 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5 75/6
ERROR (Sh) -1 12 13 0 =8 ^4 48 40 lT ”
ERROR (%) -1 .1  13.3 12 -  -5 .7  -2 .5  25.7 17.5 4.6
YEAR 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
ERROR (Sh) 26 58 43 53 105 106 152
ERROR {%) 9.9 20.1 11.7 13.1 23.5 16.8 22.3
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
YEAR 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5
ERROR (Sh) 1 0 2 -1 2 -3 -14 11
ERROR (*) 6.3 - 10 -2 .7 8.3 -8 .6 -28 23.9
YEAR 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
ERROR (Sh) 16 23 13 13 33 35 -6 51
ERROR (£) 47.1 46.9 23.2 15.7 37.5 34.3 -3 .4 37
Appendix 10, Table 10A-2 Continue.
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND TOURISM.
YEAR 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5
ERROR (Sh) 0 0 1 -3 -1 1 0 3
ERROR (*) - - 9.1 -18.8 -7 .1 6.3 - 25
YEAR 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
ERROR (SH) 3 3 1 6 0 -10 -11 0




68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5
ERROR (Sh) 1 1 1 2 1 -1 1 2
ERROR (%) 14.3 12.5 5.9 10.5 5.3 -4 .3 3.6 6.3
YEAR 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
ERROR (Sh) -1 1 3 0 7 5 4 6
ERROR (%) -2 .6 2.4 6.8 - 14 7.9 4.6 6.5
MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND DEVPLAN.
YEAR 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5
ERROR (Sh) -6  -8 68 -45 -55 -18 -24 120
ERROR (* )  -4 .4  -4 .1 30.1 -16.9 -20.4 -12.8 -13 73.6
YEAR________ 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
ERROR (Sh) -239 -209 -305 -169 -503 -727 -30 -753
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Appendix 10, Table 10A-2 Continue.
MINISTRY OF INDUSTRIES, COMMERCE (& MINERAL RESOURCES & POWER).
YEAR 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5
ERROR (Sh) -1 0 -1 -2 - 1 0 - 2  2
ERROR <*> -10 - -10 -20 -11.1 -  -14.3 10
YEAR 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
ERROR (Sh) 2 -1 3 -9  0 1 1 18
ERROR (* ) 15.4 -4 .5 12.5 -12.5 -  1.8 1.5 25.4
SOURCE: United Republic of Tanzania. Computed from M in isteria l data





















Ikulu 21.2 27.1 25.1 1.28 1.18 0.93
Deni la  Taifa 5999.0 6632.6 6426.6 1.11 1.07 0.97
O fis i ya Rais 266.4 423.3 311.7 1.59 1.17 0.73
O fisi ya Makamu 9.9 12.9 10.5 1.30 1.06 0.82
Uturaishi 135.9 167.2 167.6 1.23 1.23 1.00
Uongozi 3.4 4.0 3.4 1.18 1.00 0.85
Nje 193.0 308.3 280.3 1.60 1.45 0.91
Mwenendo 4.1 5.7 4.3 1.36 1.02 0.75
Tumeajiri 3.2 3.8 3.3 1.19 1.03 0.87
Waziri Mkuu 672.4 975.7 757.5 1.45 1.13 0.79
Ngome 2319.3 3107.0 2461.8 1.34 1.06 0.79
Jkt 376.2 538.9 445.0 1.43 1.18 0.83
Mahakama 141.6 202.9 163.2 1.43 1.15 0.80
Sheria 18.7 19.4 18.4 1.04 1.00 0.96
Bunge 21.8 30.7 26.7 1.42 1.22 0.86
Kilimo & Mifugo 837.4 1072.7 889.7 1.28 1.06 0.83
Viwanda & Bihashara 95.1 118.6 107.7 1.25 1.13 0.90
Ukaguzi 15.0 19.5 19.5 1.30 1.30 1.00
Elimu 1433.4 1689.1 1639.7 1.18 1.14 0.95
Mawasiliano& Ujenzi 773.3 1115.0 773.3 1.44 1.00 0.69
Ardhi M a lia s ili U ta li i  214.6 281.0 219.7 1.31 1.02 0.78
Maji Nishati Madini 103.3 224.4 132.1 2.17 1.28 0.59
Hazina 410.8 472.9 410.8 1.15 1.00 0.87
Mambo ya Ndani 1387.7 2036.8 1612.4 1.47 1.16 0.79
Afya 561.3 773.2 694.3 1.38 1.24 0.89
Mipango na Uchumi 45.0 59.6 50.3 1.32 1.12 0.85
Radio Tanzania 48.2 51.9 48.1 1.08 1.00 0.93
Makao Makuu 24.5 27.7 27.0 1.12 1.09 0.97
Tumebei 6.5 8.3 6.6 1.28 1.02 0.80
U linzi 73.0 81.5 76.0 1.12 1.04 0.93
Scopo 3.9 6.9 6.4 1.77 1.64 0.93
Law Reform Commission 2.1 2.7 2.3 1.29 1.10 0.85
Total M inistry/Depart.10201.6 13841.9 11369.2 1.36 1.11 0.82
Special Expenditure 2036.0 2036.0 2036.0 1.00 1.00 1.00
S erikali Za Mitaa
Wilaya 1315.7 4100.0 3246.5 3.12 2.47 0.79
M iji 336.4 747.2 686.8 2.22 2.04 0.92
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Appendix 10, Table 10A-3 Continue.
Co.5 Co.6 Co. 7 Co.8 Co.9 Co.10
REGIONS
Arusha 86.0 107.9 97.4 1.25 1.13 0.90
Pwani 62.8 113.2 71.4 1.80 1.14 0.63
Dodoma 102.2 123.4 123.4 1.21 1.02 0.84
Iringa 80.6 106.6 91.2 1,32 1.13 0.86
Kigoma 63.3 82.8 70.3 1.31 1.11 0.84
Kilimanjaro 90.1 119.2 93.7 1.32 1.04 0.79
Lindi 57.4 76.3 61.4 1.33 1.07 0.80
Mara 72.7 109.8 79.4 1.51 1.09 0.72
Mbeya 83.0 118.8 87.6 1.43 1.05 0.73
Morogoro 107.1 130.2 117.4 1.22 1.10 0.90
Mtwara 76.2 87.1 82.1 1.14 1.08 0.95
Mwanza 97.7 119.9 107.5 1.22 1.10 0.90
Ruvuma 57.8 97.4 69.5 1.69 1.20 0.71
Shinyanga 89.7 97.3 92.5 1.08 1.03 0.95
Singida 62.7 88.2 68.8 1.41 1.10 0.78
Tabora 75.9 128.6 93.0 1.69 1.23 0.72
Tanga 93.5 116.3 105.6 1.24 1.13 0.91
Kagera 58.6 50.3 63.2 0.86 1.08 1.26
Dar es Salaam 33.8 13.5 9.7 0.40 0.29 0.73
Rukwa 49.7 75.8 54.0 1.53 1.09 0.72
Total for Regions 1500.6 1962.7 1619.9 1.31 1.08 0.82
Grand Total 21410.6 29347.4 25410.1 1.37 1.19 0.87
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, Treasury Documents.
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APPENDIX 11
TABLE 11A-1; DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE DATA.
(Shs. are in m illio n s .)
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col.3= Col.4=
YEAR ACTUAL ESTIMATED Col:2-1 Col:3/2
EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE #
(Shs.) (Shs.) (Shs.) (* )
1967/68 344 277 67 24.2
1968/69 461 320 141 44.1
1969/70 610 703 -93 -13.2
1970/71 830 910 -80 -8 .8
1971/72 884 1182 -298 -25.2
1972/73 956 1379 -423 -30.7
1973/74 1629 2065 -436 -21.1
1974/75 1703 2259 -556 -24.6
1975/76 1669 3010 -1341 -44.6
1976/77 3244 3502 -258 -7 .4
1977/78 3331 4335 -1004 -23.2
1978/79 4749 5296 -547 -10.3
1979/80 5184 7187 -2003 -27.9
1980/81 4759 7041 -2282 -32.4
1981/82 5185 6622 -1437 -21.7
1982/83 4404 4816 -412 -8 .6
TOTAL 50904 11378
AVERAGE ERROR = C^3(/N)/(^2/N)
= (11378/16)/(50904/16) 
= 22.4%
# -  The to ta l for column 3 is for the absolute figures




TABLE 11A-2: MINISTERIAL DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE ERRORS. 












































































































Appendix 11, Table 11A-2 Continues.
MINISTRY OF INDUSTRIES, COMMERCE, MINERAL RESOURCES AND POWER. 
YEAR 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5

















MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND TOURISM:
YEAR 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5
ERROR (* ) 0 -33.3 -100 -100 -80 -66.7 N/A 0
YEAR 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
ERROR (%) 0 -28.6 -62.5 300 -5 -25 0 -50
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE:
YEAR 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5
ERROR (* ) 40.4 -51 12.8 15.3 -8 .6 -27.6  25.9 8.5
YEAR 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
ERROR (%) N/A -28.6 36.1 -13.3 -36.2 -39 38.1 N/A
Appendix 11, Table 11A-2 Continue.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
YEAR 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5
ERROR (* ) -50 0 0 0 0 0 N/A 0
YEAR 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
ERROR (* ) 0 -88.9 0 -50 -34.8 0 28.6 22.2
MINISTRY OF LAND, SETTLEMENT AND WATER DEVELOPMENT:
YEAR 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5
ERROR (* ) -46 -50.9 -41 -12.5 -10 -40 N/A 18.8
YEAR 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
ERROR (%) -23.2 -55.7 -47.5 -29.2 -48.7 -36.0 21.2 1.2
MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATION AND WORKS:
YEAR 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5
ERROR {%) --33.8 27.8 -30.2 -13.3 -8 .2 -21.8 N/A -20.4
YEAR 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
ERROR (%) -26.4 -6  -32.8  -53 -30.7 -51.1 -24 .8  -9 .4
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Appendix 11, Table 11A-2 Continue.
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS
YEAR 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5
ERROR (*) -33.3 -50 -28.6 -18.2 -9 .1 -18.8 N/A -20.4
YEAR 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
ERROR (*) 30 0 10.5 -23.1 -20.5 8.3 3.6 8.9
MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND PLANNING;
YEAR 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 7172 72/3 73/4 74/5
ERROR (X) -10 -2 .2 223.7 -41.9 -21.5 -34.5 -0 .1 -38.5
YEAR 75/6 76/7 77/8 78/9 79/80 80/1 81/2 82/3
ERROR (* )  -54.4 -55 -35.3 -21.8 -45.9 -72 -89.2 -47.5
NOTE: (a) N/A- The figures for this period were not available for the 
computation of errors.
(b) Error is the difference between the actual and the prediction 
divided into the prediction and expressed as a percentage.
SOURCE: United Republic of Tanzania, Computed from M in is tria l data as




Table 11A-3: Share of Parastatal Enterprises* Capital Formation in
Total National Capital Formation.
Parastatal National Share of
Investiment Investment Parastatal 
to National
Period (Tsh.in m ill) (Tsh.in m ill) ( * )
1971 467.5 2591 18
1972 500 2439 21
1973 516 2760 19
1974 571 3516 16
1975 1098 4004 27
1976 1662 5597 30
1977 2538 7524 34
1978 2517 8094 31
1979 2353 9458 25
1980 2526 9685 26
1981 2174 11130 20
1982 3533 12235 29
1983 2556 11068 23
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, Economic Survey , Various Years 
( especially 1982 and 1983)
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APPENDIX 12
TABLE 12A-1:DETERMINANT OF FOCASTING ERRORS USING ADJUSTED ESTIMATES
YEAR ACTUAL AJUSTED ERROR
EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES
1967/8 305 -71 376
1968/9 412 -184 596
1969/70 369 410 -41
1970/1 688 530 158
1971/2 555 520 +35
1972/3 360 881 -521
1973/4 850 1372 -522
1974/5 1865 1409 456
1975/6 1804 1888 84
1976/7 855 1913 -1058
1977/8 1936 2950 -1014
1978/9 4134 3147 987
1979/80 5261 5580 -319
1980/1 4865 4394 471
1981/2 5373 4884 489
TOTAL (Absolute) 7127
NOTE: (a). Average error as a ratio of GDP is derived as follows:
( 2 W n )/ ( £ g/N) = (7127/15)/(314703/15) = 2.27
( E stands for errors, while G stands for GDP values).
(b) The Adjusted Estimates have been computed using the 
Realization Function: A = -548.103 + 1.163E
SOURCE: United Republic of Tanzania, Estimates of Public Expenditure, 
Various Years. ( Applies to data on actual expenditure).
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APPENDIX 13
TABLE 13A-1: DATA ON PRIMARY SCHOOLS.












1967/8 765169 16377 61913 1884*
1968/9 776109 16577 134005 3896*
1969/70 827974 17790 146734 18569*
1970/1 902609 19876 137302 38387
1971/2 1003396 20938 167963 47687
1972/3 1106387 23165 INC 56987
1973/4 1288886 25254 129635 66287
1974/5 1532953 28783 275370 75587
1975/6 1954442 39245 288235 129495
1976/7 2194213 45330 358955 175750
1977/8 2913000 64000 578128 236535
1978/9 3197000 77000 630294 309761
1979/80 3361000 81000 740179 393793
1980/1 3531000 82000 819484 473678
1981/2 3504000 88000 1085447 524837
1982/3 3553000 90000 INC 572703
NOTES: INC- stands for incomplete: the Accounts were not complete for
that period. Hence, data was not extracted.
*-no cummulative investment from prior years (i.e. 1966/67
downwards).
SOURCE: United Republic of Tanzania; The Economic Survey, Various
Years. Estimates of Public Expenditure (Supply Votes-Regional) 
Volume 111, Various Years, and Estimates of Public 
Expenditure (Supply Votes - Ministries), Various Years.
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APPENDIX 13.
TABLE 13A-2: DATA RELATING TO SECONDARY SHOOLS.
YEAR STUDENT TEACHER OFFICE MAINTENANCE SPECIAL RUNNING
NUMBER NUMBER EXPENSES AND EXPEND. OF SCHOOL
RUNNING EXP. EXPENSES
*000Shs. *000Shs. *000Shs. *000S]
1967/8 28043 1336 N/A 396 396 N/A
1968/9 29958 1474 3606 711 1133 N/A
1969/70 31217 1638 N/A N/A N/A N/A
1970/1 32603 1706 4311 1347 1167 N/A
1971/2 33413 1747 3999 1248 217 N/A
1972/3 34502 1626 5717 1966 264 N/A
1973/4 35926 1855 5078 2820 779 N/A
1974/5 38327 1947 N/A N/A N/A N/A
1975/6 39947 2225 4317 3043 240 40726
1976/7 41965 2355 5379 3423 275 40965
1977/8 41792 2392 6452 4306 1075 49215
1978/9 40298 2230 6428 3948 2551 48083
1979/80 38830 2121 4892 4893 3186 42789
1980/1 38292 2105 4455 5774 3546 71896
1981/2 38982 2054 N/A N/A N/A N/A
1982/3 39737 2213 5257 12149 3024 144493
SOURCE: United Republic of Tanzania,
1). Estimates of Public Expenditure_ Supply Votes (Ministries 
and Regions), Various Years.
2). The Economic Survey, Various Years.
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APPENDIX 13.
TAB.1^A-3: DATA RELATING TO HEALTH.
YEAR No. OF DR.s, 
ASS. MED. OF., 
& MED. OF.
No. OF ALL 
STAFF (DR. 
AMO.,NURSES







’ 000s Shs. in mill
1971/2 969 5796 57136 137.5
1972/3 1078 6423 63811 INC
1973/4 1248 7174 82517 251.45
1974/5 1402 8115 87258 323.07
1975/6 1646 9086 93734 333.86
1976/7 1880 10561 98418 393.23
1977/8 2092 11783 105313 502.48
1978/9 2323 13559 107780 542.60
1979/80 2547 15105 108744 570.82
1980/1 2830 16913 112298 702.60
1981/2 3214 19300 118510 829.00
NOTE: #— The expenditure is for Hospital Services and Preventive
Services, It combines centrally (Ministerial) incurred 
expenditure and Regionally incurred expenditure.
INC— Stands for incomplete: data not available in sufficient 
details.
SOURCE: United Republic of Tanzania, Estimates of Public Expenditure
/





Illustrative summary of the recurrent expenditure implications of 
projects as a proportion of investment expenditure across development 













Primary Schools 0.06 - 7.0
Secondary Schools 0.08 - 0.72
Universities 0.02 - 0.22
HEALTH
District Hospitals 0.11 - 0.30
General Hospitals 0.183
Medical Auxiliary Training Schools 0.14
Nurses College 0.20
Nutrition Rehabilitation Unit 0.34
Rural Health Centers 0.27 - 0.71
Urban Health Centers 0.17
HOUSING 0.03
MANUFUCTURING, COMMERCE, and CONSTRUCTION 0.01
ROADS
Feeder Roads 0.06 - 0.14
Paved Roads 0.03 - 0.07
Social and rural development 0.04
Tourism 0.05
Note:
These coefficients are drawn from a very restricted sample of 
developing countries, and are meant to illustrate the variability 
one can observe across sectors and projects.
Example: If a poltechnic school costs $ 1 mill, to construct and 
equip, on the basis of an Mr" coefficient of 0.17, we can esti_ 
mate that it would cost on average $ 170,000 in each subsquent 
year to pay the teaching staff, to operate facilties and to 
maintain the buildings.
Source: Adapted from Heller 1979: op. cit. p. 39.
APPENDIX 14.
NOTE ON THE USE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRES.
The questionnaires appearing in this appendix were used by the 
researcher mainly as a guide to the interviews he held with the 
accounting officers responsible for budget matters at both Ministerial 
and Regional levels. However, the questionnaire on recurrent 
expenditure (pp. 583-587) was mailled to accounting officers in some 
of the outlaying Regions for completion.
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APPENDIX 14(a).
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RECURRENT EXPENDITURE BUDGET TO BE COMPLETED BY
MINISTERIAL AND REGIONAL OFFICERS INVOLVED IN BUDGET PREPARATION.
GENERAL
1. What is the office designation of officer in charge of 
recurrent expenditure budget preparation?
2. What is the number of establishments (sections, departments, 
or divisions) taken care of in the budget prepared at this 
level?
3. Does this department receive mini-estimates from the 
establishments?
4. If answer to question 3 above is Yes, at what time of the 
fiscal year are such mini-estimates received?
5. What is the size of staff working on the budget.........
How many have post form four education...................
How many have at least 1 year training in accounting or 
finance/economics ..................................
6. What is the staff establishment for the budget office?
7. What is the staff short fall in each key position?
8. Is there staff misallocation in the budget office? (state 
the extent of misallocation).
9. Does manpower shortage in the section affect the preparation 
of the budget? Explain.
HOW ESTIMATES ARE PREPARED.
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10. Are there (written) guidelines for preparing the estimates 
(YES/NO)
11. If answer to question 10 above is YES, give answers to the 
following questions.
11.1 From whom are the guidelines received?
11.2 At what date are they received?
11.3 How specific are they? (ie. do they include figure
limits, ratios, indices etc.) Give a brief comment.
11.4 Can you follow them (mention any problems you have 
with such guidelines)
(Kindly provide me with most recent copy of the 
guidelines).
12. Do you receive any additional advice before preparing the 
estimates (YES/NO)
13. If the answer to question 12 above is YES, provide answers 
to the following
13.1 From whom do you receive the advice (name of office)
13.2 At what time of the year are they received?
14. Do you see any body from the reviewing authority for more 
advice?
15. If answer to question 14 is YES, who are they? (name of 
office)
16. What additional information or instructions can you get 
from the reviewing authority. Mention briefly.
17. What factors do you take into account in estimating 
personal emoluments................ ......
18. Is there a continuous review of the staffing position to
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justify present and projected employment in the 
ministry/department etc.
19. What factors do you take into account in estimating non­
personal emolument expenses, kindly mention any special 
methodology (formula) used in estimating seme of the major 
items.........
20. How do you take into account the changing price situation 
in preparing the estimates?
21. Do you consult the Ministry of Manpower Development for any 
advice during the budget preparation session?
22. What other factors (qualitative and quantitative) influence 
your decision of what to ask for?
23. Can you tell what you are likely to get out of what you 
have prepared?
24. If the answer to question 23 is YES, then, how do you know?
25. Are you ever in danger of getting the amount requested cut 
down significantly? (YES/NO)
26. If answer to question 25 is YES, how do you protect 
yourself? What steps or measures do you take to ensure that 
the cutting would not affect your real requirement?
27. Besides what you may request which is constrained by 
government’s limited resources, do you attempt to prepare 
realistic estimates?
28. If answer to question 27 is YES, answer the following
questions:
28.1 Do you have evidence for such work?
28.2 What methods (techniques) do you use to forecast the
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estimates given the present level of cummulative 
investment and activity in your Department /Min i s t ry ?
29. If answer to question 27 is YES, and if there is a 
significant discrepancy between such annual figures and 
what you are limited to, do you sound any warnings to your 
reviewing officers about what the repercussions might be?
(YES/NO Any evidence of a report nature?)
30. If answer to question 27 is NO, why has this not be done?
31. If you want to initiate a new programme which is not of
development nature (ie. is not capital expenditure), how 
would you set about getting new funds? (Describe briefly 
the procedure you follow and the analysed information that 
you would have to provide)
32. At what stage of processing development projects do you 
include their recurrent expenditure in your recurrent 
budget?
33. Do you make a forecast of recurrent costs associated with 
new development projects being undertaken? Any evidence?
34. In estimating recurrent costs for activities requiring big 
outlays, do you consider various alternatives of carrying 
out that activity which would keep costs down? (YES/NO)
35. If answer to question 34 is YES, kindly cite a few examples 
of activities in the 1984/85 budget where the alternatives 
were considered, and the type of comparison or analysis 
that was carried out.
36. In view of the present foreign exchange problems, do your 
estimates indicate costs related to directly imported
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resources and locally produced resources? (YES/NO)
37. If the answer to question 36 is NO, why is it not done?
38. In the past five years, have had problems in carrying out
your activities which were caused by shortage in imported 
resources? Which areas were hard hit?
39. If the answer to question 38 is YES, did it influence your 
estimates? Explain how they were affected.
40. Given the current economic problems which limit financial 
resources flowing to the government, what specific measures 
have you taken/do you contemplate to take to reduce 
spending.
41. How long does it take to prepare the estimates? Explain.
42. Do you prepare your estimates on a standard form? (YES/NO)
43. If answer to question 42 is YES, is the form useful?
(Kindly provide a copy of the form)
44. Do your estimates get to the higher reviewing authority in 
time? (YES/NO)
45. What happens if the estimates are submitted late?
46. Are the estimates you submit to the reviewing authority 
discussed with you. (YES/NO)
47. Are the estimates returned to you for revision from 
reviewing office? Explain.
APPENDIX 14(b).
QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE REVIEW OF CURRENT EXPENDITURE TO BE COMPLETED
BY MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND OTHER MINISTRIES/REGIONS ON SELECTIVE 
BASIS.
1. What is the period set for submission of the estimates to you?
2. From which specific offices do you receive the estimates?
3. Are the estimates normally submitted in time?
4. If they are submitted late, how do you handle the situation?
5. In respect of the estimate you receive:
5.1 Are there clear instructions or guidelines for carrying out the 
review?
5.2 Do you relate some of the estimates to particular social and 
economic indicators?
(How does the budget link itself to the economic performance).
5.3 What criteria is used to determine priority for allocation of 
resources among sectors, regions or departments?
5.4 To what extent does political decisions influence directly the 
allocation of resources eg. in the treatment of sectors, 
regions, departments etc.?
5.5 Can you cite some examples of the quantitative and qualitative 
factors used in the allocation process and the expenditure type 
to which they are applied?
5.6 Are the factors in 5.5 a part of the guidelines?
6. Has it been practical to have financial performance reports of
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prior year and for the half year of current period of all spending 
agencies ready at time of review of next period’s estimates?
7. How do you ascertain that the estimates presented for review are 
reliable, that they have not been unduly overstated or understated?
8. If the estimates submitted are considered to be either overstated 
or understated, what specific steps do you take to have them 
adjusted?
9. Where a spending agency is required to seek approval for inclusion 
of certain expenditure from another specialist agency (say,
Ministry of Manpower Development and Administration for office 
equipment), how does the reviewer check such information during 
the review?
10.How does the ministry/region take into account the Controller and 
Auditor General’s reports in deciding on what to allocate to 
implicated ministries/regions and departments?
11. In view of the foreign exchange problems which limit the 
importation of goods and services, how does it influence the review 
of expenditure?
12.Does the Ministry order the other ministries/departments/regions to 
break down their estimates into local and foreign goods/services 
(resources) components?
13.If answer to question 10 is NO, why has it not been done?
14.What parties (offices) are involved in the discussion during the 
review?
15.What are the parties in answer to question 14 expected to 
contribute?
16.How many weeks does the Ministry have for reviewing the estimates?
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17.Is the time indicated in question 16 adequate for the purpose of a 
thorough review of the estimates?
18.After the review of the estimates, to which other higher authority 
do you submit them?
19.What does the authority mentioned in question 18 do with the 
estimates?
20.Are you involved in the discussions at the higher level?
21. Are the estimates returned to you for further adjustments?
22.After the budget has been approved by the Parliament, does the 
ministry/region carry out further review during the year?
23.To what extent do the reviews consider the reports prepared by the 
spending agencies?
24.In the past fiscal year (1983/84), how many supplementary reviews 
were held?
25.How the agencies involved affected by such supplementary reviews 
ie. are their bydgets adjusted?
26.In the past 10 years, has there been any fiscal period when the 
whole recurrent expenditure budget was revised and major 
adjustments made to spending agencies* allocations (Provide 
details).
27.Does the ministry/region/department keep an update record of funds 
reverted to the Treasury which could not be spent due to lack of 
foreign exchange to import inputs?
28.How does the staffing in the reviewing division constrain the 
reviewing process?
Kindly provide data on the following:
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staff establishment (approved) 




QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DEVELOFMENT BUDGET TO BE COMPLETED BY DEVPLAN 
AND OTHER MINISTRIES.
1. At what time (month) are the development estimates presented to 
you?
2. From which specific offices do you receive the estimates?
3. Is there a specific office in the Ministry designated with the 
task of handling development budget?
4. Are there specific instructions or guidelines which have to be 
followed in the preparation of the budget? (Kindly provide a 
copy).
5. Are those submitting the projected development programmes issued 
with guidelines which they should abide by in preparing their 
projections?
6. Does the Ministry ask for the programme requests to be prepared on 
standard forms? (YES/NO)
7. If answer to question 6 is YES, what special purpose do such forms 
serve?
8. How do you evaluate the requests for their reliability?
9. How do you decide on priorities between ministerial and regional 
demands
10. How do you assess the realness of the projects, their feasibility 
etc.?
11. Do projects presented give a full picture of the total initial 
investment costs and the period over which they would be incurred?
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12. To which economic indicators (or measures) is the component and 
total development expenditure related to ensure optimal resource 
allocation?
13. In evaluating the projects, do you consider the consequential 
recurrent costs ? (YES/NO)
14. If answer to question 13 is YES, answer the following questions.
14.1 Are those presenting the requests obliged to present a 
forecasts of future recurrent costs?
14.2 Does the ministry have special indicators (formula, ratios, 
indices etc.) for determining the expected future recurrent 
costs for a particular type of an investment?
14.3 What is the period for which the recurrent costs are 
projected?
14.4 Does the ministry consider the local and foreign financial 
resource components of such future costs? (YES/NO)
14.5 If answer to 14.4 is YES, how does such classification of the 
recurrent costs affect decisions on projects evaluated?
14.6 If answer to 14.4 is NO, are there any reasons for not doing 
so?
FINANCING OF DEVELOFMENT PROJECTS
15. Does the ministry seek any assurance about financing of the 
project before its approval? (YES/NO)
16. If answer to 15 is NO, why is it not done?
17. If answer to 15 is YES, then answer the following questions:
17.1 As far as the local costs are concerned, does the ministry
get an assurance of getting the funds from the Treasury?
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(c). The project requester
(d). All
17.3 Does the soliciting take place before or after the approval 
of the project?
17.4 Does the ministry demand to have certain minimum information 
about the foreign funds before it approves the projects? 
(YES/NO). What is that information?
18. In view of the current foreign exchange problems, does the 
ministry persuade the solicitors of foreign funds to impress upon 
the potential donors to consider supplying funds for recurrent 
costs of the project? (Explain)
19. What is the assessment of the ministry on the supply of foreign 
funds for projects in the past 10 years?
GENERAL
20. Does the ministry consider the direct revenue potential of the 
project which could be used to defray some of the recurrent costs? 
(YES/NO)
21. If the answer to 20 is YES, how does the ministry ensure that when 
the project is in operation such revenues will be collected?
22. If answer to 20 is NO, why is it not done?
23. What is the ministry’s frequency of reviewing projects approved 
for implementation in the current and past fiscal periods?
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24. Which department is responsible for handling the projects?
25. Are there reports prepared by this department to indicate problems 
which they encounter?
26. How does the ministry react (ie. specific action taken ) to poor 
performance in implementation?
27. Are there manpower constraints in such department?
28. At what time does the reviewing of the projects end?
29. To which other higher authority are the evaluated projects given 
for further consideration?
30. What supporting information is forwarded with the shortlisted 
projects to the higher authority?
31. During the review of proposed projects, how is the issue of: high 
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